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# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

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NUMBER I

## PERMANENCE OF THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

JAMES HARRINGTON BOYD

Toledo, Ohio

### ABSTRACT

Causes of political decay—Imperial Roman System: representative despotism; concentration of offices, privileges classes driven into orgies of private luxury; conciliation of poor by free gifts of corn and public games; the worship of the emperors as divinities and sacred character of their images; destruction of liberty and of opportunities. Degradation of slavery: slaves replaced the home stock of the best men who went to the provinces as soldiers and to engage in trade; agriculture became extinct; the race of free presents became extinct; all liberty bartered for free corn; self-respect of the Roman citizen destroyed.

Gladiatorial shows and dethronement of pity: brutal amusements; Roman populace and social elect amused by shows of gladiators, slaves, criminals, and wild beasts by the thousands fighting to the death; re-enthronement of pity by Christianity; the failure of the eighty-four years of good government of Trajan, Hadrian, Antonius, and Marcus to save the Empire. Conditions affecting social and moral conditions of society: improvements in the development of machinery and industrial processes; development of principles of justice due to changes taking place in the adjustment of social and political organizations to fit new conditions. Economic conditions controlled by sources of wealth: lands, timber, minerals, and water power; changes in economic and social relations due to applications of inventions and discoveries of science; rapid concentration of population in large industrial centers; 70 per cent of the population now industrialized; the rapid concentration of wealth into the control of the few and great increase in the population of eleemosynary institutions and of the vespicious classes.

How promote justice, liberty, and the efficiency and welfare of the citizens of the state?—The socialization of justice—works of Frederick Car von Saigny, Bernard Windschied, and Rudolph von Jhering; state eleemosynary institutions; state elementary public school systems; workmen's compensation acts providing compensation for injuries, sickness, old age, and out-of-work pensions, regulations of hours and conditions of employment of men, women, and children. The elimination of friction and economic waste arising between employees and employers in collective bargaining; creation of state and federal commissions to regulate state and interstate commerce and to protect the general public welfare. Economic considerations: the growth of

population; sources of wealth; land deterioration; consumption of coal and iron. Means for preventing political decay: provisions of the Code Napoleon, preservation of liberty and opportunity to earn a living for every citizen; conservation of minerals, soil, and all of our national resources; and the provision of national schemes for encouraging universal thrift; industrial efficiency; the conservation of the family; the nationalization of a vocational educational system; the elimination of political waste; the promotion of justice; universal and compulsory military and naval service with adequate equipment.

## I

It is an outstanding fact of history that all of the civilizations of the Old World have followed the same cycle of development—Babylonian, Persian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and Spanish. Each in its turn became conqueror of the then known commercial world in its lust for silver, gold, lands, and commercial and political world power. Each made advances over its predecessors in learning, art, science, law, accumulations of wealth, and the control of the world's commerce and political supremacy. Each surpassed its predecessors in magnificent displays of wealth, in the national follies of its peoples, and the deep depravity and moral debasement of its ruling classes. Each fell from the supreme height of power.

What are the governmental practices which a nation must adopt and exercise in order to perpetuate a high standard of civilization? Can they be determined from the past history of the races and their accomplishments?

## II

*What are the most destructive germs which cause political decay, and which have been fatal to the nations that have gained and lost the power to rule the world?*

The germs which cause political decay may be discovered from the history of the rise and fall of many nations, for example, that of the Romans.

Following the reign of Augustus, there were three great causes which impeded a sound political, social, and economic development of the people—the Imperial Roman System, the Institution of Slavery, and the Gladiatorial Shows. Each of these exerted an influence of the widest and most pernicious character on the morals and economic conditions of the people.

## I. THE IMPERIAL ROMAN SYSTEM

The theory of the Roman Empire was that of a representative despotism. The various offices of the republic were gradually concentrated in a single man. The privileged classes were gradually depressed, ruined, or driven by the dangers of public life into orgies of private luxury. The poor were conciliated, not by any increase of liberty, opportunity, or even of permanent prosperity, but by free distribution of corn and by public games, while the emperors undertook to invest themselves with a sacred character through religious devices, which established the worship of themselves as gods and divinities. We recall how Tiberius deprived the Asiatic town of Cyzicus of its freedom, chiefly because it had neglected the worship of Augustus. The images of the emperors were invested with a sacred character. They were the recognized refuge of the slave of the oppressed, and the smallest disrespect to them was punished as a heinous crime. A woman was executed for undressing before the statue of Domitian.

Liberty is always favorable to morals, for the most effective method that has been devised for diverting men from vice is to give free scope to greater opportunities and higher ambitions. This scope was absolutely wanting in the Roman Empire.

## 2. DEGRADATION OF SLAVERY AND THE DECAY OF AGRICULTURE

As the Roman conquests proceeded Rome was filled with slaves while the home stock of the best men were sent out as soldiers to conquer new provinces. To these also flocked the most enterprising youth of the rural parts of Italy, because there he could grow richer faster than at home. When he became rich he returned home and lived on an estate surrounded by slaves. The poor citizen found almost all the spheres in which an honorable livelihood might be obtained wholly, or in a very great degree, occupied by slaves, while he had learned to regard trade with an invincible repugnance. Every rich man was surrounded by a train of dependents who lived largely at his expense. The mass of the people were supported in absolute idleness by corn which was given without regard to desert and was received as a right.

• Under these influences the population dwindled. Agriculture and every productive enterprise became almost extinct. The slave population was a hot bed of vice and corrupted all with which it came in contact. In the Empire all liberty was cheerfully bartered for games and corn, and the worst tyrant could by these means buy popularity. The race of free peasants in Italy entirely disappeared. Thus the Italians had become absolutely unaccustomed to real war and had acquired habits that were beyond all others most incompatible with military discipline, while many of the barbarians who menaced and at last subverted the Empire had been actually trained by Roman generals.

The effect of such moral and political degradation upon a people was such that in the time of the Republic, when Marcus threw open the houses of those whom he had proscribed to be plundered, the people, by a noble abstinence, rebuked the act, for no Roman could be found to avail himself of the permission. But in the Empire, when the armies of Vitellius and Vespasian were disputing the possession of Rome, the degenerate Romans gathered with delight to the spectacle as to a gladiatorial show, plundered the deserted houses, encouraged either army, dragged out the fugitives to be slain, and converted into a festival the calamity of their country.

The existence in modern Europe of many distinct nations of the same level of civilization, but with different forms of government and conditions of national life, has secured the permanence of some measure of patriotism and liberty. If these perish in one nation they survive in another, and each people affects those about it by its rivalry or example. But the Roman Empire, which comprised the entire civilized globe, could know nothing of such political interaction. The life of the Roman provinces was even more corrupt than that of Rome itself, and could not therefore rekindle political life in the center.

### 3. GLADIATORIAL SHOWS AND DETHRONEMENT OF PITY

Finally the business and political system of the Roman Empire inevitably led to general depravity and to the most brutalizing amusements. Nero and the other emperors amused the populace

for many days at a time by shows in the vast amphitheaters where gladiators, slaves, criminals, captives, and all varieties of wild beasts by the thousands fought to the death for the amusement of the Roman populace and the political and social elect. These shows were only brought to an end by the re-enthronement of pity by Christianity.

The foundations of the Roman Empire were so worm-eaten by the time of Vespasian that it was beyond repair. He passed laws to reform and suppress the extravagance of the aristocracy. The continuous period of eighty-four years during which the emperors Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus, and Marcus Aurelius ruled, exhibits a uniformity of good government which no other despotic monarchy has equaled. Yet, these noble rulers were unable to prevent the decay of the Roman Empire. The germs fatal to the vitals of the state had done their work. The good doctors came too late, the state's vital organs had been destroyed and could not be restored.

### III

#### CONDITIONS AFFECTING SOCIAL AND MORAL CONDITIONS OF SOCIETY

Just as there has been progress in the improvement of machinery used on the farm, in printing newspapers, in weaving cloth, in popping corn, in hoisting machinery, railroad engines, machines for drilling holes in iron and making paper envelopes faster than any school boy can count them, and the rapid firing machine gun and cannon, and thousands of other kinds of machines, so has there been progress in the development of the principles of justice, and for the same reason due to economic conditions and the constant changes taking place in the adjustment of social and political organization to fit the new conditions. Economic conditions are in the first place controlled and largely determined by the existence of the sources of wealth, rich lands, timber, minerals, coal, iron, lead, zinc, copper, silver and gold, and the constant changes in economic and social relations, are brought about by the many inventions of improved practical applications of discoveries of science, which improve and cheapen the old and add new processes for the conversion of raw materials into wealth and useful commodities. Thus

the force of electricity is now used in the different forms of light, heat, and power.

As a consequence of these developments, industrial cities have grown rapidly by drawing their populations from the farms and foreign countries. So that America and the world during the last fifty years have grown more in their industrial development and accumulations and concentration of vast wealth than they did during the two thousand years preceding.

Today there are employed 5,000, 10,000, 25,000 persons in one factory, and even 200,000 by one employer. One machine running automatically for months without stopping, attended by a dozen men, will produce 80,000 pint bottles in one day of twenty-four hours at a cost of less than 8 cents per gross, the labor for which formerly cost \$1.35. Wages have risen, rents have increased, cost of living doubled within a few years. Seventy per cent of the population of the United States lives in towns and cities, and 30 per cent on the farms. Fifty years ago these figures were reversed. Then divorces were not as frequent. Now in some states there are one-third as many divorces granted in one year as there are marriage licenses issued. Organizations of white slavery have become so powerful that they can only with difficulty be controlled by the federal government. The middle and wealthy class rear now less than half as many children per family as they did at the close of the Civil War. The red-light districts have grown enormously.

The social evil has spread to thousands of rooming houses and apartments in every large city. The per capita wealth of the United States one hundred years ago was \$300. Today it is \$2,000. Yet 60 per cent of the 20,000,000 families in the United States own on the average less than \$500 worth of property (1910 census).

The population of asylums for the insane, of jails, penitentiaries, reform schools, children's homes, humane societies, and summer resorts for the wealthy, is increasing more rapidly in the United States than the population of the states! The expenditures of public funds by our cities, and that of public and private funds on charities is increasing more rapidly than their population. The problem of the statesman is not to shield or to apologize for the

depraved and bad moral conditions of society or the dishonest and incompetent political administrations of departments of the government, but to point out what the resultant of the forces, moral, political, and economic, are, whether it tends to promote justice, liberty, and the efficiency of the citizens of the state or not. If the resultant of these forces does not so tend, then he can only appeal to the inner conscience of the public with suggestions for the correction of their evil tendencies. Such a process must be continuous and must be appreciated by the citizens of the state. No state can survive without it. The statesman must be able to provide that system of justice, such that no citizen can profit unjustly at the expense or injury of another, and provide that system of education for all of the citizens which is in keeping with the requirements of the social, political, and economic conditions of the times. What ways and means shall the state provide in order that these requirements at all times shall be fulfilled?

#### IV

How have the changes and progress in the development of principles of justice, social relations, and economic efficiency been affected by our industrial progress?

##### I. SOCIALIZATION OF JUSTICE

Frederick Carl von Savigny (1817-92), who was head of the Department of Justice of Prussia under King Frederick William IV, discovered that the principles of justice have an organic growth as a living thing, evolving with the evolutions of races and kingdoms and tongues. He was the master-mind of the Historical School of the Law. He was a bitter enemy of enactment of laws by legislatures and congresses, representatives of the people.

The second most eminent master-student associated with the development of principles of justice, Bernard Windschied (1817-92), taught that all law flowed from the will of the sovereign, that legal rights were created by the adoption of ways and means, for the protection of the will of the sovereign. In other words, that it was the divine right of the ruler or sovereign to declare what the law is or should be.



• With the appearance of Rudolph von Jhering (1818-92), the most profound student of the law the world had ever known, came new conceptions of the law—the change from the individual to the social emphasis. That is, instead of its being left to some individual king, sovereign, or individual to say what the law is or ought to be, that principles of justice are to be determined by the social needs of the citizens of the state, that all rights are legally protected interests, and that when the state by its legislatures or congresses determines what interests it will protect, the state sets forth the purposes of the law. This opens the way for the socialization of the law. *That is, to establish that system of principles of justice that will be to the best interests of the greatest number of the citizens of the state without regard to their social position or how rich they may be.*

Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century there were evolved out of the birth, growth, commercial domination, and perishing of world powers, two fundamental principles of the socialization of the law, viz., the providing of eleemosynary institutions, such as state asylums for the insane, reformatory schools for boys and girls, and dependent and orphan children's homes, and also elementary public school systems by the state, which are sustained by general public funds of the state without regard to whether or not those who are benefited by them are able to pay anything toward their support, or on the ground that they are necessary for the promotion of the health, morals, and public welfare of the people at large.

During the last fifty years, the period during which America and the world have been industrialized, the dominant phases of the development of American jurisprudence are those exhibited by the socialization of the law, on the one hand, along the lines of social insurance laws, workmen's compensation acts which provide compensation for injuries, sickness, and old-age pensions, which are based upon the public purpose involved in providing for the laboring classes a normal physical existence for the whole life, consistent with a wholesome moral and social welfare, and in the regulation of hours and conditions of employment of men and women, prohibiting the employment of children under a certain

age, the fixing of a minimum wage, public health and morals; on the other hand, in providing such remedies by legislative action as eliminate the friction and economic waste arising out of conflicts between groups of employees and their employers over wages and conditions of employment.

The former class of legislation has no longer any opposition on principle. It is conceded that an individual who is one of many thousands of employees of an employer is no longer able to contract on equal terms with his employer respecting wages and conditions of employment under modern industrial conditions. Moreover, all the efforts of small and large groups of working people, to protect themselves by mutual insurance associations of their own against sickness, accidents, invalidity, old age, and out-of-work, have failed in their purposes.

In regard to the second class of legislation mentioned above, to eliminate friction and violence between workmen and their employers, and the waste that results from them, when they have failed in collective bargaining respecting a just wage and rational working conditions, which are brought about by strikes, lockouts, picketing and boycotting, has not been completely solved.

The terrible financial losses and personal violence which have accompanied such strikes and lockouts have led to the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, and the like quasi-compulsory government boards of arbitration of labor disputes. In the event of the failure of the four American railway organizations to obtain concessions which they demanded of the railways, they proposed to strike, threatening to paralyze the entire transportation system of 100,000,000 people. Congress passed "An Act to Establish an Eight Hour Day for Employees of Carriers Engaged in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and for Other Purposes."

The Adamson Law, just cited, provides for an increase of wages and a standard eight-hour day, and a commission to investigate wages, hours of labor, and working conditions of employees of carriers engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. The Supreme Court of the United States has sustained the Adamson Act. It naturally will be replaced by an act that will create a court vested with the authority to adjudicate all disputes between such employees

and employers when they have failed to adjust them by collective bargaining.

The socialization of the law is going on through the enactment of laws by the states and the Congress of the United States. The laws reflect the development of legal principles in keeping with the industrial and economic development of our country. Thus fire insurance companies are taxed to support injured firemen; grain elevators are not allowed to charge more than a certain sum for storing grain; dogs are taxed to pay for sheep injured by them; coal and other mines are taxed to pay for their inspection to secure the safety of the miners; smelters and deep mines are prohibited from employing men more than eight hours; oil and gas companies are regulated to prevent waste; forty-six states have compensation acts to protect workmen against injuries. The United States passed laws which provide for safety appliances on railroad cars; prohibit the employment of children under a certain age, and the transportation of adulterated goods and drugs; require the inspection of meats and live stock. It has created many commissions, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Trades Commission, Tariff Commission, the Export Board, Shipping Board, and many other similar commissions. Every year the legislatures of the states of America enact thousands of laws, all of which are aimed at the correction of real or supposed social and economic evils, which show the efforts on the part of the people to bring their governments into line with their conception of a free state under modern industrial conditions.

The rights of a citizen are his legally protected interests. When the state selects the interests which it regards most worthy of protection, it determines the purposes for which the laws are enacted and the rights created. The interests protected are those that arise out of the ways of living developed by people living in groups and states. The first task of primitive man was to live. He sought to do those things which were pleasurable, and to avoid those things which were painful. Thus he adopted those ways of doing things which were expedient, and living in groups, there resulted through experience, an agreement to do that which was most expedient. These interests are those relations and social conditions

thus determined by the group or state to be the most desirable and valuable to the entire group or state, and it is for that reason that they are maintained and protected by the state.

## 2. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATION—NEED FOR CONSERVATION OF SOURCES OF WEALTH

### A LOOK AHEAD

Let us take a look, say of twenty, thirty years ahead and see what will then be our condition. The main elements of this problem are three: What will our population then be? What will be our actual and possible resources and possibilities of productive application of one to the other? According to the most careful observers, the population of the United States in 1950 will be more than 200,000,000. Where are these people to be employed and how supported?

We cannot adapt conditions to the future by restricting the growth of population. The natural increase by birth will continue. We cannot, did we wish it, interfere with immigration movement, except perhaps to enforce a more careful scrutiny of the moral and industrial fitness of these newcomers. Notwithstanding the addition of more than a million people a year from abroad, most of whom are men and women who must work for a living, labor outside of the cities was never as scarce, or wages as high as at the present time. The new immigrants remain in the great cities and add to the difficulties attending employment.

### FOUR SOURCES OF WEALTH

Omitting the elements of the atmosphere, which contribute indirectly to the national economy, there are just four sources from which mankind must draw all natural wealth, viz., the sea, forests, soil, and mines. Of these the sea supplies only 2 or 3 per cent of man's food. It cannot be made much more productive, and therefore is dropped from the calculation. The forest is valuable for shelter, not for food, and as an aid in production of wealth. The forest, once a rich heritage, is rapidly disappearing. Within twenty years, perhaps, we shall have nowhere east of the Rocky Mountains a timber product worth recording, and shall then be

compelled to begin in earnest the slow process of reforestation. What we have already done with our forests we are doing just as successfully with our soils and mines.

#### LAND DETERIORATION

A very large per cent of the life-sustaining power of the soil, notably of the southern and eastern and New England states, has been wasted. Wasted in two ways: First, by physical destruction, through the carrying away of the earth to the sea; and second, chemically by the withdrawal of the elements required by plant life. The sterility of the soil in the older, which are also the more hilly, portions of the cultivated country, is accounted for by the former cause. It may be checked or easily prevented. Professor Shailer says that a field lying at an angle of twenty degrees can be totally destroyed in a hundred plowings. This process of denudation of the soil has proceeded far in the South and is going on rapidly. Shailer estimates that in Kentucky one-tenth of the arable soil has thus been destroyed, much of which cannot be restored by any application of industry and care.

The second cause of waste of the soil, more serious and even more general and speedy, is the deliberate soil exhaustion. New England once supported a population of farmers, but today agriculture as an independent industry, able in itself to maintain a community, does not exist in the hilly parts of that part of the United States. During the last twenty years the average yield per acre of wheat in the United States has been from 12 to 15 bushels per acre. The agricultural lands of Great Britain, France, and Germany, which have been farmed for more than a thousand years, produce on the average from 30 to 33 bushels of wheat per acre, and other cereals in proportion. Japan supports its 45,000,000 people—30,000,000 of whom are farmers—by a cultivated area of but 19,000 square miles. France at the time the world's war began drew five times as much wealth from the soil as she did a century ago. Before the world's war began almost all of France's national debt of \$6,000,000,000 was held at home, and her holdings of foreign securities was about \$15,000,000,000.

Thus, by the adoption of the proper methods of cultivation of the soil, such as prevail in France and Germany, the annual pro-

duction of farm products of the United States could be increased from the minimum yield of \$5,000,000,000 before the war to \$15,000,000,000 or \$20,000,000,000.

#### COAL AND IRON

The two great sources of wealth that are indispensable to the comfort and growth of a people are coal and iron. When a pound of either has been used it can never be replaced. The annual production of coal in 1895 was 193,000,000 tons. In 1905 it was 393,000,000 tons. In 1915 it rose to 531,619,000 net tons, and in 1918 it rose to 678,212,000 net tons. Thus during the period of twenty-three years the consumption of coal increased 251 per cent! No account was taken of the vast consumption of natural gas and petroleum for fuel purposes. In 1950 our population will be more than 200,000,000. At that time the best authorities say that the areas of hard coal will be exhausted and a double demand will then be made upon the soft coal. Formerly much wood was used for fuel, but now scarcely any is. At that time our best and most convenient coal will have been so far consumed that the remainder can only be applied to present uses at an advanced cost, which would compel the entire rearrangement of industries, revolutionizing the common lot and common life.

#### IRON GOING FAST

In 1870 we produced 3,000,000 tons of iron ore. Every ten years to 1890 it increased 150 per cent. In 1895 our production was 16,000,000 tons. For the years 1902 and 1903 it was 35,000,000. It rose in 1905 to 42,000,000 tons, and again in 1915 to 55,526,000, and in 1916 it became 75,168,000 tons! The increase in consumption of iron during the twenty years, 1895-1915, was nearly 400 per cent.

All of the ore deposits of national importance have been known for twenty years. There is no substitute for iron whose production and preparation for its main practical uses is not far more expensive. By tariff and otherwise, every effort has been made to stimulate its consumption. Not merely our manufacturing industries, but our whole complex industrial life, so intimately built upon cheap iron and coal will feel the strain and must suffer realignment. The

peril is not one of remote time but of this generation. Their exhaustion in central Europe is one of the great factors among the causes of the world's war. Where is there a sign of preparation for it?

During the period, 1545-1624, the Portuguese took from Japan 60,000,000 pounds sterling of gold and silver. From 1611 to 1710 the Dutch imported from Japan 43,000,000 pounds sterling of gold and silver, or in all, Europe obtained from 1545 to 1710, \$515,000,000 gold and silver. Very little was obtained thereafter, owing to the sound financial policy of the Minister of Finance introduced in 1710, which you may learn from the following:

A thousand years ago gold and silver and copper were unknown in Japan, yet there was no lack of necessities. The earth was fertile, and this produced the best sort of wealth. Gangin was the first prince who caused the mines to be diligently worked, and during his reign so great a quantity of gold and silver was extracted from them as no one could have formed any conception of, and since these metals resemble the bones of the human body, inasmuch as what is once extracted from the earth is not reproduced, if the mines continue to be thus wrought, in less than a thousand years they will be exhausted.

Since these metals were discovered the heart of man has become more and more depraved. With the exception of medicines (European drugs), we can dispense with everything that is brought to us from abroad. The stuffs (cloths) and other articles are of no real benefit to us. If we squander our treasures in exchange for them, what shall we subsist upon? Let the successors of Gangin reflect upon this matter, and the wealth of Japan will last as long as the heavens and the earth.

Through a bloody war of thirteen years the Spaniards were expelled from Japan in 1625. The principal reasons which prevented the Spaniards from enslaving the Japanese were two: The Japanese had the knowledge of the use of steel weapons, armor and horses, but no firearms; and primarily the Mexicans believed in a Messiah, and when Cortez craftily announced himself as the emissary of this heavenly personage, Montezuma was credulous enough to believe, to yield to him possession of his person, and to advise his people to surrender themselves to the stranger. The Japanese, being Buddhists, looked for no Messiah, and in the self-reliance of an ancient creed, regarded the strangers more with disdain than fear. They regarded the strangers as barbarians, who were shrewd traders, but held no reverence for them.

Shall America, Russia, their Allies, and the Neutrals, be duped by the Teuton propaganda of Pan-Germanism in the same fashion as were the Mexicans, South Americans, the West and East Indies, by the Spanish conquerors?

If we were today only as wise as the Japanese Prime Minister was in 1710, then our statesmen would adopt his policy and not export in the future a pound of the product of our mines, excepting in emergencies such as the world's war, but limit the exports of the United States to the products of the soil and things produced therefrom, for not a pound of coal, or of any mineral once removed from the mines, can ever be replaced. But the products of the soil can by skilful cultivation be steadily increased and the soil be kept in as good condition, and in most parts of the country in better condition, than it now is. The high way to success of the American in the future must be fashioned from the common clod under his feet. He must cease to stimulate his industries and exert himself in the improvement of the production of the products of the farms.

## V

*What are the means, if any, for destroying or preventing the development of the germs which cause political decay, and which have been fatal to civilizations and their governmental organizations in the past, which America must recognize in order to prevent the decay of our government and its institutions, and make them the easy prey of internal and external enemies?*

The French, through the instrumentality of Napoleon, conquered almost the whole of Europe and ruled and governed it for a decade of years. Yet the defeat of Napoleon and the passing of the French dominion over the countries which he had conquered did not result in the extinction of the French civilization nor in a great moral degradation of her people. This is proved by the successes of the French nation in the world's war. The French nation in proportion to its population is the equal, if not the superior, of any of the belligerent nations in the great national virtues, courage, self-denial, morals, thrift, national organization, and intellectual gifts of the highest order.

That the French nation has not gone the way of earlier world conquerors is, we think, due to the socializing principles of justice



found in the Code Napoleon and its development, the abolition of hereditary aristocracy and primogenitureship, the limitation of testamentary disposition of property, the introduction of uniform legal procedure in the administration of the law by the courts, the nationalization of educational institutions and elementary schools, the introduction of vocational educational training, social insurance for the working classes, and the establishment of many devices for the encouragement of efficiency and economic thrift of the common people. The war has not redeemed France, as some are wont to say. It has merely revealed France—that France whose national life has been developed under the democratization of its institutions, the foundation of which was the Code Napoleon.

The illustration and analysis given shows that the minimum requirements for the prevention of political decay of modern governments and their institutions are three:

1. The preservation of liberty and opportunity to earn a living for every citizen, and the conservation of minerals, soil, forests, and all of our national resources, and the provision of national schemes for encouraging universal thrift.

2. Industrial efficiency, the conservation of the family, and the nationalization of a vocational educational system.

3. The elimination of political waste. Universal and compulsory military and naval service with adequate equipment. The promotion of justice.

All of these requirements are substantially provided for under the Napoleon Code, as developed during the last century. None of them in fact existed under the Roman imperial system of government, and that of the other world-powers which have perished. They all were present in the German imperial political system, in their highest perfection, excepting the provision for individual liberty. There, hereditary aristocracy, materialistic as well as social and political were dominant. Universal suffrage was a mere form. All of the political power of the national importance was centered in the German Emperor and those whom he personally selected, and they were responsible to no one but him. Thus he was able to plunge the entire world into the world's war.

The political organization of Great Britain provided for these requirements only in part. It still retains hereditary aristocracy,

and has not abolished primogenitureship. Nor has it established a national compulsory common school system with vocational training for the masses. It has also not conserved its supply of coal, nor divided up its landed estates for agricultural purposes. Hence, it has failed to create a source from which to draw men with the best brains properly skilled not only to direct its affairs of state, but also to direct its industrial activities most wisely. It failed to create a deep interest in the minds of the masses in the welfare of their own government. Not only have its statesmen failed during the last thirty years to cope with the efficiency of the organization of the German government, but also failed to successfully compete with the efficiency of the German industrial organization. The aristocratic breed of English statesmen disappeared during the first three years of the world's war from the management of their part in the same.

In the United States we fail to meet these requirements in many particulars. On the one hand, we have too much public and private charity, and on the other hand, we have too little protection of the workman and his family against the hazards of our industrial life. The workman's family lives under a constant dread of want on account of sickness, invalidity, old age, out-of-work, and the high cost of living. For decades our industries have been over-developed by artificial stimulation, at the expense of the neglect of the proper cultivation and conservation of our farms. The products of our mines and forests have been wasted. The efficiency of our industrial life has suffered greatly by the lack of universal vocational training in our common school system. The waste due to inefficient administration of our municipal, state, and federal governments is colossal. It alone would support the entire outlay of the cost of administration of the navies, armies, and governments of continental Europe at the beginning of the world's war (1914).

There is but one excuse for government, but one use for law—the preservation of liberty—to give to each man his own, to secure to the farmer what he produces from the soil, the mechanic what he invents and makes, to the artist what he creates, the thinker the right to express his thoughts. Liberty is the breadth of progress.

The chief problem of a government in its relation to the world's commerce is to maintain a high average efficiency of the productive

capacity of its citizens, and thereby to be able to take part in the world's business on equal terms with its competitors.

Unwise control of vast concentrations of wealth by the world-conquering powers wrecked their moral, economic, and political organizations. These destructive forces which arise from the uses to which vast concentrations of wealth are put, or the manner in which they are spent, whether in luxurious living, gambling, and corruption of politics, are independent of the manner in which they have been accumulated. All wealth represents so much work—human effort.

The economic return for the expenditure of money varies from pure waste, and in fact a destructive result, to 100 per cent or more return. If I expend \$5,000 in building apartments or a barn, useful to the community, I get a full return; if I spend the \$5,000 for digging useless holes in a field, I get no return for the money, but have done a damage. The reward to the laborer is as much in one case as in the other. A German community, the Dutch people, the French and Japanese, owing to their national traits of thrift, receive a very large percentage of a full economic return for their expenditures of wealth. In America it varies from a gross waste to a full return.

The world's war developed many improved methods of administration and introduced many new economies, both private and national in character, and has made long strides toward the establishment of the means to save us from the pending disaster, which destroyed the older powers who had conquered the world, by hastening the perfection of the minimum requirements stated above.

#### I. PRESERVATION OF THE LIBERTIES AND MATERIAL OPPORTUNITIES OF THE CITIZENS

The preservation of the liberties of the citizens is secured by the state and federal constitutions. The preservation of the opportunities of our citizens depends largely upon the conservation of and regulation of the use of the products of our forests, mines and soil, and the prevention of private monopolies and the granting of special privileges to the few, which are matters of efficient federal and state legislation.

2. INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY AND THE CONSERVATION OF THE  
FAMILY, AND NATIONALIZATION OF A VOCATIONAL  
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

There will be competition whether gas engine or electric motor is to be used, whether a local stream turbine plant is to be installed, or power brought from a long distance transmission system. But the decision will be made on the basis of the relative economy in each process.

Financial manipulation for the mere acquisition of more money, without regard to constructive economical organization, will necessarily be impossible. There must be an active co-operation between all producers, from the unskilled laborer to the master mind which directs a huge industrial organization. Such active co-operation presupposes that everybody feels personally interested in the industrial economy. This presupposes that the fear of unemployment, of sickness, and old age has been relegated to the relics of barbarism, and everybody is assured an appropriate living, is assured employment when able to work, and protected against want, maintained in his or her standard living when not able to work—not as a matter of charity, but as an obvious and self-evident duty of society toward the individual.

This can be accomplished as it has been done in other countries, by effective social legislation.

As a mainstay of support effecting all of these constructive measures, our common compulsory school system with advanced vocational training must be vastly improved and extended in its organization, and the thoroughness of its instruction which must be maintained in keeping with the requirements of our social, economic, and political development. This is necessary, not only to maintain industrial efficiency, but also is the best means for developing industrial and political leaders from the masses, and providing an intelligent population of voters to whom the national leaders can make appeals on national questions and have them receive intelligent consideration.

These fatal diseases can be determined with no great difficulty. It is a harder task to provide the ways and means to overcome them. These ways and means can be created through the existing

knowledge of the most efficient forms of organization of our industrial, social, and political institutions. We must provide new and exacting methods of economy, not only in conserving our timber, mines and soil, but also every human effort from that of the common laborer to the master mind which directs a large industrial organization. We must not only provide the man who works an opportunity to earn a living, but also to see to it that all who are able to work earn their own living, surrounded by incorruptible administration of just laws. He must be provided with an educational system in keeping with the social, industrial, and political conditions of the times.

3. THE ELIMINATION OF POLITICAL WASTE; UNIVERSAL AND COMPULSORY MILITARY AND NAVAL SERVICE WITH ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT; THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE

We must infuse into the administration of our municipal, state and federal governments, economies in expenses and amount of labor used, and place the ablest and best trained brains at the head of affairs.

These constitute our necessary efficient and potential resources. They can only be defended and preserved by a military organization and equipment, scientific, up to date, universal and on a scale commensurate with the resources of our country.

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## THE CONDITIONED RESPONSE AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF KIND

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### ABSTRACT

Giddings' concept of the consciousness of kind as the elemental aspect of human association is strengthened and clarified in the light of a recent development in psychology—the conditioned response. This latter, the transfer of associations and the conditioning of emotions, has been demonstrated by Pavlov's experiments with the salivary reflexes of dogs and John B. Watson's experiments with the emotional reactions of infants. This psychological mechanism clarifies many of the more obscure aspects of the Giddings concept, and in it one of the forces active in the determination of kind is discovered.

When Franklin H. Giddings published his *Principles of Sociology* in 1896, he gave to the literature of sociology one of the first comprehensive expositions of the subjective aspects of human association. In its objective phases, sociological writers had carried their study of group life far, but the basic principles underlying societal relations had by no means received adequate attention. The bond of unity underlying group cohesion had not been analyzed. Aristotle's dictum that man is a political animal was accepted axiomatically; and in a general way it was recognized that birds of a feather flock together. But the why of the matter had not been developed. It was to meet this need that Giddings formulated his consciousness of kind, which, as he conceived it, "is the original and elementary subjective fact in society."<sup>1</sup> Here, to him, is the point of departure for all interpretations of social life; and here, the distinguishing factor between what may rightly be called society and mere gregariousness.<sup>2</sup> A psychological foundation for social analysis was thus

<sup>1</sup> *The Principles of Sociology*, p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> *Principles*, p. 19; cf. *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, chap. xv, "Pluralistic Behavior," pp. 249-90. Here Giddings makes consciousness of kind a phase of a somewhat more general process, the like reaction to like stimulus. But in this reaction to like stimulus, the consciousness of kind is the elemental fact.

introduced with the publication of this work, and whatever may be the judgment concerning the superstructure of the system of sociology erected by Giddings, it must be agreed that in this psychological and subjective approach his contribution has greatly enriched the field of human knowledge.

Consciousness of kind, simply defined, is "a state of consciousness in which any being, whether high or low in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself."<sup>1</sup> This has been elaborated by Giddings at great length in his extended writing.<sup>2</sup> It is the purpose of the writers to examine most briefly those factors that determine what constitutes a *kind*, to regard them in the light of a recent development in modern psychology, and to suggest certain bearings of this latter upon Giddings' doctrine as originally formulated. In no way is this to be construed as invalidating the earlier analysis; it merely strengthens it by bringing into support of it recent facts of psychology, facts which were unknown at the end of the last century when the *Principles* was published.

It is clearly true that "our conduct towards those whom we feel to be most like ourselves is instinctively and rationally different from our conduct towards others whom we believe to be less like ourselves."<sup>3</sup> What, then, lies behind our beliefs as to whom we shall include in our kind? It is no simple matter to answer this. Giddings himself has clearly recognized the subtleties involved: ". . . consciousness of kind is an ever changing state of mind. It is not to be once and for all identified with the consciousness of species, or of race, or of class, or of similarity of moral nature, although at any given moment it may, in fact, be identical with any one of these."<sup>4</sup> In later works Giddings has sought out more definitely the elements of his principle: consciousness of kind is

<sup>1</sup> *Principles*, p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Elements of Sociology*, chap. v; and especially, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, where the doctrine has received its latest formulation and interpretation. Also *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, Part II, chap. iii., and *Inductive Sociology*, Part II.

<sup>3</sup> *Principles*, p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. xiv, Preface to 3d edition. Cf. "The Mind of the Many" in *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, pp. 154-74.



seen to be a compound of organic sympathy, perception of resemblance, conscious or reflective sympathy, affection, and the desire for recognition.<sup>1</sup> The perception of kind, without elaborating the above, is obviously based on two phases of recognition: (1) external, physical resemblances; (2) emotional, psychological resemblances.<sup>2</sup> The two, quite clearly, usually blend into each other.

Objectively kind is a matter of like physical appearance: a matter of race, size, color, stature, sex, age, etc., and these are fundamental, it would seem, in what Giddings calls organic sympathy.<sup>3</sup> The observer sees the physical appearances of another, and feels resemblance in his reaction to the other as stimulus, and according to the degree of resemblance to self, the matter of kind is determined. Fundamental in this, and underlying the reactions, is organic sympathy. This organic sympathy may be traced through the history of life from amoeba to man. To Giddings it is one of the great co-operating causes in the origin of species, and a chief factor in what he has called "anthropogenic association." Like reaction to like stimulus is to be understood in terms of it.<sup>4</sup>

Subjectively the problem is more difficult of analysis. Here kind rests on likemindedness, common interest, mutual desires, feelings, sentiments, and tastes.<sup>5</sup> This explains how diversified physical types may on occasion work harmoniously for a given end—and so far as the attainment of that end is concerned, constitute a kind. It also suggests that individuals who recognize others as their kind in one respect or interest may not consider them as of their kind when other interests are involved. The loyal democrat is one with a protectionist in some common religion, but when politics is concerned they are of different social groups (kinds): The black man and the white may be of the same kind politically in the South, but there the community ends. Thus it is clear that on the

<sup>1</sup> *Elements of Sociology*, p. 66; *Inductive Sociology*, p. 99; *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 165; *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, p. 289.

<sup>2</sup> *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 46 ff.; *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, Part II, chap. iii, pp. 275 ff.; *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 165.

<sup>3</sup> *Elements*, pp. 59-62; *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 46-55.

<sup>4</sup> *Principles*, Book III, chap. ii; *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 91-94.

<sup>5</sup> *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 91-100; *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, pp. 257-61.

subjective side the determination of the factors underlying the kind is not simple. And on this side kind itself is a varying concept. On the objective side the stability of kind is obviously greater. All of this the writers feel Giddings has implied, and in general would agree with. Which is more fundamental, the subjective or the objective phase, is not clear. In the long run are those we select as of our kind chosen because of physical resemblance, or on the basis of mental resemblance? Or both? To the writers it would seem that no hard-and-fast rule applies, but in a general way it appears that in selecting those with whom we would consort, a certain physical limit is set: white men do consort with white, blacks with blacks, yellow with yellow, etc. Types go with types. This, of course, in a general way.<sup>1</sup>

Leaving for the moment this altogether too brief statement of the factors entering into the determination of kind, consideration must be given to a psychological mechanism that throws further light upon, and refines, the foregoing analysis. We refer to the "conditioned response."

Pavlov's experiments with salivary reflexes of dogs are now generally familiar. How the sight of food causes the flow of gastric juices, and how the sounding of a bell simultaneously with the stimulation through the food soon builds up an association which makes for the flow of the juices when only the bell is sounded, is clear. It is also now evident that habit response in man may be similarly conditioned, and a response, originally excited by a single stimulus, may eventually be produced by a multiplicity of stimuli. The experiments of John B. Watson, especially, have demonstrated this.<sup>2</sup> He shows, for example, that originally the child gives a fear reaction to only two stimuli: a loud sound and a sudden release of support.<sup>3</sup> If a rat (which originally the child does not fear) is shown at the moment the sound is produced, and this repeated a few times, in due course the sight of the rat alone will bring the fear

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, "The Mind of the Many" and "Pluralistic Behavior." The importance of mental resemblance is stressed through all of Giddings' work. The real problem is to determine what underlies this mental resemblance.

<sup>2</sup> *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, pp. 28-38, 199-200.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

reactions. And more than that, the rat itself then becomes an object to which other objects may be conditioned to produce the fear reaction. In this manner, by compounding, conditioning, and reconditioning, the vast array of phobias that torments mankind is brought into existence. "In general, then, it seems safe to say that when an emotionally exciting object stimulates the subject simultaneously with one not emotionally exciting, the latter may in turn (often after one such joint stimulation) arouse the same emotional reaction as the former."<sup>1</sup> The mechanism seems clear, but may be further illustrated. A young man is jilted by a woman; toward her he feels the utmost hatred and contempt. This is, by association, extended to womankind in general, and a misogynist results. According to the Watson formulation, a child reared by a mechanical man would, because it satisfied the primal needs of life, have feelings resembling those of affection toward the automaton, and would extend these feelings to other mechanical men—and include them in its own kind. The man whose wife dies during an operation blames not only the doctor concerned, but conditions his hatred to all surgeons. A first-generation foreigner, with his mannerisms and uncouthness, displeases an individual of Puritan extraction: the displeasure is then transferred to the entire group of which the original foreigner is a member.<sup>2</sup>

The relation of this brief analysis to that with which this note began now becomes apparent. Kind itself, in addition to mere physical appearance, of mere likemindedness, may be, in many instances, in part at least, determined by this process of conditioned response.<sup>3</sup> The entire learning process is a function of this conditioning.<sup>4</sup> The concept of *kind* is consequently bound up in it. Some further examples will make this evident. The particular Jew whose bear-

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>2</sup> The entire process of "Americanization" is one of reconditioning. Clark Wissler, in *Man and Culture*, makes an interesting application of the conditioning process and shows how in the earliest years of life the individual has his responses conditioned to a given culture. This further clarifies the concept of *kind*. The Indian is made an Indian—of the Indian *kind*—because of his early surroundings. Cf. *Man and Culture*, Part III, chap. xii, especially pp. 253-65.

<sup>3</sup> Wissler, *op. cit.*, pp. 266 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. R. S. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 77-152; Robinson and Robinson, *Readings in General Psychology*, pp. 91-92; A. I. Gates, *Psychology for Students of Education*, pp. 207-376, for further applications of the conditioning process.

ing, mannerisms, and conduct excite a feeling of strangeness or repulsion is in part no doubt the cause of the ill feeling toward his race as a whole. The modern negro, his ancestors still fresh in memory as slaves and menials, is the victim, by association and conditioning, of the slave psychology. The foreigner with the name suffixed with a *ski*, regardless of rank or attainment, in the general mind is regarded with distrust, largely because his name is conditioned by the misgivings produced by some first-generation countryman whose conduct has not conformed to the mode of American behavior—whose reactions themselves are conditioned to an alien culture. And how many are the unfortunates who are social outcasts because, holding what to them seem sound doctrines, they, by conditioning, are linked with what the popular mind calls “Red” or Bolshevik?

Thus, while kind may be in part a function of physical appearance, while it may be a function of similarity of interests, feelings, and the like—still, by this process of reconditioning, even the person who bears characteristics of the self may yet, by a conditioned reaction, by means of which some trait or characteristic has been associated with some unpleasantness or idiosyncrasy, be conceived of not as of the kind, but as an outlander. The cultured, refined, blond, and regularly featured Jew or Jewess, even though once unknowingly accepted, is dropped, perhaps unconsciously, but generally nevertheless, from the Gentile's kind. The feeling against the more grating race-mate is carried over; the conditioned response has made former associates now of another kind, although in interests and appearance they are yet as one.

In summary, we may say that while all that Giddings has analyzed is true, there is this additional factor operating much of the time in determining the characteristics of the kind. Here we have one of the elements underlying the choice of kind-mates, and one of the important factors behind the “laws of social choice,” the determination of which, according to Giddings, is one of the sociologists' main quests.<sup>2</sup> The transfer of emotions and the

<sup>2</sup> *Principles*, pp. 76, 404 ff. Giddings himself appreciates thoroughly the importance of the conditioned response in human mental life, but he has not in his writing made the direct application of this mechanism to his own concept of consciousness of kind, as the writers have tried to do. Cf. *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 155.

## STATISTICS AND THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

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### ABSTRACT

From a survey of the comparative extent of social inadequacy among the various races and nationalities in the United States which Dr. H. H. Laughlin prepared for the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, he concluded that "the recent immigrants . . . present a higher percentage of inborn socially inadequate qualities than do the older stocks." An examination of his data and methods of analysis proves this conclusion to be unfounded. (1) His data are incomplete and statistically biased, as proved by the relatively large probable errors of the samples chosen. (2) The "quotas" for the various races and nationalities are derived without proper regard for the homogeneity of the facts compared. (3) The statistics disclose larger differential ratios between the older immigrant stocks and the natives than between the recent and older immigrant stocks. (4) Quotas for recent immigrant stocks are actually lower than the quotas for the older stocks, native and immigrant, in seven out of the nine inadequacies studied. (5) Finally, tests by the methods of correlation not only further prove the unreliability of Dr. Laughlin's data, they also remove any possible support for his assumption that social inadequacies are racially inborn values.

On November 21, 1922, Dr. Harry H. Laughlin, staff member of the Eugenics Record Office of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, D.C., and "expert eugenics agent" of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House of Representatives, appeared before that committee with the results of a study which he had made on the "individual physical, mental and moral quality, and more particularly the potentiality of the immigrant as a parent of desirable Americans of the future."<sup>1</sup>

As a basis for this study he had taken "the occurrence of the degree of specific degeneracy within the several nativity and racial groups of the United States" as revealed by an enumeration "of the inmates of the custodial institutions of the several states and of the Federal Government."<sup>2</sup> Ten such degeneracies, or "social inadequacies," were subjected to this analysis, as follows: (1) Feeble-mindedness; (2) insanity; (3) crime; (4) epilepsy; (5) inebriety (including drug habitués); (6) disease (including tuberculosis,

<sup>1</sup> Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives, 67th Congress, Third Session, November 21, 1922, p. 729. The Report, as Serial 7-C, was released by the Superintendent of Documents in July, 1923.

syphilis, leprosy, and other chronic infections and legally separable diseases); (7) blindness; (8) deafness; (9) deformity (including cripples and ruptured); and (10) dependents (including orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps and paupers).<sup>1</sup>

In this investigation Dr. Laughlin claims to have found "a measure of degeneracy which characterizes the several nativity groups of the United States."<sup>2</sup> "The differences in institutional ratios, by races and nativity groups, found by these studies," he asserts, "represent real differences in social values, which represent, in turn, real differences in inborn values of the family stocks from which the particular inmates have sprung. These degeneracies and hereditary handicaps are inherent in the blood."<sup>3</sup> He further asserts that "making all logical allowances for environmental conditions, which may be unfavorable to the immigrant, the recent immigrants, as a whole, present a higher percentage of inborn socially inadequate qualities than do the older stocks."<sup>4</sup> (5) It goes without saying, therefore, that not the adequacy of the individual, but that of his family, race, or nationality becomes the test of his admissibility into the United States.<sup>5</sup>

Now, these conclusions are of serious import not alone to the theoretical eugenicist and sociologist. They are of immediate and practical value to the statesman. It is upon such evidence, for instance, that rests the major part of the argument for changing the base year of our percentum immigration law from 1910 to 1890. Greater assurance of their validity might, therefore, be asked for than the mere testimony of the chairman of the committee that he had examined Dr. Laughlin's "data and charts" and had found them "both biologically and statistically thorough, and apparently sound."<sup>6</sup> In fact, even a casual perusal of the "Hearings" will raise several serious doubts. For instance, as a biologist, does Dr. Laughlin really care to go on record as claiming that deformity can be proven a race characteristic and racially heritable? Or that the state of being an orphan is hereditary?

<sup>1</sup> P. 730.

<sup>3</sup> P. 752.

<sup>5</sup> P. 748.

<sup>2</sup> P. 733.

<sup>4</sup> P. 755.

<sup>6</sup> P. 731. The chairman, Mr. Johnson, is president of the Eugenics Research Association.

But it is not necessary at this point to enter upon a detailed analysis of Dr. Laughlin's biological assumptions. Of these we will speak later. Here it should be noted that primarily Dr. Laughlin's is a statistical study. It is a study of "data and charts." And when examined in the light of elementary principles of statistics it is found that he had built upon three very doubtful premises; namely,

I. That an enumeration of these institutions, and particularly the enumeration as conducted by himself, sufficiently reveals the proportionate occurrence of these inadequacies among the various race and nativity groups.

II. That the data as gathered disclose significant differential occurrences among the various races and nationalities.

III. That the mere occurrence of an inadequacy within a group of individuals of a given race or nativity is a valid proof of the existence of susceptibilities toward the inadequacy as an inborn racial quality—Dr. Laughlin's fundamental biological assumption.

## I

A. Sufficient ground exists to doubt that "a statistical survey of the race or nationality . . . of the inmates of the custodial institutions of the several States and of the Federal Government" "most accurately and profitably" reveals the "occurrence of the degree of specific degeneracy within the several nativity and racial groups of the United States."<sup>1</sup> For instance, Dr. Laughlin himself admits "that only about 5 per cent of the feeble-minded persons needing custodial care are actually receiving it from their respective states. The rest remain in the care of their own families. . . ."<sup>2</sup> Obviously, those families which by virtue of their better economic status can take care of their feeble-minded at home will be most inadequately represented in the statistics of the institutions for the feeble-minded. Without seeking further proof, it may be confidently asserted that these would generally be the families of the older American and earlier immigrant stocks, who in the course of a longer sojourn in this country, have established themselves in economic competence. Conversely, poorer families, economically

<sup>1</sup> P. 730.

<sup>2</sup> P. 736.

speaking, will have relatively larger proportionate institutional representation. In general these are the families of our more recent immigrants.

That this would hold true with varying proportions in the case of most of the remaining inadequacies is a foregone conclusion. The more economically competent will take care of their own insane, their epileptics, their deaf, their blind, their deformed, their orphans etc., either within the family circle or in private sanatoria. On the other hand, the inadequates from among the foreign born and economically less able families will become inmates of our custodial institutions in apparently disproportionate numbers.

B. But besides this fundamental fallacy Dr. Laughlin further qualifies the soundness of his enumeration: (a) through an unrepresentative territorial selection of his data, and (b) through a misinterpretation of these data in terms of an arbitrarily determined "quota."

a) At the time of the survey,<sup>1</sup> in 1921, there were 657 state and federal custodial institutions in the continental United States. Dr. Laughlin's study is based on information received from only 445 of these. A complete statistical census of all the institutions taken in 1916 showed a total inmate population of 394,991. Dr. Laughlin's inventory of the 445 institutions in 1921 yielded only 210,835 inmates, or a little over 50 per cent of the 1916 figures. Now, for diagnostic purposes, this sample of 50 per cent of the cases is quite acceptable. But for a racial-nativity analysis a sample to be acceptable must first be statistically weighted in accordance with the racial heterogeneity of our states.

As is well known, our foreign-born population, especially the immigrants of the last thirty to forty years, are concentrated in our industrial states. The percentage of foreign born in the population of North Carolina, according to the census of 1920, was 0.3; of Rhode Island it was 28.7, to take the two extremes. Under the circumstances Dr. Laughlin's data should have been "corrected" for this selective factor in the enumeration, as well as for the age and sex distribution of each nativity group and for each of the various states. One or two examples will illustrate the point.

<sup>1</sup>P. 734.



In the first two columns of Table I, which follows, are arranged the forty-eight states and the District of Columbia in order of the per cent proportion of their foreign-born population as of 1920. In the last two columns are shown the states for which Dr. Laughlin failed to secure data for the feeble-minded and the insane. A comparison of the four columns readily discloses the fact that as many as sixteen of the twenty-four states lowest in percentage, but only eight of the twenty-four states highest in percentage of foreign-born were omitted in the enumeration of the feeble-minded, and that seven of the lowest twenty-four states, with 15,555 inmates, and five of the highest twenty-four, with only 3,094 inmates, were omitted in the enumeration of the insane. Not that these omissions were intentional. For, as noted above, not all the institutions circularized returned the desired information.<sup>1</sup> But the native proportions of the omitted feeble-minded of the sixteen states, and the native proportions of the omitted 15,555 insane of the seven states, if added to the inadequates credited by Dr. Laughlin to the "native" groups would appreciably decrease their relatively favorable standing.

To obviate this criticism Dr. Laughlin proposes to test the representativeness of his data by means of the "probable error."<sup>2</sup> The probable error is a mathematically determined quantity which indicates the limits within which a given statistical constant would fluctuate if more or larger samples of the groups of facts measured were taken. For instance, suppose we wished to determine the average height of a student body of an institution with an enrolment of 6,000. The statistician need not measure the height of every one of the 6,000 students. He would merely measure at random such student groups as the largest class in Freshman English, the largest class in Sophomore political science, the largest class in Junior economics, and the largest class in Senior social ethics. He would thus secure a set of measurements, say, of only 600, or 10 per cent of all the students. Say, further, that the computed average, or mean, amounted to 67 inches; also that  $P.E. = \pm 0.5$ . This on the basis

<sup>1</sup> It should be noted also that not all the states institutionalize their inadequates to the same extent, and the states which provide least institutional care for their inadequates are among the most "native" states, that is, the states below the Mason and Dixon line.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 734.

TABLE I  
STATES OMITTED IN ENUMERATION\*

States	Percentage of Foreign- Born White	Feeble- Minded	Insane
North Carolina.....	0.3	.....	.....
Mississippi.....	0.4	.....	.....
South Carolina.....	0.4	.....	1,791
Georgia.....	0.6	.....	3,947
Tennessee.....	0.7	.....	.....
Alabama.....	0.8	.....	.....
Arkansas.....	0.8	.....	.....
Kentucky.....	1.3	353	4,376
Virginia.....	1.3	.....	.....
Oklahoma.....	2.0	.....	.....
Louisiana.....	2.5	.....	.....
West Virginia.....	4.2	.....	.....
Florida.....	4.4	.....	1,444
Indiana.....	5.1	.....	.....
Missouri.....	5.5	.....	.....
Kansas.....	6.2	588	2,976
District of Columbia.....	6.5	.....	.....
Maryland.....	7.0	613	.....
Texas.....	7.7	.....	.....
New Mexico.....	8.1	.....	.....
Delaware.....	8.9	.....	.....
Idaho.....	9.0	.....	621
Iowa.....	9.4	.....	.....
Nebraska.....	11.5	.....	.....
Ohio†.....	11.8	.....	.....
Colorado.....	12.4	.....	1,188
Utah.....	12.6	.....	.....
Vermont.....	12.6	200	.....
South Dakota.....	12.9	297	.....
Oregon.....	13.0	310	.....
Wyoming.....	13.0	.....	229
Maine.....	14.0	.....	.....
Pennsylvania.....	15.9	.....	.....
Montana.....	17.1	.....	.....
Wisconsin.....	17.5	.....	.....
Washington.....	18.4	.....	.....
Illinois.....	18.6	.....	.....
Nevada.....	19.1	.....	244
Michigan.....	19.8	.....	.....
California.....	19.9	.....	.....
North Dakota.....	20.3	.....	.....
Minnesota.....	20.4	.....	.....
New Hampshire.....	20.6	.....	.....
Arizona.....	23.4	.....	484
New Jersey.....	23.4	.....	.....
New York.....	26.8	.....	.....
Connecticut.....	27.3	284	.....
Massachusetts.....	28.0	.....	.....
Rhode Island.....	28.7	.....	1,349
Total (1916).....	.....	2,645	18,649

\* The dashes (—) and figures indicate the states omitted. The figures are for the inmates as enumerated in 1916.

† The median state.

of the mathematical theory of probabilities means that if he had measured every one of the 6,000 students the chances are even that the calculated mean would still have been found to lie between 66.5 and 67.5 inches, that is  $67 \pm 0.5$  inches. But supposing, on the other hand, that as many as 50 per cent of the Freshmen only were measured, and the average of say, 65 inches obtained. A P.E. would be meaningless as indicative of the limits of the mean of the whole of the student population. The logical fact would remain that the mean height of Freshmen cannot be taken to represent the stature of the upperclassmen, no more than it can be taken to measure their own ultimate height when they reach the Sophomore, Junior, and Senior years.

So it is with the case at hand. An enumeration of the institutionalized inmates of the states with relatively large foreign-born populations cannot be taken as representing fairly the race and nativity distributions of inmates in institutions of states where the population is mostly native. The probable error measures the limits of the mathematical values of statistical samples only in the case when the samples are drawn from a homogeneous mass of data.

As a matter of fact, after he obtains his probable errors, Dr. Laughlin proceeds promptly to neglect them in his analysis. The reason, of course, is clear. Dr. Laughlin was told by one of his colleagues<sup>1</sup> that a finding should be at least two or three times larger than its P.E. in order to be statistically reliable. Also that, "a per cent distribution of less than 5 invalidates the significance of the accompanying P.E." But in case after case the P.E. obtained by Dr. Laughlin invalidated his findings. In the racial-nativities measured for feeble-mindedness the P.E.'s are large enough to invalidate the findings in 14 of the 32 groups. In the case of epilepsy the findings of 11 of the 29 groups are unacceptable for the same reason. In tuberculosis the finding for Mexico is  $6 \pm 16$ ; for Switzerland  $11 \pm 22$ . In blindness 3 of the 9 groups, in deformity 4 of the 9 groups, in dependency 6 of the cases are thus invalidated.<sup>2</sup> Yet all these findings Dr. Laughlin absorbs into his generalized data without making the slightest allowance for the P.E.'s whatsoever.

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 772-73.

<sup>2</sup> See Hearings, Figures 1 to 9.

b) After selecting doubtful samples for an incomplete enumeration, and after neglecting the limiting probabilities which he had himself set up as necessary correctives, Dr. Laughlin proceeds to compute relative ratios of inadequacy for the various race and nativity groups, "quota fulfillments," in a manner which is open to even graver criticism. Dr. Laughlin explains the "quota fulfillment" as follows:

... If we are to compare different nativity groups and races which are represented by vastly different total numbers in the whole population of the United States, we must reduce . . . absolute measurement to a relative one based on percent or quota fulfillment. . . . This was done by crediting . . . to . . . say the Italian born, in the whole institutional population for the type under consideration, say insanity, a number measured by the percentage of the Italian born in the whole population of the United States, the latter as found by the Federal Census of 1910.

We then made a first hand institutional survey, as of January 1, 1921. . . . The next step was to compare the number expected with the number found.

... For instance, according to the census of 1910, there were 1,343,125 persons of Italian birth in the United States, constituting 1.46 per cent of the whole population of the United States. . . . Consequently, if the Italians in the United States were equally as susceptible as all other nativity groups to insanity we should expect 1.46 per cent of the inmates in all hospitals for the insane in the United States to be of Italian birth. In the 93 hospitals for the insane . . . there were 84,106 inmates at the time of the survey. The Italian quota is 1.46 per cent of 84,106, or 1,228. This is the number calculated or expected. The actual survey found 1,938 persons of Italian birth. . . . Dividing the number found by the number expected, we find a quota fulfillment of 157.53 per cent.<sup>1</sup>

Now, all this sounds reasonable, only that Dr. Laughlin committed two serious statistical errors in the process. In the first place, as numerators he uses the inmates in the custodial institutions as of 1921, but as denominators he uses the various races and nationalities as of 1910. In the second place, he divides the number of specific inadequacies by the whole of the respective population groups, instead of first allowing for the respective age and sex proportions of the population which are variously represented in custodial institutions. He, so to speak, divides two bushels of wheat by three bushels of rye and gets a "quota" of two-thirds, or 66 per cent of potatoes.

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 731-32.

1. On the first score, Dr. Laughlin attempted to anticipate the criticism in the following manner:

It seemed logically sounder to make the comparison on the basis of the census of aliens in the United States of 1910 and the inmates of institutions a decade later, because the immigrants who go through Ellis Island, and who are destined to become inmates of institutions, do not pass immediately from the immigrant station to the institutions, but mix first in the free population of the country and are later segregated. All of this takes time.<sup>1</sup>

Is it logically sounder? By this method, Dr. Laughlin fails to measure either the specific contributions to the inmate population by each specific incoming immigrant group, or the ratio between the foreign-born inmates in American custodial institutions today and the present general immigrant population in the country. For were the former Dr. Laughlin's intentions, and a definite lag had been determined between the date of arrival of each specific immigrant group and the date of admission of its inadequates to our institutions, say, the lag for the admission of Italian insane had been discovered to be ten years, in order to obtain the proper ratio, he would have to divide the number of inmates admitted each year by the number of immigrants that had come at the beginning of the lag. The number of Italians admitted in 1910 would have to be divided by the number of Italians that came to the United States in 1900; the number admitted in 1914 by that of the immigrants of 1904. And similarly for the rest of the several inadequacies and immigrant groups. If, on the other hand, what Dr. Laughlin is endeavoring to measure is the "occurrence" of the various inadequacies within our several nativity groups at a given time as he claims to have done, then the only logical dividend is the present respective population of these groups. In the present instance, the population census of 1920 was the logical basis for the quota ratios.

The fact is that had Dr. Laughlin computed his quotas on the 1920 instead of on the 1910 basis he would have found even less support for his conclusions. Between 1910 and 1920 our older immigrant stocks—"our foundation stocks," as he calls them—decreased by 1,600,000 more than did our newer immigrant stocks—the immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe; and one need not be a

<sup>1</sup> P. 734.

statistician to discern that the smaller the denominator the larger the fraction, the quotient, or quota.

The error committed by Dr. Laughlin will become more obvious by referring to a reverse error committed by a writer on immigration who attempted to prove conclusions opposite to those of Dr. Laughlin; namely, that recent immigration has not caused an increase in crime, pauperism, and insanity in the United States. From the fact that a census taken in 1904 had disclosed an inmate population of 634,877 and that one taken in 1908 disclosed an inmate population of 610,477, some 25,000 inmates fewer, that writer joyfully concluded that: "A comparison of these figures clearly shows that the large immigration of the five year period 1903-1908 was accompanied by an actual decrease of pauperism and crime," and hence "the statistics for crime and pauperism give no occasion for alarm."<sup>1</sup> Obviously, the implication that immigration might be held responsible for contemporaneous changes in the number of inmates in our custodial institutions was entirely gratuitous.

What prompted both these gentlemen to commit these errors was apparently their intense desire, of one to associate with, and of the other to dissociate from race the incidence of the various social inadequacies. Facts were therefore selected in such a manner and the methods of interpretation were so chosen as to yield the desired support for their preconceived conclusions.

Curiously enough, Dr. Laughlin did venture out into the mysteries of sound statistics for just long enough to assure himself that that was not the path especially desirable for the purpose at hand. Dr. Laughlin computed the quotas for two of the ten inadequacies, for feeble-mindedness and insanity, on the 1920 basis.<sup>2</sup> But what he discovered was not apparently to his liking. Table II presents several comparisons between the quotas as determined on the 1920 and 1910 bases.

The outstanding deductions from these comparisons are quite clear. There had taken place in these ten years a lowering of the institutional quotas in both feeble-mindedness and insanity for all the nativity groups except for those from Northwestern Europe.

<sup>1</sup> I. A. Hourwich, *Immigration and Labor* (2nd ed.), p. 353.

<sup>2</sup> Hearings, tables 12 and 13.

For the latter there was an increase in both quotas. In insanity there was an increase from 198 per cent to 269 per cent, an increase of 36 per cent. Obviously, however, this was an apparent increase only, due to the use of a diminished denominator. At any rate, it surely was no reason for the panicky retreat into the superficially safe refuge of deriving the quotas from a false, the 1910, basis.

2. In the second place, Dr. Laughlin's method of quota fulfilment is unacceptable also on the ground that he derived the ratios by dividing the occurrences of inadequacies, which in most cases

TABLE II  
COMPARATIVE QUOTA FULFILMENTS ON THE 1910 AND 1920 BASES

Race or Nativity.	Feeble-Mindedness		Insanity	
	1910	1920	1910	1920
Native-born white, native parentage.....	107.70	104.87	73.27	71.33
Native-born white, mixed parentage.....	190.27	187.15	103.90	102.17
Native-born white, foreign-born parentage....	165.39	156.50	108.49	102.60
Northwestern Europe.....	18.98	23.88	198.36	269.15
Eastern Europe } .....	.....	43.25	.....	201.32
Southern Europe } .....	33.02	.....	188.50	.....
.....	.....	24.18	.....	149.77

possess specific age and sex attributes, by the whole of each of the various race and nativity populations. One of the most vital principles of statistics is that in computing ratios or percentages the numerator and denominator must be correlative or homogeneous in denomination. The relative incidence of measles in the lower East Side and upper West Side of New York City is referred to not in terms of the total number of cases in each district as divided by the respective total populations, but in terms of the ratio between the number of cases and the number of children of the susceptible age group, say, the age group of one to ten years, living in the respective districts.

In the case at hand, differences in sex and age must be allowed for in order to obtain ratios of a proper perspective. Criminality for instance, is by far more characteristic of the male than of the female sex. In 1916<sup>1</sup> the male criminal inmates in the custodial

<sup>1</sup> "Defective, Dependent and Delinquent Classes in State Institutions," *U.S. Census*, 1916, pp. 8-9.

institutions of the United States numbered 87,716, the females only 7,532. In 1910, at the peak of the immigration current, there were living in the United States 129 foreign-born white males to every 100 foreign-born white females; a situation which undoubtedly also obtained in 1916. The males and females of native birth, on the other hand, obtain in approximately equal proportions. Secondly, major crimes are committed neither by minors nor by superannuates, and according to the Census of 1920, 53.2 per cent of our foreign-born white males, and but 35.5 per cent of our native-born white males, were between 20 and 44 years of age. According to the Census of 1910 (the figures for the Census of 1920 are not available at the present writing) "almost two-thirds of the difference between the native and foreign born white as regards the relative numbers committed to prison and jails is due to the difference in age composition."<sup>1</sup> What is even of greater significance, the Census goes on to show, is that, "in the ages between 21 and 55 the ratio of commitments is either smaller for foreign-born males than for the native born or is not much larger in all divisions [geographical] except the three Southern . . . and the Mountain divisions."<sup>2</sup>

## II

Dr. Laughlin's biased approach to his problem becomes most glaring when his conclusions are subjected to the second test; namely, whether the data gathered in the survey under review reveal a significant differential in the quota fulfilments of the various race and nativity groups which would warrant his assertions as regards the existence of greater racial susceptibilities toward the inadequacies among recent immigrant than among our older immigrant stocks. Table III is a condensed summary of the quotas which are given in detail in the Hearings.

The facts disclosed in Table III are most remarkable in view of Dr. Laughlin's persistent reiteration that the recent immigrants have "a higher percentage of inborn socially inadequate qualities than do the older stocks." In seven out of the nine inadequacies for which quotas were computed the immigrant from Southeastern

<sup>1</sup> *Prisoners and Juvenile Delinquents*, 1910, p. 120.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 127.



Europe—the recent immigrant—shows ratios below one or more of the four older nativity groups—the native-born white of native parentage, the native-born white of mixed parentage, the native-born white of foreign parentage, and the immigrants from Northwestern Europe—our “foundation stocks.” Specifically, Southeastern Europe shows lower ratios than the three native groups in feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, blindness, deafness, deformity, and dependency—in six of the nine inadequacies. In insanity and in dependency Southeastern Europe has a lower ratio than Northwestern Europe. In only two inadequacies, crime and tuberculosis,

TABLE III  
QUOTA FULFILMENTS OF THE SEVERAL TYPES OF SOCIAL INADEQUACIES,  
BY GENERAL NATIVITY GROUPS

Nativity Group	Feeble-Minded	Insane	Criminalistic	Epileptic	Tuberculosis	Blind	Deaf	Deformed	Dependent	Summary
Nat. wh., nat. par. ....	107.70	73.27	81.84	93.05	89.40	155.64	134.20	66.21	104.09	84.33
Nat. wh., mix. par. ....	190.27	103.90	115.58	200.00	122.98	81.29	75.83	145.45	101.77	116.65
Nat. wh., f.-b. par. ....	165.39	108.49	91.14	179.54	122.97	57.31	82.24	364.21	101.97	109.40
N.W. Europe. ....	18.98	198.36	37.97	80.36	94.08	8.33	11.49	.....	233.81	130.42
S. and E. Europe. ....	33.02	188.50	141.25	89.04	148.02	20.37	22.31	50.00	50.39	143.24

have the immigrants from Southeastern Europe a higher incidence of inadequacy than the other four nativity groups. But, as we have seen a moment ago, the major part of the apparent difference in the crime ratios is accounted for by the peculiar age and sex composition of our recent immigrants, and as for tuberculosis, Dr. Laughlin readily admits that “because of its infectious nature it is not possible to say, from the figures which we have here analyzed, whether the immigrant stock of the present generation is more or less constitutionally susceptible to tuberculosis, than the older stocks.”<sup>1</sup>

It seems, however, that as far as drawing conclusions is concerned, the statistics which Dr. Laughlin has collected are merely incidental. For whenever the statistics do not bear out his presuppositions, he blames the recent immigrants for the higher quotas

<sup>1</sup> Hearings, p. 745.

found among the rest of the nationalities. The fact, for instance, that in feeble-mindedness the three native groups show quotas of 108 per cent, 190 per cent, and 165 per cent respectively, while the quota for Southeastern Europe is found to be only 33 per cent, is to Dr. Laughlin ample evidence that "the average recent and present immigrant is himself vastly better than the blood or hereditary family stock which he brings with him to the American type of the future."<sup>1</sup> In the case of the epileptic, the quota fulfilment for the recent immigrants is 89 per cent; for the native white of foreign parentage, 179 per cent; for the native white of mixed parentage, 200 per cent; for the native-born white of native parentage, 95.03 per cent. The conclusion, as he sees it, therefore is that "We admitted bad blood and did not know it."<sup>2</sup> To the mind of a congressional "eugenics expert" the wrath of God not only descends even unto the third and fourth generation; it also transfuses the "bad blood" of the "recent and present immigrant" into the veins of people born generations earlier.

Dr. Laughlin's treatment of the statistics for dependency is characteristic. From a study of poor relief in Massachusetts he finds that Southeastern European immigrants fill their quota to the extent of 50.39 per cent, only half as much as that of the native groups, and less than a quarter of that of Northwestern Europe. He therefore reasons as follows:

In dependency, the older American stocks show an incidence higher than the newer . . . the immigrants themselves are, for the most part, thrifty. . . . But allowing for all these factors, it seems clear that in the matter of family thrift, if not in personal industry, the immigrants of former generations were superior to those of the present time.<sup>3</sup>

The busy congressman reads the last sentence only, and votes accordingly.

Hitherto we have been concerned with an examination of (I) Dr. Laughlin's methods of enumeration, and (II) his methods of interpretation, and we found that his enumeration, his samples, the computation of his quota fulfilments, and his interpretation of the resulting findings were all statistically and logically unsound, and

<sup>1</sup> P. 739.

<sup>2</sup> P. 743.

<sup>3</sup> P. 748.

clearly designed to place the recent and current immigrant in as unfair a light as possible. Despite all these efforts, however, when the several quotas are summarized and averaged for the several race and nativity groups (see Table III, above), the incidence for Southeastern Europe is found to be only some 10 per cent higher than for that of Northwestern Europe; namely, 143.24 per cent and 130.42 per cent respectively. For all the native groups combined the quota amounts to 91.89 per cent. To Dr. Laughlin the differential of 10 per cent between the quotas of the recent and older immigrant stocks signifies "real differences in social values." Yet he completely ignores the much larger differential, of over 41 per cent, between the quotas of the native stocks and of the immigrants from Northwestern Europe, akin to the natives. To the student who approaches his data with no bias or preconceptions, these differentials are significant, not of a difference in social values, but of a relatively shorter or longer experience in the invigorating social and economic environment of America. In the case of insanity, for instance, even Dr. Laughlin is constrained to admit that, "after the shock of immigration is over, and adjustment more or less established, the children of immigrants . . . show a lower incidence of insanity than that found among the immigrants themselves. . . ." The "bad blood" which we have in our ignorance admitted apparently does lose its virulence under the all-healing benevolences of the American environment.

### III

Finally, Dr. Laughlin's third premise, that the occurrence of an inadequacy among individuals proves it to be an inborn racial quality, can best be tested by the method of correlation.

Briefly, according to the theory of correlation:

When two quantities are so related, that the fluctuations in one are in sympathy with fluctuations in the other, so that an increase or decrease of one is found in connection with an increase or decrease (or inversely) of the other, and the greater the magnitude of the changes in the one, the greater the magnitude of the changes in the other, the quantities are said to be correlated.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> P. 741.

<sup>2</sup> A. L. Bowley, *Elements of Statistics*, p. 316.

The degree of correlation is generally expressed in terms of  $r$ —the coefficient, which according to the formula worked out by Karl Pearson cannot be larger than  $+1$ , perfect positive correlation, nor less than  $-1$ , perfect negative correlation. Coefficients less than .30 are considered low; coefficients less than .20 are probably negligible. Furthermore, to be significant,  $r$  must be at least four times its P.E.

In the present instance, several series of values, the quotas for the several degeneracies, are presented as jointly and separately representing inborn racial values of a number of races and nationalities. These series of values should, according to the theory of correlation, show a high degree of positive correlation. That is, races or peoples fulfilling high quotas in one degeneracy should fulfil relatively high quotas in the other degeneracies and vice versa. On the other hand should the degree of correlation be found negligible or even low it is safe to conclude that the values, the quotas observed, are on the whole independent of each other and cannot be taken as indicative of race qualities.

Normally, the formula used for the computation of  $r$  is the product-moment formula  $r = \frac{\Sigma xy}{n\sigma - \sigma_y}$  as developed by Karl Pearson.

However, when the number of cases involved is less than 30-40 the product-moment method has been found unsatisfactory, and the

"rank" or "grade" coefficient formula  $\rho = 1 - \frac{6SD^2}{N(N^2 - 1)}$  is used

instead. In the present instance, when the summary quotas, such as those for "Northwestern Europe" and "Southeastern Europe" are excluded, as also the numerous races and nativities for which the quotas are negligibly small, only from 18 to 25 remain. Accordingly, for the present purpose the  $\rho$  formula was deemed the more applicable of the two and the  $r$ 's were derived from the  $\rho$ 's in accordance with

expressions  $r = 2 \sin \left( \frac{\pi}{6} \rho \right)$ . In Table IV are arranged the several race and nativity groups in the ascending order of their rank quota fulfilment for the six most significant degeneracies and for "all," that is, for the average of all the nine degeneracies, as computed by Dr. Laughlin. These ranks were derived from Table V, in which the

actual quotas are listed. The results of the computation are shown in Table VI.

Even a superficial examination of Table V will at once disclose the complete absence of concomitance among the quota fulfilments. No single race or nationality seems to stand out as consistently either high or low in its quota fulfilments. Ireland, for instance, has the lowest ratio of all peoples in feeble-mindedness, 8.16 per cent, but

TABLE IV  
RANK: QUOTA FULFILMENT

Nativity Group	Feeble-Minded	Insanity	Crime	Epilepsy	Tuberculosis	Dependency	All
Austria-Hungary.....	8	10	8	9	6	2	5
Bulgaria.....	20	23	23				24
Canada.....	9	9	7	11	10	15	6
China.....		5	22				14
France.....	5	14	12	4	14	17	15
Germany.....	6	17	3	10	3	12	8
Great Britain.....	12	12	5	19	7	16	11
Greece.....	4	16	20	8	20	14	20
Ireland.....	1	24	2	16	15	19	22
Italy.....	11	13	18	12	13	3	16
Japan.....		1	15				2
Mexico.....	13	11	24	3	1		23
Native-white, foreign parentage..	22	8	10	21	12	8	9
Native-white, mixed parentage...	23	7	11	22	11	7	12
Native-white, native parentage..	21	4	9	13	8	9	3
American Negro.....	3	2	17	1	4	1	4
Netherlands.....	14	15	6	6	9	6	10
Portugal.....	17	19	16	20	19	11	17
Rumania.....	10	6	14	18			7
Poland, Finland, Russia.....	18	22	13	17	16	4	19
Scandinavia.....	7	20	4	2	17	5	13
Serbia.....	24	25	26				26
Spain.....	19		25	15	18		25
Switzerland.....	2	3	1	5	2	10	1
Turkey in Europe.....	16	21	19	14		18	21

the highest in dependency—633.53 per cent. Mexico is lowest in tuberculosis with a quota of only 6.25 per cent, but is highest in criminality, her quota for that inadequacy being 549 per cent. This fact alone is of great statistical significance. Nevertheless, before computations were undertaken it was presumed, because of the diagnostic interrelationship of the various degeneracies, that some degree of correlation would be established among them, and that all would be, by the logic of the case, positive in character. Instead,

11 out of the 21 correlations computed turned out to be negative, and 17 out of the 21 were found to be of either such low values, or to have such high P.E.'s that their significance becomes entirely negligible. The fact that so many of the  $r$ 's have negative values and that so many of the P.E.'s are so large point with a certainty of mathematical precision to the extreme unreliability of Dr. Laughlin's data. The low values of  $r$  with equal precision remove any

TABLE V  
QUOTA FULFILMENTS

Nativity Group	Feeble-Minded	Insanity	Crime	Epilepsy	Tuberculosis	Dependency	All
Austria-Hungary.....	21.0	134.2	68.4	64.5	70.9	25.2	91.0
Bulgaria.....	60.0	300.0	366.6	.....	.....	.....	227.2
Canada.....	23.0	124.4	66.0	75.5	107.0	187.8	99.2
China.....	.....	78.3	337.0	.....	.....	.....	125.2
France.....	19.1	158.3	124.0	33.3	125.0	240.0	133.3
Germany.....	19.6	174.3	35.1	73.5	24.5	120.0	107.4
Great Britain.....	27.2	156.8	44.0	145.5	72.09	217.5	113.0
Greece.....	15.5	172.7	293.6	57.1	436.3	145.1	190.9
Ireland.....	8.15	305.2	31.0	108.4	155.7	633.6	208.8
Italy.....	25.3	159.5	219.1	83.8	123.9	40.5	144.5
Japan.....	.....	42.9	153.1	.....	.....	.....	57.8
Mexico.....	31.6	137.5	549.0	25.0	6.25	.....	219.6
Native white, foreign parentage..	105.3	108.5	91.1	179.5	122.9	101.9	109.4
Native white, mixed.....	190.2	105.1	115.5	199.8	122.9	101.7	116.6
Native white, native parentage..	107.7	73.2	81.8	93.0	89.04	104.0	84.3
American Negro.....	15.1	57.2	207.9	10.9	40.7	24.02	86.1
Netherlands.....	33.3	171.6	58.0	46.5	100.0	83.3	111.7
Portugal.....	48.3	181.6	185.7	150.0	375.0	114.3	166.6
Rumania.....	24.2	100.0	142.0	120.0	.....	.....	103.0
Russia, Poland, Finland.....	50.5	265.9	126.0	117.2	201.0	71.8	183.5
Scandinavia.....	20.0	193.3	35.4	13.9	213.6	76.5	118.5
Serbia.....	220.0	400.0	1400.0	.....	.....	.....	600.0
Spain.....	55.0	.....	660.0	100.0	300.0	.....	400.0
Switzerland.....	8.45	69.2	27.6	44.4	11.1	106.3	53.8
Turkey in Europe.....	42.0	200.0	240.0	100.0	.....	375.0	199.1

possible support from Dr. Laughlin's assumption as to the existence of *racially* inborn social inadequacies among the people here studied.

The attempt to discredit the "present and recent immigrant," disclosed in the preceding paragraphs, is not a new venture in the history of American immigration. From the earliest days of American history, the "present and recent immigrant" has been proclaimed by his immediate predecessor as inferior and undesirable. So the English despised the German; the Germans, the Irish; and

these together, since 1880, have decried as "inferior" to themselves, the "new" immigration of Slavs and Hungarians and Italians. It is a matter of recorded history that in 1727 the colonial governor of Pennsylvania caused the enactment of a special anti-immigration law because he "feared that the peace and security of the province was endangered by so many foreigners coming in, ignorant of the language," etc.<sup>1</sup> This was before the time of immigration from

TABLE VI  
COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION

Correlated Items	Rho	r	P.E. Rho
Feeble-mindedness and Dependency...	-.78	-.79	.065
Crime and Dependency.....	-.38	-.39	.142
Crime and Epilepsy.....	-.19	-.198	.148
Insanity and Epilepsy.....	-.13	-.136	.159
Feeble-mindedness and Tuberculosis...	-.12	-.125	.16
Epilepsy and Dependency.....	-.12	-.125	.168
Insanity and Dependency.....	-.08	-.094	.165
Insanity and Feeble-mindedness.....	-.056	-.052	.15
Epilepsy and All.....	-.05	-.052	.153
Crime and Tuberculosis.....	-.02	-.02	.161
Dependency and Tuberculosis.....	-.02	-.02	.171
Insanity and Crime.....	+.04	+.042	.148
Dependency and All.....	+.12	+.125	.164
Feeble-mindedness and All.....	+.16	+.167	.1425
Epilepsy and Tuberculosis.....	+.17	+.177	.157
All and Tuberculosis.....	+.37	+.385	.14
Insanity and Tuberculosis.....	+.41	+.426	.138
Feeble-mindedness and Crime.....	+.34	+.354	.13
Feeble-mindedness and Epilepsy.....	+.50	+.517	.116
Crime and All.....	+.57	+.588	.0955
Insanity and All.....	+.78	+.794	.0565

Southeastern Europe. A century and a quarter later we find an anti-immigration appeal by a political party in similar words: "It is an incontrovertible truth," that party proclaimed, "that the civil institutions of the United States of America have been seriously affected and that they now stand in imminent peril from the rapid and enormous increase in the body of residents of foreign birth, imbued with foreign feelings and of an ignorant and immoral character."<sup>2</sup> All this from the descendants of those whom the colonial

<sup>1</sup> H. P. Fairchild, *Immigration*, pp. 41-42.

<sup>2</sup> *Proceedings, National Conference Charities and Corrections*, 1912, pp. 239-48.

governor feared as dangerous to the peace and security of the province. All this before the days of the "Hunky" and the "Wop."

Dr. Laughlin's "expert analysis of the metal and the dross in America's modern melting pot," as the chairman of the House Committee proposes to call his survey, is in line with several other recent efforts to prove "our present and recent immigrant" inferior to ourselves. But in order to give these efforts a semblance of impartiality Dr. Laughlin has ventured out from behind the screens of the generalities of our forefathers and has attempted to conceal his preconception in the elusiveness of technical statistical inaccuracies.



## SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY

### SECTION XVI. THE SCHMOLLER-TREITSCHKE CONTROVERSY. ILLUSTRATING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TRANSITION

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#### ABSTRACT

The Schmoller-Treitschke controversy covered a range of argument which could not be reduced to the limits of this section. As a compromise representative propositions are selected and discussed as illustrations of "the psychology of transition." Whenever issue is joined between individuals, on the one hand, who represent respectively conventional views, social, scientific, political, religious, and dissent from the same; or, on the other hand, classes which are established and classes which are ambitious to secure standing, certain typical attitudes are exhibited. The contents of this section constitute one of the choicest collections in our literature of specimens exemplifying the rule.

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History does repeat itself in the sense that, under similar circumstances, people react in correspondingly similar ways. Literary reconstruction of human experience, or written history, is instructive, in distinction from merely interesting, in direct ratio with its rendering of experience in terms of typical crises and corresponding reactions. The record of human thought has preserved the meaning terms of such typical crises more numerous and more revealingly than any other variety. We have recited some of the more obvious facts about two such passages in the development of thought about social science—the Thibaut-Savigny controversy, and the Menger-Schmoller debate. We shall allude later to three other instances of the same type—the Menger-Schäffle debate, the von Mohl-Treitschke debate, and the issue between Herbert Spencer and the English social reformers of his earlier years, as reflected in the essays collected under the title *The Man vs. the State*. At present it is in order to use some of the material we are gathering so as to illustrate certain recurrent behaviors in transition from one dominant type of thinking to another. By means of exhibits contained in the reactions between Schmoller and Treitschke over the issues raised by the leaders of the *Verein*, in

particular over the proposal to substitute ethical standards for the so-called Manchesteristic standards of economic theory and practice, we shall try to identify certain forms of behavior which appear whenever innovation in thought or action brings promoters and opponents of the change into conflict.

The cant phrase, "psychological moment" corresponds to something which is very specific in reality, whether it can be analyzed down to its elements in a given case or not. No matter how precisely an issue may be outlined in words, the group attention, feeling, and cognitive content must be correspondingly receptive if the stimulating action is to be followed by the appropriate response. Wagner's utterance evidently did not reach a prepared public. It is easy to imagine his audience as taking refuge in its self-satisfied smugness, which was too sure of itself to be shocked. The criticisms which his argument roused seem to have voiced no general consensus. Even the opposition of the conservatives must needs become more deliberate and self-conscious before it could give full force to its latent hostility to the progressive movement. It was Schmoller's spokesmanship for the aroused consciousness and conscience of German economists which called Treitschke to the defense of the established order, and thus signalized the collision of the old and the new. There are many points of resemblance between Treitschke's attitude and that of Chancellor Day in the quotation that follows. It appeared as a signed editorial in *Leslie's Illustrated Weekly*, June 17, 1912.

### THE PERIL OF OUR LAND

BY CHANCELLOR DAY OF SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

The men who teach that constitutions established on battlefields of human liberty are barriers of personal freedom, who ridicule courts of justice founded upon principles of eternal righteousness as arbitrarily oppressive of human rights, who preach class hate and pose as the defenders of the people, are followed by droves of the unthinking, who some day will awake to find themselves in a barren wilderness of anarchism and self-destructive socialism.

The peril of our land today is those teachers who appeal to the ignorance and passion of the people, arraying them against the institutions secured at Concord and Lexington, at Valley Forge and Monmouth, and defended by a million men whose graves were strewn with flowers a few days ago.

I wonder that the great sustaining, foundation class of our citizens do not resent this implication of ignorance, this infamous impeachment of their intelligence, and hurl such foes of our country down to their own place.

Nothing will bring us to immovable foundations, nothing will establish the perfect equilibrium of justice and content between all classes, so that the *rich shall always apply the Golden Rule and the poor trust God and not complain*,\* but that true gospel preached by the Methodist Asbury and his mighty host, as on horseback they rode from the Atlantic to the far wilderness; by the Presbyterians and Episcopalians from the Canadas to the Appalachians; by the Baptists with their martyrs; by the Congregationalist Edwards, under whose preaching men held by the pillars of the church lest they drop into perdition; by heroic Lutherans, who have always insisted upon the liberty and responsibility of conscience, and by devoted Catholics, whose Marquettes, Nicollets, and Fennepins were found from the St. Lawrence to the Father of Waters.

In one sense such an utterance as the foregoing in our day is staggering. A modern man does not know where to begin, how far back in the rudiments of things to start, when he is suddenly called upon to express himself in reply to such amazing sophistry. Chancellor Day's demand really is that the millions of living men, whose ancestors destroyed feudalism and whose nearer ancestors destroyed political absolutism, and substituted constitutionalism, shall sit still and be content while a few men who have made money complete their work of nullifying democratic constitutions and of bringing the civilized world under the dominion of capitalistic oligarchy. To accuse of impiety toward the past the men who refuse to be silent against this tendency is precisely one with the claim that demand for a sane Fourth of July is defamation of the men who signed the Declaration of Independence; or that enforcing a pure food law is ingratitude to the Pilgrim Fathers who starved through their first winter in Massachusetts; or that improvement of safety devices on ocean steamers is an impeachment of Christopher Columbus.

The idea that the present balance of power in our capitalistic society is beyond criticism and correction is such a monstrous exhibit of provincial bias that it would be set down as an amateurish blunder in portraying life, if it were attributed to a character in fiction. It is well, however, to have a few monstrosities in real life to exhibit the absurdity of certain actual tendencies if they are

\* Italics ours.

allowed to flourish without restraint. We have another, though much less preposterous, case in Treitschke.

A few more general observations must precede analysis of his first paper.

In the first place, the Germans have always taken their historians seriously. Of course it is in the nature of the case impossible to demonstrate such a generalization, but it seems to be true that, in proportion to their merits, German historians, for the last century and a half, have enjoyed relatively higher prestige than any other type of German scholars. If we analyze the writings of such a man as Justus Möser (1720-94), for instance, we are not left in doubt that he was a thinker of superior talents and merits; yet we are not likely to find the evidence on which wholly to justify the rating which his opinions enjoyed as expressions of wisdom derived from history.<sup>1</sup> Roscher calls him "the father of the historical school of jurisprudence" and "at the same time the greatest German national economist of the eighteenth century." During his lifetime and down past the middle of the nineteenth century this or some similar estimate of Möser crops out very frequently in the literature of German social science. He is often referred to in the same tone of awe-stricken reverence with which many German writers of the first half of the nineteenth century alluded to Goethe—as though his opinion on any subject from A to Z in the cyclopedia settled the matter. Möser was a man with very pronounced opinions upon subjects about which his historical pursuits furnished him with little or no basis for judgment. Yet the fact that he entertained judgments on those subjects seemed to get for those judgments the benefit of historical sanction. He figures in a certain stratum of German literature therefore as a sort of Sir Oracle on all sorts of social matters. In this respect he is a good illustration of a marked German tendency. The German historian is more of a factor in the calculation of Germans than any other scholar of proportional merit. The theory on which we may account for this is that even scholars, and after them, of course, the general public, tend to assume that because a man is ostensibly studying past experience therefore his opinion on any subject must necessa-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Roscher, *Gesch. d. National-Oekonomie in Deutschland*, p. 500.

rily be a digest of past experience. Historians in all countries enjoy excessive benefits from this presumption; and we point to this fact without desiring to detract from the appreciation, which proper appraisal of any historian's work authorizes. The fact is that this naïve presumption is as far from the truth as it would be to assume that because a man is a patent lawyer, he must necessarily be an authority upon admiralty practice. The German historian has had a more respectful hearing on a wider range of subjects than any other German scholar (always meaning in proportion to his claim to a hearing on the basis of critical knowledge of the subject in question).

In the second place, Treitschke is a vivid illustration of the actual aloofness of the academic type from the main current of affairs,<sup>1</sup> and its inability to sense proportions between the considerations which interest it and the factors which are decisive in a given social situation. We need not raise the question whether this weakness is more or less evident in the German academic type than in that of other nations; or whether it was more conspicuous a generation ago in Germany than it is now. The foible is real enough in the academic type always and everywhere, and the present case will be most instructive to us if we let it tell its full story without breaking its force by saying to ourselves that we are not as other men are. The live issue raised by Schmoller and his friends was whether the Germans could do more than they had done and were doing toward bringing their social conditions into more effective harmony with up-to-date insight into justice. Treitschke was right in his intuition and his logic that all such questions must be treated by men who are able to think, in connection with long looks backward and forward, and with broad surveys of the field of interests affected by the present alternatives. His typically academic mistake was *first*, in not being able to distinguish between historical experience which might be instructive about the real issue, and speculative questions of historical philosophy which turned attention only to pedantic trifles; and *second*, in his consequent inability to hit upon the proportion in which these considerations

<sup>1</sup>In spite of the frequent connection to which we have referred in the case of the Cameralists, and later German social scientists, between academic and public functions.

were timely in a case of actual social crisis. The consequence was that, in everything but motive, Treitschke's argument was as pitiable an exhibit of untimeliness and disproportionateness as Nero's fiddling while Rome was burning. There was an importunate situation to be met in real life, and Schmoller was trying to find out what the Germans could do about it. Treitschke's best was a pedantic attempt to shift the issue to a debating-society wrangle over the pros and cons of the philosophical conceit of the equality of man! No doubt right or wrong thinking on this subject has a bearing upon all other social thinking and acting; but there are always relativities of importance in social factors; and the urgent question was—equality or no equality—can the German nation afford to let the present state of competition in the labor market have the whole say about the sort of air German laborers shall breathe, and the food they shall eat, and the houses they shall live in, and the hours they shall work, and the scale of their wages?

Treitschke was as far from the strategic center of the conflict as von Holst was in his *Constitutional History of the United States* when he reached the assault upon Sumner by Brooks in the Senate. Instead of taking up the big problems of the extent to which Sumner and Brooks respectively represented opposite forms of social momentum, von Holst ignores that vital matter and occupies a series of pages with ponderous weighing of the trifling question whether "Bully Brooks" was a gentleman!<sup>1</sup>

It was in these trifles of academic pedantry that Treitschke had whatever advantages he had over Schmoller in the debate. Schmoller was certainly too anxious to generalize history into sanction for immediately appropriate action. His moral perceptions were more accurate than the historical formulas by means of which he attempted to commend them. With Treitschke the relation was reversed: His historical generalizations were safer than Schmoller's, but they were arbitrarily associated with the moral questions presented by the existing social situation. Treitschke was a paleontologist discoursing on the anatomy of extinct species, while Schmoller was trying to be a good Samaritan administering first aid to injured fellow-citizens.

<sup>1</sup>V, 318-33.

Treitschke would seem to have had his eyes open when he said:

A profound revolution, such as Germany has experienced only once, in the days of Luther, has burst upon our popular life. With one bold leap we have passed from the meagerness of provincial civil life into the large circumstances of the national state. We have released the enormous economic forces of this nation for free competition; and while we have just begun to understand what money economy is, we are already surprised by the economic form of the future—credit economy—with an abundance of new structures.

So far he sees the tremendous change in actual conditions, but he cannot be just to the activities that have been stimulated by the change. He goes on:

This sudden convulsing of all the old order, and the frightful misery with which peoples always have to pay the price of transition to new economic forms, have lured modern socialism from its French home into our territory. So far, no really new fruitful idea has sprung from the German *Sozialdemokratie*. It has given us nothing which had not already been refuted by word and deed in France. But the leaders of socialism<sup>1</sup> command such a splendid type of confidence as has never before been found in German party life. They declare that black is white and white is black with such obstinate assurance that the innocent bystander involuntarily asks himself whether he is not perhaps laboring under some sort of an illusion. As experienced demagogues they know the temper of the masses, the yearning of the common man for a fixed, indubitable authority which shall overawe him. They know it will be possible to take from the people their belief in a better future only when the prospect of a fat present can be made immediately promising. Consequently they picture that naked nonsense, the lazy and sated vagabond life of the future in such definite outlines, with such brilliant colors, as though no doubt about the matter were possible.<sup>2</sup>

It would be a blunder as unpardonable as Treitschke's if we were to take a single case as proof of anything. We may be content with saying that Treitschke's case at this point is a sample of the sort of evidence which might be piled up as high as the biographies of all the historians would reach, tending to show that the experience of specialists in the study of history is no more assurance than the experience of any other specialist, of balanced judgment about the meaning of contemporary events. This perception was one of the important factors in the development of sociology. Men who

<sup>1</sup> I.e., Schmoller and the *Verein!*

<sup>2</sup> Note that Treitschke was saying this by innuendo of the paper of Schmoller which we have just epitomized!

had been trained in historical technique discovered that this technique alone as surely warped the judgment of scholars as training in language alone gives a bent to the mind which does not necessarily insure trustworthy procedure in the experimental sciences. The universal tendency of historians is to overestimate the instructive value of past experience as compared with present experience. They sometimes reason with the tacit assumption that experience came to a definitive close before the contemporary conflicts of forces began. They imply that past experience has settled all the problems of life for all time, and that it is not only superfluous but impertinent to formulate, as problems of a distinct character, the crises confronted by living men. They are inclined to assume that past experience has yielded precepts competent to control the present. This is equivalent to the notion that the schoolboy's last year's problems in fractions could settle his this year's problems in cube root.

Toward the close of his eminent career, Professor von Holst gave an exhibition of this foible. He discoursed in most impassioned manner, and in pontifical tone, upon the thesis that annexation of the Sandwich Islands by the United States would be the beginning of the end of the Republic. In reality, however, his historical studies had never touched closely upon those specific state relations which were and are to be pivotal between the peoples bordering the Pacific. He was, therefore, almost as amateurish on the subject as the average American college graduate. The point is that he was nevertheless listened to because he was a historian.

These typical preconceptions, which may be found so often in the deliverances of historians about the actual human situation of their own time, falsify the past as well as the present. They fail fully to visualize the lusty conflict of human interests, in the exercise of human equipments, which was always the reality in the past, instead of the mere impersonal play of cosmic or logical forces. They fail still more to see that this same conflict is going on today between men whose interests are still developing. They consequently fail to see that moral judgments and battles for the enforcement of moral judgments today must turn more on the



appraisals of values passed by living men than upon logical deductions from conclusions reached by past men. In other words, the historical habit inclines to the presupposition that men's destinies are decided more by the past than by the present. The typical habit of the constructive type of mind is to presume that men's destinies are decided more by the present than by the past. This is the thesis and antithesis of conservatism and progressivism. Neither without the other gives the synthesis which expresses reality. It is not safe to assume beforehand that either the past or the present considered independently should be the chief factor—say in settling the next strike: i.e., whether our inherited system of laws should be the primary factor, or considerations of immediate expediency, or considerations of principles of justice not yet worked out.

We might say the same thing in this way: It is the foible of historians to attempt to state present situations in terms of past situations. As a matter of logical classification this is the same mistake which Pythagorus committed in attempting to explain all being in numerical terms—as though quantity were the only factor of reality. That is, when they turn their attention to contemporary situations the historians are likely to ignore the variations in consequence of the added or modified factors, which circumstances have injected into the later situation, by which it is differentiated from the situations which they think they have interpreted in the past; and they consequently feel authorized to bring over their interpretation of the past and make it cover the issues of the present. That is, they expect the Bill of Rights (1689) to settle the pending coal strike. More than this, the historical habit is in principle the attitude of the established classes, the people who have arrived and secured their positions. They feel that the problems of life have been settled at last, and that what remains is merely to take this settlement as fixed for all time and make the most of it.

To go back to Treitschke: His eyes were not open wide enough to see the meaning of the details that he discovered. He could not see in the social unrest of his time the on-going of the main process of life, the development of more evolved wants out of the

less evolved satisfactions, combined with discovery of new ranges of means of satisfaction. He could see, in the outreachings of the unsatisfied, nothing but vandalism, barbarous destructiveness toward permanent social achievement.

Let us look a moment at the assertion that the social democratic movement had given the Germans "nothing which had not already been refuted by word and deed in France." If this refers merely to philosophical propositions and to concrete devices, a good case might be made for the assertion. But what really had been refuted in France? That which was really refuted in France was the old régime, and the refutation of it was the Revolution. The Revolution incidentally refuted its own peculiar propositions and projects to be sure, but it did not refute life. It vindicated life; and that was the real issue between the old régime and the Revolution. The truth that triumphed in the Revolution was that when institutions begin to set arbitrary bounds to the development of life, they begin to fore-ordain their own doom. There was more life in France than the horizon of the 80,000 in the court coterie at Versailles could understand, and the pulsations of that life were the Revolution. The thing that the conservative intellect never can grasp is that the men at the lowest rung of the social ladder today are men with endowment at least on a level with that of the remote ancestors of all the people who have arrived at the heights of civilization. There is no sufficient reason to doubt that, if all the population of the earth except the manual laborers were destroyed today, in a few centuries the descendants of these present laborers would have recovered all the arts and refinements which we now possess, and would proceed to carry on civilization from the point where it was interrupted. The static sort of thinkers cannot entertain the idea that it is the orderly procession of the generations for those who come into life on a lower plane of advantage to take knowledge of the higher orders of achievement which have been gained by men before them, and to make those achievements marks for their own striving. The ambitions of the backward classes ought to be hailed with rejoicing as humanity's reassertion of its vitality. To the type of mind which can see social safety only in holding things as they are, continuation of the very process which has made it possible for things to be as they are looks like destruction.

This type of thinking is illustrated again by the following paragraph from a Chicago paper of July 1, 1912:

*The Rev. — of the — Church attacked the progressives in politics in an address last evening on "Mistakes of the Progressives."*

The so-called progressives are accomplishing nothing in separating the people into classes and arraying these classes against each other. Calling people liars and train robbers is not conducive to national prosperity and national peace. It has become almost a reproach for a man to be prosperous and possess wealth. He is pointed out on the street as a plutocrat; while the hero of modern society is too often the man who is shiftless and incapable. There are three essential principles to happiness and prosperity of the nation and the protection of the people: liberty, equality, and fraternity. Equality and liberty demand that the rich man have just as much consideration before the law as the poor man.

We must make allowance for the reporter, of course, and we may not assume without verification that the person quoted said exactly what was printed. The paragraph as it stands, however, is a typical reflection of another angle of the statical attitude, viz., reliance upon mere words which have a historical meaning; but resorted to as finalities in present conditions they are merely means of dodging the duty of thinking.

Referring once more to Treitschke's taunt that the German social democratic movement had proposed nothing that had not already been disposed of in France, his whole argument is an effort to identify the *Verein* with the social democracy, so we may take him at his word in this respect, and submit that the two main planks in the platform of the *Verein* were virtually new social factors, viz.: (1) *All socio-economic questions are ethical questions and must be considered as such.* (2) *It is the task of state and society to study human conditions within their respective spheres, and to act as a moral unit in transforming those conditions, so far as the means are controllable, in the interest of progressive sharing by all the members of the group in all the achievements of humanity.* These cardinal principles of the *Verein* were new not in the sense that no one had ever heard of them before.<sup>1</sup> They were in substance the burden

<sup>1</sup> It is very hard to find absolute beginnings of anything in human thought. For example, the Golden Rule was approached in Hebrew folk-consciousness long before it received its Christian formulation. We find a negative version, for instance, in the apocryphal book of Tobias: "Do not do anything to anyone that you would not want him to do to you."—Translated from iv, 16, of Luther's version.

of the preaching of the later Hebrew prophets, and it would be very superficial and hasty reading which did not find them implied in Jesus' words: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you." As we have said repeatedly, the collectivistic traditions of the Germans were reiterated in these new campaign formulas; so that in one sense they were older than any European civilization, and in their German form three or four centuries older than the recent empire. On the other hand, they were new in the only sense in which, as a rule, any social principle can be new in the modern world: i.e., as energizings, vitalizings, reincarnations, and realignments of the old. It would in this sense be one of the most spectacular originalities in history, if a party in power, or fighting for power in the United States, should actually propose to make the Golden Rule the arbiter of its policy in respect to the tariff. The principles of the *Verein* were in this sense projections of new moral forces into the German social problem.

Again, we may well be less sure that a typical tendency is illustrated, but we may venture hypothetically the generalization that the historical habit in itself predisposes to a substitution of conventional classifications of present activities for valid moral appraisals. Treitschke seems to be a clear case in point (although, as was observed before, we must guard against assuming that one case proves anything). The mental process involved in the error that we are now pointing out is substantially this (to express it in a particular instance instead of abstractly): "Germany achieved a great gain in civilization by abolishing benevolent despotism and substituting constitutional monarchy. Therefore, opposition to constitutional monarchy is opposition to civilization." The fallacy of this reasoning is the begging of the question involved in identifying "opposition to constitutional monarchy" with the obstructive activities which retarded the original achievement of constitutional monarchy, instead of ascertaining whether "opposition to constitutional monarchy now," while in form a negative action, is not really a continuance of constructive activity, i.e., an opposition not to anything that was an actual gain for civilization, but a repudiation of something in constitutional monarchy which now retards further gain in civilization.

Perhaps we can see this typical fallacy more plainly in terms of a familiar American argument. "The Republican party is the party of progress. The Republican party freed the slaves and saved the Union. Therefore, it is striking a blow at progress to withdraw support from the Republican party." From the standpoint of pure logic, this pretense of reasoning is drivell. Whether the Republican Party is entitled to the support of good citizens now, or not, turns on what it is now trying to do, or refusing to do. We are not now freeing the slaves, nor saving the Union, any more than we are now learning how to apply the power of steam to machinery. Let us assume for the sake of illustration that the vital domestic problem for Americans at the present moment is the task of making our professedly representative institutions more genuinely representative. That being the case, the question whether the Republican Party deserves the support of good citizens, turns not on sentimental consideration of what that party did when another piece of work was the order of the day, but on the balance of evidence as to the availability of that party for better work than may be expected of any other party upon our present task.

Whether or not we have called attention to an actual tendency of historical specialization in general, Treitschke certainly furnished a striking instance of this misinterpretation of the moral meaning of a contemporary social movement. Instead of admitting the scientific validity of the principle of the *Verein* that the unrest of the time calls upon all scholars to study the conditions and find out what they actually mean, he begins with superficial slander of the social democrats. The sentence preceding the quotation, in which he recognizes the change in economic conditions, reads: "In the last analysis this army of complaints which hurls itself against civic society serves only as a convenient protection of the flanks of the socialists, *the sworn enemies of all noble culture.*"<sup>2</sup>

Then following the quotation, Treitschke continues: "The controlling idea of the whole movement is unmistakably naked sensualism, radical repudiation of all that which raises man above the beast."

This indictment is really the major premise of Treitschke's entire argument; or perhaps the better figure is that it is the first

<sup>2</sup> Italics ours.

clause in his declaration, and his argument continually harks back to this assertion. In another connection we have given our estimate of this phase of the controversy in the form which seems to imply all that needs to be said about it, viz.: It is the private secretary of Dives branding Lazarus at the gate as a sensualist for wanting some of the crumbs. The spokesmen of satiety make themselves and their social theories ridiculous when they denounce workingmen for wanting security of a decent standard of life. Of course the manual laborer is more interested in a steady job under conditions that will assure himself and his family the means of leading worthy human lives than he is in supplying the Kaiser with funds to turn the *Siegesallee* into a free museum of graven images of the Hohenzollern genealogy. And the judgment of civilization is with the manual laborer—not that there should be less art in civilization, but that there should be more of the necessities of life.

It should be said once for all that there is no need of softening down any of the facts to which Treitschke refers in support of his superficial interpretation that the social democratic movement is essentially sensualism. It would be quite as true to describe the quest of the Pole by Lieutenant Greely and his party as essentially sensualism, because their first actions when they were found at the point of death from starvation were the instinctive actions of the basic animal. First live, then live toward the higher levels. It would ignore all the precedents throughout the ascent of men from barbarism to civilization to blame the backward classes for backward ways of expressing their interests. Anything else would be uncanny. The man who fights brutally for his job may get the courage for his fight from his ambition to send his daughter to a school of music and his son to college. We need not defend any of the brutalities of the social conflict, on the one side more than on the other; but it ill becomes men who claim to look upon human affairs through the perspective of history to confound incidents of the conflict with its main impulse.

There is another typical factor in Treitschke's attitude, which we may pass with a single observation, viz., his attempt to belittle the social movement, the rising tide of popular consciousness, by insinuating that it is merely the noisy pretentiousness of a few

self-seeking disturbers of the peace. Even if this were true, the task of society would nevertheless be just as constant, to study its own conditions, and to see whether its institutions are promoting or retarding progress.

It is merely a variation of the two mistakes just pointed out when Treitschke attempts to reduce the situation as described by Schmoller to a bare conflict between the mob spirit and German culture. There had been labor mobs in Germany before Treitschke, and there have been many more since, but to make mob phenomena the measure of the situation was to put on exhibition the universal academic propensity to substitute *inferences from words and propositions* for objective analysis of realities. Schmoller was not a mob, and the *Verein* was not a mob, and the great producing stratum of the German people was not a mob, and the clashing interests of labor and capital were actual factors in German life, whether they were trying to become articulate in mobs or legislation, or socialistic theories, or academic essays. Treitschke sneers at the very phrase "social question." He calls it "this huxter's expression of neo-Napoleonic invention which seems unfortunately to have found a lodging in our uncomplaining language." Thus he really undertakes to show that there is no "social question." He says:

Everyone who loves German civilization must without reserve stand up for that economic order which supports and carries that civilization. We can do justice to the legitimate demands of the masses—and they are all too numerous—only when we precisely know and fearlessly declare what we will grant them.

Here speaks the convinced traditionalist. His position is not that there are no evils in the human lot which benevolent men are bound to mitigate. It is rather, first, that the final form of industrial society has been reached, and that formulations of issues between social classes are henceforth impertinent. The class stratification as it now exists is here to stay. If the ruling class can make improvements in details of the workings of the institutions that have now reached perfection in their general structure, it is their duty to do so; but this is all a matter of benevolence on the part of the controlling class, not something which may raise any legitimate questions about the permanence of its control.

This is the point for mention of another typical aspect of conservative thinking in transition periods. It may be expressed as a temporary dualism between specific feelings and volitions which are of the coming period, combined in the same person with reasonings on general principles which are essentially of the waning period. Quite a collection of passages might be culled from these three essays of Treitschke which, apart from their context, read like arguments in support of Schmoller's program. If that platform had been put merely in terms of more generous patronage of laborers by the higher classes, Treitschke would have applauded with all his might. The offense in his eyes consisted in speaking of improved conditions of laborers in terms of *social justice*. His thesis was that the existing social order represented the culmination of justice, and reorganization of that order would necessarily represent a backward step in civilization. The controlling classes in the perfect social order must henceforth learn how to be more benevolent. They cannot compromise their class control without making the demoralized social order less just.

We return to more specific points in Treitschke's attack. In supporting the foregoing claim, Treitschke goes far afield for sustaining historical generalizations. He first reconstructs human experience in correction of Schmoller's proposition: "The economic stratification of classes springs from wrong and violence." He takes particular offense at the phrase "tragic guilt," as Schmoller uses it in referring to the course of history.

This is one of the cases to which reference was made in our account of Schmoller's essay. The form of expression invited the reply which Treitschke makes the most of, viz.: Conquest of weaker groups by stronger, enslavement of the conquered, and the founding of permanent social stratification upon this arrangement, was merely the inevitable working out of the law of the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence. It is accusing the order of nature to apply the epithets "wrong" and "guilt" to these stages in the evolution of society.

This answer was far more conclusive in 1874 than it would be today; and it was tactically a blunder for Schmoller to open his guard to such a blow. He was not ready, as every student of social



evolution is now ready with the reply, "Very well, have it so if you please, for the periods when only brute strength had been evolved. But after the power of moral discrimination has been evolved, perpetuation of distinctions between men which do not correspond with the functional values of men in contributing to further moral evolution is violence and wrong and injustice, and thus the arrest of evolution." In 1874, the earlier brutish implications of the struggle-for-existence idea were so impressive that Treitschke was undoubtedly thought by a large following to have scored heavily for conservatism by this appeal to a conception which was then at the height of its influence.

In pressing his argument from these premises, Treitschke accuses the socialists, and Schmoller as their spokesman in particular, of the primordial error of reasoning "not from the nature of the individual person, but from the nature of society." This particular diagnosis does not seem very consistent with the immediately following charge that socialism is at bottom Rousseauism; but we will not stop to consider that incongruity, but merely to quote the assertion:

Here emerges at once the fundamental mistake of all the socialists and of many learned national economists who look down with pity upon the rationalism of the eighteenth century. In all their ideas we detect the voice of Jean Jacques Rousseau. One and all of them stand, most of them without being aware of it, upon the illusion of the natural equality of men. Whoever has once looked through this colored glass is never more in a situation to observe historical matters without prejudice. Whoever is willing, however, to learn humbly from history must begin with the perception that nature forms all her higher creatures unequally.

It would be useless to speculate here about the correctness of Treitschke's assertion that as a rule the socialists believed in the "natural equality of men." Be that as it may, it was a most obvious perversion of Schmoller's meaning to force such a construction upon his views. He no more believed in "natural equality" in the Rousseau sense than Treitschke did, and it is difficult at this distance to understand how a candid opponent could justify himself in bringing a charge which seems to readers now so absurdly unwarranted. Treitschke was doubtless honest, and our explanation of his reasoning must have recourse to the hypothesis that he had not overcome the nightmare of the conservative class that all

criticisms of the established order must necessarily be merely masked reappearances of that fictitious "natural equality" which shrieked its shrillest note in *The Terror*. Treitschke enters upon a labored, but entirely gratuitous, refutation of the "tragic guilt" and the "natural equality" idea, in which he incidentally develops a very clear expression of the "class conflict" factor in human history, apparently without a thought that he was contributing to the very conclusion which Marx was at the same time trying to develop. This whole component of the argument, however, is merely a clouding of the issue, although we do not accuse Treitschke of intending any such trickery. He thought he was arguing to a real point. Although Schmoller did not make his meaning as plain in his first essay as he did in his rejoinder, no present reader can doubt his original intention. To suppose that Schmoller was tainted with communism, that he ever for a moment dallied with the notion that a pro rata distribution of economic goods ever might, could, would, or should become the order of society, was as extravagant as to suppose he would have the professors in the University of Berlin appointed by drawing lots on tickets distributed throughout the population of Germany.

What Schmoller meant by his phrase, "all men should be led to share in all the goods of civilization," was that the moment society makes an advance in the technique of exploiting nature, it should thereupon become a little easier for every member of society to obtain the means of satisfying his material wants. After a more efficient technique of transportation has been developed, the ends of the earth should be brought a little nearer even to the common man than they had been before. After we have learned something new about the nature of disease, and means of prevention and remedy, the percentage of suffering and the mortality rate, even in the less fortunate strata of society, should be somewhat reduced. After we have gained a new insight into justice, that achievement should not be monopolized in a class, but it should be generalized so as to confer some measure of benefit upon all classes. Not that prince and peasant should occupy the same kind of dwelling, but that palace and cottage should both be more sanitary than they were before we knew anything about bacteriology. Not that the

railroad manager and the trainman should have the same conditions of work and the same wages, but that safety appliances and schedules of hours on duty should diminish needless differences in the conditions of labor between manager and trainman. Not that employer and employee should have equal shares in the product, but that every hindrance which progressive moral insight discovers to fair representation of both interests shall be removed from the conditions which determine the basis of distribution.

Treitschke did not discuss Schmoller's position. He discussed the absurdities of views which have been held substantially by a great many people, but it was trifling to drag them into the case which the organization of the *Verein* represented.

In the course of this mistaken and misleading discussion, Treitschke finds it necessary, in order to establish a base of operations against the reform movement, to assert social absolutism as a principle in contradiction of the idea of ceaseless progression in society. He takes Lassalle as the awful example, in his favorite formula: "Social institutions are historical not logical categories." That is, social institutions are men's achievements, up to a certain date, in their perpetual encounter with conditions; but as the conditions change and men's competence to understand and cope with the conditions changes, institutions also certainly change as men continue to match their purposes and powers against the conditions. "Not so!" asserted Treitschke. "*Absolute* moral ideas must be present in history."

Herewith Treitschke presents another typical situation in the psychology and logic of transition. What does he mean by the term "absolute"? Does he mean one sharply defined and invariable concept, or does he mean to keep the term for use with one force in one connection, and a quite different force in another? Whatever his intention, what actual part does the word play in his essay? Probably there was a sense in which the generalization was as convincing to Schmoller as to Treitschke. So far as we can make out, there is no functionalist or pragmatist or behaviorist in our generation who does not, when pushed to his last lines of defense, have some sort of sheet anchorage for his thinking in some kind of recourse to the conception of a moral absolute (or quasi- or brevet-absolute!)

underlying visible variation in human affairs. Treitschke's assertion that there must be present in history certain "absolute moral ideas," appeals to a certain response in every serious mind. But there is a trick, a juggle, a logical sleight-of-hand performance in pleading this general proposition. When we analyze the force of the appeal we find that it gets its value for Treitschke's purpose by that same old sophism of the ambiguous middle term which has so often given empty victory to assertive dogmatists. Suppose we reply: "Yes, there are absolute moral ideas in history, and one of them is the illimitable perfectibility of moral conditions, instead of the blind old illusion of the immutability of conventionalities." This is a perfectly good checkmate for the absolutists' attack. That is, we concede the principle, but we deny the traditionalists' application of the principle.

The conclusion which Treitschke tries to draw from the principle is this: "Ergo, German institutions as they now stand are absolute." There is, however, neither logical nor empirical sequence between the two propositions, viz., "There are absolute moral ideas in history," and the implicit conclusion which Treitschke suggests by begging of the question: "Therefore, present German institutions are absolute." The very illustrations to which he appeals are refutations of that notion of the absolute which he tries to get into the argument. Thus he specifies *marriage*, *property*, and *the articulation of society*, as "moral ideas which . . . alter their form in endless variation, yet without changing their essence." In other words, he thereby confesses that they are not "absolute" at all in any sense which would be material to the issue represented by the *Verein*. Take marriage, for instance, in the most nearly unalterable form in which we have it in modern society, i.e., in the law of the Catholic church. The Catholic law of marriage does not in purpose nor in effect represent an "absolute," but merely an irreducible minimum. There is nothing in the law of the Catholic church to prevent progressive sublimation of the relations of the monogamous husband and wife to unimaginable degrees. The church law of the marriage relation is merely a definition of the lowest terms upon which the alliance of a man and a woman can have the sanctions of religion. The highest terms possible within

the relationship may have been achieved by rare persons here and there, or they may not. At all events the monogamous family as defined in the law of the church is merely the external framework of a spiritual relationship between husband and wife, parents and children, which is evidently capable of measureless expansion and enrichment and elaboration, through mutual exercise of confidence, fidelity, respect, social, intellectual, and moral stimulus, and reciprocity. Consequently, within this framework one family might differ from another by degrees as great as those that separate the acknowledged benefactor of mankind from the mere negative mediocrity who disobeys no statute law, yet accomplishes nothing particularly creditable to a man. So with property, and the class formations in societies. Instead of being absolute, they always have been—considering long stretches of time—and they probably always will be in a movement of transformation in the cumulative process of expressing formative interests which, whether we call them absolute or not, incessantly vary their social realization. Instead of being “absolute” then, in any sense that conflicts with the concept or the achievement of improvement, each of the institutions which Treitschke cites as examples—the German family, the German property system, the German class structure—had not only been in the course of modification during the previous century but has been undergoing quite as obvious modifications ever since. Surely “absolutes” as plastic as that are not absolute.

One is at a loss whether to interpret Treitschke's use of the “moral absolute” concept in attempting to dislodge the idea of historical adaptation, as dogmatic arrogance or as the desperation of cowardice. Whether it is one or the other, or some of both, it is pitiable futility of logical form in place of objective recognition of facts. Reduced to its lowest terms, the issue which Schmoller had represented was: *German institutions may be improved so as to do relatively more justice to the belated classes.* Treitschke's answer was: *The thought of changing the structure of German society is a proposal to alter the absolute.* Whichever of the debaters made the most of his case simply as one side of a logical sparring match, Treitschke was trying to define the human reality out of existence, while Schmoller was speaking for the omnipresent human process.

Treitschke might whistle up his own courage, and give heart to men whose wish was for the permanence of things as they were, but he was asserting that experience is what it is not. It is the process of life for backward interests to fight for their own, and so long as there are contentions among men as to what is each one's own, it will be both stupid and futile for either contestant to conjure up a bogey "absolute" to bar his opponent from struggling for his own. We must speak with caution here. Perhaps it is better simply to ask a question: Is it typical of the psychology of transition to throw dust in the air, to becloud the issue, in particular to invoke some sort of an absolute to halt progress? When we say: "No, that would be un-American," "that would violate the discipline of the party," "that would violate the sacredness of property," we are appealing to so many imitation absolutes, each of which, if it works according to the intention with which it is invoked, suspends the valid process of ascertaining the values of conduct from inquiry into its functional workings. We simply ask again: to what degree is this substitution of taboo for inquiry typical of transition in general? We must be on the watch for it in all theoretical or practical treatment of social problems.

There immediately follows a passage which illustrates another familiar aspect of the psychology of transition, viz., *the grasp of a perception which is progressive in its chief meaning, but apprehension of it only in a form and degree which lend themselves to defense of the traditional*. Treitschke's phrase for the particular idea at this point is "*the historical delimitation of all human life*." What he means is one of the foundation ideas of modern sociology, viz., that personality is always on the one side a function of the previous and contemporary group experience. We might abstract the passage and use it in a collection of select sociological readings. The idea has hardly been expressed better anywhere. The use to which Treitschke tries to put the perception which he so well expresses is, however, to carry the conclusion: *therefore, being a historical product, a human condition cannot be transformed by deliberate continuance of the historical process!* This was the precise issue later between Herbert Spencer and Lester F. Ward. Today practically every psychologist and sociologist says: "Because we have seen

that man is a product of a historical process, therefore on with the process! Let us men raise ourselves to men of higher powers by a more conscious process, and with the use of accumulating resources for achievement in pursuance of the human program which has been going on less consciously and with inferior equipment, up to the present time."

The passage reads:

Man alone is an historical existence, and hence the one true societary being. He receives in language and morality, in law and industry, the works of the fathers. They live with him and he is effective by means of them. He stands as a living, and if he wills, a conscious link in the chain of times. Step by step he feels the limitations which are set to the historical will. He lives only in and through submitting himself to the aggregate culture of his people. What occasionally oppresses a genius by appearing to be a narrowing fetter is for the inert majority a wholesome spur to activity and progress. The generations of a people's life are joined together and limited by a community of views about life, from which even the strong man cannot break away. How eloquently did Niebuhr champion against Fichte, the glorifier of the unlimited power of the will, the noble theorem that the richest poetic gifts could not have produced a complete work of art in the days of Alexander the Great! The strong as well as the weak feel this dependence. The business man loses money and trouble when he offers goods for sale which no longer satisfy the wants of his time. The most talented inventor starves, if his creative idea outruns the intelligence of the time. Ten years later, perhaps, the same idea brings new well-being to thousands, and the name of the dead lives in all mouths. Such tragic cases, which the socialists love to exploit in charges against society, spring necessarily from the nature of man as an historical being. The recurrence of them could not be prevented by any conceivable form of social order, for who can deceive himself with the fond illusion that King Mob, if he came to power in Icaria, would better and more promptly evaluate the ideas of great minds than the public opinion of today in the market of free competition.

The last sentence is a perfectly valid application of the analysis, so far as it goes, but it is equally valid to go a step farther and to conclude that: after men have carried on this process of historical development some stages more, they may be able to substitute something that will do better than either King Mob or "free competition," in "evaluating the ideas of great minds" or indeed any other great or petty human activities. To be able to suppose that this perception of the gradual forming of personalities through

historical cause and effect amounts to a reason why the *Verein* should not go ahead with its constructive program is almost certainly an incident of social transition. It is a case of partially thinking things through, of seeing part way through the connections of relations, and of jumping at conclusions instead of tracing out the rest of the relations. We should now say: Because German society is a historical product, the work of all the Germans, with such help and hindrance as they have had from the rest of mankind for centuries, therefore, it is not only permissible and desirable, but inevitable that the Germans, such as they have thus historically become, should exert their personality as their predecessors did in being themselves, that is, in exerting themselves, and thus in becoming more completely themselves, and so in continuing the process of creating their successors.

Treitschke's alternative was the opposite of all this—Because our generation is a historical product, therefore the institutions of our generation are finalities. In other words, this is a conception of the historical process which, if taken literally, would make the process a constant march up to our own time, but an eternal halt forever after.

Once more, just as Treitschke has made use of the ambiguous middle term "absolute" to support his plea for immutability of existing German institutions, so he constructs another argument on the same ground plan by the same sophistical use of the term "aristocratic." His primary proposition is: "The civic society of a wealthy people is always an aristocracy even under a democratic constitution." Again we may accept the generalization, but we must demand: what of it? Treitschke's effort is to deduce from the proposition the conclusion: "Therefore, the same sort of aristocracy, the same class structure with the same kind and degree of power over the rest of the community which now exists in Germany, must remain forever." There was nothing whatever in the program of the *Verein*, or in the argument of Schmoller, which might not have been expressed with complete accuracy in terms of aristocracy and mediocrity. We might paraphrase the reform arguments throughout in variations of the proposition: We must develop a higher type of aristocracy in Germany to serve better in discharge



of the tasks now in sight, including leadership of a higher grade of mediocrity. Schmoller's whole argument was to the effect that the Prussian monarchy, and the bureaucratic organization under the monarchy, must take the lead in the work of improvement next in order. This is farthest from a denial that aristocracy is a universal feature of economically prosperous societies. It is rather a proclamation that aristocracy, like every other normal human relationship, is itself in the process of evolution. Exchange of better functioning aristocracies for worse functioning aristocracies is one of the most familiar and effective steps in social improvement.

This, by the way, is a commonplace in our American type of party government. We are merely not in the habit of expressing it in these terms. We are familiar with the proposition that political reform in the United States consists chiefly in exchanging one political machine for another, "turning the rascals out." The party machine is the American political aristocracy. Every organization of leadership is an aristocracy within its sphere of influence. Mr. Roosevelt's attempt to capture the government for a new party in 1912 might have been described, if successful, as the rise of a newer aristocracy to compete with the older aristocracies composing the Republican and Democratic party machines. The valid argument for or against the change in either the German or the American case was not that either change would be an attempted abolition of the aristocracy necessary to the relationship of leaders to led. The only pertinent argument was that the aristocracy involved in the older or the newer régime, in either case, was an aristocracy which seemed better adapted to the tasks of its time than the type of aristocracy which it opposed.

After exploiting as well as he could the assumed absoluteness of aristocracy, Treitschke returns to another of his negations, which we have already sufficiently noticed. He says: "*It is by no means the task of history to introduce all men to the enjoyment of all the goods of civilization.* . . . " He continues:

There is one way only to give all men all the goods of civilization. It is as simple as it is sure. Merely turn loose the beast in men, reduce the scale of general culture so low that the sage can know, enjoy, and possess no more than the fool, take the rule, since a community cannot exist without leadership,

out of the hands of the cultured and rich and transfer it to the fists of the rude and the poor, i.e. to King Mob, and the hideous *égaliser les intelligences* will be literally realized.

Without resorting to the explanation that Treitschke was intentionally misrepresenting the reformers, we have no way of accounting for his position except as an exhibit of paralyzed vision. In accordance with what we have said above, there is no difficulty whatever in writing specifications of conceivably long reaches of advance for the multitude in appropriating all the goods of civilization, without a semblance of communism, without a modification in present social structure, but simply in the course of operating our present social institutions with easily imaginable sublimation of social aims. Indeed, just this has been going on to a considerable degree during the last generation in all the civilized countries of the world. Our growing social purpose is that the minimum member of a civilized community shall start life with a sound body; and to insure this we are closing in on one another with demands that none but the fit shall propagate their kind. We are resolving that the units of coming generations shall start in communities equipped with all the known sanitary and hygienic appliances to assure physical conditions of living in accordance with our present knowledge of the laws of health. We are making up our minds that all children and youth shall have a chance to acquire the rudimentary technique of intelligent partnership in the world's work; the elementary knowledge which facilitates communication of ideas and some training for occupational efficiency, which shall make the individual able to supply some social demand. We are insisting upon a level of competition in all occupations which shall not permit work to exhaust the powers of workers, but shall leave a margin of time and strength for those human interests to which the bread-winning activities should be tributary. We are learning how to combine social resources so that those goods of life which only the favored few could command by their private resources may be within the reach of the many through wise use of common resources—playgrounds, parks, amusements, music, and the other arts, higher vocational and general education, the scientific output of museums, laboratories, institutes for research, the advantages

of publicity through all the services of printers' art and publishers' enterprise, the ministries of religion, through extension of religious activities so that they will find men everywhere and need not be sought far from the ordinary man's orbit. We are working out institutions for the insurance through life of every socially loyal man and woman; so that all may help to bear the burden of those incalculable accidents of life to which each is exposed, and none may be left to the sheer mercy of chance, provided he has faithfully tried to fill his place in the world's program.

This is an ideal which might conceivably have been carried out in Russia, if the Czar had been a sufficiently strong benevolent despot to control the Grand Ducal oligarchy in assent to the program. It would not, so far, necessarily have changed the external structure of Russia nor of a more civilized state.

There is one item in the schedule of typical human goods, to be sure, which the titles mentioned do not cover. High in the ranks of the goods of life is exercise of *self-determination*, expression of one's own valuation of one's own interests, both as a person and as a partner in society, without arbitrary suppression of one's individual initiative by any other person or interest; the function of self-government in the individual, and of sharing in proportion to the functional value of the personal equation of each in the self-government of the groups to which each belongs. This is a human good which must certainly change social structures in proportion as it is achieved by larger fractions of mankind, till no vestige is left in civilized communities of arbitrary superiority of one man or one class over another. Realization of this good is a growing aim of modern communities—growing not merely in reality, but growing also in definiteness of conscious purpose and program. Every interest existing among the members of communities must be recognized as having its proportional claims to unfettered suffrage in the community councils. Whether this, that, or the other device will be most useful in realizing this purpose is a subsidiary matter. The fundamental thing is that the process of admitting all men to a share in all the goods of life, as thus explained, is not, as it appeared to Treitschke, a choice between King Mob and an aristocracy with power to dictate to a majority. Human

interests themselves are a progressive hierarchy. Explain it how we will in philosophical theory, the higher in men is in constant campaign for supremacy over the lower. Few scientific generalizations have a wider basis of inductive proof than this. Civilization is a cumulative exhibit of the persistent forereaching of humanity for better things, after the more immediately necessary things have been secured. It is a very superficial interpretation of history to construe progress in the higher ranges of human achievement, as Treitschke does, as a gift which foreordained governors of the masses have handed down to the masses, and consequently a revelation that humanity can lead no higher life unless it perpetuates a dictating class. The higher achievements of men are not the product of an arbitrary type of human institutions. They are the realization of typical human interests, working hitherto mostly through arbitrary social institutions, but relatively eternal, while the institutions are relatively accidental and transitory. Human beings, not merely privileged castes, want all the goods realizable in life. Human beings have the latent capacity to learn discrimination among goods, and in the course of time to give merited preference to those that deserve the higher place. If Americans were ever in doubt of this, our public and private educational system should be more than enough to banish the doubt. Our comparatively young civilization has developed a system of schools which is more astonishing than our economic achievements. These people who rank in the opinion of Europeans as greedy materialists have not only cheerfully but enthusiastically taxed themselves, and some of them doubly, to build and operate public schools from the lowest to the highest grades, and parallel denominational schools, which, considering the youth of our institutions in general, compare favorably with the cultural institutions of any country in the world. And this is the point—we have done it without the help of a governing caste. In short, with all the faults of democracy up to date, there is reliable scientific sanction for the democratic faith: Give humanity a chance, and humanity will demand for itself all the goods attainable by humanity, and these goods will be arranged in a juster hierarchy by free humanity than by any conceivable dictatorship by a part of humanity over the whole.

Treitschke's discussion does not follow a progressive order from one position to another in a series of logical dependence, and it would be impossible to rearrange the essay so that its different parts would fall into such dependence. It is rather a number of attacks from different angles of approach. They all aim to halt the march of events toward the ideal of admitting increasing proportions of Germans "to a share in all the goods of civilization." The strategy of this obstructive campaign is a variation of the effort to show that maintenance of the traditional social structure is vital to preservation of civilization in general. Although we are at a disadvantage in taking up considerations in turn which merely reassert this underlying contention in different terms, following the writer's own order is the most convenient alternative.

We come, then, next, to a symptom of transition which we have already referred to in another connection, viz., discrimination of relations which appeal as facts equally to men on the traditional and on the innovating side of the situation, but interpretation of the facts as supports of the stationary and the progressive conception respectively. So far as Treitschke could see, the issue presented by the *Verein* reduced to a choice between aristocracy and mobocracy, or, as he viewed it, social control by classes that produce and guard the higher goods of civilization versus classes whose interests are barbaric. The real issue which is the generic social problem of the democratic period, especially since the French Revolution, is between an aristocracy of structure and an aristocracy of function. The one is rude, and naïve, and elementary, and provisional. The other is mature, and reasonable, and developed, and dependable. The aristocrat by institutional foreordination may be a stupid and dangerous brute. The aristocrat by virtue of human service is to that extent a tested agent of the social process and deserving of prestige among his fellows in the degree of the importance of his service in the whole social scheme. Treitschke had not gone beyond the assumption that traditional status must be relied upon as assurance of the social functions. The democratic faith is that discharge of the social functions must be relied upon to earn such status and prestige as are henceforth to be tolerated. Treitschke insisted that social merit must be imputed to a structural

aristocracy, and social faith must be reposed in it. Democracy raises the opposite demand that services alone shall insure social prestige. It is the difference between imputed righteousness and essential righteousness.

We Americans have invented a political aristocracy which is an intermediate term between the aristocracy of status and the aristocracy of function, viz., the aristocracy of political pull. This is an institution which has all the defects except that of permanence, which have been brought home to the old régime, and it affords no assurance that it will display the merits attributed to it by democratic optimism. Office holding by people without qualifications for office, but because they have performed service for a party, was a phenomenon with which Treitschke was not enough acquainted to be able to use this by-product of democracy as an effective contrast with the services of an aristocratic bureaucracy. As between the two types of political institution, it is by no means certain that our American type of civil service is to be preferred to the older class monopoly of civic functions. The latter certainly did develop certain ideals of efficiency which are not strikingly in evidence in our American system. Our last word about the system, however, the ground on which we may defend it against Treitschke's type of aristocracy, is that it is an institution in the making, that as we have it, little may be said in its favor except that it is a necessary intermediate condition between a statical régime which less fully insures satisfactory discharge of social functions and a genuinely functional régime.

The particular fact which Treitschke here calls up is the falsity of the proletarian assumption that manual workers are the only workers. He is clear-cut in his expression of the contrary, but he halts there with the implied conclusion: Therefore the classes which have the opportunity to do the most work must have the honors and emoluments and powers that belong with the work, whether they do it or not; instead of going on to the functional principle, viz., that doing the work must be the condition of receiving credit for the work—function before reward.

The passage in which the *non sequitur* comes out most clearly is the following:

If we would judge these necessary antitheses without passion, we must first consider that it is after all merely a theoretical abstraction to place laborers and the higher classes in antithesis with each other, as two separate worlds. Socialism fights no objection of its opponents more vehemently than the assertion that *we are all laborers*. The reason is plain. Sometimes this trivial expression, say, in the mouth of a candidate for the Reichstag, serves merely as a cheap means of currying popular favor. Yet it correctly characterizes modern society, and strikes at the heart of the theory of class hatred. More relentlessly than ever before must every muscle of society be employed in labor. No one among us works harder than the German Kaiser, for the duties of his high office follow him step by step even into the gaiety of court celebrations. In this tremendous operation of labor countless intermediate members have been developed, which constitute an unbroken series, from the heights to the depths of society, and modify the antithesis of class conceptions. Who could designate the point in German society today where the so-called material and intellectual callings divide? Who can designate this point accurately, even among the employees of a great factory?

Classes in the legal sense [estates] have long since ceased to exist, and between the free social groups which still exist, and can never wholly disappear, there occurs an eternal coming and going. New forces rise, effete ones fall. Look at the family trees of families of the higher classes selected at will, and it is plain that the socialists deny the facts. It is hard to maintain the position won by ancestors, and it is easy, by fault or misfortune, "to fall out of the caste." Sharing in the highest goods of civilization depends, moreover, by no means so exclusively upon the possession of material goods as socialism asserts. The sons of the cultured middle classes are undoubtedly better educated and with more human standards than the spoiled children of the rich. So long as theology was still in accord with the thought of the time, the narrow walls of the German parsonage were the classical soil [*sic!*] of good training of children. Countless is the number of important men whose cradle was in these modest homes, and if we retain courage to assert the wholesome severity of our common schools against all attacks of socialistic undiscipline, it will turn out presently, and in the future still oftener than in the past, that gifted pupils will be put in a position by this modest and thorough school equipment, to rise above the average culture and to win their way in the freedom of methodical knowledge.

If we should strike out one or two touches, here and there in the passage, like the use of the term "socialistic" as an epithet of reproach, there would be nothing in the passage itself to indicate the use to which the author intended to put it as an argument. In his mind the proper inference is: Therefore, hold fast to all the safeguards of aristocratic privilege which are left. To the man who has begun to judge functionally instead of traditionally, the

equally evident implication is: Therefore, abolish as completely as possible all arbitrary devices which tend to perpetuate the opportunity of members of one class to collect rewards for service not performed, and to limit the certainty that other classes will be able to enjoy the equivalent of services actually rendered. The program of the *Verein* did not contain any premature specifications of persons to whom this generalization would apply. It called for investigation of German conditions, in order to discover where and to what extent this inequality of distribution existed, and it proposed thereupon to carry the investigation farther into ways and means of reducing the inequality to a nearer approach to justice.

Again Treitschke has his eye on another vital principle in society, when he insists that the socialistic agitation has weakened the sense of the necessity of labor in the masses.

As we read his different homilies on this theme, we feel their untimeliness, and their tactlessness, and their disproportion, yet it would be a mistake on this account to disregard the serious reality which he had in mind. When the belated sections of society are in a state of embittered class consciousness, it is a poor time for the classes against whom they feel resentment to attempt to improve matters by talking down to the agitated about their duty to work more faithfully. This duty may have been disregarded in all sorts of ways, but the classes against whom the grievance is felt must go a long way toward showing that the charges are unfounded, before it will be wise or expedient for them to assume the rôle of preachers of the obligation of labor. In terms of American conditions now, rather than of German conditions a generation ago, it is beyond human wisdom to declare whether exploitation or sabotage is at this moment the greater social menace or the more difficult and imminent social problem. We may be sure that there will never be stable social peace nor the highest prosperity, either material or moral, until every laborer does his work for all it is worth, whether in the lower ranks or the higher. There is no doubt, for instance, that the policy of scamping work is a considerable factor in the "high cost of living."

Possibly sabotage, in its deliberate and its unconscious forms, is a heavier burden on prosperity than all the forms of parasitism



in the economically superior classes. Whether this is true or not, and it is beyond conclusive demonstration one way or the other, it is reasonably certain that the class which has the economic advantage must set the example of conspicuous fairness, and must make it convincing to the backward classes, before the elimination of scamping can make much progress. Manual laborers and the wage-earning classes in general have no such intellectual and moral advantage over the propertied classes that they can be expected to put more magnanimity into their work than they can discover in their employers. It does not help the matter, but rather adds insult to supposed injury, if employers who are at odds with their help are philanthropists in other relations, with means which are in dispute between the help and themselves. The corporation must be conspicuously fair in all its dealings with its employees before it can expect to exert an influence on its employees which will tend to save the economic and social waste of sabotage. This spirit of fairness must go beyond all the charitable coddlings of employees. It must show itself in taking them into the confidence of the management, in a much more democratic way than many employers believe possible, and in encouraging their self-respect by treating them as though they were entitled to respect as human beings, not merely to the share of the maintenance fund that is necessary to keep them going as workers. This consideration applies to a considerable fraction of Treitschke's argument, and he seems to ignore it most blissfully.

It certainly must have aggravated every trade unionist to whom the words were reported to hear such a passage as this:

The dogma of the exploitation of man by man roughly rends in pieces the complex unity of society. Strong peoples have always lived in the belief that the first commandment of folk-thrift is: *labor! much, very much, and well!* Only in the second rank came the question about the distribution of the fruits of the common labor. Shall this fine old principle be forgotten today, while aversion to labor and relaxation of discipline are on the increase in the lower classes? Before we talk to the masses about violation of their human dignity, we should calmly say to them: First show yourselves men! Labor, in order that the total resources may increase! And if state and society apply a part of the total product of labor to build laboratories for the explorers of nature, or academies for the artists, be certain that this application will bear fruit for you also. Such fruits are, to be sure, not so immediately enticing as the showers

of gold from the state of which Lassalle talked, yet they compare favorably with the fantasies of the socialists through the trivial circumstance that they are real!

The diabolical fatuity of such assertions is in the fact that they are truth out of place. It is easy to imagine that if the Archangel Michael appeared in the world today, his message to wage-earners would be along these lines: More conscientious labor! Be sure you give a hundred cents' worth of work for a dollar's wage before you accuse the wage system or the employer of misusing the wage system. And the Archangel would be a more timely minister of grace with such a message than when he slew the dragon. But what sermon would he preach when he entered Congress, and state and municipal legislatures, and boards of trade, and directors' rooms? He would not be the old dragon-slayer if he did not wither men of financial and political power with the shame of their pettiness in loving power more than righteousness, and parade of patronage more than justice, and the arrogance of their legal rights more than magnanimity in leading the testing of legal rights, to see whether they tend more to increase or decrease of arbitrary distinctions between partners in human tasks. It is certainly to laugh when an attorney of *one of the parties in interest* takes it upon himself to pose as the Archangel Michael of the labor conflict, and to pronounce judgment upon the other party in terms of the self-righteousness of his clients. But this has been a large part of the inwardness of the class struggle in all civilized countries since the industrial revolution. Each party in interest has been trying to sit in judgment over the other, instead of trying to establish some sort of social tribunal which would actually be dispassionate toward each *ex parte* claim. We may go farther than this, and say that in comparison the classes with economic and political power show themselves more pusillanimous and more ungenerous in obstructing a program like that of the *Verein* than the labor classes do in any of their obstructive programs. The academic and professional classes are at bottom more in sympathy with economic and political tradition than they are with anything that would be subversive of essential economic or political justice. Their judgment would lean toward conservatism rather than toward a really destruc-

tive radicalism, if such an alternative actually came to the issue. The conservative classes certainly have no occasion to fear that their cause would be betrayed by partisan prejudice if it were admitted to examination by the quasi-academic elements in society. The proletariat has the more plausible reason for such fear. The longer the influential classes oppose thorough judicial examination of the bases and structure of our economic and moral institutions the stronger will be the *prima facie* case against them.

We have another illustration of the sophistical use of the ambiguous middle term in another form of Treitschke's talking down to the labor class in elaboration of the text, "*Labor* is an end in itself." The conclusion which Treitschke tries to enforce by means of this edifying dictum is precisely Chancellor Day's doctrine, "The rich should always apply the Golden Rule, and the poor trust in God and not complain." But suppose it turns out that the rich are not applying the Golden Rule, and the poor discover that they wouldn't be trusting in God unless they did complain. What then? "Why," says Treitschke, "the alternative is: Remember that labor is an end in itself." Suppose we take Treitschke at his word. What have we got? Why, we have got one of the most complicated problems in human experience, viz.: What is labor, and what kinds of labor are more evidently ends in themselves than others? For instance, is labor in the weave room of a cotton mill, at a killing rate of speed in tending too many looms, in an atmosphere that is murderous—is such labor as that more or less an end in itself than labor to bring to the notice of the nation that parents of future citizens are working in these conditions; or even later to win for one's self and one's comrades better conditions? The only pertinence of Treitschke's claim was the implication that every laborer in Germany should accept the particular type of labor which his lot in life had assigned to him, as "an end in itself" and let well enough alone. That is, labor which is accepted as a bar to labor to improve the type of labor is an end in itself! Compared with a fallacy that ends in such self-stultification, Nirvana is a doctrine of surpassing spiritual dignity. Such trifling is not argument. It is merely betrayal of the essential dishonesty of the obstructive mental attitude. Treitschke indulges

in a long preachment on the theme: "All reputable labor is honorable." If he were a weak-minded man, he might be defended by the plea that he did not know the platitude was impertinent. He was by no means a weak-minded man, and he should therefore have known that it was hypocritical to confuse the issue by contending that reputable labor is reputable when the real problem was: How may labor that is not reputable be made more disreputable, and labor that is honorable be made more comfortable and efficient and remunerative?

Then Treitschke introduces a pseudo-pietistic passage which is an equally elementary logical fallacy, i.e., that poverty itself, rather than brave struggle to overcome the disadvantages of poverty, is the admirable condition; *ergo*, eternalize the poverty rather than stimulate the struggle. The same passage is unctuous with the implication that resignation rather than aspiration is the essence of Christian faith. Again, *ergo*, if the poor should succeed in improving their condition, there would be no more religion!

It is a relief to reach the passage in which Treitschke begins most positively to illustrate another general law of the psychology of transition, viz.: *In a period of transition everyone baptizes his doctrine with the name "progress."* We are certainly familiar with the phenomenon in American politics at this moment. In his own esteem, every politician in the United States today is progressive, from those who are progressing backward to those who are progressing headlong.

Moreover, in every period of transition (or to simplify the proposition we may confine it to periods of transition from worse to better conditions) the phenomena are always confused by much obstructive action on the part of men who are already in sympathy, but not in reasoning, on the side of all that is essential in the forward movement.

Treitschke's traditionalism voiced itself in very dogmatic assertions of the necessary permanence of factors in the existing German social order which were mere details. Having delivered himself of his unalterable opinions about these details, he passes to expression of his belief that:

There is going on in the state and society a mighty development, the growing realization of the idea of humanity, and this process goes on only in the

course of severe struggles. State and society belong to the ethical world. They live according to moral laws, and these are distinguished from physical laws by the fact that they sway personal life, i.e., that they reach their realization not always and everywhere, but only partially and occasionally. . . . There is a natural conflict between the selfishness of different men. . . . The unbridled selfishness of individuals leads necessarily to class conflicts. . . . Society cannot automatically achieve an assured peace or a permanent order, but it must come through the state, through the moral will of the totality, which is something quite different from the sum of the selfish individual wills, and is related to them as duty to desire, etc.

There is so much along this line in the rest of the essay that if one should stumble upon that part of the paper without having read the beginning, it would be a puzzle whether the writer was on the whole arguing with Schmoller or against him. In fact the two men evidently did not know, and it is impossible at this distance to find out how far they really were apart on concrete details. As is always the case in a social transition, the man on the traditional side distrusts the theories of the innovators, and fears the extremes to which they would be committed if they were able to go as far as extravagant interpretations of their reasonings would lead. Because of this dissent from abstractions and abhorrence of imaginable consequences, the traditionalist sets himself against programs which he might approve and promote if proposed on their own concrete merits, or upon theoretical grounds that more nearly resembled his own.

We have had in the United States a generation filled with instances under this general form in the matter of the tariff. People have called themselves and each other "protectionists" and "free traders," with occasional occurrence of the species "for revenue only." Analysis of the debates, public and private, on this subject, since the first Morrill bill, would show the most heterogeneous consortings, under the same title, of people who believed in very different policies; and at the same time the most irrational fighting between people who adopted different party titles, but really wanted the same thing. Thus people were arguing for protection when they meant things varying from the 10 to 20 per cent necessary to give an "infant industry" a market while it was learning to stand on its own feet, up to the rate which those protectionists wanted who would prefer to exclude foreign goods altogether. On

the other hand, as was illustrated by the Wilson bill, people called themselves free traders when what they wanted was tariff schedules ranging from 40 per cent to over 100 per cent at a time when an average rate of 20 per cent was regarded in Europe as high protection. Men who held these inconsistent views almost invariably represented their opponents as holding views so extreme that it certainly would have been the height of folly to follow them. The judicial method of dealing with the tariff has consequently been conspicuous by its absence to the present time, and is likely to be postponed indefinitely.

The particular bugaboo which throughout the essay Treitschke has suspected in Schmoller's program is the lineal progeny of the monster "equality" which the theory is supposed to harbor. It is extremely doubtful whether Schmoller really believed in an equality in actual practice different from that which Treitschke would approve, or at any rate different enough to be worth arguing about from the American point of view. They certainly differed about an abstract theory of distribution which was unnecessarily complicated with the antecedent theory of equality or non-equality. We might consider this difference to better purpose in connection with Treitschke's essay on the theory of distribution. Meanwhile we may quote Treitschke's own expression of what he thinks he has established in the present essay. It is his closing paragraph:

The civic society of a socialized folk is a natural aristocracy; it can and should assure the highest functions and enjoyments of civilization to a minority only, yet it allows everyone without exception to rise into the ranks of this minority. In the present century, Germany's cultured classes have never entirely forgotten their duties toward the lower classes, least of all in the much abused days of the emancipating social legislation of the North German Confederation. In the future also they will recognize these duties. They reject the illusion, however, that in the moral world there can be anything like a gift, or that any social reform can give to the laborers what a lying agitation threatens to destroy—the sense of the honor of labor. While bloody misdeeds tell of the demoralization of the masses, while demagogues preach on the streets the right not to work, and play with the works of centuries as with houses of cards, we men of culture will loyally guard the inheritance from our fathers, and we will fearlessly profess the proud old motto of German citizenship which the American Longfellow once translated from the roofs and towers of Nuremberg: "*The nobility of labor, the long pedigree of toil!*"

[To be continued]

## SOCIAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS

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Research in social science is hampered by the lack of indexes of abstracts of periodical literature. At the present time our research workers are far more handicapped than chemists or physicists because scientists in these latter subjects have resort to such publications as "Chemical Abstracts" and "Science Abstracts" wherein are found, systematically indexed, careful abstracts covering the whole field. A research worker in these sciences can do his preliminary reading with convenience and expedition. In contrast, the social scientist who wants to exhaust the periodical literature on his subject cannot depend on the existing abstracts published in social science journals, however excellent these may be as individual pieces of work, since the existing abstracts do not fully cover the field. Consequently, he must supplement them by considerable reading from original articles and run the risk of missing something really important.

In view of this situation, the present statement has been prepared by the Committee on Social Science Abstracts of the Social Science Research Council. It is hoped that members of the social science societies, as well as any other interested persons, will study this statement, in order that they may be prepared to make suggestions to the chairman of the committee at any time, and particularly to be prepared to take action on one of the alternative plans presented at the annual meetings of the social science societies next December.

At the present time the *American Political Science Review* and the *Journal of the American Statistical Association* do not print systematic abstracts of their literature. The *American Economic Review* has for some years printed brief abstracts. The *American Journal of Sociology* has since July, 1921, printed in each of its issues several pages of carefully classified abstracts. The original system of classification was enlarged in March, 1922, and since this time has comprised ten main headings and forty-eight sub-headings. Since the abstract plan of the *American Journal of Sociology* is more complete than that of any of the other social science journals, the main headings are presented herewith, with the suggestion that the reader examine the complete classification with its subordinate headings, as it is found in Volume XIX, pages 373-74 of the *American Journal of Sociology*. The existing classification is not final,

nor have the methods of abstracting been yet perfected, but the scheme is serviceable. The main headings are as follows:

- I. Personality: The Individual and the Person
- II. The Family
- III. Peoples and Cultural Groups
- IV. Conflict and Accommodation Groups
- V. Communities and Territorial Groups
- VI. Social Institutions
- VII. Social Science and the Social Process
- VIII. Social Pathology: Personal and Social Disorganization
- IX. Methods of Investigation
- X. General Sociology and Methodology of the Social Sciences

The following alternative plans for improving the existing abstracts of social science are suggested for consideration by members of the social science societies. It is assumed that only articles containing the results of original research will be abstracted.

1. Independent and separate publication in bulletin form

- a) Abstract service to be maintained jointly by membership dues from the social science societies, and published as a separate monthly bulletin (the principles of editorial organization described under 2 (c) below are understood to apply to this plan)
- b) Or abstract service to be maintained jointly by social science societies with the cost of administration and publication met in whole or in part by a subsidy or grant of funds from some national foundation interested in social research (the principles of editorial organization described under 2 (c) below are understood to apply to this plan)
- c) Advantages of these plans
  - (1) The whole field of social science would be covered with approximate completeness so that cross-referencing would make accessible valuable leads from related fields, on which so much progress depends
  - (2) Duplication in abstracting would be avoided, such as would exist if every journal abstracted independently for its own clientele
  - (3) One large, strong abstract journal could secure by exchanges or purchase more current serial literature than could independent journals, and this would save duplicate subscriptions

2. Abstract services of the social science journals continued as at present, but—

- a) Present services enlarged to cover the field more intensively and comprehensively
- b) Methodology of abstracting systematized by acceptance of some mutually agreeable plan such as:
- c) Acceptance of guidance over abstracting to be exerted by some central editorial body representative of the whole field
  - (1) Which formulates a methodology of abstracting to be generally used
  - (2) To conform to some objective system of classification of subjects



- (3) Cross-referencing
- (4) To avoid unnecessary duplication in printing
- (5) Editing and abstracting paid
- d) Disadvantages of this plan as compared with (1) above
  - (1) Danger of duplication of abstracts of the same article in several journals. This is now a real difficulty in the abstracts of biological sciences
  - (2) The field would be incompletely covered and cross-referencing incomplete
  - (3) Current files of serial literature would not be as complete and there would be inevitable duplication of subscription costs
- 3. Enlargement of the present abstract services and creation of new services in existing social science journals where needed
  - a) Organization
    - (1) Editor-in-chief, four associate editors, one for each science, but unpaid
    - (2) Abstracting paid for by the page
  - b) Agreement on a common basis of classification of abstracts, each journal publishing in full all the abstracts relating to the field of its science and printing merely the scheme of classification of each of the other sciences, with a note referring the reader to these journals for full abstracts
  - c) The disadvantages of this plan are all the faults of plan (2), but in greater degree

It will be observed that the last plan is the least ambitious of the three and perhaps, in the present stage of development of the social sciences, the most practicable. This last plan would leave to each of the journals the details of its own abstracting, since only a loose type of common editorial organization would exist. On the other hand, the plan has such serious objections that it could be at best but a temporary makeshift.

The cost of the alternative plans would vary and it is probable that the third plan would be the least expensive. In this connection, it may be of interest to note that the abstract editor of the *American Journal of Sociology* now prints galley sheets of the abstracts of each issue. These may be had by all subscribers for \$1.00 a year. The subscriber then cuts up the galleys and pastes the separate abstracts on filing cards. The cost of chemical abstracts which are published according to plan (1), a, is \$6.80 per subscriber, with a subscribing membership of 13,000. The combined membership of the four social science associations is about 7,000.

F. STUART CHAPIN, *Chairman*

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA  
MINNEAPOLIS

Members of the Social Science Abstract Committee:

F. STUART CHAPIN, Sociology, Minnesota  
A. C. HANFORD, Political Science, Harvard  
DAVIS R. DEWEY, Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
WALTER F. WILLCOX, Statistics, Cornell

## NEWS AND NOTES

Notes of interest to the readers of the *Journal* should be in the hands of the editor of "News and Notes" not later than the tenth of the month preceding publication.

*American Sociological Society*.—President Charles A. Ellwood announces the following tentative outline of the program of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society to be held in the Auditorium Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, December 29-31.

CENTRAL TOPIC: "THE TREND OF OUR CIVILIZATION"

MONDAY, DECEMBER 29, 10:00 A.M.

Section on Social Research, *chairman*, W. F. Ogburn  
Ten-minute reports on research projects and papers

MONDAY, DECEMBER 29, 3:00 P.M.

Section on Social Psychology, *chairman*, Ellsworth Faris

MONDAY, DECEMBER 29, 8:00 P.M.

Joint Meeting with the American Economic Association and with the American Statistical Association, Presidential Addresses

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30, 10:00 A.M.

Section on Statistical Sociology, *chairman*, W. F. Willcox

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30, 3:00 P.M.

Section on International Relations, *chairman*, H. A. Miller

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30, 6:30 P.M.

Annual Dinner, American Sociological Society

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 10:00 A.M.

Section on Biological Factors, *chairman*, F. H. Hankins

*The Social Science Research Council*.—The Social Science Research Council, composed of representatives of the American Economic Association, the American Political Science Association, the American Statistical Association, and the American Sociological Society, has now at the beginning of its second year of existence several projects under way. The representatives of the American Sociological Society on the Council are F. Stuart Chapin, Shelby M. Harrison, and William F. Ogburn.

The spring meeting of the Council was held in Chicago, May 17. Reports of the various committees and conferences of the Council were submitted and discussed. These reports included those by the Committee on Survey of Social Science Research Agencies of which Professor Secrist is chairman, the Committee on the Publication of an Annual Digest of State Laws of which Professor Chamberlin is chairman, of the Committee on Abstracting Social Science Periodicals of which Professor Chapin is chairman. The Council also considered the report of the Conference on International News and Communication, held under the auspices of the Council in Washington, on May 2. The plan (for the formation of which a gift of \$2,500 has been made) contemplates "a thoroughly scientific and objective investigation of the instrumentalities involved in the world-wide action and dissemination of current news and opinion of international concern and of the underlying and related problems of the formation, expression, and significance of attitudes on international affairs." The following committee was appointed by the Council to take charge of the inquiry for which financial support could probably be secured: Mr. Walter S. Rogers, *chairman*, Dr. Franklin Adams, Professor Willard G. Bleyer, Mr. Bruce Bliven, Professor Jerome Davis, Dr. Edward F. Gay, Professor H. A. Miller, Professor Harold G. Moulton, Professor W. F. Ogburn, Dr. E. E. Slossen, Dean Walter Williams, Professor George E. Wilson.

The Committee on the Scientific Aspects of Human Migration was also appointed as follows: Miss Edith Abbott, *chairman*, Dr. W. C. Mitchell, Professor H. A. Miller, Professor John R. Commons, Professor R. C. Foerster, Professor John A. Fairlie, Professor F. A. Ogg, Professor Carl Wittke, Professor W. F. Ogburn, Dr. R. M. Yerkes, Dr. Clark Wissler, Miss Mary Van Kleeck. This committee is to consider the social aspects of the migration problem and is to act in co-operation with a similar committee of the International Research Council. An appropriation of \$15,500 for a study of the mechanization of industry in relation to migration has been made by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation. This project will be begun on July 1 under the auspices of the Bureau of Economic Research and in particular charge of Dr. Wesley C. Mitchell and Dr. Jerome Davis.

Professor Edmund E. Day, of the University of Michigan, was elected treasurer of the Council and fiscal organization and methods were outlined. Gifts of \$20,500 have already been made for the work of the Council, and other funds amounting to as much more are in immediate prospect. A gift of \$2,500 for general administration purposes has been received.

The Council appointed a committee to outline a plan for obtaining fellowships for post-doctorate work in social sciences. Of this committee Professor A. B. Hall is chairman, and the other members are Professor John R. Commons and Professor W. F. Ogburn. The officers of the Council are: chairman, Professor Charles E. Merriam, University of Chicago; secretary, Professor Horace Secrist, Northwestern University; treasurer, Professor Edmund E. Day, University of Michigan.

Suggestions for the development of the work of the Council are invited by its members. The Council also stands ready to advise regarding any especially significant or large-scale project in the field of social research. The next meeting of the Council will be held in November.

*The American Council of Learned Societies.*—The Council has been asked by the Carnegie Corporation to make a survey and report on the work of American learned societies in the field of the humanities and the social sciences. Information regarding the societies concerned, either in whole or in part, with the natural sciences is available through the National Research Council; but no systematic attempt has been made to collect information of this kind in the field of the humanities and the social sciences. It is hoped that a comprehensive report would be useful not only to the Carnegie Corporation in considering its various problems, but, if printed, to the individual societies, and in general to those interested in the promotion of scholarship in the United States.

Mr. Waldo G. Leland, of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, has been put in charge of the undertaking, and will begin his active duties July 1, 1924.

*L'Institut International de Sociologie.*—The officers of the International Institute of Sociology for the year 1924 are: president, Lord Balfour, president of the Sociological Society of London; vice-presidents, Antonio Dellepiane, formerly professor at the University of Buenos Aires, Salomon Reinach, member of the Institute of France, and Maurice Vauthier, professor of administrative law, University of Brussels; general secretary, René Worms, editor of the *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*; treasurer, P. L. Manouvrier, professor of physical anthropology, the School of Anthropology; and critic, Charles Gide.

Harry E. Barnes, Smith College, Kenyon L. Butterfield, Massachusetts State Agricultural College; and Charles J. Galpin, the Federal Department of Agriculture, have recently been elected associates of the International Institute of Sociology.

*The American Country Life Association.*—The Proceedings of the New Orleans Conference of 1921 on the subject of "Town and Country

Relationships" and the Proceedings of the New York Conference of 1922 on "Education of the Rural Community" have been completed and mailed. Through a grant from the trustees of the Russell Sage Foundation the publication of the Proceedings of the St. Louis Conference on "The Rural Home" is assured.

President Butterfield has asked a committee of the Association to study the whole field of rural education with the major objective in view of stating, in outline at least, an adequate system of education for rural America. Included in this statement will be a careful consideration of the educational functions of churches, since the topic for the next annual conference at Columbus, Ohio, November 7-11, 1924, is "Religion in Country Life." This topic, put in the form of a thesis by Dr. Butterfield, becomes: "The Vital Importance of Moral and Spiritual Forces in the Development of Country Life."

*Russell Sage Foundation.*—The trustees of the Russell Sage Foundation at their April meeting appointed Shelby M. Harrison as vice-general director of the Foundation, the appointment to take effect from May 1, 1924. For the present Mr. Harrison will continue as director of the department of surveys and exhibits, and in charge of the studies of social conditions of the regional plan of New York and its environs. Mr. Harrison graduated at Northwestern University in 1906 and did graduate work in economics and sociology at Boston and Harvard universities. His first experience in social surveying was with the Pittsburgh Survey in 1908. From 1910 to 1912 he was one of the editorial staff of the *Survey*. He joined the staff of the Foundation in 1912 when the department of surveys and exhibits was established and he was appointed its director by the trustees.

*Institute for Social Research.*—The Society for Social Research of the University of Chicago will hold its second Institute for Social Research in Chicago, August 18-27, 1924. While the Society is composed mainly of advanced graduate students and former graduate students of the University, participation in the Institute is open to all interested in sociological research. The purpose of the Institute is to provide a clinic for the presentation and criticism of methods of investigation. Persons planning to attend the Institute are invited to submit statements of their research projects and plans of research to the secretary of the Society for Social Research, Box 98, University of Chicago.

*An Experiment in Publication.*—The Republic Publishing Company, 421 W. 21st Street, New York, is initiating an interesting experiment of bringing out new and worth-while books in paper covers to sell for

\$1.00. The publisher states that the attempt is "to find out if the comparatively restricted sale of good books in this country is influenced by the question of price." The first volume in the series is *Social Discovery* by Eduard C. Lindeman.

*University of Missouri.*—The German publishing firm of W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart and Berlin, announce the publication of a German translation of Professor C. A. Ellwood's book, *The Reconstruction of Religion*. The translation was made upon the initiative and under the direction of Professor Eugen Schwiedland, professor of economics in the University of Vienna, Austria, and secretary of the Vienna Chamber of Commerce. A few copies of the book have recently been received in the United States.

The American Book Company announce the publication on the first of September of a revised edition of Professor Ellwood's *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*. This is the third revision of this text.

*University of Nebraska.*—Professor J. O. Rankin has compiled a series of pamphlets on farm life in the state, based on studies of 1,145 homes in ten areas. Number 185, "The Nebraska Farm Family," deals with some phases of land tenure. In Number 191 Professor Rankin makes a comparison of living conditions of owners, part-owners, and tenants. In Number 196 is a discussion of "Nebraska Farm Tenancy, Some Community Phases."

*University of Southern California.*—Dr. Erle Fiske Young of the faculty of the University of Chicago has been elected assistant professor of sociology. His is the sixth chair in sociology that has been created at the University of Southern California since the department was established in 1915.

Dr. William C. Smith is giving half-time as expert investigator for the Pacific Coast Race Relations Survey.

Under the direction of Drs. C. M. Case and W. C. Smith, new courses are being organized in the field of race and national heritages.

*University of Washington.*—The department of sociology through its society, the Alpha Kappa Delta has begun the publication of a quarterly news sheet in mimeograph form.

The department, in co-operation with the social service agencies, plans to compile and publish a *Hand-book of Social Resources of the City of Seattle*. Mr. H. A. Waldkoenig is directing the work.

## REVIEWS

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*Anthropology.* By A. L. KROEBER. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923. Pp. viii+523. \$4.00.

To the sociologists who are alert to the value of anthropological material and methodology in analyzing the problems in their own field of observation and study, Professor Kroeber's volume will come as one of the most welcome books of the year. That the anthropologists are massing a wealth of material that is of the utmost importance is being more and more recognized by the students of sociology, as the growing interest in the cultural approach to the subject shows. But thus far the anthropological material has been more or less scattered, or published in form not altogether suitable for use in the classroom. Professor Kroeber has brought the material together, and in a lucid and simple style presents it all so that even the most elementary student can understand. The book is admirably adapted for use as a textbook, yet at the same time is free from the formalized and hackneyed style that so often characterizes textbooks. The one factor detracting from the volume is the absence of footnotes and bibliography.

The author begins his discussion with a consideration of the scope and character of anthropology, pointing out the confusion that so often results from the failure to separate biological and social factors. To him the "specific task and place in the sun for anthropology" is the interpretation of the social phenomena into which both organic and social causes enter. The remainder of the book is largely given over to a discussion of this, and the methodology to be employed in untangling these factors. The history of man and of man's early culture are traced out in the first chapters, and in a most concise and readable manner. This gives background to the chapters on living races, and race problems which follow. Here, after appraising the biological and social elements, Professor Kroeber concludes that "most of the alleged existing evidence on race endowment is likely to be worthless." Cultural factors seem to outweigh the biological. This leads directly to the detailed consideration of culture.

Cultural diffusion and parallelism are treated at length. To the author, diffusion is the mechanism of greatest importance. Several

chapters are written to illustrate the principle, and these include discussions of the spread of the alphabet, the arch, and other cultural traits. In describing the growth of a primitive American Indian religion, Professor Kroeber switches slightly from his main thesis, the separation of organic and social factors in society, and becomes engrossed in the problem of the time element in the spread of culture traits. The manner in which this entire problem of diffusion is handled, however, is most praiseworthy. It is treated simply, yet in sufficient detail to make for perfect clarity. The final two chapters on the growth of civilization, in which the cumulative nature of culture is described, are particularly valuable in demonstrating the importance of the cultural factor in understanding human society, and make evident the necessity of understanding cultural borrowing before attempting to interpret it.

Professor Kroeber's book deserves most careful reading by all sociologists. It is tolerant, scholarly, and well written. And the reader who will couple it with Lowie's *Primitive Society*, Goldenweiser's *Early Civilization*, Wissler's *Man and Culture*, and Ogburn's *Social Change* will provide himself with an adequate background that will aid greatly in any analysis of social relationships. These volumes, with practically no overlapping, constitute a most valuable source of material for the sociologist.

MALCOLM M. WILLEY

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

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*Introduction to Rural Sociology.* By PAUL L. VOGT. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1922. Pp. xv+457. \$3.00.

In 1917, Dr. Vogt, then recently professor of rural economics and sociology in the Ohio State University, published the first edition of this volume. It was one of the early volumes in this field and met with a wide reception and use because of the fine scholarship displayed throughout its pages, its substantial qualities, its contributions to the understanding of the rural field, and its fine readable style. In its twenty-eight chapters it discussed the main features of the life of rural society. Dr. Vogt had had much experience in the rural field by reason of his survey and investigative work in Ohio, and was qualified to speak authoritatively because of his first-hand knowledge of his subjects. He gave especially valuable treatments to the affairs of the rural church and to the conditions and life of the villages—the halfway places between country and city. The present volume issued in 1922 is a revision of the former one. The chapter headings and subheadings are the same. But



considerable new matter has been incorporated as appears in the fact that there are fourteen more pages in the new than in the old volume. Meanwhile, since writing the earlier edition, Dr. Vogt has functioned as superintendent of the department of rural work, board of home missions and extension work, of the Methodist Episcopal church; and so has had wide contact with rural life and the rural church all over the nation. This experience has helped him to add substantially to the value of the new edition. He has brought the statistics pertaining to national affairs up to date and has added a number of new maps.

The schools and the reading public will be glad to have this valuable treatise brought up to date and improved.

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*Race and National Solidarity.* By CHARLES CONANT JOSEY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923. Pp. 227. \$2.50.

This book by Professor Josey is sociologically immoral. Here is a volume that frankly calls for national and racial arrogance. Here are denounced all efforts toward humanitarianism; here are branded as pernicious all attempts to broaden the consciousness of kind beyond race and national boundaries. The volume should be classed as philosophical jingoism; it raises all of the old bugaboos of race and "colored perils," although in a language and style that gives a semblance of profundity. The thesis is as simple as it is unsound: the Western world at present is dominated by two sets of ideals, one centering in democratic and internationalistic aspirations; the other centering in race, nationalism, and imperialism. The two cannot exist together; one should be overthrown. Professor Josey devotes his chapters to the attempt to prove that it is internationalism and humanitarianism that must be discarded, and the narrow doctrine of race and national solidarity embraced.

According to the argument, the greatest good to mankind will come if the Western world recognizes that it is dominant, and that the white race and civilization are supreme. This supremacy rests largely on innate differences between the white races and the colored, differences making for an intenser group life among white peoples. World-welfare involves the continuation of this white supremacy, and an essential part of this is the exploitation of the colored by the white divisions of mankind: "Just as we see man as a species dominating, excelling, and living on other forms of life, so we see the white race, acting as masters,

and drawing to themselves a large part of the wealth of the world. The white races dominate mankind. They are the rulers par excellence. In the white man the evolutionary process seems to have reached its highest point. He is the culminating achievement."

The assumptions made by Professor Josey are most striking, and even though one disagrees violently with most of the thesis, there is a certain admiration for the fearlessness with which he has carried his logic to its ultimate conclusion. The book is essentially dogmatic, though here there is not space to discuss this in detail. The simple manner in which Professor Josey disposes of the critics of the mental tests (p. 145), and the glibness with which he eliminates the anthropologists and cultural determinists (p. 83) is rather annoying. More than this, it is not at all apparent that Professor Josey is intimately familiar with the accomplishments and civilizations of the peoples he relegates to secondary places. Especially is this true of his discussion of the orientals. Further, to one who has read carefully the literature of sociology, it is hard to see how Professor Josey arrives at his premise that internationalism and group loyalty are totally antagonistic. It is also hard to see, in view of the present chaotic conditions, in the white race, how he can glorify its accomplishments as he does.

Professor Josey maintains that his volume was written with complete objectivity, but in spite of this it seems clearly biased. The laudation of the white race, the exhibition of national egotism, and the emphasis of superiority seem proof of this. It is hard to understand. Perhaps the clue lies in the fact that Professor Josey is a Southerner. May we not assume that this, unconsciously, has colored his point of view?

Needless to say, the book is challenging. It flies into the face of all orthodox sociology. Its merit is in its frankness, rather than its thesis. Professor Josey has not been afraid to state his case, even though he must have known that it would raise an almost unanimous chorus of dissent.

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*Charts and Graphs: An Introduction to Graphic Methods in the Control and Analysis of Statistics.* By KARL G. KARSTEN. New York: Prentiss-Hall, Inc., 1923. Pp. 724.

Graphic methods in statistics have had a very wide development in the United States during the past twenty years and the use of these methods has been carried farther here, particularly in the field of business,

**Leadership and Group Activity.**—Leadership in the community is usually vested in an inner circle of personnel common to several active groups. Popularization of leadership within the community, as between groups, tends to elaborate until some leader's range of elasticity for participation in group activity is passed, when some one or more groups begin to disintegrate until an equilibrium of group activity is restored.—F. Stuart Chapin, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (January-February, 1924), 141-45. T. C. W.

**The Occupational Attitude.**—A person's occupational activities over a period of time influence his social attitudes and give him an occupational attitude of life. When all of life becomes organized habitually around one's occupational activity, he is apt to feel that "his" occupation or profession is the most important of all, i.e., he develops an occupational egocentrism.—Emory S. Bogardus, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (January-February, 1924), 171-77. (I, 4.) T. C. W.

**Über Gegenwartsaufgaben der Jugendpsychologie.**—At about the time of Hegel and Descartes the so-called "world questions" were put into the background by the more narrow scientific method. There may be some danger of becoming too narrow in this method of study but it is more fruitful than the former. It fits in with the mind of the "youth movement" which wants to connect things with the practical side of life. The best verification of a real philosophy of youth would be to remove the bar between the natural and the spiritual and bring the two into closer relationship. There is no need to fear the "movement," for in many instances it is already dead and youth wants to hear but little of it.—E. R. Jaensch, *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, LICIV (Heft 1-2, 1923), 38-53. (I, 4; VII, 2.) F. H. S.

**Defensive Harmony.**—The attitude of defensive harmony like all social realities is prevalent because of its survival value in the adaptation of individuals to their social environment. In human society one need not be strong, nor wealthy, provided one is defensively harmonious, inconspicuous, docile, innocuous.—Walker C. Hayes, *The Journal of Social Forces*, II (January, 1924), 199-201. (I, 4.) J. L. D.

**An Experiment in Self-Estimation.**—The tendency toward overestimation is not a fixed characteristic of an individual's self-estimation, but is a function of the trait in question. The possession of a given trait bears a negative relation to its overestimation. Individuals who are rated by their associates as most conceited manifest the least tendency toward overestimation.—Georgene J. Hoffman, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XVIII (April-June, 1923), 43-49. (I, 4.) W. M. G.

**Introverts and Extroverts.**—Introvert and extrovert differ in exaggeration and diminution of thought processes in relation to directly observable social behavior with accompanying tendencies to withdraw from and to make social contacts respectively. Heredity, environment, and gland functions are possible factors in their formation.—Max Freyd, *Psychological Review*, XXXI (January, 1924), 74-87. (I, 4.) W. M. G.

**Behaviorism and Behavior.**—The scientific study of what is generally known as the educational, vocational, administrative, recreational, and personal activities of individuals can be conducted with the physicochemical continuum as the sole existential datum and that the totality of the electron-proton aggregates is the universe.—Albert P. Weiss, *Psychological Review*, XXXI (January, 1924), 32-50. (I, 4.) W. M. G.

**Prejudices regarding Expert Testimony in Mental Diseases.**—Contradictory testimony by authorities on psychiatry is due to legal anomalies as to criminal responsibility based on knowledge of the nature and quality of an act and the relation of intent and motives.—Menas S. Gregory, M.D., *American Journal of Psychiatry*, III (October, 1923), 211-17. (I, 4.) W. M. G.

**Die Abtrünnigen.**—It is one of the most universally observed facts of social behavior that each individual and group is constantly striving to improve its status in the structure of society. There are individuals and groups, however, who, although

they have attained a fairly satisfactory or relatively preferred status in the social scale, voluntarily surrender the advantage they have gained in the process of social grouping and voluntarily affiliate themselves with a group less favorably situated in order to participate in its struggle for social emancipation. The significance of this group for the success of all social movements and for the labor movement in particular cannot be overestimated. There is, of course, also the tendency on the part of members of a lower social stratum to invade a higher one. But this severance of the bonds of affiliation with one's group, in order to improve one's status, is easily explained. The "stepping-downward" in the social ladder is more complex and less easily explained. One form of it is found in the mere ideological affiliation with another, inferior group; another is the tendency to become completely incorporated into the lower social unit. Revolutionary Russia furnishes excellent examples of this phenomenon. The latter individual finds himself separated from his original group through his external appearances; from his newly adopted group through birth and training. As a result his is the lot of a socially homeless being.—Alfred Meusel, *Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie*, III (Heft 2-3, 1923), 152-69. (I, 4; V, 3; VII, 4.) L. W.

**Shifting the National Mind-Set.**—The mind-set is made, not by hating other nations, not by desiring war, but by adjusting the whole mental mechanism so that, in certain situations, war-favoring reactions will occur as a matter of course. By changing the earlier members of the series so as to establish a contrary mind-set, we could make war as obsolete as cannibalism.—George A. Coe, *The World Tomorrow*, VII (February, 1924), 42-43. (I, 4; VII, 4.) J. L. D.

**Zur Gestaltung des Ich-Du-Problems in der Dichtung.**—*The nature of social conduct:* Human behavior can be called social only if it takes into account other human individuals outside the self. The subjective behavior processes that go on within the individual can be called social only if they are oriented with reference to another external person. Social conduct is therefore only that kind of human behavior which calls forth a response in other individuals. The increasing density of population makes the demands for the adaptation of individual conduct to the social norm increasingly urgent. The growing division of social labor results in increased individual autonomy, and makes the discrepancy between the wishes of the self and the demands of others greater. *Art and behavior:* It is the valuable function of art in modern social life to bring about the wish fulfillment of the artist through his artistic medium in a manner in which he could not do so in actual life. The artist does that consciously which the rest of society are forced to do in their dreams and imagination. The modern psychologist, and especially the psychoanalyst, can render a great service in the explanation of these complex processes of social life.—Rudolf Pampferri, *Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie*, III (Heft 2-3, 1923), 133-51. (I, 4; VII, 4.) L. W.

## II. THE FAMILY

**Marcuse, Max. Handwörterbuch der Sexualwissenschaft.**—The handbook is a monumental work by thirty-two writers and edited by Marcuse. It is arranged in an easily accessible style and is comprehensive, interesting, and readable. It goes back to the beliefs of primitive peoples concerning sex, and comes down to the problems of the present day, dealing with the history, the characteristics, the ethics, and also with venereal diseases, control of prostitution, eugenics, sexual hygiene, and many other topics of interest to students in this field.—Dr. Erich Arndt, *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft*, X (Heft 12, 1924), 292-99. (II, 1; VIII, 3.) F. H. S.

**Family-Life Ideals in Traditional Judaism and Today.**—The Jewish and non-Jewish ideals of home life have received their impetus from the same source, and the resemblances of these ideals, as we observe them today, must be attributed to parallel development rather than to mutual interaction. Monogamy, affection, maintenance, and education are the conspicuous elements in the ideals of family life prevalent in the United States at present, and these are found in Jewish traditions of varying degrees of antiquity.—Abraham Cronbach, *Religious Education*, XIX (February, 1924), 5-14. (II, 2; VI, 1.) J. L. D.

**Marriage Legislation, 1923—Successful and Unsuccessful.**—Abolition of common-law marriages and advance notice, health of applicants, both parents' consent to an "under-age" marriage, a higher age for exemption from parental consent, and a higher marriageable age are some of the laws passed in the various states last year. The following bills did not pass: viz., the federal marriage law introduced in Congress, and, in the several states, bills relating to mental and physical health of candidates, and advance notice bills.—Joanna C. Colcord, *Family*, V (March, 1924), 14-16. (II, 3; VI, 5.) J. L. D.

**Social Effect upon the Family of Forced Marriage.**—The social effect of forced marriages may be defined in relation to (1) the stability of the family; (2) the attitude of the couple toward each other and toward the children, especially the older ones; and (3) the kind of atmosphere that has been created in the home because of the event and the effect it has had upon all the children. In an investigation of a number of cases, it was discovered that a number of factors entered into the situation making such marriages as a rule a failure.—Mildred D. Mudgett, *Family*, V (March, 1924), 16-22. (II, 3.) J. L. D.

**Family Life as an Objective of Higher Education.**—Parents need information regarding heredity, eugenics, physiology, something of human embryology, obstetrics, and social diseases and detailed facts of child life. In psychology they should understand their own complex make-up, child psychology, and such elements of abnormal psychology as will better interpret the normal child. In sociology they should know the historic background of the family, its present functions in society in relation to other institutions. To get such information before the parents the universities must use its resources to effect such ends.—Eugenie Andress Leonard, *Religious Education*, XIX (April, 1924), 136-44. (II, 3.) J. L. D.

**The Isolated Family.**—Isolation is produced by anything that causes exclusion from communication. It may be geographical separation (as in the case of the southern mountaineer) or physical conditions (such as color of the skin, blindness, deafness, and stammering), but especially cultural traits as customs and convention. Many maladjustments in family life can be traced to family isolation even in the midst of a city environment.—E. H. Sutherland, *Religious Education*, XIX (February, 1924), 32-36. (II, 3.) J. L. D.

**La difesa sociale nel Diritto privato.**—Private rights must stop at the point where society resents the action. The supreme moral interests of the family, especially of the young, demand the maintenance of laws which restrict the private individual. Several case studies are given for illustrations.—M. Carrara, *Archivio di antropologia criminale psichiatria*, XV (January-February, 1924), 1-26. (II, 3.) E. P. G.

**Gleichgeschlechtliches Leben bei einigen Negerstämmen Angolas.**—*The psychology of sex and primitive society*: It is difficult to isolate the genuine (congenital) homosexual among primitive peoples because among those tribes where homosexual relations are tabooed these relations assume a different outward form (sexual mimicry) from the manner in which they express themselves in groups where this social disapproval does not exist. Among the two negro tribes of Angola, the Wawhe and the Ovigangellas, which have been closely studied, homosexual practices are an integral part of the sexual life of the people. A study of the native tribes of this region leads to the generalization that whenever the custom of homosexual relations arises in a tribe that tribe acquires an undesirable reputation for condoning this practice although its neighbors who practice homosexuality in secret may be equally addicted to the practice.—Kurt Falk, *Archiv für Anthropologie*, Neue Folge XX (Heft 1, 1923), 42-45. (II, 1; VIII, 5.) L. W.

**Chiah Shien Gie Sin Lung.**—*Essay on family revolution and rejuvenation.*—To revolutionize our national system and life, we now begin with our family. We are facing two phases of our "several thousand years old" form of family: The "large family system" is not adequate, because it (a) lowers one's status, (b) encourages

individual dependence, (c) suppresses individual originality and free development, and (d) creates frequent and inevitable personal conflict. The old marriage system is not democratic and it can no more be allowed to have a place in a democratic country. 2. Family life and spirit are not democratic and scientific. Parental rule, including the worshipping the past, superstition, and unnecessary prestige, should all be abolished. They should all be democratically and scientifically revolutionized and remade.—Si Lu, *The Ladies' Journal*, IX (September, 1923), 2-11 (II, 2.) T. C. W.

Chin Kuo Hwan Li Di Ngen Eu.—*A study of the Chinese marriage rites*.—Exchange of marriage gifts is an old custom which can be traced to the beginning of the ancient history of China. This custom arose among the rich, and eventually entered Chinese mores. This custom was one of the greatest causes of the old Chinese parental tyranny in arranging the marriages of their children, because of the latter's economic dependence. Among the poor families, boys and girls may be forced to late marriage or other inconveniences. This "traditional chain" has been and should be thoroughly broken down especially among the youth in China, in order that true love and marriage may be realized. Yang Hung-lieh, *The Chinese Journal of Sociology*, I (May, 1923), 61-68. (II, 2.) T. C. W.

### III. PEOPLES AND CULTURAL GROUPS

Notes on the Kipsikis or Lumbwa Tribe of Kenya Colony.—Incomplete notes covering twenty-one topics descriptive of the habits, customs, government, ceremonies, marriages, social divisions, etc., were compiled during two periods of residence (one of eleven months and one of five) among the Kipsikis or Lumbwa tribe together with some experiences of other cognate tribes of the Niloto-Hamitic group.—Juxon Barton, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, LIII (January-June, 1923), 42-79. (III, 1.) J. L. D.

Notes on the Social Organization of Australian Tribes.—The social organization of the tribes of the Murray-Darling Basin presents certain peculiar features, a fuller knowledge of which is very desirable for any theoretical discussion of the more important problems of Australian sociology. It is now clear that two at least of the tribes of this region, Wonaibon and Murawari, possess relationship systems similar in important respects to those of Western, Central, and Northern Australia, and this makes it probable that the other tribes of the region have systems of the same type.—A. R. Brown, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, LIII (July-December, 1923), 424-48. (III, 1.) J. L. D.

Notes on Birth, Marriage, and Death Ceremonies of the Etap Tribe, Central Cameroon.—Among other ceremonies connected with birth, a cord with pendant amulets, to ward off evil influences, is placed around its neck. While still an infant a girl may be selected as a future bride, but she lives with her parents until she is claimed by the bridegroom. After the death of a relative all the members of the family shave their heads, and smear ashes all over the body which are not washed off until after the burial.—L. W. G. Malcolm, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, LIII (July-December, 1923), 388-402. (III, 1.) J. L. D.

L'atelier chez les sauvages.—The individual worker dominates among savages; patronal arrangements exist only as exceptions and for short periods, such as hunting, harvesting, or building a large canoe. This study classifies the forms of labor, in the manufacture of instruments, arms, and utensils, as unisexual and communistic (both unisexual and mixed). (Bibliography.)—F. Descamps, *Institut de sociologie (Solvay Bulletin)*, I (November, 1923), 315-78. (III, 1.) E. P. G.

Relation of Cranial Capacity to Intelligence.—A selected group of 449 male students of the University of Aberdeen, whose ancestors were of undoubted Scottish extraction, were studied with the view of estimating the correlation coefficients between the average age and the average cranial capacity; average stature and average cranial capacity; average age and average stature; average age and the sum of marks obtained

at professional examinations; average stature and the sum of marks obtained at professional examinations; the sum of marks obtained at professional examinations and the average cranial capacity; and by taking these into consideration the partial correlation coefficient for the sum of marks and average cranial capacity was calculated.—R. W. Reid and J. H. Mulligan, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, LIII (July–December, 1923), 322–32. (III, 1; I, 2.) J. L. D.

**Les conditions psychologiques du langage.** (Extract from a book on *le Langage et la Pensée*, March, 1924).—An attempt to resolve language into its elements results in three main classifications: (a) sounds expressing agitation; (b) efforts to make another comprehend (developing thought with illustrations); (c) leading other minds through a definite process of thinking (logic). Language has become intellectualized so that the mind now receives far in advance of the ears; but the old emotional values are still indispensable for impassioned speech.—H. Delacroix, *Revue philosophique*, XCVII (January–February, 1924), 28–64. (III, 2.) E. P. G.

**Sumeriskt och Semitiskt.** (Sumeric and Semitic).—The Sumerians likely came into the valley of the Euphrates from the East and antedated the Semites by some hundreds of years. They were non-Semitic and their language was adapted by the Semitic peoples of a later date. Their writings reveal a more or less abstract and speculative world-idea and a freshness and originality which is foreign to the Semitic where one finds "an almost sickly anxiety not to change any of the things which the fathers have worshiped as holy."—Harri Holma, *Nordisk Tidskrift*, Heft I (1923), 39–52. (III, 2, 3.) F. H. S.

**Spengler als Staats- and Wirtschaftsphilosoph.**—Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* is a scientific-artistic creation by a modern thinker who is more distinguished for the beauty of his expression than for the accuracy of his investigation or the logic of his thought. His work owes its universal appeal to the fact that it offers a synthetic view of present-day occidental civilization, such as the specialized social sciences cannot offer, and to the circumstance that its theme of the downfall of European civilization finds, during the post-war period, a ready echo throughout Europe. Spengler's comparison between ancient and modern cultures is defective because it rests on the mistaken assumption of the unity and continuity of culture history. His outlook is pessimistic, romantic, mystic, and conservative.—Erwin von Beckerath, *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, XLVII (Heft 1–4, 1924), 33–47. (III, 3; X, 3.) L. W.

**Who Are the Coal Mine Workers?**—A more intelligent adjustment of our immigration laws might be made if there were data available for all industries similar to that collected by the United States Coal Commission. Of the 732,000 coal mine workers, 287,000 are foreign born. Distribution through the states, rate of naturalization, literacy, race, and standards of living are fields in which the data collected present valuable material for comparison with conditions in other industries.—Marie L. Obenauer, *North American Review*, CCXIX (May, 1924), 609–15. (III, 4.) W. M. G.

**Die Zahl der Ausländer in Berlin.**—*Problems of population:* The breakdown of the official registration system and the inability, for financial reasons, to undertake a census, makes the official statistics on the number of foreigners residing in Berlin unreliable. Numerous police raids on the rendezvous in the underworld of Berlin have brought to light many unregistered foreigners who are engaged in criminal activities. Basing an estimate on the fairly accurate mortality statistics it was found that in 1923 there were 145,000 foreigners resident in Berlin. *Character of foreign population of Berlin:* Foreigners have an advantage over the native population in that they have less dependents, giving them an economic advantage. Thirty-three per cent of the foreigners live in the criminal quarter of the city and many of them are thieves and receivers of stolen goods. Forty-two per cent live in the luxurious section of the city, where, through their superior economic status, they are able to monopolize badly needed living quarters. A majority of the foreign population consists of eastern

Europeans, most of whom are Jews. These elements constitute a potential cultural and economic menace to the native population.—Karl Freudenberg, *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, LXVI (Heft 6, 1923), 582-86. (III, 4; V, 2; VIII, 1, 2.) L. W.

**Some Contributions of Anthropology to History.**—Anthropology has furnished the temporal and institutional perspective for history, and is, in many ways, the true background and threshold of history. It has for the first time given a concrete and adequate basis for the conception of the unity of history. It has supplied history with the most perfect of analytical techniques for the interpretation of cultural processes and complexes, destroyed the racial basis of national arrogance, and will prove progressively more valuable as an auxiliary science to history, as the latter comes to be more concerned with the explanation of cultural development and less absorbed in the narration of political events.—Harry Elmer Barnes, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (March, 1924), 362-73. (III, 6.) J. L. D.

**The Social Contrast: Continental Americans and Insular English.**—The essential mark of the American social spirit is publicity, the spirit of the market-place. The contact of individual with individual is indefinitely more continuous and more frequent in America than in Europe. With Europeans the market-place, the Forum, is a special meeting place, and privacy is the rule; with the Americans the Forum is the habit of life.—Hilaire Eelloc, *Atlantic Monthly*, CXXXIII (April, 1924), 433-45. (III, 6; I, 4.) J. L. D.

#### IV. CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION GROUPS

**On Picket Duty.**—An industrial worker who took turn about as "scab" and "picket" during a strike of women employees in a collar factory gives her impressions of a struggle in which much personal bravery and a great deal of invective were expended in a forlorn cause.—A. M. Maclean, *Forum*, LXX (December, 1923), 2199-206. (IV, 1.) W. M. G.

**Der Begriff der Gesetzmässigkeit bei Marx.**—*Scientific social laws:* Marx and Engels have given to the concept "law" varying meanings. At times the concept has an "ideally typical" connotation, at others a rational or "immanent" tinge. Then again it is used to denote natural law. *Marxism:* The historical determinism of Marx is based upon the French-English thought of the eighteenth century. Marx had only a slight acquaintance with the sociological literature of the eighteenth century, and was greatly influenced by the French historians of the nineteenth century. Of the four naturalistic conceptions of history: (1) the geographic of Buckle; (2) the psychological of Taine and variants; (3) the technological-economic, which has become known as the materialistic and which was already fully developed by the end of the eighteenth century and to which Marx and Engels added nothing when they proclaimed it in the eighteen forties; (4) the dialectic which may be said to be especially characteristic of Marx. Marx's dialectic metaphysics of history differs very fundamentally, however, from that of Hegel.—Werner Sombart, *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, XLVII (Heft 1-4, 1924), 11-31. (IV, 1; X, 3, 4.) L. W.

**Neue Literatur zum Gedanken des berufständigen Staates.**—Parliamentary democracy has failed to meet the present-day problems of the social and economic order. Its defects are to be found in the disorganized condition and the defective and inequitable functioning of the political state. There is a marked conflict between modern political and economic institutions which it is proposed to eliminate or reduce through occupational representation or economic parliaments. Important scientific works have appeared dealing with these problems. Among them are: H. Herrfahdt, *The Problem of Occupational Representation* (1921); E. Tatarin-Tarnheyden, *The Occupations* (1922); George Bernhard, *Economic Parliaments* (1923); Wolzendorff, *The Pure State*; Spann, *The True State* (1922); Wittmayer, *Toward Guilds* (1922); Schürholz, *Tendencies toward Occupational Organization of German Economic Life* (1922).—Arnold Bergstraesser, *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, XLVII (Heft 1-4, 1924), 283-99. (IV, 1; VII, 1, 3; X, 4.) L. W.



**Zum Schicksal der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland.**—*Social ethics and social politics:* The social policy movement in Germany, which culminated in the organization of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* in 1872, was a protest against the optimism of the laissez faire school and an attempt to find a middle ground between this camp and the radicalism of the socialists. While fifty years ago this group was unanimous in urging the regulation and the curbing of power of industry for the sake of the body politic at their most recent convention in Eisenach in 1922, it was felt necessary to moderate this social-political program for the sake of conserving industry. *The crisis:* The breakdown of social insurance, the precarious position of the eight-hour work day, the weakened power of the state and of the trade-union movement, and the increased monopoly-control of industry indicate a serious crisis in the social politics of Germany.—Otto von Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, XLVII (Heft 1-4, 1924), 77-142. (IV, 1; VII, 1, X, 4.) L. W.

**De l'Américanisme et de ses variétés.**—Americanism is not the same as American nationalism. American ideals of liberty and equal opportunity are everywhere proclaimed, yet we find continually instances of discrimination against Negroes, Jews, and occasionally Irish, Ku Klux Klan violence, and the passage of prohibitory laws based on prejudices. Such inconsistencies separate American ideals, so called, from American practices.—H. Hauser, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XXXII (January-February, 1924), 1-6. (IV, 2.) E. P. G.

**Psychology, Disarmament, and Peace.**—The prevalent economic interpretation of history is inadequate for dealing with the problem of world-peace. The fear complex based on the instinct of self-preservation must be allayed in France and Germany to change the present situation. The League of Nations is not strong enough to cope with the situation because of the present form of the League and the lack of confidence in it. General disarmament with the suppression of aerial navigation, excepting a powerful force as an armed sanction for the Court of International Justice, is the proposed psychological solution.—William MacDougall, *North American Review*, CCXIX (May, 1924), 577-91. (IV, 2; VI, 7.) W. M. G.

**Der Weltkrieg und die Nationalitäten Europas.**—*Nationalities:* S. R. Steinmetz' *De nationaliteiten in Europa* is a study of the effects of the world-war on the problem of nationalities in Europe. The author regards a nationality as a cultural group which has not yet produced a political state. National consciousness, national movements and problems can in large measure be treated historically. National consciousness and a persistent unity of purpose within the group are essential factors in a national movement; while religious, racial, and linguistic homogeneity are desirable but not essential elements in national development. *Culture and nationality:* The higher and richer the cultural level of a group and the more continuous this heritage, the more irresistible becomes the striving of that group for national autonomy. Three basic considerations are involved in a sound approach to the problems of nationalities: (1) every human group has the right and duty to develop itself according to its own inclination and to the extent of its capacity as long as the equal right of other groups is thereby not infringed upon; (2) a majority vote (a plebiscite) cannot decide whether a given group is a nationality, for this question must be settled on the basis of a sociological and historical investigation; and (3) the progress and the peace of mankind depend upon the richness and variety of cultural individualities; the greatest danger threatening progress is uniformity and imperialism.—Felix Rachfahl, *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, XX (Heft 1, 1924), 92-101. (IV, 2; VII, 2, 3.) L. W.

**Kalvinismus und Kapitalismus am Rhein.**—*The economic process:* The economic history of the Rhineland shows unmistakably the influence of Calvinism upon economic development. The religious doctrines of Calvin were in harmony with the requirements of a developing industrialistic capitalism. Not so with Lutheranism, which was more in consonance with the agrarian *petit bourgeois* ideology. *Calvinism and rhinish capitalism:* Calvinism put a characteristic stamp upon Rhenish industrialism through (1) the emphasis it laid upon the familial organization of economic activity which has exerted a lasting retarding influence upon capitalistic expansion in that region; (2) the close relationship which it fostered between church and industry, hampering the

unrestricted development of the latter; and (3) the paternalistic attitude in the employing class which it developed, evidences of which are to be found in the advanced welfare systems which the Rhenish workers enjoy to the present day in their respective industries.—Justus Hashagen, *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, XLVII (Heft 1-4, 1924), 49-72. (IV, 4; VII, 1, 2.) L. W.

#### V. COMMUNITIES AND TERRITORIAL GROUPS

**Changes in the Farm Family.**—The economic bonds which held the pioneer farm family together are being gradually dissolved by the introduction of new industrial methods, by the extension of the neighborhood life due to the automobile and improved highways, by changes in the form and content of rural education, diminishing size of the family, and the women's attitude toward social life. These make new demands for the strengthening of other ties for preserving family solidarity.—Dwight Sanderson, *Religious Education*, XIX (February, 1924), 22-32. (V, 1; III, 3.) J. L. D.

**Agrarpolitik als Wissenschaft.**—The science of agrarian politics has as its objects the examination of the conditions under which agricultural activities are carried on, the aims of agricultural enterprises and the means available for their realization, and the evaluation of these means in relation to the ends which they are designed to promote, and the social process as a whole. The subject may be approached from a practical and concrete standpoint or from the historical or sociological points of view.—Herbert Schack, *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, LXVI (Heft 6, 1923), 547-54. (V, 1; VII, 3; X, 2.) L. W.

**Community Disorganization.**—Community disorganization implies a state of inadequacy and disunity that gives free play to the forces of deterioration in community life. It is likely to be characterized by an undue amount of personal demoralization. Increase in mobility makes disorganization inevitable. The increasing multitudes of organizations show a general spirit of discontent and unrest. Conflicting groups are being organized. The processes of disorganization in the fields of politics, industry, and religion are constantly creating problems. Is community organization the way out?—Jesse F. Steiner, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (January, 1924), 177-87. (V, 3; VII, 4.) T. C. W.

**Erdteilstaaten als Weltmächte.**—*Human geography.* The concept *Erdteilstaat* has been coined to denote a type of state which comprises a large, contiguous, homogeneous part of the earth, akin to what is known in the new geography as a character region. The most important of these states, on the basis of area and population, are China, Russia, and the United States of America. The British Empire typifies the highest development of the old, European, colonial great-power states, but stands in sharp contrast to the three foregoing newer types of political entities. Of the three, America is destined to play the most important rôle in the immediate future, because China and Russia are undergoing profound crises. America, moreover, is the most completely self-sufficient economic unit of the three. The danger for America lies in the possibility that in her self-sufficiency and prosperity she may squander her natural resources, and in the mad chase for material successes may lose her spiritual balance, thus bringing upon herself grave social disorder. *The political process:* The probability of the formation of a United States of Europe, the only potential competitor to the United States of America, is remote because of the national antagonisms, the great differences in cultural levels, and, above all, the fact that England and France are units (though leading units) in a chain of extra-European empires.—Walther Vogel, *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, XX (Heft 1, 1924), 55-78. (V, 3, 4; IV, 2; VII, 1.) L. W.

#### VI. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

**Home Life for the Child.**—The child is immature and changing every moment. It is a fallacy to think that childhood is nothing but a preparation for adult life. The end and aim of the home should be to provide the environment which will tend to bring about a sound and beautiful body, an intelligent and sympathetic mind, and a sincere spirit.—Johnson, Marrietta, *Playground*, XVIII (February, 1924), 590-92. (VI, 1; I, 3.) T. C. W.

**La famille nombreuse et le logement.**—Amelioration of the housing problem is at the heart of social improvement. Efforts to increase birth-rate, to fight tuberculosis, alcoholism, infant mortality, are misspent while 18 per cent of French families occupy a one-room hovel instead of a "hcmc."—G. Risler, *Le Musée sociale*, XXXI (February, 1924), 33-55. (VI, 1; II, 3.) E. P. G.

**The Teaching of Patriotism.**—Since the teaching of patriotism is now required by law in some states, the question arises concerning the right kind of knowledge best designed to promote patriotism. The highest kind of patriotism must have its basis in real knowledge and not on half-truths which will likely be the case if history is taught from the national standpoint with a patriotic objective. Too much emphasis upon the military aspects of our country's history will result in developing a spirit of Chauvinism at the expense of a more wholesome interest in the arts of peace.—Ira W. Howerth, *Educational Review*, LXVII (March, 1924), 135-40. (VI, 3.) J. L. D.

**The Play School of the University.**—Our home and school have failed to give children adequate opportunity to think for themselves. The play school came into existence because boys and girls needed a really complete, all-round development, and because it was seen that the public school did not do this.—Daisy Hetherington, *Playground*, XVIII (February, 1924), 587-89. (VI, 3, 4.) T. C. W.

**Laws for Children Born out of Wedlock.**—The New York State Commission to Examine Laws Relating to Child Welfare has accepted a draft of a bill in behalf of children born out of wedlock which is believed to be in advance over the present illegitimacy laws of most of the states; and, inasmuch as it is the outgrowth of the practical experience and recommendations of groups closely identified with the problem of the unmarried mother and her child, this draft, as published herewith, may prove of value as a guide to similar legislation in other states.—George E. Worthington, *Journal of Social Hygiene*, X (March, 1924), 165-77. (VI, 5; II, 3.) J. L. D.

**Veracity in Social Work.**—Should a social worker always tell the truth, in so far as he knows it, to clients, to other agencies, and to the general public? Most social workers would have no hesitation in answering this question in the affirmative. There are cases, however, that present real difficulty, but we have no right to deceive patients with mental trouble or an unmarried mother or even the criminally delinquent.—Richard C. Cabot, *Survey*, LII (April, 1924), 67-69. (VI, 6.) J. L. D.

## VII. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL PROCESS

**Le présent et l'avenir de la liberté économique.**—International economic liberty seems everywhere suspended, menaced by a sort of professional reaction. Speculations as to the future depend on ability to prophesy how long domination will hold against the natural logic and the experience of the people.—C. Gignoux, *Revue économique internationale*, XVI (January, 1924), 102-17. (VII, 1.) E. P. G.

**Le combinazioni "verticali" nell' industria.**—If an industry from the extraction of the raw material to the development of the finished product is organized under one management, it is termed a vertical combination. The greatest examples have been in America and Germany, for example, the Standard Oil Company. Their financial success has caused the general method to be overrated, for advantages independent of the vertical integration can be observed in all.—C. Rodano, *La Riforma sociale*, XXXIV (November-December, 1923), 560-82. (VII, 1.) E. P. G.

**L'Organization du Travail et la Question Ouvrière: 2. La déchéance de la personnalité ouvrière.**—The series opened in the September *Bulletin* ("1. Le problème de l'organization et les oppositions syndicales"), I 205-30. The French Revolution consecrated the individuality of the workingman, but gradually the transformations of industry have despoiled the workman of his personality. The syndicates have not restored it, but have merely caught the masses in a machine which was not designed to improve conditions between patrons and employees.—G. de Leener, *Institut de Sociologie (Solvay Bulletin)* I (November, 1923), 379-414. (VII, 1.) E. P. G.

**Der moderne Wirtschaftsmensch.—Types of "economic men":** Every epoch in economic history sets into operation social forces resulting in the emergence of a type of economic man representative of the period. The modern economic man becomes intelligible only if he is contrasted with his predecessors. Three such types are distinguishable in our cultural history: (a) the shackled; (b) the free; and (c) the free-restricted economic man. The first is typical of medieval culture; the second of the period around the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the third is emerging out of our present-day life. The shackled type carries on his activity for the glory of God, the free type for his own gain, and the free-restricted type for the benefit of the community. *Present-day problems:* The supreme problem of our present cultural epoch is that of shaping and controlling our social heritages and creations in the form of institutions, social organization and attitudes, so that they will serve and promote the fundamental needs of mankind of our day and become or remain harmonious with the basic characteristics of human nature. To this end three great constructive sets of ideas are at our disposal: (1) the vast body of knowledge accumulated during the nineteenth century, which we must work over, organize, and synthesize; (2) the political ideal of the universal right of the self-determination of peoples; and (3) the social conception of mutual rights and obligations.—Waldemar Mitscherlich, *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, XX (Heft 1, 1924), 25-54. (VII, 1; I, 4; III, 6.) L. W.

**Agrarpolitik. Von August Skalweit.**—Skalweit's book on agricultural economics is the best treatment of that subject that has appeared in recent years. He deals with the historical background of the field and the relation of the study to the other social and biological sciences. The book sheds new light on the division of labor between town and country, on the operation of the law of diminishing returns in agriculture, on capitalization and credit, and on the economic and social aspects of the agricultural labor problem.—James E. Boyle, *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, XX (Heft 1, 1924), 101-5. (VII, 1; V, 1; X, 2.) L. W.

**L'Organisation du Travail et la Question Ouvrière: 3. La restauration de la personnalité ouvrière.**—Employers are interesting themselves more and more in the workmen and the conditions under which they labor. Co-operation and concerted effort will restore the workman's personality and self-respect, improve his workmanship, and result in many benefits to society.—G. de Leener, *Institut de Sociologie (Solway Bulletin)* II (January, 1924), 31-69. (VII, 1.) E. P. G.

**Zur Stellung G. Schmollers in der Geschichte der Nationalökonomie.**—The importance of Schmoller's position in the history of political economy has recently been seriously questioned. It was only through his and Adolph Wagner's efforts that political economy at the University of Berlin acquired its pre-eminent position. Schmoller never aimed to create a school of economics, as is shown by the various affiliations of his students. No one has to the present day done more to synthesize the results achieved in the special fields of political economy and to incorporate them into the general body of historical, sociological, and philosophical thinking than has he, as is evident from a study of his main works and an acquaintance with his activity in the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*.—Heinrich Herkner, *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, XLVII (Heft 1-4, 1924), 3-10. (VII, 1; X, 1, 2.) L. W.

**Die wirtschaftliche Dimension.**—F. v. Gott-Ottlilienfeld has consistently pursued the aim of substituting "economic dimension" for "value" as the central concept in economic theory. He holds that in the ordinary economic systems the terminology and concepts appear while the science is in its infancy, and become the determining factors for all subsequent thinking. The concepts with which he has to deal acquire a content which preclude the student from obtaining a complete and accurate view of the material to which they are applied. The concepts of value hitherto in use have through their definitions carried with them a causal explanation of the phenomena to be explained and have thus led to a deductive rather than inductive procedure. Concepts should be defined to apply only to the most general aspects of the objects or processes to be investigated. The most general characteristic of economic goods, which he finds, is their measurability or dimensional character. His dimensional theory of economics

leads to a set of concepts which take into account the manifold aspects of the objects and processes and the multiple causation factors underlying them. His is essentially a sociological system of economics.—Hero Moeller, *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, XLVII (Heft 1-4, 1924), 273-82. (VII, 1; X, 2.) L. W.

Tsi-Mo Tze Ung-Hwa: "What Is Culture?"—Culture is the accumulative creativeness and collective function of the human process. It is thus always in the making and socially becoming. Its content may be divided into material culture and spiritual culture. The former is dead without the latter and the latter is always enriched and stimulated by the former.—Liang Chi Chao, *Liang Chi Chao's Lectures*, III (September, 1923), 115-30. (VII, 2.) T. C. W.

Progress and Decay in Ancient and Modern Civilization.—There is a close union between primary creativeness of culture in life and its secondary creativeness in literature and art. Only so long as change is the spontaneous expression of the society itself does it involve the progress of civilization; as soon as the internal vital development of a culture ceases, change means death.—Christopher Dawson, *Sociological Review*, XVI (January, 1924), 1-21. (VII, 2.) T. C. W.

Origin and Function of Religion according to Pierre Janet.—The concept of God grew out of the desire to explain creation. The function of God is to guide, inspire, and protect. In general the value of religion is to give strength to the weak. The future may show that substitutes, such as romanticism, are possible.—Walter M. Horton, *American Journal of Psychology*, XXXV (January, 1924), 16-52. (VII, 2.) W. M. G.

Chinese Renaissance and Its Significance.—In less than one generation China has passed from the candle to the electric age, from the wheelbarrow to the motor-lorry, from the bullock-cart to the airplane. Out of this rapidly changing environment and the great contact with the West, the Renaissance Movement came into being—the demanding of a new scale of values and a new attitude toward life. It resembles the Renaissance of the West, especially in the eagerness after new learning and the revival of the old civilization. The Chinese Renaissance, with its mingling streams of the East and West, seeks to achieve a synthesis and give birth to a new thing in the world.—A. M. Chirgwin, *Contemporary Review*, CXXV (January, 1924), 62-71. (VII, 2.) T. C. W.

Is Prohibition a Failure?—From the past experience of the movement for prohibition, it stands to reason that the federal government will have a long struggle for complete prohibition but in the long run it will win.—Frank W. Blackmar, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (January-February, 1924), 156-59. (VII, 3.) T. C. W.

Le mouvement de "la Jeunesse allemande" et l'Assemblée de Hohen Meissner (1923).—The Congress of 1923 gave evidence that the war could not crush the German youth movement. The chief appeal at the Congress was for peace and amity with France and for funds to build an orphanage on devastated French territory.—O. Czierski, *Le Christianisme social* (January, 1924), 34-46. (VII, 4.) E. P. G.

Jugendbewegung und Sexualleben.—The youth movement has had much to do with the development of higher standards in sexual ethics. It has given no place to a double standard of morality and through its freedom from prudery has made for a lessening of the usual evils in this field. Many faults are to be found with it yet. It, however, is very easy to make too much of incidental defects in the movement. It, however, is not to be feared, or it is in many instances a passing thing and had its most influential period before the war. Now many young folks want to hear no more of it.—F. Dehn, *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft*, X (Heft 11, 1924), 276-77. (VII, 4.) F. H. S.

The Effect of Science on Social Institutions.—Science has not given men more self-control, more kindness, or more power of discounting their passions in deciding upon a course of action. It has given communities more power to indulge their collective passions, but, by making society more organic, it has diminished the part played

by private passions. Men's collective passions are mainly bad; far the strongest of them are hatred and rivalry directed toward other groups. All that gives men power to indulge their collective passions is bad.—Erstrand Russell, *Survey*, LII (April, 1924), 5-11. (VII, 4.) J. L. D.

#### VIII. SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

**The Delinquent Girl and the Unmarried Mother.**—Only recently are we coming to see that delinquency is the result of the interaction of complex forces, and that the community must share with the individual the responsibility for social maladjustment. Moreover, we are embodying in our laws the theory of the state as *parens patriae*, and are bringing under the protection of the state, not only the dependent and the defective, but also the young delinquent.—Katherine F. Lenroot, *Journal of Social Hygiene*, X (February, 1924), 5-82. (VIII, 1.) J. L. D.

**Kriegskriminalität.**—*Crim: during the war:* The crime statistics of the present day are not sufficiently accurate and uniform in the various countries of Europe to permit of many generalizations. It has been a matter of experience before the world-war that wars are accompanied by a decline in criminality. This is due to the fact that the male population between eighteen and thirty years of age, among whom crimes are normally most frequent, are beyond the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. *Types of war-crimes:* By direct war criminality is meant offenses against laws which were enacted during the war or expressly to deal with the abnormal conditions produced by the war. By indirect war criminality is meant behavior which through the war is measured by new standards or assumes new forms. *Comparison between warring and neutral countries:* Crime statistics show that in the warring countries the male criminality decreased considerably, while female and youth criminality increased. In the neutral countries, the late war was accompanied by a gradual increase of the more serious criminality. In both instances the crimes against property increased while other offenses decreased.—Friedrich Zahn, *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, XLVII (Heft 1-4, 1924), 243-71. (VIII, 1.) L. W.

**Der Einfluss der Unterernährung auf die Verrichtungen des weiblichen Körpers.**—The Russian famine of 1921-22 furnished the field for this study. The effects were both psychic and physical but the latter were of most importance. In the first place, an entire change of the female form and a premature aging were noticed, the form becoming angular and taking on a masculine character. In some instances the loss of fat among the internal organs caused serious disorders. The abatement of menstruation was one of the most important effects. No very definite effect was noted on the tendency to conception, the period of gestation, nor yet the distribution of sexes in the offspring.—S. Weissenberg, *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft*, X (Heft 11, 1924), 257-63. (VIII, 2.) F. H. S.

**Sterilization in America.**—The eugenical advantages of sterilization may be indicated by the one fact that an immense amount of human misery, degradation, and inefficiency might be avoided in all future generations by now preventing parenthood among those endowed with defective hereditary qualities. But there are disadvantages that will have to be overcome before such measures shall become effective. Public opinion is not yet ripe for this undertaking; there is a likelihood of injuriously affecting the inborn qualities of the nation; hereditary defects are frequently carried by apparently normal persons; and its enforcement will interfere with the liberty of the individual.—Leonard Darwin, *Eugenic Review*, XV (April, 1924), 335-45. (VIII, 2.) J. L. D.

**Firtiarenes Norske Skole: reformforsök i Deres Forhold til Nabolandenes Utvikling.**—*Efforts at school reform in Norway during the forties and their relation to the development in the neighboring countries:* Educational reforms were along three lines: realistic, democratic, and national. Herman Foss placed the emphasis on practical instead of classical education. The schools were democratized so that all of the children in a given district could benefit. Emphasis upon the Norwegian language was emphasized instead of the previous stress upon foreign and dead languages.—Einar Boyesen, *Nordisk Tidskrift* (Heft 1, 1923), 33-54. (VII, 2.) F. H. S.

**Conscious Limitation of the Birth-Rate.**—Inability to care adequately for large families of children has been met by conscious limitation of conception. The psychical and spiritual values of love may be destroyed by a mechanical device allowing unlimited intercourse without responsibility for natural consequences.—E. V. and A. D. Lindsay, *Gibbert Journal*, XXII (January, 1924), 294-310. (VIII, 2.) W. M. G.

**Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung Stockholms, 1721-1920.**—*Problems of population:* The mortality rate in Europe during the Middle Ages was extraordinarily high. This was especially true of the cities due to epidemics, the absence of public-health standards, of street-cleaning and sewer systems and adequate water supply. The momentary improvement that accompanied the prosperity and hygienic progress of the sixteenth century was negated by the numerous wars and the Thirty Years War in particular. Cities maintained their population largely through migrations from the surrounding rural communities. *Birth and mortality rate:* From 1721 to 1860 the mortality rate in the city of Stockholm continuously exceeded the birth-rate. From then on the reverse has been true. *Marriage and birth-rate:* Beginning with 1890 the figures for Stockholm indicate a regression in fecundity. The fluctuations in the marriage, birth, and mortality statistics are closely paralleled by the critical changes in Swedish political and social history. Infant mortality has been unusually high in Sweden and in the city of Stockholm. Alcoholism contributed considerably to the death-rate from 1780 to 1870, when a successful temperance movement began. The largest single factor underlying the heavy mortality is to be found in the great prevalence of tuberculosis.—Dr. Prinzing, *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, LXVII (Heft 1, 1924), 87-93. (VIII, 2, 3; V, 1, 2.) L. W.

**Berufstatistik der Kriegstoten.**—*Statistics of the war-dead:* The lack of exact statistical data bearing on the question of the war-dead has to some extent been overcome by the publication of the *German Yearbook for 1921-22*, a number of periodical publications, and Wilhelm Winkler's book on the *Occupational Status of the War-Dead of Austria-Hungary*. He has prepared the following table, which, with certain limitations, is applicable to all combatant countries, and which has especial value because it indicates the division among the various social classes of the war casualties:

	CENSUS OF 1910 TOTAL MALE POPULATION		STATISTICS OF WAR-DEAD		
	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage of Total	Per 1,000 of Occupational in Total Population
Economically independent.....	3,402,637	44.0	65,883	30.6	19.4
Salaried employees, clerks, and officials.....	489,322	6.4	14,465	6.7	29.6
Manual workers, and day laborers.....	3,798,395	49.4	135,223	62.7	35.6
Total.....	7,690,354	100.0	215,571	100.0	28.0

The losses sustained by the economically independent class are thus considerably less than their proportion of the living, those of the clerks and officials somewhat higher than their share of the living, while those of the skilled and unskilled laborers are considerably higher than their proportion of the living in the population. *Physical characteristics of war-dead:* These figures, however inadequate for final analysis they may be, indicate that the losses among occupational groups requiring good physical equipment were larger than among those which make less exacting bodily demands. This is not true of miners and a few other groups whose services were needed at home

during the war.—Otto Nathan, *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, LXVI (Heft 5, 1923), 482-85. (VIII, 2.) L. W.

Elster, A., "Sozialbiologie, Bevölkerungswissenschaft und Gesellschaftshygiene."—The author, from the point of view of social science, deals with the difficult boundary-line-field which lies between medicine and hygiene, on the one side, and statistics and political economy, on the other. He seeks to give a synthesis between these widely different fields in the form of a new science which he calls "Social Biology." The chief merit of the book is that the author has succeeded in bringing into the field of social science a great many individual facts from the fields of biology, hygiene, and medicine and making them usable there.—A. Grotjahn, *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft*, X (Heft 11, 1924), 278-79. (VIII, 2; X, 2.) F. H. S.

**Social Hygiene and Community Organization.**—In an effective handling of social-hygiene problems, all social agencies of whatever kind must form one unbreakable chain in which each link is important and with which the enemies of mankind may eventually be bound. The relationship of social hygiene to community organization gives us the best possible evidence of the interrelationship of all social movements, both as to causes and as to the adjustment of social problems.—Elwood Street, *Journal of Social Hygiene*, X (February, 1924), 82-89. (VIII, 3; V, 3.) J. L. D.

**L'adaptation sociale des énormes psychiques.**—The psychically abnormal as a class are so numerous as to be of much social interest, not alone for humanity's sake, but because they fall to the charge of society. The chief types of psychical abnormality are noted: feeble-minded, perverse, "pedagogically backward." Special training from childhood is urged since by that means many can be rendered self-supporting, while the discovery of vicious or criminal types may avert future evils.—Paul-Boncour and Laufer, *Revue anthropologique*, XXX (November-December, 1923), 551-69. (VIII, 4.) E. P. G.

**Cadet Problems.**—Students at West Point Military Academy can be classified into three types: unadjusted, normal, and those individuals who enter to "become men." Severe discipline strengthens those of strong character habits, but breaks the weak. In 1920 there were two suicides. Nervous disorders are second in number of cases with an average of one psychosis per year, usually of *dementia praecox*. No cases of conscious homosexuality have ever been discovered. Autoerotism is frequent, but usually successfully treated by information and a frank discussion.—Harry N. Kerns, M.D., *American Journal of Psychiatry*, III (January, 1924), 555-66. (VIII, 4.) W. M. G.

**Vom Heilwert der geistigen Arbeit bei den allgemeinen Neurosen Leidenden.**—The utilization of intellectual and semi-intellectual tasks as a therapeutic measure in the treatment of neurotics is comparatively recent and far from fully developed. In the convalescent centers, sanatoria, and resorts of Russia, the prescription by the psychiatrist of definite doses of intellectual work suited to the patient's condition has proved itself very beneficial. Its central function is to raise the general level of activity of the patient which, in the case of neurotics, is very important. Intellectual work, such as attending lectures, reading, special instruction, copying, are of prime importance to the neurotic who in ordinary life is a manual worker, since it (1) raises the level of activity of the patient; (2) offers him diversion from the routine manual tasks of his workaday life; (3) appeals to his interest and has educational value; (4) diverts his attention from his ailment; and (5) makes his stay at the sanatorium less boring and more fascinating.—W. Fechterew, *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, CXII (Heft 1-3, 1922), 49-57. (VIII, 4; VI, 6.) L. W.

**Education in Relation to Prostitution.**—Undoubtedly the greatest single preventive of prostitution is education—just simple, common-school education. The lower in the scale and the smaller the amount of education in a community, the greater the amount of promiscuity and prostitution.—J. J. Heagerty, *Journal of Social Hygiene*, X (March, 1924), 129-39. (VIII, 5.) J. L. D.



IX. METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

**William Jennings Bryan as a Social Force.**—Mr. Bryan appeared at Dartmouth College in December, 1923, and delivered his lecture against the theory of organic evolution. If Mr. Bryan is to be measured as a social force, it must be done in terms of units of accomplishments. In a questionnaire submitted to 136 Sophomores, Juniors, and Seniors, 10 per cent of the student body, in which were included five propositions involving an acceptance or rejection of the theory before and after hearing Mr. Bryan's lecture, it was discovered that eight men who were previously on the side of evolution were drawn to a position of doubt; and seven others were drawn over to the side of non-acceptance.—Malcolm M. Willey and Stuart A. Rice, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (March, 1924), 338-44. (IX, 1; I, 4.) J. L. D.

**The History of Mental Testing.**—There have been four methods of attacking psychological data. The oldest method in modern psychology is the psycho-physical. Weber (1795-1878) experimented with sensory data, chiefly pressures, and showed that differences in sensations did not agree with the differences in the stimulus-scale of intensity. The second method was that of a study of different limens; the third is that known as "mental measurements" which is practically synonymous with mental testing; and the fourth is the psychological. Here the unit is expressed in terms of the stimulus, for instance, as among rigid behaviorists.—Kimball Young, *Pedagogical Seminary*, XXXI (March, 1924), 1-49. (IX, 2.) J. L. D.

**The Army Tests and the Pro-Nordic Propaganda.**—Professor Brigham, in his recent book, *The Study of American Intelligences*, contends that the Nordic stock is far superior in native intelligence to the Alpine, Mediterranean, and Negro races by showing that they provide good schools as a part of the "heritage" it passes on to its children. It is interesting to note, among the other glaring inconsistencies presented in this book, that the southern states in which the white population shows the highest proportions of Nordic blood have the poorest schools and the lowest white "intelligence" as measured by the Army Alpha, while Massachusetts and Connecticut, literally over-swept by a Mediterranean tide, stand in the first rank among the forty-eight states in the Alpha tests.—William C. Bagley, *Educational Review*, LXVII (April, 1924), 179-87. (IX, 2; I, 2; III, 6.) J. L. D.

**The Physical Basis of Emotional Disorder.**—It has been claimed in the name of psychoanalysis that "every neurosis is caused by a psychic conflict." But the conflict is frequently conditioned by factors of a biological nature. Alimentary inadaptability, the influence of vascular tone, the endocrine system, and the sexual aspect of mental disharmony are the frequent causes of emotional disorders.—H. Crichton Miller, *Lancet*, I (February, 1924), 378-81. (IX, 5.) T. C. W.

X. GENERAL SOCIOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

**Der Historismus und seine Probleme.**—Ernst Troeltsch's last-published work is full of incisive criticisms of the outstanding historical theories, but fails to give adequate recognition to the rôle played by the great romantic movement in the history of all the social sciences. Troeltsch recognizes, however, that the most important concepts and achievements of sociology are due to the influence of the romantic movement. Among the modern writers we have been able to find very little clarification of the nature and the scope and problems of the new science of sociology. We representatives of the older social sciences have all pursued sociology, and have done it the more effectively as we intensively worked in our own respective specialized fields. It is impossible at present to squeeze the concept of society within the confines of a single science. Some of the latest works of the so-called pure sociologists richly deserve the epithet which has been coined for sociology (*Wertmaskenverleihinstitut*).—George von Below, *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, LXVI (Heft 5, 1923), 486-90. (X, 1, 2, 5.) L. W.

**La logique et les sociologues.**—The study is largely based on *La logique sociale* (1895). Tarde did not consider logic for logic's sake, but in the study of practical life

and common thinking he tried to illuminate sociology by logic. The present article develops (1) the "Theory of Reasoning"; (2) the "Theory of Invention" or "Social Dialectics"; and (3) offers criticisms of Tarde's logic.—E. Dupreel, *Institut de Sociologie (Solvay Bulletin)*, II (January, 1924), 71-116. (X, 2.) E. P. G.

**Idée et définition de la sociologie.**—If a method of classifying social phenomena can be developed, if the principles underlying society can be understood, sociology is worthy of ranking as a science. False conceptions must be dismissed: it is not mere history, not a "social art." A science is always relative and provisory, developing and changing with new knowledge.—R. Orgaz, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XXXII (January-February, 1924), 7-14. (X, 2, 5.) E. P. G.

**Dependable Theory and Social Change.**—Present-day social theory has no excuse for existence except as it becomes a scientific mode to meet the needs of social change. Effective social theory has to do with institutions and common factors of evolving group life, the means of discovering new talent, the medium through which new theory may be expressed, and directly or indirectly an index of social needs.—Howard W. Odum, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (January, 1924), 282-86. (X, 3.) T. C. W.

**The Culture Concept in Social Science.**—It is the thesis of this paper that social values, expressed in the comprehensive term "culture," constitute the distinctive and only field of the social sciences.—Clarence M. Case, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (January-February, 1924), 146-55. (X, 3.) T. C. W.

**The Reconstruction of Humanism.**—Sociology is more than a bond between the old categories of man and nature. It serves as an interpreter of both, fusing them into something that can be thought of as a greater unity. Sociology stands on the shoulders of all the other sciences, evolving out of psychology as psychology evolved out of biology, and in turn out of chemistry and physics. We have caught the first faint glimpses of how force works into matter, matter into life, life into mind, and mind into society. Its interest is not only with the past but with such things as idealisms and religion that used to be guarded on a different plane altogether.—George B. Logan, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (March, 1924), 357-51. (X, 5.) J. L. D.

**Scientific Methods of Studying Human Society.**—A complex science, such as sociology, demands for a complete and adequate scientific method a synthesis of the results of deduction from the principles of antecedent sciences with the facts secured through the inductive study of social life by means of anthropology, history, observation, and statistics. All the facts from these sources must be put together in a constructive synthesis before our psychology of human society is complete.—Charles A. Ellwood, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (March, 1924), 328-38. (X, 5.) J. L. D.

**The Rise of Educational Sociology.**—The sociological phase of education, in distinction from the merely social, is a reaction of the science of sociology on educational doctrine or practice. The more general term, of course, covers the meaning of the narrower one as well, and we would expect to find that the sociological phase of education developed at a time when the social phases were receiving special attention. There is an increasing demand for teachers from the kindergarten on who are sufficiently instructed in sociology to put all their teaching in the setting which the sociological point of view affords.—Frederick R. Clow, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (March, 1924), 332-37. (X, 6.) J. L. D.

**Education for Social Work.**—Social work itself has been defined as the detailed study of a better adjustment of social relationships. In order to master adequate technique and to secure efficiency in social work, education is the surest and least wasteful way. What education seeks is more important than merely having education for social work today.—Earle E. Eubank, *Journal Applied Sociology*, VIII (January-February, 1924), 164-7c. (X, 6.) T. C. W.

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## THE MIGRATORY POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES

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### ABSTRACT

Despite the efforts of governmental authorities and social workers, the problem of the migrant in the United States has, with the passing years, become more acute, until at the present time a conservative estimate of the number of men and boys riding around the country on freight trains, and living on what they can beg or steal, is placed at several million. The writer believes that there are two factors responsible for this condition, namely, a lack of understanding of what hobos or migrants are, and second, a lack of insight into the causes that prompt migrancy. This paper is an attempt to consider briefly; first, the types of migrants in the United States, second, the reasons underlying their being, and third, to offer suggestions as to the checking and control of the problem.

If the entire population of the United States should cease work for two weeks, there would be no more labor hours lost than are lost annually through the idleness, enforced and voluntary, of the migratory element in it. In 1907 Orlando Lewis<sup>1</sup> estimated that there were no less than 500,000 men and boys "beating" their way on the railroads, living by begging and stealing. Later estimates show that there has been a decided increase in this number. In 1924 there is believed to be between 1,700,000 and 2,000,000 of these migrants.<sup>2</sup>

Major Panghorn, representing President Butler of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, said that in 1907 a conservative estimate of what

<sup>1</sup> Orlando Lewis, *Vagrancy in the United States*.

<sup>2</sup> *Charities and Commons*, p. 342.

this cost the railroads annually would be \$25,000,000.<sup>1</sup> A statement purporting to have emanated from President Sproul of the Southern Pacific Railway, which appeared in an October, 1921, issue of the *San Francisco Chronicle*, claimed that hobos cost this one road alone over \$20,000,000 annually.

Society has always been rather tolerant of the wanderer. It has classed him with the artist, the poet, and others of the human race that we fail to understand, but secretly envy and admire. At times we have felt a vague, undefined sense of responsibility and have attempted certain remedial measures that have been ineffective because we failed to understand the problem we were trying to deal with.

An examination of the vagrancy laws of thirty-eight states and countless municipalities reveals the same generalized opinion about migrants and the same solution, namely, a jail sentence.

Hobohemia, the picturesque name applied to the field of these migrants, can be said, with truth, to be a state of mind. Their problem must be one a psychologist as well as a sociologist or economist can be well employed in studying. Some of these migrants need nothing but a shave and a haircut, others need the use of intelligently applied force, a few should be incarcerated, while many of them require the attention of trained psychiatrists.

These migrants have been classified before, the general classification being: those who wander, but do not work; and those who work and wander. Such a classification is, in the opinion of the writer, entirely too broad, and we must subdivide it into more exact groupings that will enable us to study the individual characteristics of these men at closer range, and with an understanding of what they are representative. Such a classification the writer found to exist among the migrants themselves, who recognize differences in types and purposes.

#### Tramps

- Professional tramps
- Road kids
- The tramp criminal
- The criminal tramp
- "Jockers and prushons"
- Neuropathic tramps

<sup>1</sup> Based on three estimates: (1) railroad officials' records; (2) police officials and relief workers; (3) I.C.C. reports.



## Hobos

The "bundle stiff"

The "beachcomber"

The automobile "tourist"

## Bums

Feeble-minded, superannuated, or diseased

*The professional tramp.*—Flynt calls him the "blowed-in-the-glass stiff,"<sup>\*</sup> a name frequently used by the professional himself. This tramp prides himself on two things: first, his ability to ride any and every contrivance that runs on rails, second, that he can beg a meal under even the most adverse circumstances. The professional tramp seldom if ever works, depending upon his wits and his knowledge of human character to provide him with all the necessities of life. An elaborate system of "road signs" enables him to discriminate between good and bad towns, relative to the activities of the police; also between houses where people give to tramps and those that are likely to call the authorities or to loose the dog. His story-telling ability is traditional; in this respect the resemblance to the wandering troubadours of old is striking. Many an idle hour, between trains, is wiled away by a group of tramps vying with each other in telling tales of their experiences. His vocabulary is filled with striking expressions, and his sense of the climactic is worthy of a broader field of expression.

*The road kid.*—Road kids range from ten to sixteen years of age, and travel about the country in gangs, commonly called "a push." Very often these gangs will reach great heights of centralized and autocratic control, but most of them are but loose organizations with few ties of devotion or means of control. The leadership is never permanent, for at any time a larger, stronger, and more resourceful boy may step in and oust the old leader. If the leader is unpopular there is no open rebellion, the gang simply melts away, the members seeking other gangs or forming a new one. There seems to exist an understanding that the movement of the gang is not to be hindered by any delay or action of the members. If train time comes and members of the gang are absent, they are left behind to catch up if they can or to shift for themselves. The

<sup>\*</sup> Josiah Flynt, *Tramping with the Tramps*.

different gangs are on good terms, but, for the fun of the brawl, fights frequently break out.

The road kid lives by begging and stealing. He seldom, if ever, joins in the community life of the jungle. His fear of adults is based on the unspeakable actions of criminal tramps, and the well-meaning but obnoxious attentions of kindly people who wish to find a home for him. He is tricky, deceitful, and has no sense of the rights of private property. If he wants an object and it can be stolen, he usually acquires it. His youthful agility makes possible riding in places and positions that an adult would not attempt. His fearlessness seems to be his salvation. In places where a more mature individual would hesitate that fraction of a second that separates disaster from success, the road kid thoughtlessly plunges ahead, and usually comes through. Many of them are killed and injured, but, in proportion to the number on the road, their casualties are surprisingly few.

The particular menace of the road kid to society is twofold, first, the ultimate effect upon the boy of such a mode of living must be detrimental; second, traveling in large numbers as they do, they frequently commit crimes that a smaller number would never attempt. Attacking a lone pedestrian at night is a favorite sport. After subduing their victim, they proceed to divest him of everything on his person, leaving him stark naked. They throw away what they cannot wear or use, seldom taking the risk of selling to the second-hand dealers; while, on the other hand, they frequently go about begging clothes from housewives and immediately turning them into cash.

In rare cases these boys return home after a few months or a year of wandering. If they live to maturity they join the ranks of the adult migrants, becoming tramps or casual laborers.

*The tramp criminal.*—The tramp criminal commits his crimes in the large cities, then takes to the open road to escape arrest. The road offers an exceptional security, as the men can travel at night and live in the jungles during the day, meeting no one who has heard of their exploits and is likely to apprehend them. They live on the proceeds of the last job. Carrying guns, they terrorize train crews and many cases of wanton murder have been traced

to them. Though they consider themselves above petty "jobs," a particularly attractive post-office or country store may tempt them into taking a try at it. Whenever the authorities are puzzled by the evidence of a master safe-cracker's work on some small safe in a village town, it is safe to assume that it is the work of a tramp criminal who was out of funds.

*The criminal tramp.*—The difference between tramp criminals and criminal tramps is greater than their names would imply. The criminal tramp is first and foremost a tramp, who lives by committing a petty crime. Holdups, sneak thievery, the robbing of freight cars, and other similar crimes not requiring great courage or skill are their specialties. They are of a low mental caliber as a rule, and many of them have nullified what mental powers they may have once possessed by addiction to drugs or other physical excesses.

It is among this group that we find the "jocker," that despicable enticer of young boys. The jocker finds a likely looking youngster in some community, then, ingratiating himself with the boy, he lures him away by promises of adventure. After the boy's spirit has been broken by mistreatment, the jocker proceeds to train him in the way a "prushon" should go. After the boy has learned how to beg and steal he is sold to another criminal tramp, whose appearance prevents his snaring boys for his own use. If they are apprehended by the authorities, little can be done, for the boy has been taught to swear that the jocker is his father, and through fear of death he sticks to the story and seldom tells of the horrible conditions that exist.

*Neuropathic tramps.*—Neuropathic tramps are harmless, demented men, who wander about the country driven by various obsessions. There are three principal types, the "scenery tramp," the "road hog," and the "religious tramp." The scenery tramp is one who "in his love of nature, holds communion with her visible forms." It is simply the case of a man whose sense of values is different from those of society at large. Working through the cold winter months, the scenery tramp acquires a few dollars which enable him to spend the summer months wandering. He presents no problem, and as his numbers are not excessively large he does

no one great harm. The road hog is impelled by one driving motive: to cover as much territory as possible in the shortest possible time. It seems that the thrill of riding means more than comfort or even physical well-being to him. His life is short. Worn out by tremendous nerve strain and malnutrition, he is soon found in some county hospital, shattered and well on the road of his last journey. The religious tramp believes he has received the call to go into "the highways and byways" and preach the gospel. Finding few listeners, he has adopted the sign-painting method of spreading the gospel. Armed with a can of paint and a brush, he covers walls, fence posts, and bridges with various biblical injunctions: "Jesus Saves," "Prepare to Meet Your God." Evidently the absence of a direct biblical command to the contrary gives him sufficient freedom of conscience to steal rides. The worthy women throughout the country evidently feel that his work is of an evangelical nature, for they contribute to his welfare almost as freely as they give to foreign missions.

*The hobo.*—Our seasonal demands for labor are such that during the summer months large numbers of men are employed, and in the winter months they are forced to hibernate in the large cities dependent upon charity for food and shelter.

The hobo has developed very definite characteristics. His psychology has been largely determined by his mode of living. His negative contacts with the law and his position in society have made of him an undesirable type. He is a familiar figure in the middle western and western states, as he trudges along the roads with his earthly possessions strapped to his back in a blanket roll. He is the creator and occupant of the famous hobo "jungles." There he goes to cook his food, for he must live well to stand up under long hours of strenuous work. With his gastronomic demands, restaurants are out of the question even if they were available. In the jungle he finds the necessary appurtenances for "boiling up," which is a combination laundry and delousing process. There he spends his time between jobs. Hotels are far too expensive for his meager income, which, while fairly large per day of work, is absurdly small considering the amount of time

consumed in going from one job to another, and the long period of enforced idleness during the late fall and winter months.

When one considers his environment, it is surprising that the hobo is not the lawless individual he is sometimes pictured to be. His contact with the law is not conducive to a growing respect for it. Railroad guards operating as officers of the law resort to extreme practices in an effort to rid their road of this undesirable free rider. The small-town constable, appealed to by nervous women of the community, shoots up the nearby jungle—and sometimes the occupants—in the majestic name of the law and the star that he wears. Justices of the peace fine him when he is returning from the harvest with a “roll,” thereby enriching their local treasury, and at other times, if they need their roads repaired, they sentence him to hard labor. The parts of the city in which he moves during the winter months are patrolled by policemen who “hit first and argue afterward” if there is anything left to argue with. He is womanless, jobless, and homeless.<sup>1</sup> The usual residence qualification deprives him of his franchise, and he bitterly resents the fact that he has no voice in the making of our laws. Organized labor has neglected him, and he is left to the I.W.W. to educate and organize. But, though he listens to their propaganda and apparently is acquiescent, he never rebels. That, perhaps, is why he is a hobo.

*The beachcomber.*—Closely allied to the hobo is the beachcomber, the itinerant sailor, who frequently deserts the sea for a short jaunt ashore, either in this or in foreign countries. His mode of living while ashore in this country is very similar to that of the hobo, while his life in foreign countries does not fall within the scope of this paper; consequently no more than the foregoing mention need be undertaken here.

*The automobile tourist.*—The automobile tourist packs his family into a cheap car and sets out to follow the harvests. In the summer time the children work, sometimes picking fruit, cotton, and vegetables, and sometimes in the canneries. The mother tends camp, and the father is eternally adjusting the carburetor or tuning up the engine of their car. The children earn a fair joint income while

<sup>1</sup> Carlton Parker, *The Casual Laborer and Other Essays*.

at work, and as the families' standards are very low, their cost of living is well within the children's earning power.

This phase of the migratory problem has developed to such an extent in California that the state has appropriated a sum of money to equip and maintain a migratory school, much to the annoyance of the head of the migratory family who does not gracefully accept such interference with the economic activities of his family.

Any estimate of the number of these migratory families would be based entirely on guesswork, for there are no available statistics or other data on which to work. But no matter what the number, it is by far too large for the best interests of the state.

*Bums.*—Bums are stationary non-workers and as such have no place in this discussion. But, as they occasionally are driven out of a community, they find themselves, temporarily at least, enjoying the status of migrants; accordingly the bare mention of them here will not be out of place. Bums are of four types: the "barrel house" or whisky bum, the feeble-minded bum, the superannuated bum, and the diseased or disabled bum. They live on charity and an occasional small job.

*Reasons underlying the existence of the migrant.*—Any consideration of the problem of migrancy must concern itself with the reasons back of this phase of our social life. Out of the many that have been advanced by the students of the question the writer has picked twelve that seem to offer the most diversified method of approach. They are:

1. An increasing number of failures or incompetents
2. A natural step for a failure
3. Breaking-up of the crafts
4. Closed policy of the labor unions
5. Periods of prosperity and depression
6. Scientific management
7. Apostasy
8. Disappearance of the frontier
9. Improved traveling facilities
10. Widespread charities
11. Shipping agencies and employment bureaus
12. Prenatal and postnatal impressions

Let us consider these points briefly.

*Increased incompetency.*—Many economists and sociologists are agreed that the United States is now in a period of decreasing returns, i.e., the population is increasing faster than the agents of production, which in turn has a tendency to lower the standards of living, curtailing reproduction among the more responsible classes, but having little or no effect on the lower, less responsible, elements, for the actual subsistence level has not been reached. With these less responsible families the birth-rate goes on as before. They have a lower plane of living than they would otherwise have, and the offspring is in many ways "predetermined" to a less efficient existence than might otherwise have been the case. The children are born of undernourished mothers, and in infancy do not receive the care that their period of helplessness calls for. They are taken from school as soon as the law allows and frequently before, placed in "blind alley jobs," and by the time they reach maturity have, for the most part, progressed but little beyond the stage at which they entered industry. They are easily replaced, and when competition becomes strenuous, they go under. They are from birth predisposed to become failures.

*A natural step for a failure.*—After a man has attained a certain place in society, no matter how humble this place may be, he is reluctant to step down into a lower social or economic plane. This is primarily due to fear of what the neighbors will think and to that vague motivating emotion called pride. Fear among the strong impels fight, among the weak it impels flight. While the strong often fail, most failures are among those who are weak. Rather than set about restoring their old status, they decide to strike out for new fields and begin again. Economic failure, the loss of a job through depression of industry, inability of the worker, or the betrayal of a trust, is more common than unusual among the unskilled workers of the nation. Just how common this form of failure is may be gathered from the following quotation: ". . . . In a population of a million and a half, very nearly if not quite a half million of persons were driven, or chose to accept . . . . charity at some period of the eight years, if not during the whole of it."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> J. Riis, *How the Other Half Live*, p. 243.

Obedying the urge of flight, the worker strikes out. He may or he may not find a suitable place to begin anew. Lacking the funds for train fares, he soon learns of the convenient freight trains, which may be ridden with comparative ease. Being then a stranger in a strange land, his reluctance to ask for charity is more readily overcome. Soon he is a confirmed vagrant.

*Breaking-up of the crafts.*—The day has passed when the father may safely say to his son, "You may lose your money, but never your trade." Trades vanish overnight.

If machines displace labor rapidly men that cannot adjust themselves to the new conditions suffer, and there are always some that cannot adjust themselves, always some that suffer. . . .

The least efficient men in any trade suffer most from the introduction of machinery. The new method is hardest on the man at the margin of employment. . . .

Many cases of the breaking-up of the trades can be pointed out as we follow the history of the development of the machine era: a few of which are processes in smelting iron, the Huhn coal mining machine, the linotype and the monotype in the printing industry, the Goodyear, McKay, and other machines in the shoe industry, the new roller process in flour mills, and machinery for making glass.

While this breaking-up of crafts is highly desirable from the viewpoint of industrial efficiency, and that often the men who are forced to seek elsewhere for work are again employed due to increased production, the element of time enters in, and for the time being these men are virtual migrants, in that they are forced to accept jobs of a less desirable nature, and this in turn forces the marginal man in that job out, until the scale has been traversed and the last man finds himself on the road (see Table I).

*Closed policy of the trade unions.*—Labor unions have brought about a monopoly of jobs, the effectiveness of which is determined by the strength of the union. Rigid apprenticeship rules keep out many youths. High initiation fees keep the doors locked to the workers who are not members of the union. The policy of

\* F. A. Fetter, *Economic Principles* p. 460; see also A. Lewis, *The Militant Proletariat*, p. 108.



the "closed shop" keeps both out of the industry. The writer has been told that the plasterers' union of Oakland, California, has admitted but five apprentices in the last twelve years. Initiation fees ranging from a few dollars to several hundred are most effective barriers to many of the less efficient workers in the trade. Just how many men this policy sends into the ranks of the Hobohemians is not determinable. Sufficient to say, that, though the number may be small, it at least is a contributory force, potentially, in making migrants.

*Business cycles, prosperity, and depression.*—Crisis years have occurred in the United States with startling regularity. It is a

TABLE I  
DECREASE IN NUMBER OF WAGE-EARNERS, 1899-1909,  
IN CERTAIN INDUSTRIES\*

Industry	Average No. of Wage- Earnings, 1909	Percentage of Decrease		
		1899-1909	1904-09	1899-1904
Iron and steel, blast furnaces.....	38,429	2.1	9.6†	10.6
Smelting and refining lead.....	7,424	10.8	2.0	9.0
Carriages, wagons.....	69,928	5.3	10.2	5.5†
Ship and boat-building.....	40,506	13.4	20.2	8.6†
Roofing materials.....	2,465	67.5	72.0	16.1†
Bicycles and Motorcycles.....	4,437	74.7	33.7†	81.1

\* Compiled from *Thirteenth Census*, VIII, 40-42, by W. Jilt Lauck and E. Sydenstricker.

† Increase.

known fact that in periods of great industrial prosperity, for example, during the last war, the number of migrants traveling over our highways is notably diminished. To say, however, that industrial depression is a cause of migrancy would be a mere assertion exceedingly difficult to prove. Rather we may accept, wholly, or in part, the idea that increased migrancy in a period of depression is but a manifestation of the evil effects of such a phenomenon. We are concerned here primarily with the reasons of migrancy. From our contact with migrants and the impressions gathered, some mere impressions, others of a more scientific nature, we are led to believe that the workers of the land become migrants, to a marked degree, first, through unemployment, secondly, through attempts to find jobs, that, thirdly, result in discouragement.

Workers, both single and married, move from one part of the country trying to find work that is not to be found. While the morale of this wandering army of job hunters may be maintained for a while, it is but a matter of time before his unsuccessful efforts will bring on discouragement, which may be further augmented by undernourishment and loss of strength. A man who before the crisis had been employed regularly may in a period of depression be forced to accept odd jobs of any kind in an attempt to keep life in his body or to provide for helpless dependents. Thousands of men, weakened by exposure and discouragement, desert their families, ashamed to face them in this, their hour of failure; or, finding it difficult to keep himself fed and clothed, will heartlessly leave them to shift for themselves. Those members of our population who have never experienced the demoralization of hunger and the helplessness of searching for work unsuccessfully will find it difficult to understand the breakdown of the moral fiber of these men who desert their dependents.<sup>1</sup>

*Scientific management.*—As a part of the undeveloped era of scientific management we have the modern secondary schools, the “best” of which are equipped to turn out young men and women trained to take their place in industry. These young men and women are trained, but only half-trained: they are units in the industrial machine, partly prepared not only to take their place in the industrial machine, but to compete with other half-trained units.

This use of our secondary and elementary schools is an unpardonable crime against adolescence. Turning institutions for making citizens and training character into vestibule schools for industry is a perversion of the purpose of education. The adolescent years are the formative years of a person's life, and they should rightly be devoted to the development of social relations and responsibilities, through the unifying forces of history, literature, and the sciences. Instead, the youth spends his time learning to do things with machines, typewriters, and other tools. He does not know and he never will know. His but to do, while other more fortunate individuals plan for him, think for him, and really live for him.

<sup>1</sup> Statistics gathered show that when the labor demands of our industrial cities drop off 50 per cent, the population decreases approximately 47 per cent.

In the less efficient industry of the past, there was room for "the halt, the lame, and the blind." But today, with trade tests, intelligence tests, physical examinations, cross-filing of references, and a highly trained employment bureau in every industry, the individual with a slight defect has small chance of securing employment. What are these unfortunate, though willing, candidates for employment going to do? The answer is obvious. They are going down the scale of employments until they find their level. Perhaps that will be among the migrants, or they may be fortunate enough to be classed among the marginal workers of industry. Scientific management is not to blame, and we cannot blame society.<sup>1</sup> The conditions exist, and are responsible for the large increase in the ranks of the casual worker.

*Apostasy.*—Industrial leaders on every hand are deploring the lamentable restlessness of the working class. They claim that industry offers every inducement to the worker. Short hours and high wages, pleasant workrooms; restrooms, pensions, insurance, and vacations—without pay. The workers, while not denying that they are restless, do not agree with the employers about the desirability of labor. In fact many of them have apostatized from the good old doctrine of work. An examination of the records of any well-organized personnel bureau will show that many of the reasons given for quitting work are vague and non-specific. This labor turnover has reached the unparalleled figure of 74 per cent in certain industries.

What is the cause of it all? Are the workers crying with Carlyle? "It is not to die, or even to die of hunger that makes a man wretched; many men have died; all men must die. . . . But it is to live miserable we know not why; to work more and yet gain nothing; to be heartworn, weary, yet isolated and unrelated."<sup>2</sup> The writer believes that the attitude of the worker in turning apostate is directly traceable to the forms of industry.

Present-day industry has a tendency toward automatization of the individual. It is extremely difficult for the average man to become an automaton. He is continually spending energy

<sup>1</sup> See Kier, "Scientific Management and Socialism," *Science Monthly*, October, 1917.

<sup>2</sup> T. Carlyle, *Past and Present*, p. 203.

in fighting against this force. Couple this with the nerve-wracking roar of the machine process and you have two important factors which render the worker of today more and more unstable. The character of industry is such that the worker's attention must be fixed upon "a phenomenon of impersonal character and to sequences and correlations not dependent for their force upon human predilection nor created by habit and custom."<sup>1</sup> The worker acquires a different mode of thought from that of the worker of the past. The traditions, customs, and modes of the generations have little influence upon him. La Fargue points out that the mind of the worker is becoming irreligious. Conditions prevent his coming in contact with the processes of nature, mysterious and inexplicable, such as birth and growth, which tends toward an acceptance of the mythical in religion. It is difficult for the modern artisan to experience the overwhelming throes of a religious experience. Hobson has carried the work of the early humanists, who claimed that the degradation of the laborer was due to unsatisfactory working conditions, to a logical conclusion by intimating that these same unsatisfactory conditions dominate modern industry.<sup>2</sup>

The modern laborer's mind is becoming more and more unstable, because of the conditions of his industry. His regard for conventions is waning, the hold of religion is weakening, and the effect of it all is to be seen in the movement of unrest and dissatisfaction that predominates in industry. Here, again, to stay with our thesis, it is necessary to point out that the ultimate result is the apostate, who flees from work. The only place he has to flee to is the "open road."<sup>3</sup>

*Disappearance of the frontier.*—Still another element that modern society cannot appeal to is the pioneer, or the man who has the pioneers' aversion to civilization. The Pacific Northwest, long the outpost of civilization, was noted for its radicalism. This radicalism was the radicalism of the pioneer spirit that manifested itself in the only mode of expression within its power, a protest

<sup>1</sup> T. Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, p. 310.

<sup>2</sup> See Hobson, *Work and Wealth*, p. 62; also Josephine Goldmark, *Fatigue and Efficiency* (*passim*).

<sup>3</sup> See Jack London, *The Apostate*, an interesting story based on this theme.

against social and industrial conditions. But as civilization has overtaken the pioneer in its westward movement, it has overtaken him in the Pacific Northwest. The land of the pioneer has gone. Civilization has been the victor. A few irreconcilables like Ezra Meeker are still driving their ox teams through the mountains and over the prairies. But the many other pioneer souls who, in this day of cheap automobiles, cannot afford the luxury of an ox team are driving their "flivvers" back and forth across the country, or have put their blankets on their back and joined the throng of migrants.

*Improved traveling facilities.*—While improved traveling facilities, widespread charities, shipping agencies, and employment bureaus cannot be said to be a motivating cause of migrancy, they are at least contributory, in that they smooth the way for the individual who finds himself either on, or just taking to the road, and, as such, have a certain bearing on the considerations with which this paper is concerned.

Histories of vagrancy<sup>1</sup> tell us that the migrant is an old institution, which became established before he had any other facilities for traveling than on foot. There is little doubt, however, that the number of migrants in this country, particularly that element that travels "for fun," would be greatly reduced in number if railroads were not so prevalent as they are. The enthusiasm which the "road kid" and the professional tramp carries with him would begin to evaporate after a few weary miles along a dusty pike. It is the thrill of riding trains that appeals to them. With an increasing number of trains running, the chances of having this thrill realized is more than correspondingly increased. The more trains, the fewer free riders there are to each train, with a better chance that these few will get through without detection. In the event of being put off at a water-tank stop, there is not the dismal prospect of a long walk to the nearest habitation, for another train will be along in a few minutes, or at the most in a few hours.

"Hitting the highway" is rapidly becoming a popular means of travel among certain classes of the migrants. This consists of

<sup>1</sup> Tumes, *The History of Vagrancy*; Mayhew, *The London Laborer and the London Poor*.

begging rides from passing automobile drivers. Many of the more intelligent hobos are casting aside their traditional blanket roll, and in its place adopting a suit case, for they know that their chances of getting rides rest largely on their appearance of respectability.

*Widespread charities.*—Charities are of four kinds: the civic, the ecclesiastical, the associated, and the individual. The first three are as a reserve to the migrant in case the individual charity should fail him—which, however, it rarely does. All four of these forms of charitable organizations have extended their scope and have included the migrant in their programs for social welfare. The extension of charitable endeavors may be attributed to two factors: an increasing recognition of social responsibility and the ever growing need for such relief.

Civic organizations are catering to the migrant with municipal hotels, woodyards, and employment agencies. The associated charities are becoming better organized, they have more funds, and are taking a broader outlook upon the question of poverty. In fact so many of them have so expanded their work that they virtually invite the wanderer in to partake of their services. When once inside the wanderer finds a staff of efficient young ladies who anticipate his every need. They have been well trained at our colleges which have large departments of instruction in charities and corrections. The budgets of the associated charities depend to a certain extent upon past performances. If they have fed ten thousand hungry men in the past year, it is quite indicative that the need exists, and they must have more funds to employ more social service workers and render even more aid to these needy. The ecclesiastical charities are of two types: more or less highly organized like the Salvation Army and the Volunteers of America, and sporadic localized attempts like the rescue missions of our large cities. Both types cater to the migrant. However, it seems to be the smaller, mission, charity, with its absence of red tape, that appeals to him most. But it is the individual charity that cares for the bulk of our wandering men, thus casting an unwarranted burden upon those who can least afford it. The very poor, being near the border-line of want themselves, rarely turn away

a hungry man, while the successful man, who has no patience with incompetence, gives a few dollars a year to the community chest and turns all beggars away from his door.

The tramp makes no random movements when seeking food in a strange town. Before he has even alighted from the train he knows the character of the town and the police from conspicuous "road signs" chalked up by other members of the fraternity. After washing at the nearest tap he strolls leisurely up the side streets, carefully watching for the sign that will indicate to him the best place to beg for food. These signs contain other instructions as well: whether or not to be "religious," to plead out of work, to be an ex-soldier, or other tips of a useful character. Thus when a residence is once characterized as being "good," the occupant is continually besieged until from necessity he must turn someone away. Then the disappointed wanderer changes the sign, and the house is freed of the nuisance until the elements wear away the mark and some venturesome tramp knocks on its door. By that time the people have forgotten their harrassing of the past and contribute a meal; as the tramp passes through the gate he again puts the house in the good graces of the wandering fraternity.

It is no doubt apparent how this affects the supply of migrants. When charities exist in such abundance the fear of actual starvation is eliminated, and men who have had a constant faith in work as the only preventative of hunger begin to see the error of their ways.

. . . . There are terrible alternatives which men will accept in preference to pauperism, and yet it is a curious fact which psychology alone explains, . . . . that the very men who will do anything rather than become paupers are often the very ones who never care to do anything else when once they have become dependent upon alms.<sup>2</sup>

*Shipping agencies and employment bureaus.*—For the migrant who does not care to steal rides on trains, walk, or beg rides from passing automobile travelers there is still a manner of wandering that does not require a well-filled pocket book. By securing employment at one of the shipping agencies he may be transported free of charge any distance from 10 to 1,000 miles. These agencies

<sup>2</sup> R. Hunter, *Poverty*, p. 3.

operate for the benefit of the employers who are located in out of the way places where labor is comparatively scarce. As the agencies are paid by the contract agreement, a certain time, or men, they do not make strenuous efforts to obtain men that will stay on the job when once they arrive at their destination. The men sign the contract to work, but, as it would not be possible to secure a judgment against them, nothing can be done if they jump their contract. By an actual test case a man shipped out of New York for Illinois, then by various stages, reached Montana and finally Seattle. On the return trip a shipment was made from San Francisco to Utah, from there to Colorado, and at last into Cleveland. Here the routes diverged north and south, none going east.

Employment bureaus depend for their existence on the fact that employers need men. If they can keep those needs as constant as is compatible with the confidence the employer has in their faithfulness, so much greater their profit. In many cases it is to their benefit to send "round pegs for square holes," for then the job will again be vacant in a few days and they can collect another fee, in some cases from the employer and in others from the employee. The employment agencies that are frequented by the migratory laborer are of the type that specialize in unskilled men. The writer has been told that the average duration of a man on a job is two and one-half days, which means that the same job can be made to turn over two or three commissions a week, and sometimes more.

The action of the shipping agencies and the employment bureaus of the unscrupulous kind just mentioned have their share in increasing the number of migrants. By sending men to jobs they can never hold, they inculcate the wandering spirit in men who have always been stable and thoroughly reliable.

*Prenatal impressions.*—The theory of prenatal impressions being contributory to the wanderlust is more interesting than important. Few, if any, biologists hold to the belief that the embryo can be very definitely influenced by the mental or emotional condition of the mother. The influence that may be effected is purely of a nutritional nature, quoting Professor Conklin:



The union between the embryo and the mother is a nutritive but not a protoplasmic one. Blood plasma passes from one to the other by a process of soakage, and the only maternal influences that can effect the developing embryo are such as may be conveyed through the blood plasma and are chiefly nutritive in character.<sup>1</sup>

Dating from Galton, a great mass of data has been collected showing that human traits and faculties, good, bad, or mediocre, are heritable. One of the foremost of these specialists in eugenic research, Dr. Berman, goes a step farther than Professor Conklin and asserts:

No one can deny, in the face of the multitude of evidence available, that internal secretion disturbances occur in the mother, which, when grave, offer in the infant gross proof of their significance, and therefore, when slight, must more subtly work upon it. Endocrine disturbances in infancy have been traced to endocrine disturbances in the mother during pregnancy. Pregnant animals fed on thyroid give birth to young with large thymus glands. The diet of the mother has been proved conclusively to influence the development and the constitution of the child. As the internal secretions influence the history of the food in the body, they affect development in the womb indirectly as well as directly. Certainly, whether or not we learn how to change the nature of germplasm within a short time, we have in the endocrines the means at hand for affecting the *whole individual that is born and sees the light of day*.<sup>2</sup>

The exponents of the theory of prenatal influences maintain: (1) that the emotions have much to do with the flow of internal secretions, in which belief they seem to have abundant authority to support them;<sup>1</sup> (2) that these internal secretions influence the blood supply (of this there seems to be little doubt); (3) that the embryo, being directly nourished by this blood supply, must of necessity partake of the emotional characteristics that primarily evoked the discharge of the secretions (in this latter statement, biologists are not agreed). The weight of what evidence they have in this matter is not sufficiently strong to justify an unlimited acceptance of such a belief.

The prenatalists further point out that, though emotional outbursts have ever been common among pregnant women, the

<sup>1</sup> Conklin, *Heredity and Environment*.

<sup>2</sup> Louis Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, p. 283 (italics in the original); see also George W. Crile, *Man, an Adaptive Mechanism; The Kinetic Drive*.

conditions of modern life—and by modern they mean that period from the introduction of the new industrialism and the inception of the era of the “new woman” who is in rebellion against those forces, social and economic, which confine her to the narrow routine of kitchen—are responsible for an even greater emotional activity among certain types of women today. They ask the question: Is this increased emotional activity among mothers going to pass unnoticed in its effects on the future generations?

After briefly illustrating how this theory fits into the question of migrants, it will be necessary to leave the question, despite its absorbing interest and potentialities.

If a child is born with an excess of adrenalin, an abnormal development of the adrenal glands, generally accepted as the gland of combat and flight, it is due to the condition of the mother during pregnancy. Cannon,<sup>1</sup> of Harvard University, has built up an entire theory on the basis of fear causing excessive adrenalin and excessive adrenalin in turn causing fear. A child<sup>2</sup> similar to the one just mentioned would be weak and timid, hardly able to adjust itself to the stern forces that comprise its environment. In cases of extreme difficulty it would be the one likely to succumb first, being inclined to take refuge in flight. And in many cases that flight would result in migrancy.

*Postnatal impressions.*—Postnatal impressions, or impressions after the birth of the child, are much easier to study and form definite opinions on. That the child receives a very definite trend of character through the influences of the mother during the formative years of adolescence goes almost without proof. Most women follow a very definite “female psychology.” This psychology may in some cases be perverted, so that her outlook on life and the outlook of the child under her care is different from that of society as a whole. A woman who is rebellious, a woman who seeks release from her domestic routine, a woman who envies her husband the comparative freedom of movement and expression, untrammelled as he is by physical and social bonds, can hardly be expected to give the same training to her child as does a woman

<sup>1</sup> Cannon, “Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage.”

<sup>2</sup> Merely an assumption—the contrary is quite possible.

who is happy with her lot, accepting her daily life without the slightest desire to escape. Nervous, high-strung mothers, who are constantly bordering on hysteria and forever subjecting their children to their irritation, will undoubtedly influence an impressionable child in ways that are not likely to result in a socially acceptable attitude on the part of the child.

The foregoing reasons are merely an enumeration of the forces that society will have to counteract in seeking "ways and means" to meet the problem of migrancy. That vagrancy laws, as now existent, will effectively deal with the heterogeneous mass that comprises the migrants of this country is too much to expect. To give suggestions for ideal laws and to give suggestions for laws that will be acceptable to legislators are two different matters. Either of them will get us nowhere. The happy medium is difficult to find.

*Remedial measures.*—The suggestions offered here are six in number: (1) centralized labor bureaus; (2) co-operation, through this bureau, of industries and communities; (3) low-priced traveling facilities, which make unnecessary the use of the "brake-beam"; (4) registration of bona fide migratory laborers; (5) amended laws that will tend to eliminate the tramp and still not injure the socially necessary laborer; (6) the establishing of government hotels and supervised camps.

*Centralized labor bureaus.*—Centralized labor bureaus are in existence and are doing valuable work, considering the means at their disposal. Much of the investigation of crop conditions and forecasting of labor needs is being taken care of by men who are contributing their services gratis.

The existing bureaus should be extended. Men trained in this sort of work should be assigned to the tasks with sufficient pay to induce them to take it up as a profession, rather than as a mere temporary field for gathering stray bits of information.

*Co-operation, through centralized labor bureau, of industries and communities.*—Many communities, unthinkingly, plan to have their public work done during the summer months, when it might be just as effectively taken care of during the spring or the late fall. Communities planning work should communicate with the

local agent of the labor bureau, presenting all the details and taking his advice regarding the labor supply into consideration, so adjusting their dates that there will be as little conflict with other seasonal activities as is possible.

Certain industries might readily shut down, for overhauling and general repairs, during the summer months. This would equalize the demand for skilled laborers of the type needed to repair machinery, and would convey a double benefit: upon the workers by giving them a chance to get into the country for the harvest season, and upon the agriculturist by insuring a plentiful supply of labor. These industries, by co-operating with the labor bureaus, would be aiding them in their work.

This co-operation might well be carried even farther. When industries were forced to slow down, as they invariably are at periodic intervals, the labor bureaus could by government authority turn the unemployed men into construction gangs for work on public improvements, thus affording employment for the workers and vast benefits to the nation as a whole. A bill providing for a commission, appointed by the president, to lay the foundations for a systematic development of public works—roads, forest preserves, drainage, and irrigation—to be carried on by utilization of the reserve army of unemployed, was introduced at the last session of Congress, and, though it did not pass, its advocates predict that it will appear again in the present session.

*Low-priced traveling facilities.*—Two ways of effecting lower costs to the laborer who is moving from one job to the other could be worked out. One would be the issuing of rates during the harvest seasons, or during other periods of labor mobilization, upon the approval of the centralized labor bureau, through whose suggestion the laborer is moving. The other would be the utilization of "outfit" cars, similar in design and finish to those now used by the railroads in housing and moving their construction and other labor gangs. The cost per mile of moving such cars would be low as they could be switched on and off the regular freight trains. The cars could also be used by the workers as temporary homes while engaged on some job where housing was difficult to provide.

At the beginning of the harvest season, the harvest crews can be mobilized at central points, housed in the outfit cars, which would then be hauled to the scene of the cutting and follow the men as they gradually cut their way north, thereby eliminating the evils of the jungle camps and the danger and loss of time connected with stealing rides on freight trains. The cost of operating these cars would be borne by the men, and the railroads, in recognition of what was being saved through the elimination of the free rider, could well afford to haul the cars at cost.

*Registration of the migratory laborer.*—Recognizing the need, in our present economic organization, for the casual laborer, it is incumbent upon society to provide him with adequate working conditions. This can more readily be done when society can discriminate between the essential casual laborer and the menacing migrant of the other types. By requiring the registration of all men who intend to seek casual employment, a systematic record could be kept of their habits and movements. The cards should contain means of identification, records of days employed, and other data that would enable the officials to place the man where he would be best able to do his part of the world's work. The cost of these cards would not be excessive, and it might have a psychological value for the workman to pay for renewals or duplication of lost cards.

*Amended vagrancy laws.*—Society has no desire to punish or in any way injure the men who work at the seasonal occupations. But under the present system our judges can hardly be blamed for their lack of discrimination in dealing with migrants when they have but one law that is rigid in its interpretation. "Every man who can show no visible means of support shall be deemed a vagrant." When arrested, few migrants can show means of support, and claim that they are looking for work. In this event the court should take them at their word, and with the aid of the labor bureaus provide them with the opportunity to make good. A probationary period of from one to six months might be set during which time the migrant would be compelled to stay on the job that had been provided for him, unless the court dismissed him

for good reason. It will be argued that jobs are not so easily found as all that. They would be if the government put through the proposed scheme of public works before mentioned. Here the value of the identification card would prove itself. If the man appearing before the court could prove, by his filled in identification card, that he had been working a reasonable time out of the last six months, surely the judge, exercising some of the wisdom for which he is proverbially known, would extend the proper treatment toward the man.

If, however, an individual should be arrested for begging, stealing, or train jumping, a more stringent law could be invoked. This man should not become a burden upon the community, for then the community would not, as they do now, shift the burden on to their neighbors. The court could sentence this man to hard labor for a period of one to six months, or, if the case deserved greater severity, the time could be extended. The man would be placed on a public-service work gang at the standard rate of pay, of which he would draw one-fourth on the expiration of his sentence; out of the remaining three-fourths his board would be deducted and the balance go to pay the guards who were hired to insure his staying on the job.

For the more vicious types of migrants, mentioned above, we have a sufficient number of laws on the statutes. These, however, should be made uniform throughout all the states, and each conviction should be turned over to the federal bureaus for placement in the labor gangs. While there might be a large number of convictions during the early application of the law, and consequently large labor gangs, the state would benefit in having its public improvements progressing at a rapid rate, and at the same time rid itself of such undesirable parasites as the criminal tramp, the tramp criminal, and the jocker with his prushon. The road kid and the prushon would be cared for under different laws.

*Housing and control of camps.*—In order to insure proper sanitary conditions in both the federal and the private labor camps, the government might do well to institute a housing commission who would be empowered to enforce certain suitable laws designed to meet the conditions that are found.

There is little or no profit in conducting a hotel of the type that would cater to migrants, so the government would not be competing with existing interests by the installation of federal hotels at convenient centers. Here for a minimum of cost the migrant might obtain food, shelter, and have his other needs cared for. The hotels, after the initial cost, could be nearly, if not entirely self-supporting. It would not be looked upon as a charitable institution any more than our federal grant colleges are looked upon as charitable institutions.

The prime consideration to be borne in mind while considering these suggestions is that to be successful in their operation and to accomplish what they are designed for they must be nation-wide in their scope. The competitive element enters so strongly into all lines of industry that, if the people of one state were to enact laws and introduce measures similar to these or others destined to accomplish the same end, they would be competitively embarrassed if their neighboring states were not also subjected to the same conditions. By having these remedies under federal jurisdiction, the initial cost need not fall heaviest on any one group of individuals, but would be shared by all, as the elimination of the migrant problem would be a common benefit enjoyed by all.

# THE STATISTICAL DEFINITION OF A SOCIETAL VARIABLE

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## ABSTRACT

One of the basic problems for the sociologist is the discovery and definition of his constants and the description of his variables. The statistical method supplies a tool for the quantitative measurement of societal variables. This paper seeks to use the statistical method in defining the societal variable—room overcrowding among the families of Chicago workers—and is based on data gathered by the former School of Civics and Philanthropy. The group of 212 Italians from the Plymouth Court district is selected as a typical case for statistical definition. The coefficient of correlation, mean, standard deviation, and standard error of the mean, are computed for this group. In terms of these indexes it is possible to define with some precision the relationship between room occupancy and cubic air capacity, the average condition of occupants, the degree to which this average condition represents the series, and the probable representativeness of the sample. Further statistical analysis discovers the mathematical law of the distribution of cubic air contents per occupant. This procedure has made it possible to define our variable on seven quantitative counts.

This procedure is now applied to the ten remaining groups and the results compared. We conclude that: there is less variation among the means of the samples than in any series of observations in a single sample; the standard errors of the means of the samples confirm this conclusion; these findings establish a strong mathematical probability that the original samples were well chosen, although the reports of field work do not in themselves establish this point to the satisfaction of the critical statistician; the tabulated results conform to the normal law of error; the coefficients of correlation of the samples are quite uniform, so that the studies probably represent the actual conditions; the statistical analysis made in this paper suggests a way in which it is possible to check back upon original fieldwork investigations and is an example of the practical value of applying refined statistical methods in sociology.

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. Societal phenomena consist of variables. The analysis of social relationships is an analysis of data of observation, in which there are few if any constants. One of the basic scientific problems for the sociologist is, therefore, the discovery and definition of his constants and the description of his variables. As a matter of pure logic, the distinction between a constant and a variable is one of degree rather than of kind. Now, this distinction is one of greatest service to the sociologist in identifying his problems, because in so far as he is successful in completely describing some social variable, he has by this very process transferred the phenomenon from the



realm of an unknown variable to the realm of a known variable—and a known or a more or less fully defined variable is as near to being a constant as the sociologist can probably ever come.

2. At this point in analysis the statistical method supplies the sociologist with a refined tool for the quantitative measurement and definition of societal variables. It is the purpose of this paper to illustrate the use of the statistical method to measure and define quantitatively a definite societal variable. The variable taken for study is room overcrowding among the families of unskilled workers in Chicago, 1910-15. The data of observation consist of ten studies of housing conditions in Chicago conducted by the former Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy, and published in the *American Journal of Sociology*.<sup>1</sup> Tabular analyses of room overcrowding given in the quantitative terms of cubic feet per occupant were selected for the purpose of analysis in this paper rather than the tables of rent per apartment, because the former variable seemed to have somewhat greater significance for pure sociology than the latter. For example, room overcrowding has a closer connection with personal morality, family solidarity, and the spread of communicable diseases than does room rental.

## II. THE STATISTICAL DEFINITION OF ROOM OVERCROWDING

3. Before subjecting all of this material to statistical analysis and definition, it will be useful to attempt first a full quantitative description of a simple case. Let us select the study of 212 Italians living in the Plymouth Court district.<sup>2</sup> If no overcrowding existed and every room was perfectly adjusted to the regular needs of its occupants, we should find that the cubic feet of room space increased directly with the number of occupants, or, statistically speaking, that the correlation of air space and occupants was unity. As a matter of fact, the survey showed that 33 per cent of the cases shown in Table I were overcrowded in terms of legal definition. Statistically, we find that the coefficient of correlation instead of being +1 is  $r = -.185 \pm .044$ . This means that there is 18½ per cent of a tendency for a larger number of room occupants ( $x$ ) to be

<sup>1</sup> XVI, 145-70, 289-308, 433-68; XVII, 1-34, 145-76; XVIII, 241-57, 509-42; XX, 145-69, 289-312; XXI, 285-316.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, XVIII, 539.

associated with a smaller air space ( $y$ ). We may describe the situation differently in terms of the regression equations:

$$y = 1277 - 74.03x$$

$$x = 2.344 - .0002y$$

The first equation means that for every increase in occupancy of one additional child the cubic room capacity diminishes by 37 cubic feet. The tendency in each case is shown in the columns in the table below:

TABLE I

COLUMN OF REGRESSION OF $y$ ON $x$ , WHERE $y = -74.03x$		COLUMN OF REGRESSION OF $x$ ON $y$ , WHERE $x = -.0002y$	
Deviation in $y$ , Corresponding to a Unit Deviation in $x$		Deviation in $x$ , Corresponding to a Unit Deviation in $y$	
$x$	$y$	$y$	$x$
0.50	1,225	500	1.80
1.00	1,188	700	1.76
1.50	1,151	900	1.72
2.00	1,114	1,100	1.68
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.

4. We have taken the first step in statistically defining the variable. Let us now inquire into some other aspects of the variable. We may ask: What is the average room space? Computation shows that the mean is equal to 1,122 cubic feet or  $m_x = 1,122$  cubic feet. We may next inquire how typical of the varying cubic contents of the sleeping-rooms is this mean cubic capacity. The answer is found by computing the standard deviation of the series. This is found to be  $\sigma_x = 338$  cubic feet, which means that theoretically 68 per cent of the cases lie within a range of  $\pm\sigma_x$  or  $\pm 338$  cubic feet of the mean 1,122 cubic feet. As a matter of fact, a range of 784 to 1,460 cubic feet from 1,122 cubic feet includes 165 or 77 per cent of all cases.

5. If now we regard the group of 212 Italians as a fair sample of overcrowded conditions among Chicago Italians, we may ask how

TABLE Ia  
COMPUTATION OF COEFFICIENT OF CORRELATION

Cubic Feet	Occupants (0.50=1 Child, 1.50=1 Adult)										y Deviations				
	0.50	1.00	1.50	2.00	2.50	3.00	3.50	4.00	4.50	Totals	$\eta$	$f\eta$	$\eta^2$	$f\eta^2$	$f\eta\eta$
Contents.....															
400-600.....	9	6 3	2 3	11	211	4 1	6	8 1	10	5	-3	-15	9	45	+6
600-800.....	62	4 5	1 7	15	112	2 5	3 1	4 2	5	34	-2	-68	4	136	+4
800-1,000.....	3	2 5	1 7	15	112	2 5	3 1	4 2	5	47	-1	-47	1	47	-16
1,000-1,200.....	2	7	3	16	6	8	5	1	1	49	0	0	0	0	0
1,200-1,400.....	3 1	2 3	1 1	9	1 7	2 9	3 1	4 1	5	33	+1	+32	1	32	+22
1,400-1,600.....	6 1	4 8	2 2	4	2 2	4 2	6 2	8 1	10	22	+2	+44	4	88	-10
1,600-1,800.....	9 2	6 2	3 2	4	3 1	6 2	9 1	12 1	15	15	+3	+45	9	135	0
1,800-2,000.....	12	8 2	4 2	2	4 1	8 1	12	16	20	8	+4	+32	16	128	-12
Totals.....	8	35	20	61	40	30	10	7	1	212					
x deviations:															
$\bar{x}$ .....	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+163	$f\eta = +23$	-130	$\Sigma f\eta^2 = 611$	-38	
$f\bar{x}$ .....	-24	-70	-20	0	+40	+60	+30	+28	+5	-114	+153			+32	
$\bar{x}^2$ .....	9	4	1	0	1	4	9	16	25	49					-6 = $\Sigma f\eta\eta$
$f\bar{x}^2$ .....	72	140	20	0	40	120	90	112	25	619					
Computation of Non-linear Correlation															
Means of columns:	1,225	1,151	1,160	1,100	1,020	1,153	1,240	1,157	1,100						
$\bar{y}_x - \bar{y}$	103	29	38	-22	-102	31	118	35	-22						
$(\bar{y}_x - \bar{y})^2$	10,609	841	1,444	484	10,404	961	13,924	1,225	484						
$N \sum (\bar{y}_x - \bar{y})^2$	84,872	29,435	28,880	29,524	416,160	28,830	139,240	4,900	2,420						

## DETAIL OF COMPUTATION AND SUBSTITUTION

$$\begin{aligned}
 (1) \quad \text{Computation of } r &= \frac{\frac{\sum \xi \eta}{N} - (d_x d_y)}{\sqrt{\frac{\sum \xi^2}{N} - d_x^2} \sqrt{\frac{\sum \eta^2}{N} - d_y^2}}, \\
 r &= \frac{-6}{212} - (.0250995) \\
 &= \frac{-.0250995}{(1.6929)(1.6972)}, \\
 \left\{ \begin{aligned} N &= 212, d_x d_y = .0250995 + \\ d_x &= \frac{49}{212} = .2311 +, d_x^2 = .05341 + \\ d_y &= \frac{23}{212} = .10850 +, d_y^2 = .011789 + \\ \sigma_x &= \sqrt{\frac{610}{212} - (.05341)} = 1.6929 + \\ \sigma_y &= \sqrt{\frac{611}{212} - (.011789)} = 1.6972 + \end{aligned} \right.
 \end{aligned}$$

$$r = -.0185 + (\text{class int.}),$$

or

$$r = -.185 \pm .044$$

$$\text{P.E. } r = \frac{.67(1-r^2)}{\sqrt{n}} = \pm .044$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 (2) \quad \text{Computation of } \eta &= \sqrt{\frac{N_x(\bar{y}_x - \bar{y})^2}{N}} \left\{ \begin{aligned} N &= 212, \bar{y} = 1122 \text{ cu. ft.} \\ \sigma_y &= 1.697 \text{ class intervals, or } 338.82 \text{ cu. ft.} \\ N_x &= \text{totals of columns} \end{aligned} \right. \\
 (\text{Non-linear correlation}) &= \frac{\sigma_y}{\sigma_y}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\eta = r = \frac{\sqrt{\frac{764261}{212}}}{338.82} = \frac{60.82}{338.82} = +.179 +$$

$$\text{Using Blakeman's criterion, we find } \left[ \frac{\sqrt{N}}{.675} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{\eta^2 - r^2} \right] = 1.584 < 2.50.$$

representative of all Chicago Italians is this sample of 212 cases. To answer this question requires additional statistical analysis and definition. For the moment let us simplify the question by making it more concrete and ask: Does the average cubic contents of rooms in the sample group of 212 Italians fairly represent the average room capacity of all Chicago Italians? To answer this question we compute the standard error of the mean which is given by the formula  $\sigma_m = \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{n}}$ .<sup>1</sup> By substitution we find  $\sigma_{m11} = 23.31$  cubic feet.

This means that the chances were 2 to 1 that the true mean lies within a range of  $\pm \sigma_{m11}$ , or, more specifically, between 1,099 cubic feet and 1,145 cubic feet, and the chances are 369 to 1 that the true mean will lie between  $\pm 3\sigma_{m11}$ , or, more specifically, between 1,053 cubic feet and 1,191 cubic feet. All this is based on the assumption that the sample has been chosen at random, e.g., that (a) every Chicago Italian family of this economic class had an equal chance of being included in the sample, and (b) that the selection of each family was independent of the selection of every other family.<sup>2</sup> It is an important point to remember that the standard error of the mean applies, no matter whether the distribution of cubic air contents among all the Chicago Italian families is a normal or a skew distribution. The reason for this we can better discuss in the next section. For the present let us summarize the progress already made in defining our variable.

6. The following statistical measurements have been computed from the material given in Table II, and represent overcrowding among the group of 212 Italians. These indexes give in order named the relationship between room space and occupancy, the average amount of room space, the extent to which this average amount represents the series, and, finally, the extent to which this average amount may be considered representative of the true average in the wider universe from which the sample was drawn.

$$\begin{aligned} r_{11} &= -.185 \pm .044 \text{ cu. ft.} & \sigma_{11} &= 338 \text{ cu. ft.} \\ m_{11} &= 1,122 \text{ cu. ft.,} & \sigma_{m11} &= 23.31 \text{ cu. ft.} \end{aligned}$$

<sup>1</sup> G. U. Yule, *Introduction to the Theory of Statistics* (1912 ed.), p. 344.

<sup>2</sup> F. S. Chapin, *Field Work and Social Research*, pp. 116-17.

7. Another question may now be asked: Do the cubic contents of sleeping-rooms per occupant vary in any orderly fashion, or is the occurrence of this phenomenon wholly haphazard? In other words, we ask whether there is any law of distribution followed by the varying room spaces per occupant. The answer to this question involves more elaborate statistical computation than we have thus far attempted.

TABLE II

NUMBER OF PERSONS SLEEPING IN ROOMS OF SPECIFIED CUBIC CONTENTS\*

Contents of Room in Cubic Feet	Number of Rooms Occupied By									Total number overcrowded rooms: 64 (33 per cent)	Totals
	.5	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.5	3.0	3.5	4.0	4.5†		
400 and less than 600....	...	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Total number overcrowded rooms: 64 (33 per cent)	5
600 and less than 800....	2	5	3	11	11	1	...	1	...		34
800 and less than 1,000....	...	5	7	15	12	5	1	2	...		47
1,000 and less than 1,200...	2	7	3	16	6	8	5	1	1		49
1,200 and less than 1,400...	1	3	1	9	7	9	1	1	...		32
1,400 and less than 1,500...	1	8	2	2	2	2	2	1	...		22
1,600 and less than 1,800...	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	...		15
1,800 and less than 2,000†.	...	2	2	2	1	1	...	...	...		8
Totals.....	8	35	20	61	40	30	10	7	1		212§

\* Table for Plymouth Court district of Chicago (Italians), *Amer. Jour. Soc.*, XVIII (January, 1913), 539.

† The original table contained class "2,000 and more." This class of 14 cases had to be omitted from this table because the class was open and could not be treated statistically.

‡ For the same reason the "class 5 and more" persons was omitted, and it was necessary to substitute numerical equivalents for children and adults as follows: one child = .50, one adult = 1.00, etc., for statistical reasons.

§ In this way the total of our present table is 212 cases as compared with the original total of 230 which was not amenable to statistical treatment for the reasons just given. This practice was followed in all of the other ten tables, and accounts for discrepancies between our figures and the original data.

|| This figure was recomputed on our new base 212.

8. The precise problem before us is to fit a smooth curve to the rough graph of frequency of occurrence of different-sized sleeping-rooms. If we find that there is a fairly close approximation between some ideal curve and the actual observations, then we may conclude that the mathematical formula of the ideal curve is the law of distribution of our data of observation. With the discovery of this law we will have completed our statistical definition of the quantitative aspects of room overcrowding in Chicago, in so far as it may be represented by the sample of 212 Italians.

9. The first point to be decided is whether the distribution of our observations is normal or skew. If normal, then we shall try to fit

a normal frequency curve to the data; if skew, then we shall have to resort to some other of Pearson's fifteen types of frequency curves.<sup>1</sup> Now, skewness may be simply computed as follows:

$$Sk = \frac{\text{Mean-Mode}}{\text{Standard deviation}}$$

Applying this formula, we find that the skewness of our distribution is  $Sk = +.120$ . This is but a slight departure from normality;




FIG. 1.—Cubic feet of air in sleeping-rooms

$$y = \frac{212}{1.69\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{x^2}{5.71}}$$

$$M = 1122 \text{ cu. ft.} \quad \sigma_m = 23 \text{ cu. ft.} \\ \sigma = 338 \text{ cu. ft.} \quad Sk = +.12$$

we may, consequently, proceed to fit a normal curve to our distribution, using the standard  $x/\sigma$  tables<sup>2</sup> to compute the frequency for  $y/y_0$  values. We discover in this way the values of the ordinates of an ideal curve that most nearly fits our observations. In Table III the  $x$  and  $y$  values as computed are given. These  $x$  and  $y$  values are plotted in Figure 1, together with the histogram and

<sup>1</sup> W. P. Elderton, *Frequency Curves and Correlation* (1906), pp. 53-60, 83-86; from which types I,  $y = y_0 \left(1 + \frac{x}{a_1}\right)^{m_1} \left(1 - \frac{x}{a_2}\right)^{m_2}$ , and VI,  $y = y_0(x-a)^{q_1}x^{-q_2}$ , where skewness is  $+ .8032$  and  $+ .433$ , show similarity to several of our distributions.

<sup>2</sup> See H. O. Rugg, *Statistical Methods Applied to Education* (1917), pp. 208-10, and Table II, p. 388.

frequency polygon of the observations. Since we know the values of  $\sigma_{11}$  and  $N_{11}$ , we may now substitute these in the general equation of the normal curve  $y = \frac{N}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{\frac{-x^2}{2\sigma^2}}$ . We thus obtain the formula of the special normal curve which most closely fits our observations. This formula is given on the diagram. It should be noted in this case that the standard deviation is given in units of class intervals

TABLE III  
ORDINATES AND ABSCISSAE OF BEST-FITTING SMOOTH CURVE

Classes	<i>f</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>fd</i>	<i>fd</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i> / $\sigma$	<i>y</i> / $y_0$	<i>y</i>
400 and less than 600 . . . .	5	-3	-15	45	3.11	1.840	.18400	9.24
600 and less than 800 . . . .	34	-2	-68	136	2.11	1.249	.46357	23.28
800 and less than 1,000 . . .	47	-1	-47	47	1.11	.656	.80957	40.66
1,000 and less than 1,200 . . .	49	0	-130	.....	.....	.....	$y_0 =$	50.23
1,200 and less than 1,400 . . .	32	+1	+32	32	.89	.526	.8740	43.90
1,400 and less than 1,600 . . .	22	+2	+44	88	1.89	1.118	.5340	26.83
1,600 and less than 1,800 . . .	15	+3	+45	135	2.89	1.710	.2310	11.61
1,800 and less than 2,000 . . .	8	+4	+32	128	3.89	2.302	.0710	3.56
			+153					
Totals . . . . .	212	.....	+23	611	.....	.....	.....	.....

$$\begin{aligned}
 M &= A + \frac{d_1}{N} & \sigma &= \sqrt{\frac{\sum f d^2}{N} - (d_y)^2} \quad (d^2 = 611) & y_0 &= \frac{N}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} \\
 &= 1,100 + \frac{23}{212} (200) & &= \sqrt{\frac{611}{212} - .01178} & &= \frac{212}{1.69(2.50)} \\
 &= 1,122 & &= 1.69 + \text{class intervals} & &= 50.23 \\
 (d_1 = 23), \quad d_y &= \frac{d_1}{N} & &= 338 \text{ cu. ft.} & &
 \end{aligned}$$

rather than in cubic feet. We have now discovered the most probable law of distribution of the cubic contents of rooms per occupant among the group of 212 Chicago Italians. At this point it may be remarked that our formula which gives the mathematical law of distribution of our data, the plotted data of Figure 1, and the measure of skewness, constitute three additional items of statistical definition which may now be added to the four which were summarized in paragraph 6. In other words, we have now secured a quantitative definition of our variable on seven different counts.



10. If now we return to a former question and inquire: How representative of the conditions of room overcrowding among unskilled workers in Chicago is the sample of 212 Italians, we must needs examine into the conditions under which the sample group of 212 was selected. This question leads us to a consideration of how our Italian sample compares with the other ten samples.

### III. STATISTICAL DEFINITION OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES

11. Thus far we have confined our analysis to only one of the ten samples of overcrowding in Chicago mentioned in paragraph 2. We have shown how such a societal variable as room overcrowding may be statistically defined by taking as an example a group of 212 Italians. Let us now proceed to an analysis of the entire ten samples of room overcrowding. It should be stated at the outset that the data of Table IV were secured from an analysis of each of the remaining ten samples, and that in every case the analysis followed the procedures outlined in paragraphs 3 to 9 inclusive. It will be seen at once that row 11 contains the data derived and discussed in paragraphs 3 to 9.

12. The ten housing studies which supply the observations interpreted in this article by means of statistical method were made in the effort to procure a fair picture of housing conditions in working-class areas of Chicago. The directors of these housing surveys presumably selected with care the regions to be studied, although it should be said that reading of their published reports does not supply the statistical scientist with very tangible evidence of representative selection.<sup>1</sup> But, at any rate, it is legitimate to regard these ten housing studies as so many samples chosen with the honest intent of fairly representing living conditions in the wider universe of the city of Chicago.

13. With these preliminary observations let us now proceed to an interpretation of the statistical comparisons of Table IV. A word of explanation may be useful at this point. Column 1 refers to the number of the sample 1-11, respectively. Column 2 briefly describes the ethnic composition of each sample. Column 3 gives

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of the scientific basis and method of selecting random samples, see F. S. Chapin, *Field Work and Social Research*, pp. 116-25.

the total number of cases in the sample used in this statistical analysis. Column 4 gives the average cubic feet of room space. Column 5 gives the standard deviations around these respective

TABLE IV  
COMPARISON OF ELEVEN SAMPLES OF ROOM OVERCROWDING

No.	Composition of Sample (%)	Number in Sample (n)	Mean (m)	Standard Deviation (σ)	Standard Error of m (σm)	Probable Error of m	Skewness (Sk)	Coefficient of Correlation (r)	Probable Error of r	No. and Year
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1....	Polish, 95 Mixed, 5	4,729	730	287	4.16	2.81	+ .327	-.110	± .009	1-1910
2....	Slovaks, 33 Mixed	1,580	805	367	9.20	6.21	+ .830	-.107	± .016	2-1913
3....	Jewish, 56  Lithuanian, 18 Mixed, 37	446	810	360	17.00	11.30	+ .860	-.148	± .031	3-1910
4....	Italian, 53 Mixed	2,679	823	354	6.83	4.51	+ .910	-.142	± .0127	4-1912
5....	Lithuanian, 68 Mixed Polish and Germans	2,358	830	339	6.98	4.64	+ .38	-.543	± .0127	5-1913
6....	Polish Lithuanian	3,439	820	308	5.25	3.54	+ .308	-.15	± .011	6-1910
7....	Polish, 52 Mixed	1,123	824	328	9.70	6.61	+ .408	-.110	± .019	7-1910
8....	Bohemian, 89 Mixed	547	884	426	18.15	12.10	+ .901	-.35	± .025	8-1910
9....	Negroes	1,653	885	426	10.40	7.01	+ .434	+ .185	± .015	9-1911
10....	Italian, 72 Greek, 13	4,452	940	380	5.68	3.80	+ .630	+ .195	± .009	10-1914
11....	Italian	212	1,122	338	23.31	15.73	+ .120	-.185	± .044	11-1912
12....	Series of means of eleven samples	11	863	96	29.03	19.43	+ .390	.....	.....	12
13....	Series of means of ten samples	10	837	52	24.18	16.08	+ .230	.....	.....	13

Sample 1: *Amer. Jour. Soc.*, XVII, 22; sample 2: *ibid.*, XX, 162; sample 3: *ibid.*, XVII, 21; sample 4: *ibid.*, XVIII, 526; sample 5: *ibid.*, XX, 307; sample 6: *ibid.*, XVIII, 449; sample 7: *ibid.*, XVII, 165; sample 8: *ibid.*, XVII, 22; sample 9: *ibid.*, XVIII, 251; sample 10: *ibid.*, XXI, 300; sample 11: *ibid.*, XVIII, 539. (Eleven sample groups were available from the ten studies.)

averages. Column 6 gives the standard errors of these means. Column 7 gives the probable errors of these means.<sup>1</sup> Column 8 gives the measurement of skewness of the different distributions. Columns 9 and 10 give the coefficients of correlation of the various

$$^1 P.E.m = .675 \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{n}}.$$

samples, with their respective probable errors. Column 11 gives the approximate year in which the study was made. The two bottom rows, 12 and 13, of Table IV contain data derived from the averages of the samples taken as the units of two additional series. Row 12 is based upon the entire series of eleven averages and gives for this series of eleven averages, which is shown in column 4, the mean, standard deviation, standard error of the mean, probable error of the mean, and measurement of skewness for the series of eleven averages of the samples. Row 13 gives the same computations, pertaining, however, to the first ten averages of samples and omitting sample 11, which has such a high average as to appear in a different category from the rest of the samples.

14. An examination of the data contained in Table IV enables us to make some very interesting and significant comparisons among the samples, and supplies the basis for some interesting inferences about the selection of the samples and the degree to which the samples fairly represent conditions in Chicago.

15. In the first place, an examination of column 4 reveals the fact that the means of the samples do not show wide variation. In fact, except for Nos. 1, 10, and 11, the means do not diverge widely from one another. This fact is brought out in Figure 2, where the series of eleven means are plotted in a rough frequency histogram. Now, if we compute the standard deviations of the two series of means, we find that they are, respectively,  $\sigma_{12}=96$  cubic feet,  $\sigma_{13}=52$  cubic feet, or in each case less than the  $\sigma$  of any sample. The significance of this computation and result is that the average of the means is more representative of the series of means than is the average of any sample representative of items in that sample. In short, there is less variation in the series of means than in any series of observations in any sample.

16. The point just made is borne out in another way by the fact that the measure of the skewness of the series of the means is less than the average measure of skewness of the samples—that is,  $+.39$  as compared with  $+.55$ .

17. Let us now test out our group of samples in another way, and explain graphically the meaning of column 6, which gives the standard errors of the means. We have already (paragraph 5)

had occasion to point out the significance of this error. Its meaning and practical significance may now be made clearer. Figure 3 shows in the heavy vertical lines the range of  $\pm \sigma_m$  within which the chances are 2 to 1<sup>2</sup> that the true mean (the mean of all overcrowded sleeping-rooms in Chicago) probably lies. A range of  $\pm 3\sigma_m$  is shown between vertical dotted lines; for example, take the mean of sample 7, or  $m_7 = 834$  cubic feet, and we find that the chances are 2 to 1 that the true mean lies within  $\pm 9$  cubic feet of 834 cubic feet, or more precisely between 825 cubic feet and 843 cubic feet, and the chances are 369 to 1 that the true mean lies within  $\pm 3$  times 9 cubic feet of 834 cubic feet, or more precisely between 807 cubic feet and




FIG. 3

861 cubic feet. Similarly, with any other sample. Now the figure brings out much more clearly than does Table IV the following facts: first, that the value of 831 cubic feet is included within a range of  $\pm 3\sigma_m$  of samples Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8; second (a fact which directly follows), that six means out of eleven show a decided tendency to cluster, that is, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7; and third, that a range of  $\pm c_{m13}$  from 837 cubic feet, the average of the means, nicely spans the range of a majority of the means of the samples.

<sup>2</sup> H. Jerome, *Manual of Statistical Method*, p. 196.

18. All of these facts establish a strong probability that the original samples were well chosen—a fact that the authors of the




FIG. 3

articles from which the data were drawn did not take pains to establish to the satisfaction of the critical reader.<sup>1</sup> This statistical

<sup>1</sup> See No. 7. Several years before these Chicago studies, Miss M. F. Byington successfully used at Homestead an empirical method that approximated closely to scientific requirements.

analysis is, therefore, valuable as an example of how it is possible to check back on the fieldwork procedure of an investigation in cases in which the description of the investigation supplied by the surveyors is faulty in this respect.

19. It may be worth while at this point to make an observation which has some value in theoretical statistics as well as significance for practical investigation. It was stated in paragraph 5 that the standard error of the mean could be used as a device to test the reliability of the average of a sample, whether or no the distribution of items in the universe or the sample was skew. The reason for this is, briefly: (1) when random samples are selected, the mean of each sample becomes as it were a measurement on the true mean of the universe from which the sample was selected; (2) the true mean of the universe thus becomes in a sense a constant value which we attempt to approximate; (3) the measurements on a constant if numerous enough tend to obey the law of error.<sup>1</sup> Now, the law of error is that in measurements upon a constant there is a well-defined tendency when measurements are numerous: for small errors to be more frequent than large errors, for positive and negative errors to be equally frequent, and for large errors to occur infrequently if at all. Now, the analysis just concluded, in paragraphs 16-18 inclusive, shows that even in our study of eleven means there is a well-defined tendency for the means of the samples to approximate this law of error, and so we have in this study a very neat example of the application of this important mathematical-statistical principle.

20. One more statistical test of sampling remains to be applied. When two samples are picked from a universe and we find that there is a difference between the values of their respective means, we may ask the question: Is the difference significant of real differences in the universe such that there may really be two universes when we had thought that there was only one? Or, on the other hand, may the difference be due merely to the fluctuations of simple sampling? The statistical rule is that when the difference between two means is less than three times the standard error of the means, we may conclude that the difference is not significant.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Chapin, *op. cit.*, and A. L. Bowley, *Elements of Statistics* (1901 ed.), pp. 303, 308.

<sup>2</sup> Yule, *op. cit.*, pp. 345-46.

formula for computing the standard error of the difference between two means is as follows:

$$\epsilon_{1,2} = \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_1^2}{N_1} + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{N_2}}$$

Table V gives the errors of differences between the means of the first eight samples; for example, Nos. 9 and 10 are clearly outside the allowable range, and, consequently, have not been computed. It will be observed that differences between the means of samples

TABLE V  
ERRORS OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEANS  
OF SAMPLES

Errors of Differences between Means Indicated	Value of $\epsilon$ Found by Formula $\sqrt{\frac{\sigma_1^2}{n_1} + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{n_2}}$	Differences between Means Indicated, $M-M$
	Cu.ft.	Cu.ft.
$\epsilon_{1,2}$ .....	10.09	68* (Significant)
$\epsilon_{2,3}$ .....	19.36	5 (Not significant)
$\epsilon_{3,4}$ .....	18.33	13 (Not significant)
$\epsilon_{4,5}$ .....	11.44	18 (Not significant)
$\epsilon_{5,6}$ .....	9.67	7 (Not significant)
$\epsilon_{3,5}$ .....	18.38	20 (Not significant)
$\epsilon_{2,5}$ .....	11.53	25 (Not significant)
$\epsilon_{2,7}$ .....	13.42	29 (Not significant)
$\epsilon_{2,8}$ .....	20.39	79* (Significant)

\* In the cases of  $\epsilon_{1,2}=10.09$  and  $\epsilon_{2,8}=20.39$ , the respective differences 68 and 79 are significant because in each case larger than 3 $\epsilon$ .

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are not significant, but that when the means of samples 1 and 8 are introduced, we immediately get a significant difference. This table is, therefore, an additional check on the conclusions given in paragraphs 18 and 19.

21. Before concluding this treatment it is important to consider the meaning of columns 9 and 10 of Table IV. The series of coefficients of correlation presented in column 9 are surprisingly uniform. This means that conditions of room overcrowding are not substantially different among the eleven samples, the correlation is low in almost every case, and in most instances it is a negative correlation. This develops the surprising point that as the number of occupants of a room increases there is a slight tendency for the size of the room to diminish. At any rate, the relationship, whether




FIG. 4



positive or negative, is not marked. The meaning of column 10, "The Probable Errors of the Coefficients of Correlation,"<sup>x</sup> is explained in Figure 4. The vertical lines represent the probable error range for each of the eleven coefficients of correlation; for example, in sample 3,  $r = -.148 \pm .031$ , which means that, judging the correlation from this sample alone, the chances are even that the true correlation lies between  $r = -.117$  and  $r = -.179$ . Similarly, for the other coefficients. It will be observed at once that the coefficients derived from samples 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 11 tend to cluster. This would suggest that the true correlation lies between  $-.10$  and  $-.20$ . The coefficient of sample 5 because erratic is omitted.

### III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

22. We may now make the following points in review of our statistical analysis: (1) The societal variable, overcrowding in sleeping-rooms, is susceptible of quantitative definition in terms of mean, standard deviation, standard error, probable error, coefficient of correlation, skewness, and curve-fitting. By these devices we can discover the law of distribution of the data, and the chief trends or tendencies may be defined with clearer precision than can be true of any verbal description. (2) Applying this type of analysis to eleven samples of overcrowded sleeping-rooms, we have obtained a precise quantitative definition of a societal variable. This statistical comparison and analysis makes it possible to check back on the validity of the original fieldwork. In this case, the essential fairness of the original study seems to be established statistically. (3) It is sometimes said that the statistical method is inapplicable to the study of societal variables. What is meant is that use of refined statistical tools is not justified in the interpretation of data in which the original errors of observation play such a large rôle as in social studies. It would seem that this paper is a refutation of this argument with respect to the subject of room overcrowding at least, since the application of refined statistical methods has established the essential fairness of the original fieldwork—a consideration by no means established in the original articles.

<sup>x</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 352:  $PE_r = .675 \frac{1-r^2}{\sqrt{n}}$ , for  $r = \frac{\sum xy}{N\sigma_x\sigma_y}$ .

## THE EVALUATION AND SCORING OF COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

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### ABSTRACT

The evaluation of communities and the scoring of social activities must be made along three general lines: first, the community in general in its relation to the activity concerned; second, the specific activity with regard to its program, equipment, and participants; and third, an analysis of the activity in terms of its *functioning*. The last has been largely neglected in certain types of investigation because of the difficulty in establishing an objective unit of measure for the functioning of group activities. Functioning can be measured objectively in terms of what it accomplishes.

Students of social problems and individuals and organizations carrying on social investigations and surveys are continually confronted by the need for some sort of an evaluation of social conditions and activities which may be used as a basis for comparing the relative status of different communities. It is recognized that a true evaluation of social activities must take into consideration phenomena which are intangible, and which, consequently, do not lend themselves readily to enumeration. There is now a generally recognized technique for collecting data relative to social life. Likewise, the type of data which may be enumerated and classified for study is rather clearly defined.

Social investigation and research may be carried on according to several different methods, depending upon the problem and the available sources of information. For our purpose it is only necessary to mention two general methods of approach. First, it may consist of the development of social theories based on a study and analysis of the history of human activities. This historical data consists largely of documentary evidence and recorded evaluation of social activities by individuals who either recorded definite observed facts or made a subjective evaluation thereof. The purely subjective historical documentary evidence may have little value, since, with the extensive results of human experience at hand, it is comparatively easy to find enough isolated cases to bear out almost

any contention or point of view. Likewise, since much of the analyses and the evaluation of activities and events presented by the historical documentary evidence is largely subjective, the evaluation of social phenomena based upon this type of investigation and research can only be profitably used for purposes of making generalizations concerning social phenomena. The results of such investigations, however, may be of importance in the development of theories and hypotheses which serve as "guy-ropes" in building up a structure of principles and laws in which the results of more intensive and specific investigations may represent the units which combined gradually take a definite form, the nature and direction of which were indicated by the theories and hypotheses.

Second, social research may take the form of statistical investigations consisting largely of the enumeration of conditioning phenomena such as natural physical conditions, artificial physical conditions, density and distribution of population, and similar data. This has made up the bulk of data in most surveys, community studies, and specific studies of social activities in which the enumeration of statistical data played the major part. While it is true that there is usually a high correlation between such concrete conditioning phenomena and the part the related activity plays in the life of the group concerned, the weakness of this type of data as a basis for evaluation is due to the fact that it does not give any actual information concerning the *functioning* of agencies and activities within the group. The seating capacity of organizations, "units of attendance interests" of churches, sanitary equipment of homes, the number of books in a library, or the "per capita investment of time and money" in an organization does not measure health, culture, educational or religious activities, or the actual group functioning along the lines indicated by the agencies or organizations under consideration, although these phenomena may bear a high correlation to the objective evidence.

Numerous efforts have been made to score community life. The failure to devise a scheme which is effective has been due largely to the fact that too much stress has been laid upon exact data, and that there has been no adequate measure of the functioning of group activities. The chief value of scoring a community is

the determination of the relative status of the group or organization and the aid in comparing it with other similar units. The scoring should be of such a nature that a comparison could be made of communities which are apparently very different. The scoring should enable us to make a comparative evaluation of communities on the basis of their social institutions and activities, even though the specific form of the social activity varied. For example, we should be able to evaluate and compare communities where the chief economic activity took the form of a chicken ranch in Washington, a sheep ranch in Idaho, a wheat farm in Minnesota, or a dairy farm in Wisconsin. The evaluation or scoring must be based upon factors which may generally be found. Since communities vary in their characteristics, the factors upon which the scoring is based must be those institutions which give permanence and stability to social groups and which may be found in virtually any community. For illustration, let us take as a unit for scoring the institutions which provide for and stabilize the economic interests of the community. It should not make much difference whether this economic activity is a co-operative marketing society, a better-farming society, or what it may be. *The basis for the evaluation should be the degree to which this economic institution influences the members of the community in the promotion, the stabilizing, and the efficient functioning of their economic activities.*

Institutions which give permanence and stability to the group may be roughly designated as political, economic, educational, recreational, religious, ameliorative, and corrective. Furthermore, the score of the community must be based on three general lines: first, an intimate study of the population and the concrete objective factors related to the life of the people—that is, the usual community survey data; second, a concrete and objective study of the institutions which give permanence and stability to the group. In this division should be included the objective data such as equipment, expenditures in units of time and money, membership, program, and the nature of activities carried on by the organizations. Third, *the functioning of the institutions and activities within the social group under consideration.* We may find, for example, in considering the economic institutions of a group under the first phase, that

40 per cent of the farmers belong to a farm bureau; we find under the second phase that the economic organization, the farm bureau, is organized, among other things, to establish the principle of rotation of crops, and that 20 per cent of the farmers participate in the meetings and discussions. Under the third we find that actually only 2 per cent of the population, including members, rotate crops according to those principles. Now in this example let us allow  $N$  points for the score of the economic institution—the farm bureau; allow a maximum of  $X$  points for membership as under the first phase; allow  $Y$  points under the second phase for program and participation in work of the organization, payment of dues, attendance, and other units usually considered by school and church surveys; and allow  $Z$  points for the third phase, that is, the measure of the extent to which the community reacts to the principles of this group organization and which should bear an important part in the score of the functioning of a group activity. In assigning any numerical value to an activity or phase of an activity, it is necessary at first to arrive at a valuation more or less arbitrarily. However, even though the value arrived at with regard to a certain phase of the activity is relatively incorrect, as compared with other phases of that activity, if the same valuation is used for different activities or different organizations which are being compared, the error will be constant. Thus, in evaluating the activity mentioned as a basis for scoring or for purposes of comparison with other economic activity, we have

TABLE I

## TOTAL POSSIBLE SCORE FOR ECONOMIC ACTIVITY—THE FARM BUREAU

(1) Objective Conditioning Factors in Group X Points Possible	(2) Objective Conditioning Factors in Specific Activity Y Points Possible	(3) Functioning Z Points Possible
$\frac{40}{100} = \frac{2}{5}$ of $X = N^1$ points	$\frac{20}{100} = \frac{1}{5}$ of $Y = N^2$ points	$\frac{2}{100} = \frac{1}{50}$ of $Z = N^3$ points

Thus the score of community A, as regards its economic activity  
 $= \frac{2}{5}$  of  $X + \frac{1}{5}$  of  $Y + \frac{1}{50}$  of  $Z =$  score of activity.

Take another community for purposes of comparison, although it may be one having a *different specific type* of economic institution.

Community B has a Farmers Co-operative Dairy Products Society. Under (1) we find only 5 per cent of the farmers are members. Under (2) we find that they have only one meeting a year, and that most of the activities are carried over the telephone or at casual meetings of groups of members such as at the cheese factory or similar places where a group of those interested meet. However, such casual meetings also include anyone who happens to be standing around and who is thus included in the comments and more or less pertinent discussions. Under (3) we find that 80 per cent of the farmers in that community participate in the co-operative activity of manufacturing and marketing cheese.

Now, according to the foregoing method of scoring, we have the following:

TABLE II

Group I	Group II	Group III
5 per cent members	Practically nothing	80 per cent co-operate
$\frac{1}{20}$ of $X=N^1$ points	0	$\frac{4}{5}$ of $Z=N^3$ points

Thus the total comparative scores for the two activities are

$$\text{Community A} = \frac{3}{5} \text{ of } X + \frac{1}{2} \text{ of } Y + \frac{1}{20} \text{ of } Z$$

$$\text{Community B} = \frac{1}{20} \text{ of } X + 0 + \frac{4}{5} \text{ of } Z$$

In short, the evaluation of any activity may be made in part upon the customary objective data. It must, however, give due weight to the degree the agencies function. The evaluation of a class in literature may be made *in part* on the provision and equipment for the study of literature, methods of study, training of teacher, time units devoted to study, and similar data, but the real test is: How does it function? To what extent does it influence the reading of the group? The number of persons who meet and discuss co-operation or prohibition, and the policy and program of the co-operation and prohibition societies will, in part, evaluate those activities. The final score must be determined, however, by the extent of resulting co-operation or prohibition, or, in other words, the third element listed, namely, *the extent to which the community reacts to the principles of the organization in question.*

## SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY

### SECTION XVII. THE ATTEMPT (1860-80) TO RECONSTRUCT ECONOMIC THEORY ON A SOCIOLOGICAL BASIS

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#### ABSTRACT

Albert Schäffle began as one of the founders of the Austrian School of economic theory. The social idea early made him an economic heretic, and ill-fated action in public office made him *persona non grata* with the Austrian authorities. His divergence from the main line of economic theory carried him into publication of the strictly sociological work which became one of the prominent factors in the early stages of the American sociological movement. Lilienfeld is credited with a function similar to that of Schäffle in promoting the sociological movement, and the fatuities of the entire technique of biological analogies are exposed in a digest of Menger's destructive criticism.

This section is concerned first and foremost with Albert Schäffle.<sup>1</sup> We come then to the man whom we have mentioned in other connections, but who should be remembered by sociologists chiefly as one of the first to propose to Germans a scheme that purported to be a comprehensive sociology in the later sense of the term.<sup>2</sup>

Schäffle was a pathetic figure in modern history. It is certain that his political enemies accused him of the whole gamut of political

<sup>1</sup> The place of this man in economic and sociological development would be enigmatical if he had not furnished partial explanation in his autobiography, entitled *Aus meinem Leben*. 2 vols. For our purposes it is enough to cite from the long list of Schäffle's publications only the following (*op. cit.*, II, 244-47):

1. *Die Nationaloekonomie, oder allgemeine Wirthschaftslehre*, pp. xvi+306. 1861.

2. *Über die ethische Seite der nationalökonomischen Lehre vom Werte*, pp. 37. 1862.

3. *Das gesellschaftliche System der menschlichen Wirthschaft*, pp. xxxi+584.

With a different title, 1st ed., 1861; 2d ed., 1867; 3d ed., 1873. Pp. xxxviii+296 and 604.

4. *Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers*. Encyklopädischer Entwurf einer realen Anatomie, Physiologie und Psychologie der menschlichen Gesellschaft, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Volkswirtschaft als socialen Stoffwechsel, 1875, Vol. I, pp. xxiv+850; 1878, Vol. II, pp. viii+498; 1881-82, Vol. III, pp. xv+575, Vol. IV, pp. viii+533. Second ed., 2 vols., 1896.

<sup>2</sup> We shall repeat presently that we do not undertake to settle the question of priority between Schäffle and Lilienfeld.

crimes, from incompetence to treason. The most direct evidence available as to the reasons for his reputation and his ostracism is in the *Autobiography*, and in the Preface to *Das gesellschaftliche System*, 3d ed. (1873), pp. vi-xxi. It is not certain that one who is unacquainted with Austrian politics of the period can read even this evidence correctly. As nearly as it can be interpreted from this distance, the substance of the political issue which cost Schäffle his position as Austrian *Handelsminister*, and simultaneously his good repute among economists, was, in a word, *closer v. laxer* federation of the Hapsburg state—*consolidation v. particularism*. Schäffle passionately defended his support of one of these alternatives against unscrupulous misrepresentation. His opponents were the stronger party, and he was sacrificed. He presently left Austria, and in his declining years his home was in Stuttgart.<sup>1</sup>

The first sure factor in the formula of Schäffle's personal equation would have to be his unequivocal rejection of the classical economic theory as an interpretation of the economic elements in human life. It seems to be true, on the other hand, that he had an eclectic hospitality for each of the proposed variants of classical theory. That is, he was open to conviction from many quarters that something is present in economic activities in excess of the depersonalized activity of non-moral forces presupposed by the successors of Ricardo. He was not only tolerant of the historical, the ethical and the psychological movements in economic theory, but he was even recognized by some of the leaders in each of these movements as in part a co-worker in developing their respective methods. Thus Philippovich<sup>2</sup> credits Schäffle with having been, as early as

<sup>1</sup> Not long before his death in 1903 I exchanged several letters with him on the subject, broached by himself, of an American translation of his *Bau und Leben*. There was an undertone of disappointment and bitterness in his letters which appealed strongly to my sympathy. I have never succeeded in getting a convincing picture of Schäffle as a personality, however. I am accordingly obliged to speak of him simply as a sociological theorist.

<sup>2</sup> In the second of the two testimonial volumes to Schmoller, 1908, under the title "Die Eindringung der sozialpolitischen Ideen in die Literatur." The article is translated under the title "The Infusion of Socio-Political Ideas into the Literature of German Economics," *American Journal of Sociology*, XVIII (1912), 145-99. It is well worth reading as an economist's version of the same drive toward objectivity which we are observing.



1861, among the energetic opponents of the idea that *economic selfishness is the sole key to economic phenomena*. Philippovich says:

These ideas were energetically represented by Schäffle, by whom, as by no other economist, full value was given to the ideas of the time respecting the philosophy of law, and the relation of the state to economic phenomena. He calls attention to the fact that those who, in the immediate past, have earned the most prestige in developing economic theory, have been in part eminent, or at least respected representatives of moral and legal philosophy, in part historians.<sup>1</sup>

Without going into further particulars of these general relationships, we may get at the heart of the matter in Schäffle's case by recognizing the central fact that the inconclusiveness of the economic theory in which he had been schooled drove him, through attempts to reconstruct economic theory proper, into a venture in social interpretation on a more comprehensive scale. This latter attempt proved to be one of the notable beginnings of sociology in the general sense in which it was later developed in the United States.

In order to arrive at the most favorable point from which to appreciate Schäffle's sociology, viz., by viewing it as a natural child of political economy, we must make our approach through his chief economic work, *The Societary System of Human Thrift*. The book is chiefly in point for us now as an index of developing dissatisfaction with the prevailing method in economic theory. As it affected Schäffle, the dissatisfaction passed into proposal of an *alternative method*, i.e., a more objective and therefore more conclusive way of stating and explaining economic phenomena. We cannot precisely trace the mental processes through which the primarily economic problem and the primarily societary problem reacted upon each other in Schäffle's mind so as to revolutionize his views of the necessary treatment of each. All that is sure in this connection is that he began as other economists had begun—by trying to explain economic phenomena as though they might be interpreted solely by themselves. He ended by teaching that we must first get an insight into the interconnections of human phenom-

<sup>1</sup> Philippovich refers to Schäffle's monograph, *Mensch und Gut in der Volkswirtschaft*. *Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift* (1861), 4 Heft, p. 232.

ena in general before we can have the standing ground from which to explain those phases of human phenomena which we label "economic."

One cannot give an idea of Schäffle's memorable economic essay better than by supposing that a member of the present economic staff in the University of Chicago today for the first time stumbled upon the volume, without having heard before anything about the book or its author. His most probable reaction, after turning the leaves enough to get a general impression of the author's program, would be voiced in some sort of exclamation of surprise. He might say: "Why! Here is a man in 1861-73 trying to do just what we are trying to do now in our department. Instead of revamping conventional dogmas about economic relations, he has started out to do just what we are trying to do, viz., first get a reliable account of just how economic operations fit into one another. He is trying to begin just where we are trying to begin—not with theory but with a conspectus of the actual organization which economic interests have created, and an account of how this economic organization works."

This is a just description, as far as it goes, of Schäffle's procedure.

Now it would be an ignorant blunder to say that Schäffle was the first economist to make such an attempt. Most of the cameralists had done precisely this, after a fashion. Even the most abstract of the classical school, not to emphasize Adam Smith himself, had wrought into their attempted interpretations more or less of this concrete description. We may say of Schäffle that in comparison with predecessors his plan of starting economic theory with analysis of economic organization was supported by more sophistication as to the a priori assumptions which he wanted to exclude from influence upon his analysis, and by more conscious purpose to carry through a technique of detecting actual relations of cause and effect among economic operations, as well as between these and all their determining conditions, than had been mobilized before.

It does not require much reading between the lines to detect also in this early economic essay indications of a notable shifting of attention from that impersonal center "wealth," which had been the focus of prevailing economic theory, to the concrete

human reality. The opening paragraph of the book *Grundlegung*, under the special title "The Foundation-Laying of National Economy," reads as follows:

The personal self-preservation and self-development of human beings, i.e., their conscious moral life, is very comprehensively dependent upon acquisition and use of such external goods as are not furnished gratuitously by nature. Either universally, or at all events for particular members of human society, many goods are accessible only in consequence of human co-operation, i.e., only mediately and, in comparison with human want, in a limited, i.e., insufficient, degree.

This limited availability of means of satisfaction or use is the occasion of a peculiar regimen of production and of use. The aim of the same is: with a minimum of personal sacrifice to secure a maximum of realization of human purposes; in other words, at minimum cost to obtain a maximum of utility, and thus to insure the amplest possible provision for *the entire personal life*.

As compared with the utterances of the classical economists, this is a new and strange idiom. It shifts the emphasis from things to people. Goods are not referred to as ends, but as means. The whole program necessary for co-operating with nature in supplying human wants is treated not as something which can be expressed in terms of wealth, as a least common denominator. It is seen rather as a strictly instrumental program. Its ultimate value is located in the promotion it can assure to the moral achievements of men. Schäffle continues (p. 2):

As a matter of experience, the essence and germ of all thrift turns out to be the controlling of production and the appropriating of limitedly accessible external means of satisfying wants, so as to assure a maximum of net utility, for the purposes of maximum provision for the *entire personal life*. [Italics are the author's.] The proper subject-matter for economic theory is the process by which *society* [*sic*] carries out above purpose.

A few lines later, Schäffle adds:

The aim of all thrift, viz., *maximum net utility*, does not mean, however, *maximum wealth*, but maximum abundance of all-sided ethico-personal development and culture of individuals and of the *Volk*, through economic production and consumption of external goods. The use of money is merely mediary in the process through which society achieves this end.

A little later this moral, or social, viewpoint is indicated still more explicitly in this way:

A broad survey of the real world shows us a gradual transition from blindly necessary action and reaction of natural forces to progressively purposeful

operation. Moral activity is the highest observable summit in experience, in the course of this creative-advance into unfolding of purposeful, useful effort. But a realm of self-conscious and self-imposed purposefulness, a realm of the phenomena of real spirit, discloses itself through socialization within nature.

In comment upon this paragraph Schäffle adds:

What science cannot demonstrate, faith may gladly assume, viz., that the entire mechanism of unconsciously functioning nature is destined ultimately to serve the realization of that which is the only worthwhile moral good, namely the social<sup>1</sup> [*sittlich*]; that through the extension of moralization matter is destined to pass more and more into spiritualization, into moral organization. The national economist at least is everywhere thrust on toward such belief. More and more he sees material transmuted into goods; more and more blind workings of nature into socially useful labor and socially useful endowment; more and more impersonal and purposeless existence into personal means and personal attainment [*Bildung*].

At this point Schäffle tries to make his thought plainer by subscribing to a passage in Lotze:

In this connection I follow Lotze the more readily since his observations, entirely detached from all partisanship, so far as economic theory is concerned, are especially convincing in their application to national economy. He speaks somewhat as follows: "It is a widely prevalent materialistic conception that our inner life, like the constant change of the external, is only a whirl of movements which the countless atoms of our nervous system maintain by means of incessant reactions. We have not merely given up the idea of natural psychic personalities, but we have turned the possibility of a personal existence of any sort into the obscurest riddle. Imprisoned within the great perpetual motion machine which we call nature is this minor mechanism of the human spirit. It is more artificial than any other, since it feels its own impulses, and wonders over the toys of the other. But at last its components vanish, and the jest and earnest, the love and the hate which have actuated this strange being are no more. All these latter consequences are drawn, now with glee now with despair. But they are not *everywhere* drawn. Perhaps it will appear that the totality of all the mechanism of nature is far from constituting an antithesis with the true tasks of the spiritual life. It may turn out to be rather a necessary *subservient* member in the correlation of that great whole, of which the changing temper of the *Zeitgeist* exposes to the human mind only now the one aspect and now the other.

<sup>1</sup> Has Bergson added anything?

<sup>2</sup> I venture the rendering as carrying the idea in the context.

In this *introduction to the science of political economy*, be it noted, Schäffle continues for about fifteen (83-98) pages, quite in the manner of Lotze, the psychologist and moral philosopher, to justify consideration of the psychic peculiarities of human beings as fundamental in political economy, not less than in every other valid interpretation of human experience.

Returning to Schäffle's introductory section (p. 4), we find the following:

That consciously purposeful or morally useful effort which emerges in the realm of individual and of group socialization has accordingly as its bearers and as its goals, richly articulated moral organisms, i.e., particular persons and whole communities of persons. The purposeful efforts in this realm are accordingly to be carried out as a deliberate system of useful performance. Moreover, in the graded progressiveness of the purposefulness of the phenomena of the real world, it is finally the realm of the useful application of morally personal powers and goods, in which, in accordance with nature, consciously purposeful control of many useful movements and manifestations of energy in the direction of the highest net utility will appear. This is the field of *economics*. . . . National Economy has to do only with control of the morally useful life of the societary organism.

To be sure, as a matter of experience, economy in the present sense is inevitable, and it actually puts in an appearance, only for those socially personal useful operations and manifestations of force for which, in presence of the personal societary purpose, the means of realization are insufficiently at command. In other words *lack* is the occasion for economy.

Then Schäffle analyzes at some length the phenomena of want (*Bedürfnis*) on the one hand, and of lack (*Mangel*) on the other, as the fundamental conditions which account for conscious human action in general, and action aimed at control of material goods in particular (pp. 4-6). Thereupon he further develops his view of socialization (*Gesittung*) "as a process of the production and consumption of external goods" (p. 6). The emphasis, however, is always on the fact that production and consumption of material goods are not a vicious circle, beginning and ending with material goods, but that they are processes intermediate in the ultimate process of realizing *personal* potencies. Thus he says (p. 9): "The actor in the economically controlled artificial processes is always a *given person*, with the entire range of his moral life, *his*

*entire objective demand upon life*" (sic). And Schäffle expands this proposition in this note (p. 9): "True economy then is directed, as the vulgar conception also understands it, at the most effective provision for the *totality* of personal life, not merely at maximum satisfaction of particular wants."

These indications are sufficient clues to the sort of thesis in economic theory for which Schäffle spoke. His conception of economic processes visualized them as not merely processes beginning and ending with physical matter. He saw them as processes impelled and controlled and utilized by psycho-physical agents in the interest of complete expression of their psycho-physical interests. His general conception of economic processes may be expressed in terms of a single portion of the economic mechanism in this way: A railroad is not merely a means of moving freight and passengers. A railroad is a physical device for serving all the physico-spiritual interests of physico-spiritual persons, in so far as the processes of land-transportation can contribute to that result. Accordingly, his conception of economic theory as a whole was of the entire system of agencies devised by men for control of external goods, functioning not with control of external goods as the ultimate aim, but with the destination of making this control of economic goods as useful as possible in realizing the personal capacities of people.

This conception varied only in detail from the essential idea, not merely of such men as Knies, Wagner, Schmoller, and Menger, but of a multitude of men whose thinking followed more closely the Ricardian variation of Adam Smith's method. Schäffle merely varied the ethical emphasis, and followed this variation by a correspondingly altered treatment of economic phenomena.

It is not necessary for our purpose to follow Schäffle farther into his version of economic theory. It is enough to point out that if he had never set his hand to any piece of scientific work which bore any other label than economics, the things which he emphasized would have impelled someone sooner or later to attempt just what he attempted, viz., to show that economic phenomena are something more than economic phenomena, i.e., to *expand surveys of men engaged in the production and consumption of wealth, into surveys*

of men carrying on the whole complex of purposeful activities into which they are urged by the entire range of their wants.<sup>1</sup>

Review of the positions of Menger and Schäffle, as each has been indicated thus far, might easily suggest this query: Why did they go so far in analysis of social phenomena, without going still farther, i.e., to a point at which Schäffle might have done something more objective and less equivocal than his attempt to plot human activities under the figure of biological analogies?

It may be a partial explanation that the Austrian economists were beguiled by their very intelligence into putting their strength upon the less revealing of two alternative clues to further knowledge of human phenomena. That is, they arrived, first, at the highly abstract category "utility" as their symbol for everything toward which conscious human action (and unconscious, for that matter) is directed. Thereupon two principal ways were open to them, viz.: first, the one which they did not choose, but which remained for another tendency (Ratzenhofer, also an Austrian) to develop twenty years later; i.e., an attempt to put into that highly abstract concept "utility" the concrete content which had constituted the substantial aim of as many different types of purpose-groups as could be identified. This would have been an attempt to answer more fully the question: *Utility for what?* It must have led directly to the functional method of correlating human phenomena. Second, the way which Schäffle actually did take, of attempting to exhibit primarily the correlations of social phenomena, as such, in the abstract, instead of trying to exhibit, less artificially, social phenomena as they have been organized into concrete situations, in the course of trying to realize specific objective purposes, or "utilities." In Schäffle's hands this second program proved to reach less objective results than were reached later; first, because it directed attention primarily to means (organization, structure) rather than to ends (wants, purposes, valuations, interests), the drive to realize which created and actuated the structures; second, and perhaps partly in consequence of the former choice, it was more

<sup>1</sup> Schäffle did this in his work, originally in four volumes, entitled *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers*. For Table of Contents see Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 157-79. Cf. with Spencer, *ibid.*, pp. 109-56.

easily satisfied with analogy (biological) in its method of stating means, than it probably would have been if it had fixed its attention directly upon *persons actuated by literal purposes, and intent upon devising means to gain them*. For a long time there was such fascination about comparing social machinery and output with physiological machinery and output. By it men capable of doing better work were held back from progress toward deeper insight into real human methods of settling upon purposes and of devising means for gaining them. Thus the newly empowered desire for objectivity was misguided into a merely varied type of subjectivity. Schäffle and his kind had arrived at some promising insights, but for a long time they permitted these insights to become beclouded under a mist of far-fetched analogies.

Another book should be mentioned as notable in itself, and as an index of the general thought movement which we have been describing, viz., Lilienfeld, *Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft*. It was published originally in Russian. The five volumes appeared respectively in 1872, 1875, 1877, 1879, 1881. The German translation used by the present writer seems to have been published at Mitau almost simultaneously with the original. An edition with a German publisher's imprint appeared in 1901.

In the Preface to the first volume of the first edition of *Bau und Leben* Schäffle says: "I have systematically followed out the 'real analogies' cited by Comte, Littré, Spencer, and recently in a peculiarly stimulating way by Paul von Lilienfeld." In a note Schäffle adds: "According to John Stuart Mill, Comte's disciple Littré was the first to call attention to the real analogy between public economy and organic metabolism [*Stoffwechsel*]. Cf. Mill's essay on Comte." In another passage of the same Preface, Schäffle testifies that he did not see the earlier sheets of Spencer's *Descriptive Sociology* until he had begun to print his first volume.

Apparently Lilienfeld and Schäffle were moved by some common stimulus, or by different stimuli urging in a common direction. Although the former published somewhat in advance of the latter, and probably exerted some influence upon details in *Bau und Leben*, the latter work does not contain visible traces of debt to Lilienfeld.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I may add that I did not get hold of Lilienfeld's book until some years after I had made my own digest of Schäffle. The earlier book then impressed me as a vague foreshadowing of the later one.



The respective titles of Lilienfeld's volumes are as follows:

(1) *Human Society as a Real Organism*, 1873; (2) *The Social Laws*, 1875; (3) *Social Psychophysics*, 1877; (4) *Social Physiology*, 1879; (5) *Religion Considered from the Standpoint of Positive [real-genetische] Social Science, or: Attempt at a Natural Theology*, 1881.

Whether further search into Lilienfeld's antecedents would disclose that he is entitled to more of the credit for the particular impulse of which American sociologists became aware chiefly through Schäffle cannot now be ascertained. Enough that, while apparently detached from the main current of European tendency in social science, he was typical of one of its most energetic impulses. The fact that it was an impulse which spent its strength without arriving at the results anticipated by its promoters, does not neutralize its importance. It was a tendency which drove men to discovery of its futility and to further efforts to invent an adequate apparatus of discovery.

The Preface of Lilienfeld's first volume deserves a place with the documentary material of this survey. It is as follows:

Every day the unfruitfulness of the scholastico-dogmatical method of treating political and social questions, which still prevails not only in science but in the daily press, becomes more evident and more striking. In the realm of natural science the untenability of this method has been recognized for centuries, and it was unanswerably shown up by the great English philosopher, Bacon, at the close of the sixteenth century. Conviction of the equal untenability, yes, harmfulness of this method in the realm of social science has moved the author to devote himself to this work.

The task which the author has undertaken, the thesis which he has attempted to prove, may be formulated in this way; *Like natural organisms, human society is a real being [ein reales Wesen], it is nothing more than a continuation of nature, it is merely a higher expression of the same forces which are at the basis of all natural phenomena.* And while the author has not hesitated, in the pursuit of his undertaking, to apply the latest results of natural science, especially of biology and anthropology, to social science, and to follow them out to their extremest consequences, he has done so in the belief that he has not thereby given a new impulse to the superficial materialistic conception of the world; but that on the contrary he has performed a special service for the idealistic conception. For through association of social life with the development of the natural forces that region comes into prominence which solely and alone can serve as point of unification for those two views, hitherto hostile and irreconcilable, viz., the materialistic and the spiritualistic.

No doubt it will be some time before the protagonists of dogmatic social science, with their inflexible scholastic forms and conceptions, will learn to regard the social organism as a real being. Nothing is more difficult than to abandon once trodden ways, especially in the intellectual realm; and it is the harder the more one-sided and false and perverse the previous habit. Yet sooner or later truth will and must break through. Just as the application of the empirical method has borne splendid fruit in the realm of natural science, to the benefit of mankind and to the promotion of higher civilization; so application of the same method, let us hope in the near future, will bear equally splendid fruits and will not less promote the progress of the human race.

The work now submitted to the judgment of the reading public has been written with a purely scientific purpose. In this first part the social questions of the day are touched only in so far as they fall within the realm of general scientific consideration, and in so far as light may be thrown upon them from the scientific standpoint. The author has attempted to hold himself as far as possible aloof from partisanship and the animus of the propagandist—those implacable enemies of all scientific investigation.

The principles set forth in this part will serve the author in the later portions as basis and point of departure for solution of those practico-social questions which so powerfully grip the sympathies and passions of the present generation.

If this work does not prove as useful as is hoped, if it does not help to extend the scope of social science and to give it firmer foundations, the reason must be in the inadequacy of the powers of the author and of the means at his disposal, not in fault of the method nor in the untenability of the principles upon which it rests, and upon which alone, in the author's deepest conviction, the entire structure of the social sciences can be durably erected.<sup>1</sup>

No more appropriate criticism of Schäffle in particular and of the method of biological analogy in general is available than Menger's, published in 1883. We insert a digest of the argument.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In 1857 C. Frantz published a small book of 344 pages with the title *Vorrede zur Physiologie der Staaten*. It is interesting as a sample of sporadic publications in Germany, including Austria, along through not merely the nineteenth, but also the eighteenth, century, each indicating certain insights which later became more penetrating and which stimulated development of the analogical type of sociological prospecting. The eleventh and last chapter of the book is entitled, "Von der Aufgabe und Methode der politischen Physiologie." The author describes the chapter in an alternative title as "Nachrede statt der Vorrede." In the opening paragraph he says: "After we have indicated in the foregoing chapters that civic bodies have, in fact, a peculiar nature, and after we have pointed out wherein this peculiar nature consists, and how it manifests itself, we must in conclusion speak of the science which has to investigate *diese Natur oder Physis der Staaten, d. h. die politische Physiologie.*"

<sup>2</sup> Menger (*Methode*), Book III, *The Organic Interpretation of Social Phenomena*, pp. 139 ff.

Chapter I. "On the Analogy between Social Phenomena and Natural Organisms, the Limits of the Same, and the Resulting Methodological Viewpoint for Social Investigation."

1. *The theory of the analogy.*—Between natural organisms and numerous social structures, there exists, in respect both of their function and of their origin, a certain similarity.

We may observe in the natural organisms an almost measureless complication of details and especially a multiplicity of their parts [i.e., of the particular organs]. Yet this multiplicity conduces to the maintenance, the development and the propagation of the organisms *as wholes*. In respect to this result, each part of the organism has its special function. If this function is disturbed there results a more or less intensive disturbance of the function of the entire organism; it may be of the other organisms in succession, in accordance with the intensity of the originally disturbed function. Conversely, a disturbance of the correlation of the organs into a higher whole in like fashion reacts upon the character and the function of the several organs. The normal function and development of the whole of an organism is of a sort determined by the development and function of its parts, the latter in turn by the combination of the parts into a higher whole, the normal function and development of each particular organ finally by that of the other organs.

We find something in many respects similar to this in the case of a multitude of social phenomena, particularly of economic phenomena. . . . It is evident that we have in these facts certain analogies between the character and function of the natural organisms on the one hand and the social combinations on the other.

This holds, for example, of the *origin* of many social phenomena. Under strict observation the natural organisms present, almost without exception, wonderful adaptation [*Zweckmässigkeit*] of all their parts with reference to the whole, an adaptation, moreover, which is not the outcome of human calculation but of a natural process. In like manner in the case of many social institutions, we may observe striking adaptation in respect to the whole of society, while under closer inspection these institutions *do not prove to be the outcome of an intention directed towards the purpose in question*, i.e., of an agreement between the members of the society, or in particular of positive legislation. These social formations, too, are rather (in a certain sense) "natural" products, i.e., unpremeditated outcomes of historical development. Think, for example, of the phenomenon of money, an institution which in so large measure serves the well being of society, yet among by far the most peoples, it did not come into being in consequence of a formal agreement to establish the same as a social institution. It was rather the unpremeditated product of historical development. Other examples are law, language, markets, communities, states, etc.

Since now there are these analogies between social phenomena and natural organisms in respect to their nature, their origin and their function, it is at

once clear that this fact cannot remain without influence upon the methods of investigation in the field of the social sciences in general, and of economics in particular.

*Anatomy* is the theory of the forms of organisms and of the structure of their parts [the organs]. *Physiology* is the theoretical science which sets in order the phenomena of organisms and the functions of their parts [the organs] in respect to the maintenance and development of the organisms in their totality. If now, state, society, the economic system, etc., are thought of as organisms, in particular as analogies of physical organisms, the thought is obvious that in the realm of these social phenomena it might be profitable to pursue types of investigation analogous with those which are appropriate in the case of organic nature. The above analogy leads to the idea of theoretical social science analogous with those which are the result of research in the physico-organic world, i.e., to an *Anatomy* and a *Physiology* of the social organisms, State, Society, Economy, etc.

We have thus presented the fundamental ideas of the theory of the analogy between social phenomena and natural organisms, an analogy which, as is well known, Plato and Aristotle had drawn in the sciences of the state. We have also indicated the two factors by which the theory is chiefly recognized in recent scientific literature. We do not mean that we have thus exhausted the particulars in which parallelisms between the two kinds of phenomena are striking. We think however we have in the foregoing presented the nucleus of the theory in the form and sense in which it is held by its most careful exponents.

2. *On the limits of the method.*—The great vogue which the foregoing ideas have had in the writings of all peoples on the social sciences is at all events striking proof that there is obvious similarity between the two types of phenomena in the respects indicated.

Nevertheless only obdurate prepossession could disregard a three-fold consideration:

*First, that only a portion of social phenomena manifest analogies with natural organisms.*

A large portion of social formations is not the outcome of a natural process, no matter what the sense in which we think of that process. It is rather the result of deliberation and agreement among men, oftentimes of positive legislation. Even social phenomena of this type exhibit usually adaptation of their parts in respect to the whole. This, however, is not the consequence of a natural, or "organic," process. It is rather the outcome of *human foresight, which makes a multitude of means tributary to its ends*. It is consequently out of the question to concede an "organic" character or origin to those social phenomena. If there is any analogy in their case, it is not with *organisms*, but with *mechanisms*.

*Second, that the analogy between social phenomena and the natural organisms is not complete; it does not embrace all the sides of the character of the respective*

*phenomena*. It embraces rather only those aspects of similarity which were pointed out in the previous section, and even with respect to these it is unprecise.

This applies in the first place to the analogy which is supposed to exist between the two groups of phenomena in question with respect to the conditioning of the normal nature and functioning of the whole by the parts, and vice versa. The conception is prevalent among the representatives of this analogical tendency in social science, that the parts of a whole and the whole itself are reciprocally both cause and effect of each other. This conception is so vague, it is so inadequate to our laws of thought, that we shall not go far astray if we use it as telling evidence that our age sadly lacks profound insight in many respects into the nature of both natural and social phenomena. Accordingly the analogy which we are discussing is not one which rests upon full insight into the character of the phenomena here in question. It rests rather upon vague consciousness of a certain resemblance between the function of the natural organs and that of a part of the social combination. It is clear also that an analogy of this sort cannot be a sufficient basis for the profoundest theoretical comprehension of social phenomena.

This is true in a much higher degree of that analogy which is assumed between the *origins* of the two types of phenomena. The analogy has led to the most multifold theories of the "organic origin" of social phenomena. In this connection then the untenability of the analogy is actually evident.

The natural organisms are composed of elements which serve the whole in a thoroughly mechanical fashion. They are the outcome of purely causal processes, the mechanical play of natural forces. On the other hand, the so-called social organisms cannot, as such, be understood and interpreted as the product of purely mechanical reactions. They are rather the outcome of human endeavors, of the efforts of thinking, feeling, acting human beings. If then we are entitled to speak at all of an "organic origin" of social formations, or more exactly of a portion of such formations, this may refer solely to the circumstance that a portion of social phenomena are the outcome of the direction of the *common will* to their establishment (agreement, positive legislation, etc.), while another portion is the unpremeditated outcome of human efforts directed to the attainment of essentially *individual* purposes (i.e., the unintended resultants of these latter). In the first case the social phenomena arise through the exertion of the common will directed toward their establishment (they are the *intended* products of these latter), in the other case social phenomena arise without a common will directed to their establishment. They are the unintended outcome of individual endeavors to gain individual purposes. Only this hitherto inadequately recognized circumstance gave occasion for characterizing the origin of the last mentioned unintended social phenomena as "natural" or "organic." The so-called "organic" origin of a portion of social phenomena manifests therefore essential differences from that process to which the natural organisms owe their origin. These differences are, moreover, *not* of the sort which may be observed between natural organisms. The difference in the

respect above pointed out proves rather to be fundamental, such as the difference between mechanical force and human will, between products of mechanical energy on the one hand and of individual human ingenuity on the other.

Moreover, that portion of social combinations with reference to which the analogy with natural organisms may actually come into consideration, presents the analogy at best only in certain respects. And even in these particulars the likenesses are only of a kind which to some extent must be characterized as vague, and the rest must be pronounced highly superficial and inexact.

3. *On the methodological principles which follow from the incompleteness of the alleged analogies.*—If, as many social philosophers assume, the above discussed analogies were complete, if social formations were in very truth organisms, this circumstance would without doubt be of decisive significance for the methodology of the social sciences. In that case the methods of those natural sciences which are concerned with investigation of the organic world, of anatomy and physiology in particular, would then at the same time be the methods of social sciences in general and of economics in particular.

The circumstance, however, that the analogy exists only in the case of a portion of social phenomena, and even with them only in a partial and superficial way, excludes the hypothetical conclusion entirely. On the other hand the cognitive principles which follow from the situation thus analyzed are the following:

1. The so-called organic interpretation of social phenomena can be adequate to a portion only of the same, namely to those which we find to be *not* the outcome of agreement, of legislation, or of any other kind of premeditated common will. The organic conception cannot be any sort of universal visualizing. The organic interpretation cannot be the universal aim of research among social phenomena. For understanding of social phenomena in their totality the *pragmatic* interpretation is at all events as indispensable as the "organic."

2. Even in the case of social phenomena which do not hark back to a pragmatic origin, the analogy between them and natural organisms is not universal, it does not comprise the totality of their character. It is rather of a sort which touches *certain sides* of their character (their function and their origin), and accordingly the organic interpretation alone cannot procure for us all around comprehension of the same. To this end, therefore, other types of theoretical research are necessary; which are in a sort of partnership with the so-called organic conception.

The business of the theoretical social sciences is to expound the general character and the general correlation of social phenomena as such, and of particular ranges of the same (e.g., the phenomena of economics). They discharge this duty when, among other things, they exhibit fractional social phenomena in their significance and function with reference to the whole social combination. The problem now in question involves, meanwhile, neither the totality of the tasks of the theoretical social sciences nor the analogous problem in the realm of natural organisms, namely the totality of the scientific

tasks in the realm of nature. Even if the legitimacy of the so-called organic type of research is recognized to the extent above provided for, determination of the laws of coexistence and succession among social phenomena *at large* remains the task of the theoretical social sciences, determination of the laws of the reciprocal limitations of the same is merely a special branch of social research.

3. But even in those respects in which the analogies in question appear to superficial observation to be real, they are not precise, far less are they of a character which is based upon clear insight into the nature of the social phenomena on the one hand and of natural organisms on the other. Consequently such analogies cannot be either the basis of a methodology of the social sciences in general, or of any special department of social science. The mechanical carrying-over of the methods of anatomy and physiology into the social sciences is untenable even within the narrow boundaries above indicated.

The so-called "organic" interpretation could at the utmost be adequate only to a portion of social phenomena, and only with reference to certain of their aspects. Here again the interpretation must not be taken over literally from the natural sciences, but must be the outcome of independent research into the nature of the social phenomena guided by the peculiar aims of social investigation. The method of the social sciences in general, and of political economy in particular, cannot be literally anatomical or physiological. Moreover even in those cases in which the sociological problems are of a sort which manifest a certain similarity to those of physiology and anatomy, they are not really borrowings from anatomy and physiology. They are rather only *sociological* in the strictest sense of the term. The carrying over of physiological and anatomical discoveries by analogy into political economy is such nonsense that no trained methodologist would think it worthy of serious refutation.

The foregoing mistaken directions of research are obviously none other than those of a physiologist or anatomist who should uncritically carry over into his science the laws and methods of economics, or who should in particular try to interpret the functions of the human body by the current theories of economics—for instance the circulation of the blood by the current theories of the consumption of goods; or the functions of the nerves by a description of the telegraphic system; the function of special organs of the human body by the function of the various classes of the population, etc. Our physiologists and anatomists in the field of economics deserve the same condemnation to which an investigator in biology would be exposed if he should propose a "sociological school of biological research."<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, whoever understands the highly incomplete character of the natural sciences, even today, so far as they are dealing with the organic world, will scarcely fail to be most impressed by the humorous side of the expenditure

<sup>1</sup> But the botanists now sometimes refer to "ecology" as plant sociology.

of so much ingenuity in trying to explain the unknown by that which is still less known.<sup>1</sup>

While we may dismiss the idea of treating the proposed analogical method seriously, it is not my purpose to deny that certain analogies between natural organisms and social phenomena may have their uses in *exposition*. As a *method of investigation* the analogical program is a chimera. As a means of *exhibiting* discovered facts and relations it may nevertheless for certain purposes, and for certain stages in the understanding of social phenomena, have a value. The most eminent minds have often tried to explain to their contemporaries the nature of social phenomena, by comparison with organic structures. This has occurred even in epochs in which people in general were less capable than we are of seeing the force of such comparison. We may waive the question whether in the present stage of development of the social sciences, such pictures, at least for purposes of scientific exhibition, are not already obsolete. At all events they are certainly to be thrown aside in cases where that which purports to be only a means of presentation assumes the rôle of a means of investigation; also in cases in which the analogy is drawn not alone when it corresponds with the actual relationships, but when analogy becomes a principle and a universal tendency of research. For the followers of this tendency the author of the *Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*<sup>2</sup> has a fitting saying. He remarks: "Analogy, which offers to many an author stimulus for occasional witty comparisons, becomes with writers of the sort referred to the axis upon which everything turns."<sup>3</sup>

In these references to the relation between the Austrian School of Economics, as represented by Menger, and the Sociological School, as represented by Schäffle, it has been necessary to get decades ahead of the entire development, i.e., to 1883. We must now return to the fifties in order to pick up another important thread in the story.

<sup>1</sup> This is really the fatal objection to the sociological use of biological analogies as a means of exposition. The other objections have force against the technique as a means of research, but less force than appears. They are all vitiated in a high degree by the fact that they insist on misunderstanding what is involved in analogies between physical organisms and what are conceived as psychical organisms.

<sup>2</sup> Menger translates *Wealth of Nations* by the word *Volkswohlstand*.

<sup>3</sup> Retranslated from the German quoted from Adam Smith, "History of Astronomy," in his *Essays on Philosophical Subjects* (edited by Dugald Stewart), p. 29. Basler Ausgabe von 1799.

[To be concluded]



## STUDENTS' DISSERTATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY

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The following list of doctoral dissertations and masters' theses in preparation in American universities and colleges is a compilation of the returns from letters sent by the editors of the *Journal* to departments of sociology. The dates given indicate the probable year in which the degree will be conferred. The name of the college or university in italics designates the institutions where the dissertations are in progress.

### LIST OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN PROGRESS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES

- James E. K. Aggrey. A.B., M.A. Livingston. "The Basis of Inter-Racial Comity in Africa." 1925. *Columbia*.
- Nels Anderson. A.B. Young. "The Tramp." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Robert C. Angell. A.B., A.M. Michigan. "The Student Mind: A Study in the Social Organization of the American University." 1924. *Michigan*.
- Gertrude B. Austin. B.S. Grinnell. "Leadership in the Woman Suffrage Movement in New York City." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Read Bain. A.B. Willamette; M.A. Oregon. "Revaluation of the Concept of Religion." 1925. *Michigan*.
- Kenneth E. Barnhart. A.B. Southwestern; B.D. Southern Methodist University. "The Evolution of the Socialized Consciousness in Methodism." 1924. *Chicago*.
- J. D. Becker. M.A. Catholic University. "The Problem Child in Home and School." 1924. *Catholic University*.
- Arthur L. Beeley. A.B. Brigham Young; A.M. Chicago. "A Study of Unsented Jail Prisoners." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Robert K. Bennett. A.B., A.M. Brown. (Sociology minor subject.) 1926. *Brown*.
- Wilfred G. Binnewies. A.B. DePauw; A.M. Chicago. "Evidences of Social Pressure in the Ordinances of the City of Minneapolis." 1925. *Minnesota*.
- Leroy E. Bowman. A.B. Chicago. "Community Organization in New York City." 1925. *Columbia*.
- Beulah B. Briley. S.B., M.S. Ames; M.A. Iowa. "The Experiments in Large Scale Housekeeping." 1924. *Iowa*.
- L. G. Brown. A.B. Dakota Wesleyan. "Missions." 1926. *Chicago*.
- William F. Byron. B.S. Pennsylvania. "Case Studies of Juvenile Delinquents with Institutional Experience." 1924. *Chicago*.

- Evelyn Buchan. A.B., M.A. Chicago. "Girl Delinquency." 1924. *Chicago*.
- William W. Burke. A.B. University of Denver. "Administration of Private Social Agencies in Chicago." 1925. *Chicago*.
- L. J. Carr. A.B., A.M. Michigan. "Secondary Communication in Washtenaw County (Michigan) in Relation to Public Opinion." 1924. *Michigan*.
- Hugh Carter. A.B. Southwestern; M.A. Minnesota. "The Only Child." 1925. *Columbia*.
- Edna Cers. A.B. Radcliffe. "Injunctions in Labor Disputes in the Clothing Trades." 1924. *Columbia*.
- C. S. Chen. B.A. Nanking. "Phases of the Population Problems in China." 1925. *Columbia*.
- John D. Connor. M.A. Catholic University. "Retail Grocers' Protective Associations." 1925. *Catholic University*.
- Luther Cressman. A.B. Pennsylvania State; S.T.B. General Theological Seminary; M.A. Columbia. "The American Family: Rural and Urban." 1925. *Columbia*.
- Harmon O. DeGraff. A.B., M.A. Iowa. "A Study of the Juvenile Court of Des Moines, Iowa." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Omega D. Dutcher, A.B., M.A. Denver; B.D. Auburn. "Changes in Distribution of Negro Population in the U.S." 1925. *Columbia*.
- J. A. Dickey. A.B. Elon College; M.A. North Carolina. "The Standard of Life in a Typical Section of Hill Dairy Farms." 1925. *Cornell*.
- Z. T. Egardner. M.A. Cincinnati. "Assimilation and Social Efficiency." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Herman Feldman. A.B. City College; M.A. Columbia. "Regularization of Employment." 1924. *Columbia*.
- J. H. Foth. A.B., A.M. Oklahoma. "The Influence of Trade Association on Business." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Luther C. Fry. A.B. Muhlenberg; M.A. Columbia. "Diagnosing the Rural Church: A Study in Method." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Mrs. L. P. Fryer. A.B. Chattanooga; M.A. Clark. "Social Wastage." 1925. *Columbia*.
- Sol S. Glueck. A.B. George Washington; LL.B. and LL.M. National University Law School; A.M. Harvard. "The Criminal Responsibility of the Insane: A Study in Sociological Jurisprudence." 1924. *Harvard*.
- Kenneth M. Gould. A.B. Pittsburgh. "A Sociometric Scale for American Cities." 1925. *Columbia*.
- Julia C. Hallam. A.B., A.M. Wisconsin; A.M. Chicago. "Relation between Economic and Psychological Influences in the Development of Women." 1926. *Chicago*.
- William T. Ham. A.B. College of the Pacific; A.M. Stanford. "Unionism in the Building Trades." 1925. *Harvard*.
- Marius Hansome. B.Ed. Washington. "The Social Significance of Workers' Education." 1925. *Columbia*.

- Clyde W. Hart. A.B. James Millikin. "Political and Social Ideas in American Literature." 1926. *Iowa*.
- Maurice B. Hexter. A.B. Cincinnati; A.M. Harvard. "Certain Social Consequences of Business Cycles." 1924. *Harvard*.
- E. T. Hiller. S.B., A.M. Northwestern. "The Strike as Group Behavior." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Charles R. Hoffer. B.S.A. Purdue; M.S. Iowa State. "Commodity Distribution in Rural Communities as a Form of Community Service." 1924. *Minnesota*.
- Guy W. Holmes. A.B., A.M. Drury. "Social and Economic Survey of a New England Town." 1925. *Brown*.
- Leila Houghteling. A.B. Bryn Mawr. "Charitable Subsidies for Women Wage Earners." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Floyd N. House. A.B., M.A. Colorado. "Industrial Morale: An Essay in the Sociology of Industrial Group Processes." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Albert A. E. Howell. A.B. Oberlin; M.A. Chicago. "A Comparative Study of the County Public Welfare Organization." 1925. *Columbia*.
- May H. James. Ph.B., A.M. Brown. "The Social Service of Public Libraries." 1925. *Brown*.
- Helen R. Jeter. A.B. California; M.A. Chicago. "The Chicago Juvenile Court." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Glenn Johnson. A.B. Reed; M.A. Columbia. "The American Newspaper as an Indication of Social Forces." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Lester M. Jones. (No college given.) "Growth of Secret Organizations in the United States in Our Times." (No date.) *Wisconsin*.
- William H. Jones. A.B. Washburn; A.M. Chicago; B.D. Chicago Theological Seminary. "Negro Vice in the City of Chicago." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Carl S. Joslyn. A.B. Harvard. "Contemporaneous Changes in the Racial Constitution of the American People and Their Sociological Significance." 1925. *Harvard*.
- Aryness I. Joy. A.B. Washington. "The Organization of the Professions." 1924. *Chicago*.
- R. L. Joyce. B.S. St. Lawrence; M.A. Columbia. "Changes in the Trend of European Emigration." 1926. *Columbia*.
- Fay B. Karpf. A.B. Northwestern. "American Social Psychology." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Clifford Kirkpatrick. A.B., A.M. Clark. "Mental Differences between Certain Immigrant Groups and Their Social Significance." 1924-25. *Brown*.
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- E. T. Krueger. A.B. Illinois; M.A. Chicago. "Personality and Life Organization." 1924. *Chicago*.

- A. F. Kuhlman. A.B. Northwestern; M.A. Chicago. "The Concept of Social Forces." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Harvey Leeborn. A.B. Temple University; A.M. University of Pennsylvania. "Community Chest Experiments in the United States." 1925. *Chicago*.
- H. A. Logan. A.B. Yale. "History of Organized Labor in Canada." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Samuel H. Lowrie. A.B. Rice Institute; M.A. Columbia. "Social Forces in Early Texas History." 1925. *Columbia*.
- George A. Lundberg. A.B. North Dakota; A.M. Wisconsin. "The History of Poor Relief in Minnesota." 1924. *Minnesota*.
- Franc L. McCluer. A.B., A.M. Westminster. "Block Studies of Wage Earning Families." 1924. *Chicago*.
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- William C. MacLeod. A.B. Swarthmore. "The Origin of the State." 1924. *Pennsylvania*.
- Rev. A. J. McRae. "The Social Philosophy of Frederic Ozanam." 1925. *Catholic University*.
- Mabel A. Magee. S.B. Simmons; A.M. Columbia. "The Ladies' Garment Industry in Chicago." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Rev. L. Maltais. B.D. Theological Seminary. "The Catholic Labor Unions of Quebec." 1925. *Catholic University*, Washington, D.C.
- Ernest J. Meili. A.E. Central Wesleyan; A.M. Minnesota. "A Case Study of the Rehabilitation of Discharged Prisoners in Minnesota." 1925. *Minnesota*.
- Henry C. Mohler. A.B. Indiana; A.M. Wisconsin. "The History and Organization of Convict Labor as an Element in Penal Treatment." 1924. *Minnesota*.
- Royal E. Montgomery. Ph.B., A.M. Chicago. "The Building Trades in Chicago." 1924. *Chicago*.
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- John H. Mueller. A.B., M.A. Missouri. "The Sociology of the Automobile." 1924. *Chicago*.
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- M. H. Neumeyer. A.B. DePauw; B.D. Garrett; M.A. Northwestern. "A Sociological Interpretation of Conscience." 1925. *Chicago*.
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- Justin W. Nixon. A.B. Denison. "Interlocking Directorates in Voluntary Organizations in American Cities." 1925. *Columbia*.
- Herluf V. Olsen. S.B. Dartmouth. "The Development of the Co-operative Movement in Denmark." 1925. *Chicago*.

- Vivien M. Palmer. Ph.B. Chicago; A.M. Columbia. "A Study of Industrial Accident Cases in Chicago." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Paul H. Perigord. Bachelier Lettres, Toulouse, France; A.M. Chicago. "The International Labor Organization of the League of Nations." 1924. *Minnesota*.
- Harold A. Phelps. A.B. Brown; A.M. George Washington. "Differential Reactions of Unionism to Social Pressures as Evidenced in the Growth of the Labor Movement in Rhode Island and Minnesota." 1924. *Minnesota*.
- C. T. Pihlblad. A.B. Bethany; A.M. Missouri. "Bearing of Mental Tests on Social Theory and Practice." 1925. *Missouri*.
- Walter C. Reckless. Ph.B. Chicago. "The Natural History of Vice Areas in Chicago." 1924. *Chicago*.
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- Stuart A. Rice. A.B., M.A. Washington. "Farmers and Workers in American Politics." 1924. *Columbia*.
- M. W. Roper. A.B., A.M. Washington. "Primary Controls in a Residential Community." 1925. *Chicago*.
- F. A. Ross. Ph.B. Yale; A.M. Columbia. "School Attendance in 1920." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Wiley B. Sanders. A.B., M.A. Emory; M.A. North Carolina. "Juvenile Courts in North Carolina." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Marion Schaffner. Ph.B. Chicago. "The Care of Infancy and Maternity in Illinois." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Benjamin A. Selekman. B.S. Pittsburgh; M.A. Columbia. "Prevention and Adjustment of Industrial Disputes." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Harry B. Sell. A.M. Chicago. "Propaganda a Mechanism of Social Control." 1925. *Chicago*.
- C. S. Shaw. A.B. Adrian. "Juvenile Delinquency." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Herbert N. Shenton. Ph.B., M.A. Dickinson; B.D. Drew Theological Seminary. "The Field of Applied Sociology." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Ernest H. Shideler. A.B. Ottawa; M.A. Chicago. "The Retail Business Organization as an Index of Community Organization." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Charles W. Shoop. B.A. Lebanon Valley; M.A. Columbia; B.D. Bonebrake Theological Seminary. "Cultural Interpenetration (Religious Aspects in China)." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Jacob Singer. Rabbi. "Taboos in the Old Testament." 1924. *Nebraska*.
- Russell G. Smith. A.B. Richmond; M.A. Columbia. "Class Struggles in America." 1925. *Columbia*.
- Harmon B. Stephens. A.B. Stanford. "Changing Moral Standards in the United States." 1925. *Wisconsin*.
- W.B. Stone. Ph.B., M.A. Chicago. "The East Texas Normal School: A Study in Rural Culture." 1925. *Chicago*.

- Carl W. Strow. A.B., A.M. Indiana. "A Method for Study of Human Resources of a Community." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Herbert A. Sturges. A.B., M.A. Oberlin. "Fluctuations and Trends of Some Social Attitudes." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Franklin Thomas. A.B. Beloit. "The Environmental Basis of Society: A Study in the History of Sociological Theory." 1925. *Columbia*.
- Frederic M. Thrasher. A.B. DePauw; M.A. Chicago. "A Study of Boys' Gangs." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Newman A. Tolles. Ph.B. Chicago. "Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Harry Turney-High. A.B. St. Stephens. "Criminological Theory in the Light of United States Statistics." 1925. *Wisconsin*.
- Mary Van Kleeck. A.B. Smith. "The Scientific Approach to Industrial Relations and Legislation." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Frank M. Vreeland. A.B. Alma; A.M. Michigan. "The Moslem Mind." 1926. *Michigan*.
- Mary A. Waldron. A.B., A.M. Indiana. "History of Social Legislation in Indiana." 1924. *Indiana*.
- Tsi C. Wang. A.B. Fukien (China); M.A. Oberlin. "The Youth Movement in China." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Colston E. Warne. A.B., A.M. Cornell. "The Consumers' Co-operative Movement." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Edward J. Webster. A.B. Yale; M.A. Columbia. "Church Unity from the Sociological Point of View." 1926. *Columbia*.
- Malcolm Willey. A.B. Clark; M.A. Columbia. "The Rural Press as a Gauge of Community Life." 1924. *Columbia*.
- G. R. Wilson. A.B., M.A. Chicago. "Comparative Study of Negro Slaves' Religion in Haiti and in the United States." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Comer M. Woodward. A.B. Emory; M.A., B.D. Chicago. "A Case Study of Successful Rural Churches." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Elre F. Young. Ph.B., M.A. Chicago. "Race Prejudice." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Oscar B. Ytrehes. A.B. North Dakota. "The Norse-Danish Press in the United States." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Harvey W. Zorbaugh. A.B. Vanderbilt. "The Lower North Side." 1925. *Chicago*.

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AND COLLEGES

- Theodore F. Abel. Warsaw and Posen. "The Poles in New York City." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Annette Adams. A.B. Iowa. "Child Welfare Legislation in Nebraska." 1924. *Nebraska*.
- Alice T. Anderson. A.B. Wisconsin. "Orientation as a Factor in College Admission." 1925. *Chicago*.

- M. Leone Archibald. A.B. Barnard College. "The Place of Group Activities in the School Program." 1924. *Western Reserve*.
- Naomi Ashbrook. A.B. Miami. "The Development of Children under Ten Years through Activities Based upon Their Interest Manifestations." 1924. *Western Reserve*.
- Mary Aydelott. A.B. Wellesley. "Employment of Children in Street Trades in Chicago." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Henry Axworthy. "The Social Value of Exercise." 1924. *New York University*.
- Ernest M. Banzet. A.B. Hamline. "Community Activities of Commercial Clubs and Kindred Organizations of the State of Minnesota." 1925. *Minnesota*.
- Margaret Barnard. A.B. Oberlin. "The Place of the Public School in the Public Recreation Programs in Pennsylvania." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Ruth Belcher. B.A. Wellesley. "Co-operative Study in Various Aspects of Old-Age Dependency." 1924. *Simmons*.
- Christopher J. Bittner. A.B. Valparaiso. "Social Heritages of the Lettish Immigrants in the United States." 1924. *Iowa*.
- Bessie L. Bixler. B.S. Wooster. "Ohio Rural and City School Attendance Problems as Reflected in Legislative Voting." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Maryesther Boyer. A.B. Ohio Wesleyan. "Social Objectives in the Studies and Activities in the High Schools of Minneapolis." 1924. *Minnesota*.
- Marion Brehm. A.B. Newcomb. "The Effect of Negative Instruction on Stutterers." 1924. *Iowa*.
- David K. Bruner. A.B. Northwestern. "The Negro in Evanston, Illinois." 1924. *Northwestern*.
- Mary F. Bruton. A.B. Missouri. "A Study of Tenement Ownership by Immigrant Workingmen in Chicago." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Henry J. Burt. B.S. Massachusetts Agricultural College. "Special Interest Factors in Rural Community Life." 1924. *Missouri*.
- Dwight Cameron. B.A. Tennessee. "The Attitude towards the Jew in America." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Arthur Caponi. B.S.E. Boston. "Mental Hygiene and the Public Mind." 1924. *Boston*.
- Lucy Carner. A.B. Bryn Mawr. "Unionizing New York City Women Office Workers." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Clark W. Cell. A.B. Boston. "The Boy Scout Movement: Its Ideals and Educational Theories." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Mrs. Grace E. Chaffee. B.A. Iowa. "Administration of Social Work in Iowa." 1925. *Iowa*.
- Lloyd Charters. B.A. St. Stephens. "Phases of Local and State Charities in New Jersey." 1924. *Columbia*.
- E. J. Chesney. A.B. St. John's University. "A Study of Courts of Domestic Relations in the State of Ohio." 1924. *Western Reserve*.

- Kenneth Close. A.B. Hiram. "Education for Peace." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Jacob Cohen. A.B. Minnesota. "The History and Organization of Public Health Education." 1925. *Minnesota*.
- Maybelle Coleman. A.B. Lander. "Recent Legislation and Administrative Provision for Public Adult Education with Special Reference to South Carolina." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Elizabeth Conley. A.B. Hiram. "The Financial Support of New York City Social Settlements." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Mae E. Conn. A.B. Southern California. "A Social Analysis of Felonies Committed in Los Angeles County for the Year 1922." 1924. *Southern California*.
- John W. Crawford. A.B. Howard. "Juvenile Delinquency among Negroes in Chicago." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Frieda Dickson Daly. B.A. Toronto. "Co-operative Study in Various Aspects of Old-Age Dependency." 1924. *Simmons*.
- Marjorie H. Darr. A.B. Smith College. "Social Conditions among the Mexicans in Chicago." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Lee E. Deets. A.B. Northwestern. "An Isolated Community in Colorado." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Harry Delson. A.B. New York State College. "Compulsory Unemployment Insurance." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Bertha Dewald. B.A. New York University. "The Social Background of a Group of Children in a Certain Town." (No date of completion given.) *New York University*.
- Grace Dicks. A.B. Drake. "Unemployment Compensation or Insurance (Public or Private) in the U.S." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Bertram W. Doyle. A.B. Ohio Wesleyan. "Traits of the Negro as Negroes Assign Them to Themselves." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Joseph Leo Duffet. B.S. Vanderbilt. "Aspects of Matchmaking as a Phase of Family Life among Primitive Peoples." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Helen Duncan. A.B. Indiana. "Public Health Work in Indiana." 1924. *Indiana*.
- Edward F. Dyett. A.B. Howard; B.E. Garrett. "A Survey of South Chicago." 1924. *Northwestern*.
- M. Gertrude Eveland. A.B. Nebraska. "Sociology for Normal Training in the High School Curriculum." 1924. *Nebraska*.
- Henry Feinberg. B.A. Ohio State. "Comparative Study of Requirements for Position of Probation Officer of the Children's Court, and a Study of Cases on Probation in New York." (No date of completion given.) *New York University*.
- Leonarda Fisher. A.B. Syracuse. "A Comparative Study of the American and Chinese Family Systems." 1924. *Southern California*.
- Margaret Flenniken. B.S. Erskine. "The Woman Preacher." 1924. *Columbia*.



- Dorothy A. Flude. Ph.B. Chicago. "Social Aspects of Prohibition in the Englewood District." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Marion Font. A.B. Newcomb. "The Association of Stutterers as Compared with Normals." 1924. *Iowa*.
- J. R. Ford. A.B. Illinois Wesleyan. "The Social Influence of the Automobile." 1924. *Illinois*.
- Caroline B. Foster. B.A. Mount Holyoke. "Unemployment—A Case Study Based on Records of the South Boston Family Welfare Society." 1924. *Simmons*.
- J. L. Frank. A.B. Western State Normal College (Michigan). "The Germanic or Nordic Theory of Race." 1924. *Chicago*.
- John E. Frazeur. "Negro Migration to the North." 1925. *Indiana*.
- Roger H. Freund. A.B. Hiram College. "Begging Families in Chicago." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Joseph Gaiser. B.S. Whitman. "Public Honesty in the Light of Present Day Business Methods." 1924. *Wisconsin*.
- Christine A. Galitzi. B.A. Sorbonne, Paris. "The Child Labor Factor in Tenement Home Work in New York City." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Helen Golden. A.B. Goucher College. "Education of Crippled Children in Baltimore." 1924. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Rose Goldstein. B.A. New York University. "The Socially Maladjusted Child." (No date of completion given.) *New York University*.
- Dorothy A. Gould. A.B. Oberlin College. "A Study of Prohibition in the Calumet District." 1924. *Chicago*.
- James Gray. B.S. North Carolina State. "A Comparative Study of Rural Administration." 1925. *North Carolina State*.
- Ward M. Gray. A.B. Macalester. "Adolescent Conversion as a Conflict Situation." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Lois K. Halley. S.B. Missouri. "A Study of Motion Pictures in Chicago." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Elmer G. Hamley. B.A. Ripon. "Social Conditions of the Winnebago Indians." 1924. *Wisconsin*.
- Reuben Hamilton. B.S. Valparaiso; B.S.Ed. Kansas State Teachers' College. "Social Status of the Landowner in America." 1925. *Nebraska*.
- Katherine B. Hardwick. M.A. California. "Co-operative Study in Various Aspects of Old-Age Dependency." 1924. *Simmons*.
- Helen Hefner. A.B. Goucher. "Old Age Dependency in Maryland." 1924. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Emily Heitman. A.B. Mills. "A Study of the Probation System of Juvenile Offenders in Los Angeles County." 1924. *Southern California*.
- Omar C. Held. A.B. Indiana. "Social Control of the Feeble-Minded." 1924. *Indiana*.
- Abraham M. Heller. B.D. Doshisha (Japan). "The Study of Population Problems in Japan." 1924. *Columbia*.

Virginia Higgins. A.B. Nevada. "A Descriptive Account of 100 Problem Children under the Bureau of Vocational Guidance, New York City." 1924. *Columbia*.

W. W. Hollond. A.B. Cincinnati. "External Factors Affecting the Religion of Primitive Man." 1924. *Cincinnati*.

Hester M. Hood. A.B. Northwestern. "Community Co-operation in a Suburban Community—Winnetka, Illinois." 1924. *Northwestern*.

Herbert D. Hooper. A.B. Southern California. "Comparisons among Siblings in University Scholarship." 1924. *Southern California*.

Everett C. Hughes. A.B. Ohio Wesleyan. "The Study of an Outlying Industrial Community." 1924. *Chicago*.

James H. Hutt. A.B. Southern California. "The Social Values of Co-operative Marketing Associations." 1924. *Southern California*.

Evangeline Hymer. A.B. Southern California. "A Study of the Social Attitudes of Adult Mexican Immigrants in Los Angeles." 1924. *Southern California*.

Harry S. Jacobs. A.B. City College. "Immigration Legislation." 1924. *Columbia*.

Barbon A. Johnson. A.B. Cotner. "Social Control and the Family." 1924. *Nebraska*.

S. Y. Jowe. B.S. Oregon State. "A Study of the Blending of Cultures." 1925. *Missouri*.

Charles E. Karsten. A.B. Cornell. "The Evolution of the Social Consciousness of a County of New York State." 1924. *Columbia*.

Tadao Kawamura. D.B. Doshisha (Japan). "Sociological Significance of the Horizontal Movement in Japan." 1924. *Chicago*.

Margaret C. Kellam. B.A. Toronto. "Delinquent Girls Examined at the Judge Baker Foundation." 1924. *Simmons*.

Hamilton H. Kellogg. A.B. Williams. "The Influence of Social Development on Liturgical Forms." 1924. *Columbia*.

Samuel Kerby. B.S. North Carolina State. "Boys' and Girls' Club Work." 1925. *North Carolina State*.

Emil L. Kerchner. A.B. Illinois. "Evening Classes for Immigrants in Chicago." 1924.

Robert T. Lansdale. A.B. Oberlin. "Public Recreation Legislation and Community Organization." 1925. *Columbia*.

Robert H. Leavell. A.B. Harvard. "The Housing Problem." 1924. *Chicago*.

Maude Le Fever. A.B. York. "The Pre-School Child: His Physical and Mental Development." 1924. *Nebraska*.

L. L. Leftwich. A.B. Culver-Stockton. "Survey of Religious Attitudes of College Freshmen." 1924. *Chicago*.

Alma Lenohardy. A.B. Southern California. "A Social Analysis of the Education Difficulties of High School Pupils." 1924. *Southern California*.

- Katherine J. Lentz. A.B. Washington. "American-Japanese Relations in Seattle." 1924. *Washington*.
- Andrew W. Lind. A.B. Washington. "Mobility of Population as a Factor in Social Disorganization." 1924. *Washington*.
- Helen D. McGlade. A.B. Wellesley. "Plans for Student Loans and Student Aid in Universities, Colleges and Professional Schools." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Dorothy McGraw. A.B. Minnesota. "Social Problems in the Drama." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Franklin McKeever. A.B. Kansas Wesleyan. "Social Organization of the Negro in Kansas City." 1924. *Kansas*.
- Ralph Miles Mahan. A.B. Indiana. "Co-operative Labor Enterprises." 1924. *Indiana*.
- John F. Markey. A.B. Southern California. "The Concept of Psycho-Social Environment as a Control Factor in the Writings of American Sociologists." 1924. *Minnesota*.
- Chih Meng. A.B. Davidson. "The Chinese of Newark, N.J." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Esther Midlar. A.B. Swarthmore. "A Social Survey of Seattle, Wash." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Harry T. Morrell. A.B. Syracuse. "World-Peace Activities in the United States." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Monkichi Namba. LL.B. Doshisha (Japan). "Invention and Its Relation to Human Welfare." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Ruth B. Neptune. A.B. Southern California. "An Analysis of the Social Thought in the American Short Story." 1925. *Southern California*.
- Elizabeth S. Nitcher. A.B. Kansas. "A Study of the Juvenile Court in Kansas." 1924. *Kansas*.
- Hugh W. Norman. A.B. Indiana. "The Visual Education Movement." 1924. *Indiana*.
- Alice S. Nutt. A.B. Oberlin. "Statistical Cards of Case Working Agencies: A Critical Study." 1924. *Western Reserve*.
- Alex E. Olander. A.B. Cornell College. "A Rating Scale for Social Traits." 1924. *Iowa*.
- Bennie E. Parish. A.B. Cotner. "The Origin for the Social Emphasis in Protestantism." 1924. *Nebraska*.
- Ruth R. Pearson. Ph.B. Chicago. "The Poetry of the American Negro: A Study in Attitudes." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Felicitas Philipp. A.B. Fairmount. "The Sociological Aspects of Prenatal Care." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Nettie J. Pride. A.B. Southern California. "A Study of Rural Attitudes as Revealed in Selected Farm Papers and Magazines." 1924. *Southern California*.
- Downing E. Proctor. Ph.B. Denison. "Social Organization of the Chinese Village." 1924. *Brown*.

- Lucius H. Ransom. A.B. North Carolina. "The Development of Children's Court Laws in New York State." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Mrs. Anettalie B. Raley. A.B. Ohio State. "The Influence of the City of C. upon Three Nearby Mill Villages." 1924. *Western Reserve*.
- John M. Rast. A.B. Emory. "Recent Negro Migration from Georgia." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Jessie S. Revitch. A.B. Minnesota. "An Investigation into the Changes of Attitudes in Jews of the First and Second Generations under Influence of Social Environment." 1924. *Minnesota*.
- Arthur H. Riss. A.B. Sioux Falls. "Ecological Basis of Seattle." 1924. *Washington*.
- Marcella E. Roach. A.B. Valparaiso University. "Work Histories of Retarded Children." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Josephine Rogers. A.B. Southern California. "A Study of the Influence of Climate on Human Population." 1924. *Southern California*.
- Alice Q. Rood. A.B. Bryn Mawr. "Housing Conditions among Negroes in the Federal Street Area." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Mrs. Ruth Z. Ross. A.B. Barnard. "Federations of Social Agencies with Special Reference to New York City Federations." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Leopoldo T. Ruiz. A.B. California. "Filipino Students in the United States." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Daniel Russell. A.B. Baylor. "The Dance Hall and Cabaret in Chicago." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Catherine M. Sabine. M.A. Western Ontario. "Co-operative Study in Various Aspects of Old-Age Dependency." 1924. *Simmons*.
- Silvio Santayana. A.B. Boston. "Classification of the Types of Modern Criminals." 1924. *Boston*.
- Ira E. Sanders. A.B. Cincinnati. "Race Amalgamation and the Jewish Problem." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Louise A. Schlichting. B.A. Wisconsin. "Co-operative Study in Various Aspects of Old-Age Dependency." 1924. *Simmons*.
- Joseph F. Sefe. A.B. Oberlin; B.D. Garrett. "Social Conditions of Bohemians in Chicago and Their Bearing on Religious Work among Them." 1924. *Northwestern*.
- Elmer Setterlund. Ph.B. Redlands; B.D. Rochester. "A Comparative Study of Certain Sociological Interpretations of Religion." 1924. *Northwestern*.
- Wray E. Sexton. B.S. New York University. "A Social Survey of the Brookdale District of Bloomfield, New Jersey." (No date of completion given.) *New York University*.
- Mary B. Shaw. A.B. Pittsburgh. "Ethics in the Legal Profession." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Jeanette Siegel. A.B. Goucher. "The Social Implications Involved in Violations in the Marriage Laws among Immigrants." 1924. *Johns Hopkins*.

- Edythe Simpson. A.B. Southern California. "A Case Study of the Anti-Social Conduct of Adult Woman." 1924. *Southern California*.
- Eyer N. Simpson. A.B. Texas. "Sociological Use of Literary Material." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Louis H. Sobel. B.S. New York University. "Social Aspects of the Big Brother Movement." (No date of completion given.) *New York University*.
- V. G. Sorrell. A.B. Iowa. "Community Attitudes: A Study of the Attitudes Expressed in Amusement Activities in a Rural Community." 1924. *Illinois*.
- Anna B. Sprague. A.B. Lexington. "The Care of Dependent Children in Kentucky." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Wickliffe Stack. A.B. Southern California. "The Movement for Uniform Marriage and Divorce Legislation in the United States." 1924. *Southern California*.
- Claudie M. Steele. A.B. Baker. "Consolidated Schools of Colorado." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Frank D. Steger. A.B. Ohio Wesleyan. "American Immigration Legislation and Administration Affecting Greek, Armenian and Turkish Immigrants." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Nora Sterry. Southern California. "Social Conditions in the Macy Street School District, Los Angeles." 1924. *Southern California*.
- Henry A. Storer. B.S. New York University. "Forest Hills—Social Aspects of an Experiment in Housing." (No date of completion given.) *New York University*.
- Paul J. Sweeny. B.S. Florida. "Infanticide among Primitive and Archaic Peoples." 1924. *Nebraska*.
- Eleanor L. Symonds. A.B. Hunter. "Population Shifting in Manhattan." 1924. *Columbia*.
- K. I. Tai. A.B. Shanghai Baptist College. "Fundamentalism in China." 1924. *Chicago*.
- S. H. Tan. A.B. Shanghai. "Chinese Characters: Their Origin and Development." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Matel P. Taylor. B.A. Washburn. "Co-operative Study in Various Aspects of Old-Age Dependency." 1924. *Simmons*.
- Marian W. Taylor. A.B. Vassar. "Social Aspects of Prohibition in the Central District." 1924. *Chicago*.
- J. B. H. Tegarden. A.B. Tennessee. "Voodooism." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Edgar T. Thompson. A.B. South Carolina. "The Social Control of a Small Community." 1924. *Missouri*.
- Earl V. Tolley. A.B. Syracuse. "The Social Policies of the Methodist Episcopal Church." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Elizabeth G. Trowbridge. B.A. Mills. "The Treatment of the Juvenile Delinquent in the United States, Particularly as Shown by the Probation and Reform School Systems." 1924. *Stanford*.

- Ruby B. Trumbour. B.A. Smith. "New Methods in the Treatment of Women Prisoners." (No date of completion given.) *New York University*.
- Gretchen Tuthill. A.B. Southern California. "A Study of the Japanese in the City of Los Angeles." 1924. *Southern California*.
- Raymond H. Veh. A.B. Northwestern College. "The Identification of Clue-Aspects in Various Social Relationships: An Analysis of Charity Case Records." 1924. *Illinois*.
- A. D. Vetesk. A.B. Baldwin-Wallace. "Causes of the High Mortality Rate in Our High Schools." 1924. *Wisconsin*.
- Margery A. Vogleson. B.A. Northwestern. "Children Treated in the Nerve Clinic, Massachusetts General Hospital, 1922-23." 1924. *Simmons*.
- George B. Vold. B.S. South Dakota State. "Evidence of the Influence of Herbert Spencer on F. H. Giddings." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Ella Vollstedt. A.B. Southern California. "An Analysis of the Tendencies in Social Work in the United States Since 1883." 1924. *Southern California*.
- Wilma W. Walker. B.A. Iowa. "Social Attitudes of Young Children as Suggested by Their Preference for Selected Pictures." 1924. *Iowa*.
- Ellen B. Wallace. S.B. George Peabody College. "Hospital Social Service in Chicago." 1924. *Chicago*.
- Rowland B. Wehr. A.B. Muhlenberg. "A Survey of Certain Protestant Periodicals." 1924. *Columbia*.
- Milton W. Weiffenbach. A.B. Central Wesleyan. "Churches of Columbia, Missouri, as Agencies of Social Control." 1924. *Missouri*.
- James O. Whelchel. A.E. Oklahoma Baptist. "Teaching of Sociology in Southern Baptist Colleges." 1924. *Missouri*.
- W. E. White. A.B. Southern California. "A Sociological Organization of an Elementary School." 1924. *Southern California*.
- Louise M. Wilber. B.A. Stanford. "A Study of Immigrant Autobiographies with Reference to the Problem of Assimilation." 1924. *Stanford*.
- Dorothy Williams. A.B. Vassar. "Employment of Children in Truck Gardens in Cook County." 1924. *Chicago*.
- H. J. Williams. Th.B. Southern Baptist Sem. "An Examination of the Reciprocal Influence of Present Day Christianity and Modern Social Conditions." 1924. *Cincinnati*.
- Jesse Williamson. A.B. Southwestern. "Social Significance of the Industrial Revolution." 1924. *Boston*.
- Evelyn H. Wilson. A.B. Oberlin College. "Recent Negro Migrants on the South Side." 1924. *Chicago*.
- William A. Wiltberger. A.B. University of California. "American Parole Legislation." 1925. *Chicago*.
- Louis Wirth. Ph.B. Chicago. "Trade Union Attitudes." 1924. *Chicago*.

Julian L. Woodward. M.E. Cornell. "Variation in News from Russia."  
1924. *Columbia*.

Charles Wu. A.B. Wisconsin. "Social Thought of Confucius." 1925.  
*Missouri*.

C. Y. Ying. (No college given.) "The Social Survey in America, 1904-1923."  
1924. *Wisconsin*.

Roy M. Youngman. A.B. Nebraska. "The Search for a Permanent Peace."  
1924. *Nebraska*.

Mary L. Zahrobsky. Ph.B. Chicago. "Slovak Immigrants in Chicago."  
1924. *Chicago*.

## NEWS AND NOTES

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Notes of interest to the readers of the *Journal* should be in the hands of the editor of "News and Notes" not later than the tenth of the month preceding publication.

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*Third Pan-American Scientific Congress.*—The American Sociological Society has received an invitation to collaborate in the Third Pan-American Scientific Congress to meet at Lima, November 16-29, 1924. Not only is the Society asked to appoint one or more official delegates as its representatives to the Congress, but its members are invited to participate in the Congress.

The Congress has been subdivided into nine sections, including Anthropology and History; Private, Public, and International Law; Economics and Sociology; and Education. Papers for the Congress will be received up to October 1, 1924. A summary not exceeding 1,500 words should be attached to each paper submitted. The president of the section on Economics and Sociology is Dr. José Matias Manzanilla, dean of the faculty of politics and economics of the University of Peru.

Communications should be addressed to the secretary-general, S. José Bravo, Apartado 889, Lima, Peru.

*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie.*—The German Sociological Society will hold its fourth German Sociological Congress, September 28-30, 1924, in Heidelberg. The two principal topics for the open sessions are "Sociology" and "Social Politics," with papers by Professor Adolf Günther, of Innsbruck, and Professor Ludwig Heyde, of Kiel; and "Science and Social Structure," with papers by Professor Max Scheler, of Cologne, and Professor Max Adler, of Vienna. The president of the Society is Professor Ferdinand Tönnies, and the secretary is Professor Leopold von Wiese, Cologne, Claudiusstrasse 1.

*California Bureau of Research.*—The former staff members, under the direction of Dr. J. Harold Williams, have completed a comprehensive report on the findings of the bureau for the eight years of its existence, including data on 1,250 delinquent boys, representing consecutive entrants to Whittier State School during that period. The report also includes a study of 341 delinquent girls at the California School for Girls, and another study of 467 boys at the Preston School of



Industry. Special emphasis is placed on the results of psychological tests and the social case investigations. Several hundred homes and neighborhoods were especially studied.

The bureau, which has been engaged since 1915 in the study of juvenile delinquency, was suddenly discontinued on June 30, 1923, in consequence of the "efficiency and economy" program of Governor Richardson. Its publications, including the *Journal of Delinquency*, were discontinued with the organization. The bureau was a department of Whittier State School, and maintained branch laboratories in other institutions.

*Bryn Mawr College.*—Dr. Neva Ruth Deardorff, associate professor of social economy, has been made the executive secretary of the Children's Commission of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and has been released from her engagement at Bryn Mawr College to undertake this important piece of work.

Dr. Hornell Hart, executive secretary of the Iowa Child Welfare Commission, has been appointed associate professor of social economy in the Carola Woerishoffer graduate department of social economy and social research of Bryn Mawr College. Dr. Hart will give the graduate and undergraduate courses in sociology.

Dr. Dorothy Sells has been appointed associate professor of social economy in the Carola Woerishoffer graduate department of social economy and social research. Dr. Sells will offer undergraduate courses in the Labor Movement, and graduate courses in Industrial Relations and Labor Organization.

*Kalamazoo College.*—Dr. A. E. Jenks, chairman of the division of anthropology and psychology, National Research Council, Washington, D.C., and professor of anthropology, University of Minnesota, received the degree of Doctor of Science from Kalamazoo College, his Alma Mater, June 18, at the time of delivering the Commencement address on the subject "The Dawning Era of Science."

*Northwestern University.*—Professor F. E. Lumley, Ohio State University, offered courses in sociology in the summer session.

*Knox College.*—Professor Carl W. Strow, of Illinois Wesleyan University, has accepted an appointment as professor of economics and sociology.

*University of Missouri.*—Miss Bessie A. McClenahan, who has been with the Missouri School of Social Economy for several years, will be in

charge next year of the applied courses including social case work in rural sociology.

*Ohio State University.*—Professor Herbert A. Miller of Oberlin College has accepted a professorship in sociology and will have charge of the courses in racial psychology.

*Sweet Briar College.*—Dr. Joseph K. Folsom, of Dartmouth College, has accepted the headship of the department of sociology and economics.

*Syracuse University.*—Professor Floyd H. Allport, of the University of North Carolina, has accepted a position as professor of psychology in the newly established school of citizenship and public affairs. This new school has a substantial endowment, and plans are under way to make it a center of research and teaching on political and civic questions. Professor F. M. Davenport, of Hamilton College, and a member of the New York State Senate, is the general adviser of the school. Dr. W. E. Mosher, of the N.I.P.A., is managing director, and Professor Shore, of the University of Illinois, has been secured to take charge of the instruction in political science.

*Tufts College.*—Professor Joseph Mayer has accepted the appointment as head of the department of political science, which includes the work in economics and sociology.

*University of Washington.*—Mr. Hilbert A. Waldkoenig, who has been an instructor in the department for the last two years, has accepted a fellowship in the Graduate School of Social Service Administration of the University of Chicago. Mr. George A. Lundberg, who has been in charge of laboratory work in statistics at the University of Minnesota, will be an instructor in sociology and statistics next year. Mr. Read Bain, formerly assistant professor of sociology in the University of Oregon, will be in charge of the work in social theory.

*Vanderbilt University.*—Mr. E. T. Krueger has been appointed associate professor of sociology and Mr. Walter C. Reckless assistant professor of sociology. Professor G. W. Dyer has been granted one year's leave of absence in order to engage in industrial research.

*University of West Virginia.*—Dr. David Saposnekow, instructor in sociology at Hunter College, New York City, has been appointed assistant professor of sociology. Professor T. L. Harris is chairman of a committee for organizing a county council of social workers in Monongalia county, the seat of the state university. Extension work at the university now

includes considerable work in "community scoring" of both cities and rural communities. The sociology instructional staff is giving assistance in this work.

*Western Reserve University.*—Professor William F. Ogburn, Columbia University, was a member of the summer-school faculty.

*University of Washington.*—Dr. A. B. Wolfe, until recently professor of labor problems at the University of Texas and present incumbent of that chair at the Ohio State University, will give the introductory course in sociology and a course in social attitudes during the summer quarter.

Courses in social welfare organization and public recreation will be offered this summer by Dr. Cecil North, professor of sociology at Ohio State University and director of the Social Workers' Training School of Ohio.

## REVIEWS

*Social Discovery.* By EDWARD C. LINDEMAN, with an Introduction by HERBERT CROLY, 1924. Republic Publishing Co. Pp. xxvii+375. Paper, \$1.00.

It cannot be said too emphatically that this is a book to be reckoned with by every sociologist, and not by the sociologists alone, but by every social scientist intelligent enough to recognize his responsibilities to methodology.

The book contains nothing which is in principle new to professional sociologists. It settles nothing. It rather reopens the fundamental questions of methodology which have been under discussion for more than a generation.

According to his own statements in the Preface, and judged by the range of literature in his references, the author as a sociologist would be referred by the Germans to the type *Autodidakt*. That is, he has not come up out of the great tribulation held by the departments of sociology in our graduate schools to be necessary preliminaries to the degree of Ph.D. in their subject. As compared with the conventional type he has evidently been in a high degree his own preceptor. He mentions Miss Mary P. Follett, author of *The New State*, as the most notable source of the impulse which resulted in his book (Preface, p.v.). The feature of *The New State* which first arrested the sociologists' attention was that the author operated from portions of their own ground, which she seemed to have discovered for herself. She exhibited scarcely any evidence of direct indebtedness to them, or even of consciousness that they existed. While Mr. Lindeman shows acquaintance with a much wider range of specifically sociological writing than appears in Miss Follett's book, he still seems to write from outside rather than inside the sociological guild. This circumstance gives his book, like that of Miss Follett, peculiar value. The writers' very detachment from the main body of the sociologists, and their arrival at attitudes which are prevalent if not universal in the graduate departments of sociology in America, may be viewed as cumulative evidence from independent sources that sociological findings are converging toward objectivity.

Mr. Lindeman's thesis may be reduced to the formula: *To deserve the rank of science, sociology in particular and so-called social science in general*

*must follow a valid method and control an adequate technique.* The dubious reverence of lip service has been rendered to this principle by most of the sociologists ever since Herbert Spencer and William G. Sumner and Lester F. Ward began to proclaim it. These men and their followers were perfectly clear about the principle. They were amateurs as to its ultimate applications, and even as to many of its rudimentary implications which are now familiar. Mr. Lindeman is a welcome addition to the fellowship of scholars who have been trying to put a working content into the principle. There is a genial blend of sagacity and naïveté in the constructive portion of his book, beginning with chapter v. Its *motif* may be expressed in a different idiom from the author's: *We must objectify our categories.* One of the considerable company who have been making the same assertion, with countless variations, all the way from a year to a generation, may well be genuinely glad that a new voice has taken up the theme and with such encouraging appearance of power to sustain it.

Younger men naturally find it difficult to believe that glimpses into the nature of things, caught by the eyes of their own minds, have ever been seen before. In fact, the American pioneers in sociology over a generation ago saw the big problem of social science in essentially the same light in which it now presents itself to Mr. Lindeman, viz., as the problem of representing human experience in terms of categories which conform to reality. All their wanderings in the wilderness of provisional methodologies, which Mr. Croly in his Introduction fairly characterizes, were nevertheless conscious and often professed attempts to find objective in place of speculative expressions for human life as it is. It is probably true that more sociologists than are certainly known to one another have long been at work upon the same task of conforming categories to reality which Mr. Lindeman undertakes.<sup>1</sup>

Who among the sociologists is nearest to an adequate apparatus of categories will remain an open question until no more variations of human relationships remain unexplored. Perhaps Mr. Lindeman's proposals will presently lead all the rest. Perhaps we must confess that all the categories which we are now testing must give way to his. It is more likely that due consideration of his proposals will result in modifying them at least as much as it will change those already on trial. For example, his leading illustration of the category *Group* seems singularly unfortunate, for the same reasons which made failure of the earlier attempts to use the category *Society* as a tool of precision. The mistake

<sup>1</sup> See Small, *Origins of Sociology*, pp. 329-37, 348.

lies in ignoring the commonplace of the old logic that intention is inversely as extension. In other words, reality will always present itself to our minds in some categories that are more interrogative than definitive, and we are pointed backward toward speculation instead of forward toward science when we try to outwit that arrangement. It is much more promising to allow the term "group" to cover the whole gamut of phenomena, from the fortuitous conjunction of two strangers who seem to the observer to be united by some sort of relations out in every direction in which interrelated persons are visible.

In short, an adequate sociological methodology is less easily conceivable than both Mr. Lindeman and Mr. Croly seem to believe. If their book receives the attention it deserves, however, it should accelerate the improvement of sociological methodology which has been in progress for nearly fifty years. Discounting all its inconclusiveness, it is a comforting sign that the breed of scholars with foresight and courage to tackle first-rate problems of sociological methodology is not about to perish from the earth.

ALBION W. SMALL

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*Social Development, Its Nature and Conditions.* By L. T. HOBHOUSE. New York: Henry Folt & Co., 1924. Pp. 348. \$3.00.

It is doubtful if all the living English philosophers and sociologists combined command prestige among American sociologists equal to that of Professor Hobhouse.

Yet, after reviewing the other three volumes in the cycle bearing the general title "Principles of Sociology"<sup>1</sup> in order to have them distinctly in mind while reading this concluding portion, I find myself casting about for means of expressing the contrast which will be felt between our American ways of dealing with sociological problems and Professor Hobhouse's treatment. We have established an American tradition which a French or Italian or German sociologist might declare, on first acquaintance, to have little, if anything, in common with Hobhouse's conceptions. This judgment would be plausible in the degree in which a stranger had accepted as final the superficial appearance that there is no common methodological consensus in the miscellany of American sociological literature since 1883. On the other hand, the contrast would be height-

<sup>1</sup> *The Metaphysical Theory of the State; The Rational Good; The Elements of Social Justice.*

ened in the degree in which the continental observer rested his judgment solely upon what is explicit in Hobhouse's system, and did not follow out its implications for analysis of concrete social reality. A part of the respect which American sociologists themselves feel for Hobhouse's work is due to their consciousness that his thought-world is different from theirs, that he is penetrating depths with which they have been little concerned, that he is preoccupied with antecedents which they have never attempted to analyze.

Of course this sense of strangeness is due immediately to the fact that Hobhouse is one of the few men who have made a strong impression upon sociological theory, with general philosophy as their base of operations. American sociologists, as a rule, have not had the philosophers very distinctly in mind as they have gone about their work. They have been much more conscious of the psychologists. Chiefly, however, they have tried to adjust themselves, both in co-operation and in conflict, to the historians and the economists. Their excursions have been short and rare in the direction of metaphysics. The exceptions to the rule have been more impressive as ingenious diversions than as indications of necessary or promising courses of procedure. In a word, it has probably been much more of a misfortune than an advantage to American sociology that such men as Dewey and Tufts, for instance, have so scrupulously observed academic courtesy in keeping on their side of the imaginary line which has been assumed to separate philosophy and sociology.

The analogy of American railroad building has occurred to me as a clue to the difference which every American sociologist must feel, which no one has been able satisfactorily to define, between our tradition and Hobhouse's program. The early American railroads were opportunistically extemporized devices for applying the power of steam to the movement of passengers and goods. They were both causes and effects of urgent demands for transportation. They were not results of profound or comprehensive studies in economic philosophy, nor even in engineering. They were attempts merely to beat the stagecoaches and the oxcarts at their own game. In the course of time the rhythm between economic and technical and political cause and effect brought it about that the very forces which created the first railroads and equipments reconstructed them. An attempt to complete the analogy in detail would probably not be profitable. On the whole, however, American sociology has been more interested in immediate results, at least in the way of plausible explanations of how and why the social wheels go around, than in philosophical depth and consistency and coherence.

It has been more eager to be realistic than to be fundamental. It has been consciously, deliberately, and resolutely unconventional. As I am trying to show elsewhere, it was a product of tradition, but did not know it, and it felt itself answerable not to anybody's previous thinking, but only to facts which remained to be discovered.

The consequences have been adventures in social prospecting which have blazed trails or built highways to the utmost bounds of human associations, both in time and space. These expeditions have given us a superficial familiarity with every sort of human phenomenon that has occurred within these limits, and we have set up lines of connection between those of them which seemed to us most significant.

If this analogy holds in a general way, it suggests a partial explanation of the probable reactions of American sociologists to Professor Hobhouse's work. On the one hand, as to its fundamentals they genuinely admire and sincerely appreciate it. On the other hand, the sociological part of it will give them the impression that, with needless dwelling upon preliminaries, the author has at length reached ground with which they have long been familiar, and they will wonder whether it is worth while to run over again the topographical surveys which they have already made. This is, of course, a dilemma of attitudes, to be adjusted by some more ultimate authority than the preferences of the parties interested.

To confess the American attitude still more frankly, I am obliged to say that, in its sociological aspect, the cycle as a whole, and the concluding volume in particular, can hardly fail at first impression to be a keen disappointment to American sociologists—not in what it does, however, but for what it leaves undone. It will strike them very much as a book on railroading, by the foremost engineer of England, would affect American railroad men, if it turned out to be chiefly an abstract treatise on the relations of transportation to human welfare in general, with such allusions as it contained to railroads in the concrete in terms of Charing Cross and Euston stations as we knew them forty years ago.

In spite of appearances to the contrary, we Americans are docile. The sociologists are no exception to this rule. We are always ready to acknowledge all the help we can get from every European thinker with analytical powers at all comparable with those of Professor Hobhouse. Whatever the philosophical abilities of other scholars, however, we have to be discriminating about the kind of help we can get from writings which recall the period of our earliest departure from the beaten paths. We are somewhat aware of our own crudenesses, and we are not wholly adverse to admitting them. We have the courage of our knowledge, however,



that the handful of American prospectors who began a generation ago to venture into unexplored social regions has grown into a large and capable corps of explorers, and that we have worked out an apparatus of research categories which make Professor Hobhouse's use of the concepts "society" and "community," for instance, seem to us like reversion to the thinking of the most naïve years of our sociological movement. Perhaps we should lack the assurance to register this consciousness if continental scholars had not recognized the American adventure at something like our own appraisal. As another instance, it will be instructive to observe whether a public that has discounted Ratzenhofer's findings will regard Hobhouse's reduction of the "root-interests" to "the *egoistic* (including the bodily and therewith the sex impulses), the *social*, the *cognitive* and the *constructive*" (p. 174) as a move in advance or retreat.

While English sociologists since Herbert Spencer have divided their time chiefly between Le Playism and Galtonism, and the sort of sciolistic eclecticism represented by Benjamin Kidd, which the editors of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* mistook for sociology, with Professor Hobhouse standing in lonely eminence among philosophical prolegomena, the company of American adventurers that has grown into a host has built up a tradition and a technique of its own for exploration among social facts as they are. This tradition is not to be identified with the work of any half-dozen men—or half-dozen books. It is carried in a copious literature with the substance of which every American graduate student of sociology is expected to be familiar before he is recommended for the Doctor's degree. The evolution of that standard of procedure is indexed roughly in the eighteen annual volumes of the *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*. It may as well be bluntly confessed that we are utterly unabashed in our belief that this American tradition represents the dead work of a generation in advance of the present British position. In their conception of sociological problems, and of the programs which will be necessary in solving them, British sociologists seem to us to be in essentially the state of mind which we were in during the decade before the American Sociological Society was organized.

This irreverent judgment is due, to be sure, very largely to an unfortunate use of terms. It does not yet appear that the center of Professor Hobhouse's interest is in sociology rather than in general philosophy. He has raised excessive expectations, therefore, by choosing for his cycle of four volumes the title "Principles of Sociology." In fact, until the middle of this fourth volume he leaves his readers in uncertainty as to whether he will reach distinctively sociological problems at all.

When we approach chapter viii, with its title "The Interaction of Minds," we rather prematurely congratulate ourselves that we have at last crossed our own frontier. Chapter ix, "The Social Factor," confirms this impression. Chapter x, "Intellectual Development," disturbs our complacency with fear, which proves to be needless, that we are counter-marching back into psychology. It is only with chapter xi, "The Development of Institutions," that we find ourselves securely within sociological territory; i.e., with less than one-third of this fourth volume left for sociology proper. If the series had been entitled, "A Propaedeutic to Sociology," the ground for the most important part of our criticism would have been removed.

In a Foreword to this fourth volume the author says: "The whole (cycle) is a synthesis of the philosophic and scientific methods of social inquiry." It is to be feared that those only whose wish is father to the thought will accept the series at its authors' estimate. Examination of concrete social phenomena scarcely goes far enough in these volumes to convince a physical scientist that they actually contemplate use of a truly inductive, not to say experimental, technique. It is doubtful whether a commission of physical scientists would be able to discover that the method foreshadowed in these volumes is an advance in principle over Thomas Hill Green's *Principles of Political Obligation*. We should be more inclined to rest Professor Hobhouse's claim as exemplar of a scientific method in social science on his *Morals in Evolution* than on this series.

Does this appraisal mean, then, that the cycle will be unprofitable for American sociologists? Precisely the contrary. Placed in its proper perspective, valued for what it is, not for the title which it bears, it would better repay careful study from beginning to end than any recent addition to the literature of social science that could be cited. American sociologists will find it worth such study, however, not for its sociology but for its pre-sociology.

ALBION W. SMALL

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*The New Decalogue of Science.* By ALBERT EDWARD WIGGAM.  
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1923. Pp. 287. \$2.50.

This is the sort of book which leaves many minds that sympathize with its purpose in a state of disquiet as to whether it does more to promote or to retard their common cause. Its intention is commendable. It is far from being as genuine a book as its author imagines. Its band-

wagon features arouse expectations which are not satisfied by the rest of the show.

One of the humors of the new enlightenment, assuming that there is such a thing, is the smugness of some of its luminaries in their assurance that the world was shrouded in darkness until their sunburst appeared. When they advertise for some new provoker of the gaiety of nations, some Cervantes "to laugh our social and political morals off the worlds' stage" (p. 274), with the implication that they are willing provisionally to fill the bill, many of their contemporaries will freely concede that at least they need no further make-up for the Sancho Panza rôle. In this instance a certain type of reader is moved to recall Tolstoi as a reformer of religion. To people whose conceptions had not expanded beyond the range of notions in circulation among the laity of the Russian Greek Church, Tolstoi must have given some wholesome shocks. For people whose youth had been spent in a fairly intelligent and devout Protestant environment, Tolstoi's gropings toward reality were of an order that had become familiar before milk teeth were shed.

To be sure, this is on the whole a dolt of a world, but we have not been obliged to wait until 1924 to be told of it. There was a man named Socrates, for instance, who rather bluntly spoke out in meeting, and told the Athenians just what this book wants to broadcast more generally, namely, that, instead of longer accepting old wives' fables, folks ought to get acquainted with things as they are. After the lesson had been recited and ignored a great many times in the interim, a couple of millennia later August Comte drew some attention to it in his volumes on the main theme that the chief trouble with the world is its "anarchy of fundamental ideas." The present author was evidently on the job of relaying this perception when he wrote (p. 275): "Until society becomes intelligent it can never be happy or free." Very good! But when the boy pulled out the plum he did not go to the length of advertising it as the missing fulcrum to move the world. If the woods are not full of people chanting the same refrain, there are enough of them to confuse one another's renderings, and to shame anyone's impression that his particular phrasing is a patentable invention.

Many of us affectionately remember Lester F. Ward, who may be said to have spent his life telling nothing else. Thousands of Yale, and Harvard, and Brown, and Williams men are still living who heard substantially the same news from such men as William G. Sumner, N. S. Shaler, William James, Francis Wayland, Ezekiel G. Robinson, E. Benjamin Andrews, and Mark Hopkins. Such men—and they were

legion in colleges all over the land—had to bring up the rear of the scientific procession, of course. They had to wait until the discoverers had discovered before they could tell their students just when they must adjust their minds to a particular substitute for tradition. In the last fifty years or more, however, it has been the exceptional college in the United States whose total influence upon its students has not made for as wide open-mindedness and hospitality as their receiving capacity could bear, toward new knowledge, whenever it appeared with credible credentials.

One of the things which have been taught by ages of experience is the wisdom of modesty and the ill-advisedness of stridency. How does the author suppose it happens that he is able to draw copious illustration and allusion from a vast capital of scientific discovery, if free thought has thus far been barred from the world? He has made relatively too little of the fact that there has been far more liberty of thought than there has been discretion and competence to use it profitably.

Another of the things which men of our author's type have not learned is that quantity production of all-round wisdom is not feasible. They forget, or like the present book they do not arrive, until it has the appearance of an afterthought, at the perception that the larger part of most of our thinking has to be done by proxy, and that it takes us long at best to find out who are experts and who are fakirs. Even the scientific discoverers have not been famous for their alacrity in absorbing findings in any other field but their own. It turns out that "The New Mount Sinai" (p. 79) is not a single peak. "The Laboratory" is many laboratories. They do not instantaneously confirm one another. Their supposed discoveries do not always convince anybody but their finders. The most successful investigators have often been like the rest of us, and perhaps more so, in their childish simplicity a short distance away from their own specialties. Professor Virchow once said to the present writer: "I wouldn't dare to trust my own judgment about clinical application of anything that Pasteur and I have discovered." It is as unintelligent as any of the older superstitions to suppose that the world can be converted to a comprehensive scientific ethic by revival-meeting methods.

Science does not come in prize packages of pre-digested food. Science is not an assortment of Ford "parts," ready to be assembled at a moment's notice into a running machine. One of the most frequent marks of a scientific fact is its apparent detachment from other known facts. Those most intimately acquainted with it are least precipitate about forcing it into programs. Accordingly, no one who has a first-hand acquaintance with science at any point could read this book without a sense

of suffocation from the amateurish atmosphere which surrounds its professions.

With due allowances, then, for its reversion to sophomorphism, the book is not without merit. It would make good reading for the Pope, or for William Jennings Bryan. It would provide a few salutary, uncomfortable half-hours for those legislators who have voted, or who are about to vote, to abolish evolution. It might give some useful jolts to certain school authorities and a few surviving college presidents who prefer to treat students' minds more as catch basins than as filters. It might give pause to an occasional least fatuous of those zealots who propose to save religion by deriving it from the ages of mythology. Among such types, the larger the circulation of the book the better. It is to be hoped that it will not fall into the hands of any who are callow enough to take it as an authority on the "ethics of science."

ALBION W. SMALL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*Creative Experience.* By MARY P. FOLLETT. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924. Pp. xix+303. \$4.00.

Those who read Miss Follett's *The New State* when it was published in 1920 have waited with eager anticipation for another book from her pen. They will not be disappointed in the present book, for it is fully up to the level of the first. The author does not call it a work in sociology or social psychology, and probably rightly, for it attempts to explain the significance of the results of recent psychology for all the social sciences—sociology, economics, political science, jurisprudence, and social ethics. The motive of the book may perhaps be stated in the author's own words (p. 97): "When psychologists become willing to join hands with the students of the social sciences, it will be a day of prophecy and hope for the solving of human problems." And Miss Follett, a student of both psychology and the social sciences, attempts to bring together the conclusions of students in both fields.

It is unfortunate that the title of the book does not indicate its problem, but rather suggests a work purely in the field of psychology or philosophy. The title would have been happier and more accurate if it had been "Creative Experience in the Social Life." Such a title would have indicated the content of the book, which is a concrete study of the behavior of men, both as individuals and as groups. The author discusses in the opening chapters whether the expert is the revealer of the truth of experience; whether the legal order is the guardian of the truth; and the

nature of experience in the light of such recent psychological theories as "circular response," "integrative behavior," and "the *Gestalt* concept." (Some of these are recent only in name or in vogue.) It is impossible to give the contents of these chapters in a few words. Suffice to say that every one of them contains a vital contribution to social theory. The final chapters of the book in Part II are taken up with interesting applications of the point of view to political theory, especially the theory of democracy.

The book is "creative" in the realm of social theory, to borrow a word from its title. But it is brilliant and suggestive rather than systematic. One wonders, as one reads, why Miss Follett touches upon so many ideas which she fails to develop fully and apply. Why does she not proceed to interpret in detail the phenomena of social life, of group behavior, in terms of progressive integration and disintegration, progressive co-ordination, and breakdown of co-ordination? This is the implication of her own interpretation of the *Gestalt* concept. Perhaps she intends to do this in another book. We shall have to wait again in anticipation.

As in her former book, Miss Follett refuses to cater to the academic mind by giving her book ample references and an index. Hence the student will not find the book easy to use. While she thus avoids the appearance of a certain sort of academic pedantry, yet, on the other hand, she retains so much of the terminology of philosophy and psychology that she often fails to clothe her thought in language intelligible to the common man.

In spite of these minor criticisms, one must say that the book again demonstrates that Miss Follett is easily the foremost woman thinker along social and political lines of our time; and perhaps one of the most philosophical thinkers in the field of social theory of all time—a fact which should be highly gratifying to all advocates of the emancipation and education of women as well as to all who are seeking to further the progress of the social sciences.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

*Progress and History.* Essays arranged and edited by F. S. MARVIN.

London: Oxford University Press. Pp. 314. \$2.00.

*Progress and Science.* By ROBERT SHAFER. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pp. xii+239. \$2.50.

These books take radically opposed views of the same subject. Marvin and his collaborators attempt to show that there has been very

marked progress historically in mechanic arts and in religion, morals, government, industrial organization, art, science, philosophy, and ideals. Shafer, following the ingenious Inge idiosyncrasy, admits progress historically but grudgingly, and devotes most of his time to warning hopeful people to beware of the reformers who may arouse the unwashed and intellectually unsalvaged (those without the old and honorable classical and logical training) to expect the impossible and thus to unsettle the social order (which presumably has progressed to this point and should advance no farther). The two books should be read together, not only to get a weighting of the opposed arguments, but also to understand the logic and the psychological presuppositions of the proponents and opponents of the theory of social progress. Marvin's own essays ("The Idea of Progress," "Science") are the best in his volume. A. J. Carlyle brings his usual profundity of analysis and insight to bear upon progress in the Middle Ages; and the essays on morals, industry, and art, by L. P. Jacks, A. E. Zimmern, and A. C. Brock, are also good. The treatments of religion, philosophy, and ideals merely incumber the text with a static or superficial viewpoint tediously presented. Shafer includes in his volume criticisms of the methods of thinking of Henry Adams and Walter Pater, which may have some value for those interested in these men. He also has some pertinent remarks on the weakening of educational standards and ideals in our colleges through a too extended appeal for numbers at the expense of standards. Neither of these works gets beyond the outskirts of the problem of the measurement of social progress. Each writer, however, in his own way, recognizes science as the heart of the method of attainment, Marvin to approve and Shafer to doubt. Shafer scoffs at the "dogma" or "doctrine" of progress as he would not sneer at the dogmas of mysticism. Indeed, the conflict in viewpoint is mainly one between faith in science, on the one hand, and faith in the mystical and in individualism, on the other. Neither has any dependable criterion for measuring progress or regression. But Marvin and his group have facts relative to progress, and these must come before the criteria of measurement and valuation can be formulated.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

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*Towards a Christian Sociology.* By ARTHUR J. PENTY. New York: Macmillan Co., 1923. Pp. 215. \$2.00.

This is the sort of book that makes the judicious grieve. In some of the trying-to-be judicious it provokes emotions less Christian than grief.

It proceeds from a level of intelligence which does not know that it is precisely as muddled to talk about "a Christian sociology" as about "a Christian chemistry" or "a Christian mathematics." It is sad that we have no way of preventing prostitution of the term "Christian" by use as an advertising medium for irresponsible individual opinions. On his first page the author betrays that he is as blind a guide to valid use of Christian sources as he is to a valid conception of sociology. He shows that he dogmatizes the foundation of his rationalizing upon the New Testament, instead of getting out of the New Testament its own version of Christianity. He alleges that the Christian way is to assume "the existence of a type of society which may be designated as the normal." In contrast with this fictitious "Christian" way is the Socialist way, "altogether destitute of any conception of normality." Beside the alleged way of Christ and the alleged way of Marx there is no other.

That settles quite a batch of problems at the outset. Some record for a page and a third!

If the writer consistently hewed to his own crooked line he might have earned a certain degree of respect. A few pages later, however (p. 39), he forgets his assertion of a normative sociological presupposition in Christianity, and shifts to the alternative that the master-idea of Christianity is the primacy of the spiritual over the material. Quite a different matter!

To anyone with the reviewer's preconceptions of the rudiments of both Christianity and sociology, the book makes the same sort of appeal that a petition for appointment as sanitary engineer would make among men who had found the applicant to be a mystical amateur in chemistry and bacteriology and engineering. Life is too short for waste of any of it in trying to reach either physical or social goals behind this sort of leadership.

If the writer had been content to let sociology alone, as something outside his circle of acquaintance; if he had entitled his book *Some Gropings toward an Every-Day Religion*; and if he had submitted his sermonizings to the expurgation necessary to rid them of their pseudo-scientific pretentiousness; a remainder would be left not wholly without merit. As it stands, however, the book is merely another of the type which obscures religion and confuses thought. It is another case of the illusion that a genuinely Christian attitude toward truth and obligation in general is sufficient qualification for solution of all social problems. A Christian attitude no more makes a social than an electrical engineer.

ALBION W. SMALL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



*La Place de la Sociologie dans l'Éducation aux États-Unis.* Par FREDERICK WILLIAM ROMAN. Collaborateur spécial du Bureau de l'Éducation des États-Unis. Paris: Marcel Giord, 1923. Pp. 428. 25 francs.

This is a book of unique importance. The author has had rare opportunities to establish an observing-station at a point at which more lines of vision converge than join in the perspective of the ordinary spectator. As a sociologist, as a teacher of sociology, as a generalizer of educational practice and philosophy, as a representative of the American Bureau of Education, as a student both of sociology and of education, in America, in Germany, and in France, as a witness before the court of French academic opinion as to the experience of his own country, and as it looks from comparison of his impressions received at home with his maturer judgments formed in part by review of the same facts through the medium of European atmosphere—in all these aspects Dr. Roman commands attention, irrespective of the particular conclusions which he may have reached. Here is at all events, an estimate formed by a different sort of survey from any that have preceded. American higher education and American sociology, both as past performances and as pending groups of problems, take on aspects in this perspective which had not been presented with equal definiteness before.

The author judges both education and sociology with more of the presuppositions of the Durkheim school of thought than Americans have accepted. The conception of education as a function implicitly of and for and by the state, has had more effect with him than with the more typical American school and college man, or sociologist. That is, the conception of education as a function of and for and by society, rather than for the individual, first, foremost, and finally, shapes the estimate in the book more decisively than it appears in most American thinking. Virtually the question which the book tries to answer is this: What has sociology done, what has education done, especially as they have modified each other in the United States, to mold general social conditions in the country, and what are the visible problems of co-operation between the two factors considered as potential social forces?

It is a distinct social service merely to have raised that question. It is a much more important social service to have attempted to answer it. American educational and sociological theorists owe it to themselves carefully to consider Dr. Roman's attempt to indicate the answers.

ALBION W. SMALL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*The Social Origins of Christianity.* By SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923. Pp. vi+263.  
\$2.25.

The conventional approach to Christianity has been through its ideas or teachings, viewed as a quantity of spiritual information thrust into human history from a supernatural source and existing independently of mankind. This volume treats Christianity not as a collection of ethical precepts and theological dogmas but as a phase of social evolution—a part of the on-going process of historic development. The author has no apologetic preoccupations; and he declares very positively that Christianity, "at all costs to modern wishes," must be investigated and interpreted from the standpoint of social experience, like any other chapter of human life (p. 31). He points out that there is a great dearth of literature dealing with the formative social experiences of the early Christians in the various environments amid which the structure of their own society crystallized and their message took shape (p. 255).

The "orthodox" interpretation of Christianity has erected an artificial wall between the New Testament and the Hebrew Bible, viewing the more ancient collection of source material as having importance only through embodying mechanical predictions, or "types," of the ecclesiastical Christ preached by the apostle Paul. But Professor Case levels this barrier at the outset, emphasizing that the Christians "were part of a larger social whole, first Jewish and later Gentile" (p. 25, etc.). Christianity, he declares, can be rightly understood only as we come to it through its Jewish and gentile environments:

The Christian movement, says the author, was at first purely Jewish; and from the very outset it was "socially conditioned in a much more emphatic way than is commonly appreciated" (p. 38). The members "were chiefly concerned with the hope of realizing a new status of society" (p. 39), a concrete expression of which appears in the work of John the Baptist (p. 49). The Jewish hope for an earthly "kingdom of God," based on social justice, was inherited in common by Jesus and his Jewish contemporaries. The trouble in the case of Jesus, however, turned around the methods and attitudes which one might properly adopt in working toward this kingdom of God. The Jewish nation had fallen into the hands of its "respectable" classes, and had gradually evolved a system of theological and ecclesiastical machinery which Jesus felt to be functioning contrary to the interests of the kingdom. The common people heard him gladly; but they were poor and unorganized. On the other hand, the wealthy Jewish officials were champions of the *status quo*;

and they had the ear of the Roman imperial authorities who were holding Judea in subjection. Both John and Jesus may have been suspected of some ulterior political purpose (whether rightly or wrongly); and both were executed by the Romans.

The author has hardly begun his treatment of the social origins of Christianity before we find him stressing "The Transition to a Gentile Environment" (chap. ii). He points out that in this transition "the Christian message was not immune from certain changes of importance" (p. 74). The Jewish emphasis on a divine kingdom, based on social justice, dropped from sight; and with it vanished the tension of class antagonism between rich and poor. There was no longer any place for the perspective implied in the sayings of Jesus about the impossibility that a wealthy man could enter the kingdom of God. The center of attention was shifted from earth to heaven. Christianity became a competitor of certain "mystery" cults which offered their votaries personal security through union with some divinity who guaranteed safe passage of the soul into "the other world."

This change of emphasis comes into view when we look at the New Testament, not as a miraculous literary deposit without any chronological relations, but as a series of documents produced in a definite time-and-place order extending through a century or more and ranging widely over the Roman empire. The outstanding figure in this transition was Paul, a Roman citizen, born in Asia Minor, but of Jewish parents. Early gentile Christianity was forced to make its way in a world already occupied to a large extent by the rival mystery religions. These cults had pre-empted the field so far as the wealthy and respectable classes were concerned. Their rites of initiation were costly; and they served as exclusive clubs for the well-to-do. But early gentile Christianity, on the other hand, appealed primarily to the "common man" (p. 126). In this respect, at least, it reproduced the older Jewish emphasis on Jehovah as the God of the "poor and needy."

But since gentile Christianity was primarily individualistic in its doctrine, it implied no necessary antagonism between rich and poor. Although it was at first mainly a religion of the humble, it attracted increasing numbers of the wealthy who willed property to the churches. The accumulation of real estate and other forms of wealth went along with growth in membership; and hence an ecclesiastical organization came into existence, presided over ultimately by the Roman bishops. The church thus gradually evolving was at length recognized by the government, and finally became the only legal religion in the empire.

The church was an aristocracy; and while it replaced the divinities of paganism by the God of the Bible, the radical social passion of Jesus and the Hebrew prophets disappeared.

This volume is so valuable in its new territory that it deserves to be heralded rather than criticized. Religion is becoming more and more attractive to sociologists and historical economists. For such scholars, and for the liberal clergy, Dr. Case's book will have peculiar value. It ought to be digested by every investigator who aims to cover the general field of institutions. Many other treatises will appear dealing with the social origins of Christianity. This new literature will have significance not merely because it will give us a truer understanding of the past, but because it will furnish the technical basis for a better functioning of religious institutions in the twentieth century.

LOUIS WALLIS

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*The Philosophy of Civilization.* By R. H. TOWNER. New York: G. T. Putnam's Sons, 1923. Two volumes. Pp. 290, 340. \$5.00.

It is puzzling why so absurd a piece of work as these two volumes was published by so respectable a publishing house as Putnam's. They illustrate the dangers of a speculative sociology based upon biological assumptions. Perhaps after all the publishers have done the public a service by showing that social speculation upon biological premises is just as dangerous as any other form of social speculation: It is the old story of the effects of various forms of natural, sexual, and artificial selection upon human society. This time, however, the main emphasis is thrown upon sexual selection, and upon a very particular form of it. According to the author, it is the sexually cold women who bear the children of the ability required for administering and promoting civilization. Sexual, ardent women, on the other hand, bear only mediocre children and have many of them. As sexual coldness produces a natural aversion to mating and to maternity, the life of civilization depends on the existence of institutions that will compel or induce sexually cold women to marry and to become mothers. This has been accomplished in one way or another by all the civilizations of the past that have amounted to anything. But we are moving in the wrong direction. We are emancipating our women and this results in a "reversal of selection" which will sooner or later undermine civilization. The author finds other forms of selection, or rather absence of selection, which are also harming the race. Prohibition, for example, is a huge mistake, since it prevents the passionate types from

killing themselves by drink. The result again is a perpetuation of mediocrity. Socialistic limitations upon the accumulation of private property are also discouraging ability and helping mediocrity to flourish. The author's conclusion as to the outlook for our civilization is naturally pessimistic.

This book comes near reaching the climax of absurdity in biological sociology. It must be, however, that there is a public demand for such stuff, or else the publishers would not dare to publish a two-volume work of this sort. The work is chiefly valuable to show the need of a scientific sociology.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

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*The Witch-Cult in Western Europe.* By MARGARET ALICE MURRAY.  
Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1921. Pp. xviii+285.  
\$5.65.

The subject of this volume is witchcraft as a cult. The author makes a clear distinction between what is called "operative" and "ritual" witchcraft. Operative witchcraft includes all charms and spells, whether used by professed witches or professed Christians, for good or for evil, for killing or for curing. These are part of the common heritage of the human race. But ritual witchcraft is a religion. It is the thesis of this volume that ritual witchcraft, as it was known in the Middle Ages in Western Europe, is the surviving cult of an earlier, primitive, dwarf race identified with the fairies and with fairy lore, which, as students of folk-lore well know, is traditionally connected with witches and witchcraft.

This study is based, in the main, on the evidence adduced in the trials for witchcraft in England and Scotland, and in view of the very extensive literature on witchcraft, this volume is particularly valuable: (1) because it is based directly upon the original documents; (2) because it cites so much material from the original sources and in the language in which it was written; and (3) because these materials are all analyzed and classified with reference to the questions which are raised by the very nature of the materials themselves.

After an introduction and an introductory chapter on the continuity of religious beliefs and practices, the facts are reviewed under the following titles: (1) the god of the witches, i.e., the devil—as god, as human being, and as animal; (2) admission ceremonies—renunciation and vows, the covenant, baptism, and the mark; (3) the assemblies—the Sabbath, or religious meeting; the esbat, or business meeting; (4) rites, homage,

the dances, music, the feast, candles, the sacrament, sacrifices—human and animal—magic words, rain-making and fertility rites; (5) the organization—the officer, the covens (i.e., the ritually organized assembly), duties, and discipline; (6) familiars and transformation—the divining familiar, the domestic familiar, methods of obtaining familiars; transformation into animals.

In addition to matters discussed under the headings mentioned, there are several interesting appendixes; one in which the evidence is presented suggesting a connection between fairies and witches; another citing the evidence from the trials of Joan of Arc and Gilles de Rais, which seems to indicate what the author is inclined to believe—that they were actually members of the witchcraft cult.

A third index gives an interesting list of something like a thousand names of witches in England and Scotland, in regard to whom some sort of record has been preserved.

This volume will be interesting to sociologists mainly as an introduction to a considerable body of materials which throw light upon one of the most obscure and interesting manifestations of human nature—namely, the phenomena of diabolism and the cult of the devil.

The interesting thing about this cult is that its god is the Christians' devil, and that its ritual—much of which is not merely sacrilegious but obscene—seems to be conceived in a spirit of sacrilegious perversity, as if one aim of the cult were not merely to renounce Christianity, but to do it in the most outrageous manner possible.

It was, we are told, "a joyous religion, and as such quite incomprehensible to the gloomy inquisitors and reformers who suppressed it." But the expression "joyous" does not exactly describe the furious sexual orgies of the witches' Sabbath. It is, at any rate, not the natural joyousness of a naïve paganism, but rather the frantic and often insane outbursts of suppressed human impulses, in passionate rebellion against the austerities of an ascetic discipline to which the natural man had not been able wholly to accommodate himself.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*The Farmer and His Community.* By DWIGHT SANDERSON. The Farmer's Bookshelf. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. Pp. 254. \$1.25.

What Signora Olivia Rossetti Agrèsti, in her panegyric of David Lubin, calls the "semi-rhetorical and diletianti . . . rural life move-

ment" can only be established above the level of words and pretensions by earnest scholars utilizing the scientific method. Professor Sanderson is such a scholar, and he has written a book which contributes to this desired end. The only *valid* basis of differentiation of rural sociology from general sociology is a body of investigation directed specifically at agricultural peoples living in an agricultural environment. Happily, Professor Sanderson recognizes this principle; his volume makes the best use of what reliable rural social studies are available.

The initial chapter, although based upon the studies of Galpin, must be considered as an attempt at social theorizing. The rural community is, by the method of composition, defined as "the people in a local area tributary to the center of their common interests."<sup>1</sup> If the search is for an objective "thing," this is perhaps an adequate definition; but the recognition of the community as a "thing" does nothing to illumine the concept. If, for example, the definition should read: "the interplay of interests represented by the activities of people living within a defined local area," pertinent problems would be immediately suggested. The community would be no longer an objective "thing" but rather an objective process. It is probably essential that some method be devised for locating the rural community but the real task of sociology is to discover the meaning of the activities which give significance to the concept of community. In a later chapter<sup>2</sup> Professor Sanderson gives partial assent to this point of view, but it is not central to his theme.

*The Farmer and His Community* (introduces) three important and neglected topics which are essential to an adequate understanding of the processes of rural life, namely, (a) the "alien" or foreigner in agriculture, (b) the social implications of the co-operative movement, and (c) the rôle of social maladjustment as an inhibiting factor. A certain sociological importance attaches itself to the fact that agriculture tends to pass into the hands of successive immigrant groups. The extractive industries of mining and fishing reveal the same fact, and observation leads to the conclusion that this shift of control is accompanied by a disturbing form of social instability. The co-operative movement can no longer be considered as a purely economic or commercial enterprise. It leads inevitably to forms of social organization whose activities create new values.<sup>3</sup> It is a foregone conclusion of most observers that the technique for dealing with the dependent, defective, and delinquent

<sup>1</sup> P. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Chap. xiv, p. 169.

<sup>3</sup> The Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Marketing Association of Kentucky e.g., has employed a trained social worker.

members of rural communities will not be a mere imitation of urban methods. What the technique of rural social work is to be, however, is left to future experimentation.

Professor Sanderson's volume is intended for "rural leaders and progressive farmers," but it appears to the reviewer that it is excellently adapted to the classroom. It constitutes a comprehensive survey of the rural social problem and it begins where sociology should begin, namely, with local groups and the local community. Moreover, its references include more than three-score authors and books as well as numerous pamphlets and periodicals. It is a volume of solid content. In his Foreword, Professor Sanderson promises a larger study of the rural community—a study obviously projected in the interests of advancing social science. It is to be hoped that the intimacy of style which characterizes his first contribution will not be sacrificed in the more technical work. At any rate sociologists may look forward with hopeful confidence to the future contributions which Professor Sanderson promises.

E. C. LINDEMAN

HIGH BRIDGE, NEW JERSEY

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*Agricultural Organization in the United States.* By EDWARD WIEST, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky. Pp. 618. \$3.90.

Whether this work can be considered a textbook is difficult to say. There are few courses being given in American colleges which undertake to present this phase of our economic and social life in just this way or from this viewpoint. Certainly it can be considered a reference book, almost an encyclopedia in the field of agricultural or rural organization. Probably in the absence of any competition except Buck's two books, *The Granger Movement*, and *The Agrarian Crusade*, it is an indispensable book to anyone attempting to touch any phase of the larger organizations of agricultural interests and rural people.

The presentation of the public organization of agriculture is elaborate and detailed, probably so elaborate and detailed as to lose practically all interpretative content. The presentation of the private organization of agriculture is the most complete of anything yet available in a single document. It covers the field from the earliest agricultural societies to the American Farm Bureau Federation. It does not include a discussion of the Non-Partisan League, the great commodity co-operative societies, the Farmer-Labor Party, or any phase of the rural community organiza-



tion movement. It does not present a description of any of the attempts of agriculturists to obtain political organization. It probably fails to do this intentionally, because it seeks to deal only with those organizations which are purely economic in nature.

The author weaves all through his discussion the economic interpretations which only a student of the larger field of economics could give. Sometimes these interpretations become almost digressions into the field of economic theory, the connections of which the average reader is likely to miss and some others to disagree with. At certain points he too readily reaches conclusions concerning the viewpoint of the farmer. Such an instance is when he states, "Recently, however, it has become perfectly plain to them that their class interests are opposed to those of labor" (p. 584). The recent growth of the Farm-Labor Party in the West and Southwest does not warrant so sure a generalization.

There is no attempt, except by implication, to interpret the growing tendency of farmers to organize and the spread of agrarian organizations as a movement or phenomenon of social psychology. This book does, however, make a most distinct contribution by assembling the materials from which a study of this interesting phenomenon can take its lead. It is practically the first book of its kind in the field and is sure to be welcomed by all students of rural life.

CARL C. TAYLOR

NORTH CAROLINA AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE

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*The Making of Rural Europe.* By HELEN DOUGLAS IRVINE. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923. Pp. 224. \$2.50.

This book forms a very good introduction to the history of land control in medieval and modern Europe, and gives a good picture of the evolution of European land systems and the forces which have affected their change. Chapter iv on "The Latifundia" is particularly good, and the treatment of agriculture and the farm laborer in England is concise and stimulating. The chapter on co-operation and the author's views on the possible effects of co-operation seem inadequate. The last chapter on "Agrarian Revolutions of Today" hardly gives as much detail as might be desired for an understanding of the present situation, and which the revolutionary changes now in progress would seem to warrant. Miss Irvine stresses the social significance of the peasant's love for the land and the social effects of large-scale, commercialized farming. The

chapter on "Rural Syndicalism" and the agrarian experiments in Italy gives a good insight into the possibilities and difficulties of collective farming.

DWIGHT SANDERSON

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

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*Tested Methods in Town and Country Churches.* By EDMUND DES BRUNNER. Foreword by GIFFORD PINCHOT. New York: Geo. H. Doran Co., 1923. Pp. xix+173. \$1.50.

*Churches of Distinction in Town and Country.* By EDMUND DES BRUNNER. Preface by E. A. ROSS. New York: Geo. H. Doran Co., 1923. Pp. viii+198. \$1.50.

These two books were prepared by Dr. Brunner at the suggestion of representatives of departments of rural work of a number of the missionary boards of leading denominations. In their preparation the records of nearly seven hundred churches were examined. Forty of these were finally selected as typical of the kind of work now being done by successful town and country churches. Fourteen of the forty were then made the basis of illustration of the complete, comprehensive activities of single parishes.

The first-mentioned text illustrates by concrete examples the methods used in achieving success in the evangelistic work of the Church, worship and services, religious education, church finance, organizing the program, publicity, and community welfare. Additional chapters discuss church plant and equipment and standards for measuring success. In the introductory statement Governor Pinchot calls attention to the progress in rural work during the past fourteen years. The preparation of such a book would not have been possible at the beginning of this period. The type of church program that succeeds is no longer theoretical but is abundantly demonstrated by the illustrations given. The permanency of the program is indicated by the fact that the average period over which it has been carried on in the churches studied has been seven years. The average length of present pastorates on these charges has been four and one-half years as compared with three and eight-tenths years for charges in twenty-five counties surveyed by the Interchurch World Missionary Movement. Age and sex groups are well distributed in the membership. Attendance at religious services is exceptional. Six of the churches average more than two hundred at the morning service. Three of them

average more than four hundred and fifty and one more than eight hundred. In six of the churches the attendance averages more than the resident membership. The year preceding the investigation the forty churches had a net gain in membership of 14 per cent. These results show beyond question that the methods presented are of demonstrated value in town and country church service.

Churches of distinction in town and country illustrate the methods and achievements in various types of religious work in smaller communities. Circuit work is found successfully developed at Centerton, Arkansas. Rural industrial church service of a picturesque type has grown at Bingham Canyon, Utah. The migrant harvesting groups have been cared for in a conspicuously effective way at Larned, Kansas. The broad program of service to Negro groups is to be found at Gonzales, Texas. The mountaineers have been led to a larger religious life at Buckhorn, Kentucky. Foreign language groups have been developing self-Americanization at Stanton, Iowa. The village church has shown what it can do at Honey Creek, Wisconsin. Other types of town and country work are illustrated by stories of demonstrated success.

This book proves conclusively that "it can be done." It takes the modern program of the small community church out of the realm of theory and brings it into the field of established fact. It proves that the church that serves lives and grows. Country people are not irreligious nor indifferent to the higher spiritual values of life. Under able guidance they are more than willing to express their desires for efficient moral and spiritual community life through the leadership of the church. The material collected is an indication of the almost revolutionary change that has taken place in the place given to religious forces in the rural life movement. Present tendencies, if continued, will make commonplace the stories of John Frederick Oberlin, Grenfell, Higginbottom, and Hills.

Both books should be read by all who are in the rural ministry or who are preparing for it. They should be read by those who are actively engaged in the rural work in connection with agencies allied to the church or engaged in rural advance. They are an accurate source of information to the layman, both urban and rural, who desires to inform himself as to the progress of religious forces in rural life. They are well written, and the material is well selected. They are two of the most significant contributions to the literature of the rural church movement that have appeared in recent years.

PAUL L. VOGT.

*The Re-Creating of the Individual. A Study of Psychological Types and Their Relation to Psychoanalysis.* By BEATRICE M. HINKLE. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923. Pp. 465. \$4.50.

"I have found unmistakably that there exists in man . . . a very real inner urge toward a greater development and a more evolved personality—a creative urge not only to produce children and culture, but a finer and more highly evolved individual. Man possesses . . . the capacity for individual development and the need for its fulfilment as definitely as he possesses the physiological sex desire." (P. 43.)

Starting with this thesis the author of this book develops a theory of the neuroses which is definitely a departure from the position taken by either Freud, Adler, or Jung. Although, in large part, the author (as a disciple of Jung) is concerned in presenting a critique of the Freudian brand of psychoanalysis, she also makes it quite clear that in any adequate explanation of the neurotic symptoms and attitudes both the "masculine protest" of Adler and the "dominant mother" concept of Jung must give way to a comprehension of psychological types and the motivating force of the creative urge toward individualization.

One cannot help but admire the hearty finality with which the author, having shot her main bolt in the development of a theory of psychological types (a modification and expansion of Jung's theory of introverts and extroverts) advances in other chapters to attack such problems as the "Psychology of the Artist," "Masculine and Feminine Psychology," and "The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Spiritual Life." In these chapters any young, sociological Don Quixote who wishes to try his hand at tilting against metaphysical windmills will find occupation to his heart's content. The uses which social science will be able to make of such concepts as "the inherited collective unconscious," "creative urges," "puer aeternis" and "psychic coitus"—to select only a few at random—are, to say the least, problematical.

E. N. SIMPSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*The Problem of Group Responsibility to Society. An Interpretation of the History of American Labor.* By JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1922. Pp. 269. Paper \$1.50.

As the secondary title suggests, this essay falls into a border-line class of literature between history, economics, and sociology in the

narrower sense. Its object is to bring into clear view by intelligent selection, arrangement, and emphasis of material, and by a certain degree of generalization, the essential content of a body of historical data. In the opinion of the reviewer, this purpose has been fairly well realized, although some of the assumptions made in the early chapters would be criticized by students familiar with the history of early American political and social thought. It is the author's thesis that the American labor movement adopted as its original presuppositions the earliest American conceptions of democracy, in terms of equality of opportunity and free competition. In the effort to realize the wishes of its adherents in a changing economic *milieu* organized labor was gradually forced to redefine the situation in terms of group interests. The problem of providing for the public interest in production is one of conditioning the realization of group interests upon the assumption of group responsibility. The author considers the New Unionism to be a step in the direction of a solution, since it is a plan whereby the immediate interests of small trade groups are subordinated to the long-run aims of the larger labor group. He believes further progress to be a problem in education.

F. N. HOUSE

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

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*Abnormal Behavior, An Introduction to the Study of Abnormal and Anti-Social Behavior.* By IRVING J. SANDS M.D., and PHYLLIS BLANCHARD, Ph.D. New York: Moffat, Yard, 1923. Pp. ix+482. \$4.00.

The authors of this volume combine their experience as neurologist and psychologist to present a popular and practical account of problems of human behavior which should be of interest to a number of different groups. The instinctive and emotional basis of behavior is discussed in brief and clear fashion and the rôle of the emotional conflicts in the causation of conduct disorders is pointed out. The relation of varying intellectual capacities to varying modes of behavior is indicated and interesting statistics are given concerning the adjustment of the feeble-minded to the requirements of the community. The chapter on the physical basis for behavior and the influence of somatic diseases upon conduct, while marred by a few careless statements and contradictions, nevertheless presents an exceedingly useful and sane discussion of this important phase of behavior problems. The book is also blessed, from the standpoint of the lay reader, with a clear-cut treatment and classification of the psychoses, neuroses, and psychoneuroses.

The problems of epilepsy, drug addiction, and suicide are also considered, the latter in a rather unsatisfactory fashion. Two chapters on educational and vocational maladjustments are followed by a summary of modern methods for prevention and correction of conduct disorders, emphasizing the need of centering the attack upon problems of the child.

LORINE PRUETTE

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

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*The Theory of Organized Play: Its Nature and Significance.* By WILBUR P. BOWEN and ELMER D. MITCHELL. New York: A. S. Barnes and Company, 1923. Pp. ix+402. \$2.40.

A textbook on the art of supervising play, being No. 1 of a two-volume series entitled, "The Theory and Practice of Organized Play." It is an inspiring and timely book in this day of threatening commercialization and professionalization of school and college athletics and sports. It should be read by every school teacher and college professor as well as play leaders and social workers for whom it was designed.

The principal subjects discussed involve the play center; boys' and girls' clubs; camp life; secondary and collegiate athletics; the philosophy and organization of play; and the relation of supervised play to personal development and citizenship. Valuable bibliographies and an index are included. The volume belongs with those by Gulick, Lee, and Curtis, and is superior in its class.

The critical reader will note the absence of a distinction between the "scientific" and the "popular" concepts of "play," "work," and other generic terms; and will regret the importance given to "instinct" and biological "inheritance" and the omission of even a reference to certain recent and well-known psychological and ethnological studies relative to the origin and nature of play.

CLARENCE E. RAINWATER

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

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*The Birth of Psyche.* L. CHARLES-BAUDOUIN. New York: Dutton, 1923. Pp. xxii+211. \$2.50.

A volume of sketches, impressions, and interpretations of childhood experiences by one who is at once a poet and a student and writer in the field of psychoanalysis.

ROBERT E. PARK

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## RECENT LITERATURE

### NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

The abstracts and bibliography in this issue were prepared under the general direction of H. B. Sell, by M. W. Roper, T. C. Wang, D. E. Proctor, W. M. Gray, F. H. Saunders, and Emma P. Goldsmith, of the Department of Sociology of the University of Chicago.

Each abstract is numbered at the end according to the classification printed in the January number.

#### I. PERSONALITY: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE PERSON

**Human Nature.**—The chemical ingredients that the individual inherits from his ancestry determine his basic nature but the degree of response depends upon the environment in which the individual exists, the training he receives, and the experience through which he passes. There is in everyone an internal conflict between the primal passions and social conventions, victory often going to the passions in persons whose concepts are not powerful enough to inhibit the action of the lower nature.—F. Lincoln Hutchins, *Monist*, XXXIV (April, 1924), 292-313. (I, 2, 4.) M. W. R.

**Temperament and Mentality in Maturity, Sex, and Race.**—A measurement of the development of brain capacity during mature years shows that there is a difference in mental capacity, or at least in "progressive adaptability" between the races and between the sexes. This research is only in its infancy, but if it works out according to present indications, it will overthrow several accepted theories of sex and race difference.—S. D. Porteus, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, VIII (March, 1924), 57-74. (I, 2; IX, 2.) M. W. R.

**L'Asymetrie dans le Developpement Sensitivo-moteur de l'Enfant.**—The asymmetry of the active members of the child depends upon the development of its sensory motor system. Right-handedness or left-handedness is to be explained not by heredity or religious or social practices but by the association of perceptions.—A. Tournay, *Journal de Psychologie*, XXI (January-March, 1924), 135-44. D. E. P.

**La Mesure du Langage de l'Enfant.**—A method is suggested for recording the vocabulary of children which consists of two questionnaires. One is called a complete test of all the words the child knows, the other a partial test. The latter may be multiplied by forty to obtain the full vocabulary.—Alice Descoendres, *Journal de Psychologie*, XXI (January-March, 1924), 44-47. (I, 3.) D. E. P.

**Ce que Voient des Yeux d'Enfant.**—The vision of the child is conditioned by his source of intelligence and the notions about the environment. Its vision is essentially different from the adult whose experience modifies the vision.—E. Cramausel, *Journal de Psychologie*, XXI (January-March, 1924), 160-69. (I, 3.) D. E. P.

**Enfants Vagabonds et Conflicts Mentaux.**—The mental disorder of the runaway child has two stages, that of the *fantasy* of a better condition outside of the home and the adaptation of actual action to the forsaking of the home. The theory advanced is that the child's disorder is due to family conflicts which strengthen its tendency to revolt. According to Freud, the child wishes to revenge his father's treatment of his mother. According to Adler, it is due to self-assertion directed toward a tyrannical father. From these two comes the tendency of rebellion which causes the child to leave the home.—P. Bovet, *Journal de Psychologie* XXI (January-March, 1924), 236-40. (I, 3.) D. E. P.

**Le Cinéma comme Méthode d'Étude de l'Enfant.**—The advantages of studying the child by films are: that the child's behavior may be repeated and analyzed in detail; it allows for comparison of mental reactions of children at various places and at different times; it may also record progress.—Ed. Claparède, *Journal de Psychologie*, XXI (January–March, 1924), 241–43. (I, 3.) D. E. P.

**L'Activité Linguistique de l'Enfant.**—The child finds itself immersed in a language from its birth. It does not invent words but gets them from those it hears. Older children and adults who have invented secret languages have done so not independently but by imitation and modification of the current language.—H. Delacroix, *Journal de Psychologie*, XXI (January–March, 1924), 4–17. (I, 3.) D. E. P.

**The Need for Scientific Study of Delinquent Children.**—Delinquents and criminals, and the groups of specially handicapped or specially gifted children in the schools, offer a laboratory for the demonstration of fundamental principles in the field of preventive sociology. Through a well-developed mental-hygiene program, parent, teacher, psychiatrist, etc., may join hands in preventing the development of conditions and mechanisms that made necessary many welfare organizations. This work should be conducted under the management of persons specially trained for the job.—Clinton P. McCord, *Mental Hygiene*, VIII (April, 1924), 438–52. (I, 3; VIII, 1.)

M. W. R.

**The Superior Child: A Series of Case Studies.**—The criteria of selection of the cases studied are two—general intellectual superiority in combination with musical ability. The persistence of music as a significant factor in their lives seems all the more probable in that they possess to a marked degree the creative impulse, and spend many hours in improving. It is to such children we must look for our potential "genius" group.—Alice M. Jones, *Psychological Clinic*, XV (January, 1924), 130–37. (I, 3; IX, 4.)

M. W. R.

**The Individual and the Group.**—Freud in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* interprets the emotional bond existing between parent and child or between leader and follower as an identification of self (*libido*) by substituting the person or his ideal.—Adolph Stern, *Mental Hygiene*, VIII (January, 1924), 281–92. (I, 4.)

W. M. G.

**Imperfect Correlation between the Physical and the Vital.**—The purpose is to treat the questions at issue between materialism and vitalism by the method of concomitant variation. This is to be done by comparing various biological, mental, and social processes with the concomitant physicochemical processes. We have found that the correlations between the two series are in no case of such an order as to lend any support to the hypothesis that factors in either series are wholly determinative of factors in the correlative series.—Seta Eldridge, *Monist*, XXXIV (April, 1924), 260–91. (I, 4.)

M. W. R.

**The Significance of Interest for Vocational Prognosis.**—The degree of permanency of the objects of vocational interest can be made the subject of case study and measured in two ways: first, by sampling vocational ambitions at various developmental periods, and, second, by a comparison of the vocational ambitions expressed at various periods. After using these methods of study we can conclude that vocational interests cannot be used as exact guides to future vocational interests; they are only slightly suggestive.—Douglas Frazer, *Mental Hygiene*, VIII (April, 1924), 466–505. (I, 4; IX, 4.)

M. W. R.

## II. THE FAMILY

**Sexuelle Anschauungen und Sitten des Mittelalters.**—In the admixture of the newer and simpler culture of the Germans with the highly developed culture of the Roman Empire, the strictness of the former broke down and its inhibitions were lost without substitution of others. The eroticism which characterized the early Middle Ages was one result. In the former we find a very high valuation of virtue and very strict sex morality. When this broke down the grossest laxity of sex morality and a supereroticism occurred among both men and women. Along with this persist the



leftovers of the old heathen practices in the terrible punishments that were meted out to offenders occasionally.—Gustav Jung, *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft*, X (Heft 11 and 12, 1924), 264-74; 281-92. (II, 1; III, 6; VII, 4.) F. H. S.

**Changes in Marriage Seasons.**—Marriages tend to be concentrated in the same seasons year after year. A statistical study shows that there was a decided modification of the old distribution by seasons during the eighties. This was largely due to a change in occupations, the shift from rural to urban areas and from an agricultural life to an industrial life.—Dorothy S. Thomas, *Economics*, No. 10 (February, 1924), pp. 97-106. (II, 3.) M. W. R.

**New Morals for Old: Change in Sex Relations.**—Even within the same social circle a great divergency of attitude on sex and sex institutions exists today. These changes may be indicated by the increase in divorces, illicit relations, birth-control knowledge, etc., and have been influenced by the economic and social independence of women. Then, too, indifference to the private life of others is almost an exigency of our economic organization.—Elsie Clews Parsons, *Nation*, CXVIII (May 14, 1924), 551-53. (II, 3.) M. W. R.

**Some of the Problems of the Modern Chinese Family.**—Since the introduction of modern industry into China, thousands of women and children leave their homes and enter industry. Thus, women's labor problems developed and their outlook changed. The government did not declare its intention to provide education for girls until 1907. But today girl students have increased by leaps and bounds. There are various tendencies in family reorganization: (1) the controversy over the "small" or "independent" home; (2) a compromise of the East and West; (3) a fundamental change; (4) free-love. Celibacy was until recently almost unknown, but today hundreds of young people have decided not to marry. The movement for woman suffrage was started after the revolution of 1911, but the first association for woman suffrage was founded in 1922. The birth-control movement was first introduced by a returned student from France, but failed to develop. The situation changed with the visit of Mrs. Margaret Sanger in 1922, and organizations have been formed to promote this movement. Both Confucianism and Christianity have been critically attacked and examined.—Djen Yu-Hai, *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, I (September, 1923), 1-22. (II, 3.) T. C. W.

### III. PEOPLES AND CULTURAL GROUPS

**The Field of Paleolithic Art.**—The paleolithic artist's range of models include both the animate and the inanimate, but was confined almost wholly to the fauna. Among the fauna, mammals (including man) largely monopolized his attention. Birds and fishes came in for a relatively small share; reptilian representations are practically non-existent, and the same may be said of invertebrates. Plant-life forms are very rare. The inanimate field is represented by claviform and tectiform figures; also by chevrons, frets or grecques, spirals, volutes, wave ornaments, and alphabet-form signs, some of which were derived from animate objects through processes of conventionalization.—George Grant MacCurdy, *American Anthropologist*, XXVI (January-March, 1924), 27-49. (III, 1.) M. W. R.

**A Kachin Blood-Feud: Village War in Upper Burma.**—The trench dug round a Kachin grave is not completed, according to custom until the death, if a violent one, has been avenged.—W. A. Hertz, *Asia*, XXIV (February, 1924), 124-28. (III, 1.) J. L. D.

**Der Beschwörer bei den Wadschagga.**—*Magic and language:* The conjurer plays an important rôle among primitive peoples. To understand the importance of his craft and the essentials of his technique it is necessary to appreciate the function played by language in modern cultures. The conjurer is less renowned and respected by his people for his clever deceptions and his numerous and remarkable cures than he is for the possession of and control over the magical words which comprise his repertoire. His main power and his prestige lies in the number and kind of magical words or phrases which he usually has acquired by purchase from others, and which dispel sicknesses and evils of various sorts.—Bruno Gutmann, *Archiv für Anthropologie, Neue Folge* XX (Heft 1, 1923), 46-57. (III, 1, 2, 5.) L. W.

**Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Sonntagsruhe.**—*Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Arbeiterschutzes:* The origin of the Sabbath as a day of rest can be traced to religious motives. In primitive groups as well as among the oldest of civilized communities some parallel institution corresponding to the Sabbath-day of modern cultures is to be found. *Comparative study of culture traits:* In ancient India, Egypt, Peru, China, Babylonia, and Israel and among the Greeks and Romans, although the specific characteristics of the institution vary, there existed the custom of combining the day that is dedicated to the gods for magical or religious reasons with the rest-day from the ordinary labors. Very early in the development of this religious institution there appears its social and economic value. This is especially clearly recognized in the peculiar form the custom took among the Hebrews. The present-day laws in reference to the observance of a rest-day show that the institution has its greatest hold in countries under Puritanical influence (America and England), and has least influence in the Romance nations, while it is found in some form or other in all modern civilized countries. *International regulation:* The great variation in the details of the regulations of this important social provision for the protection of the worker in modern society calls for international regulation, providing for a rest period extending uninterruptedly over thirty-two hours.—P. E. Braun, *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, XVI (Heft 3-4, 1922), 325-69. (III, 1, 6; VII, 4.) L. V.

**Human Sacrifice in Old Mexico.**—Human sacrifice in Mexico arose from the notion that the amount of rainfall depended on the amount of blood shed in sacrifice. From sacrifice the rites had developed into cannibalism by the eighth century, A.D., when the Aztecs invaded the country. Although opposed by the majority, the priestly caste maintained it until the Spanish Conquest.—Lewis Spence, *Hibbert Journal*, XXII (October, 1923), 97-102. (III, 1.) W. M. G.

**"Jadu," White and Black.**—We can get glimpses, by way of folklore, into the mind and soul of India. It is hard in India to draw the line between folklore and religion. The malefic powers seem stronger than the benignant.—L. Adam Beck, *Asia*, XXIV (February, 1924), 102-7. (III, 2.) J. L. D.

**Danish Magic Formulas.**—The Danish Magic Formulas have been collected from old books of Latin, German, and others. There are three sources of these formulas, (1) biblical legendary, (2) formulas for snake-bites, and (3) jurisprudence, oaths, and others. Much trust is placed in the power of words. Johs. Brondum-Nielsen, *Nordisk Tidsskrift* (Hæft 7, 1923), 514-20. (III, 2.) F. H. 3.

**Dansk Kultur historie (Danish culture history).**—All culture history until lately has stood in the shade of political history, yet only by knowledge of the former can we know any people. This article is a survey of recent study in this field in Denmark.—Eiler Nyström, *Nordisk Tidsskrift* (Hæft 6, 1923), 47-22. (III, 3.)

**Die jüdischen Intellektuellen.**—*Cultural traits of the Jewish intellectual:* As a result of assimilation the Jewish cultural unity has been subjected to many cleavages. The Jewish intellectual has made his appearance in public life as a literary man or political agitator since the emancipation of the Jews, and is characterized by the radicalism of his aims. Only a minority have entered the Zionist movement, while the majority have put their revolutionary energies into the services of the general political movements of their respective countries, especially in Germany. He is furthermore characterized by the abstract nature of his thought and feeling. *Cultural conflict:* The cosmopolitanism of the Jewish intellectual is probably due to the conflicting affiliation with his own, Jewish, culture group and the extraneous, national culture to which he has become assimilated. This may also express itself in the incompatibility between the cultural entity that constitutes his historical background and to which he is related by ties of blood, as over against the cultural values of the contemporary environment to which he feels himself attracted. The enthusiasm which the Jewish intellectual shows for the ideal of humanity may be explained, therefore, in terms of the socio-psychological phenomenon of isolation.—Rudolph Schay, *Kölner Vierteljahrshäfte für Soziologie*, III (Heft 2-3, 1923), 124-32. (III, 3; IV, 2; VII, 4.) L. V.

**Observations on Racial Characteristics in England.**—A comparison as to the frequency for the selection of certain subjects at Cambridge University by the Northern and Welsh groups of students on the bases of name characteristics. In the series it was found that mathematics is the most frequent study of the northern group and the least frequent in the Welsh, while history is the favorite study of the Welsh.—*The Eugenics Review*, XV (January, 1924), 566-71. I, 2; III, 6; IX, 2.) J. L. D.

**General Ethical Attitude in Islam.**—The Muslim's ethical attitude arises from his conception of God. The Koran forbids offensive war, slavery, and deceit; commands filial obedience, charity, and independence for women. Repentance and virtuous actions are rewarded in Paradise.—F. S. Gilani, *Indian Journal of Sociology*, II (January, 1921), 72-83. (III, 6.) W. M. G.

**Moral Problems of Young Japan.**—At present a nation-wide transition in mores is under way. Culture has replaced military service as the ideal life. Education is limited, resulting in severe competition and dissatisfaction toward the curriculum. Women are demanding recognition of their rights. Religion and social service are securing more interest.—Motoi Kurihara, *Hibbert Journal*, XXII (October, 1923), 103-12. (III, 6.) W. M. G.

**Cultural Transition in India.**—Historically Indian civilization existed in a world of word-ideas. The infiltration of western modes created a conflict resulting in a critical attitude and brought in a spirit of nationality. Reaction against western economic imperialism has raised the question, "Is Asia permanently inferior to Europe and America?"—M. A. Buch, *Indian Journal of Sociology*, II (April, 1921), 107-20. (II, 6; VII, 4.) W. M. G.

**The Ozark Bluff-Dwellers.**—Explorations in dry rock shelters of the Ozark Mountains in the northwestern corner of Arkansas reveal many prehistoric articles of wood, basketry, vegetal fiber, skin, and even feathers in addition to many other objects usually found in deposits. The "bluff-dwellers" practiced hunting, agriculture, the gathering of natural products and fishing. They made use of flint spear-points, flint axes and knives of elkhorn, crude agriculture implements, and fishing nets. Evidence shows that the deposits are at least precolonial and very likely of considerable antiquity.—M. R. Harrington, *American Anthropologist*, XXVI (January-March, 1924), 1-21. (III, 1.) M. W. R.

#### IV. CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION GROUP

**La signification de l'organisation internationale du travail.**—The part assigned to this *organisation du travail* by the Treaty of Peace is to promote social legislation for the progress of working classes. Injustice, misery, privation, and discomfort impede the workers; the significant contribution of the organization is in its effort toward establishing universal peace and social justice.—G. Scelle, *Scientia*, XXXV (January, 1924), 35-46. (IV, 1.) E. P. G.

**Über das Verhältnis des Proletarischen zum Sozialistischen.**—In Sombart's book, "Sozialismus und soziale Bewegung," we find the Marxian assumption that modern socialism is a proletarian movement and that the modern proletariat necessarily is socialistic. Sombart found, however, that in America, where capitalism reached its highest stage of development, no appreciable proletarian psychology or socialistic movement has accompanied it. He prognosticates that the unique factors, such as relative political freedom and a superabundance of natural resources, will have disappeared in a generation and that socialism will then fully develop. The Marxian fallacy which underlies Sombart's theory is the following: as the accumulation and concentration of capital progresses the misery and degradation of the proletariat increases. Quite the opposite is the case. With the increasing proletarianization of the great masses of the population the power, politically and economically, of the proletariat grows and its social position is improved. Proletariat and modern socialism are therefore not necessarily correlative.—Goetz Briefs, *Kölner Vierteljahrsshefte für Soziologie*, III (Heft 2-3, 1923), 95-109. IV, 1; VII, 4.) L. W.

**Race Relations in North Carolina: A Field Study of Moderate Opinion.**—After making observations in fourteen different towns, varying in size, to ascertain the nature of the relations between the races, it was discovered upon consultation with the intelligent men on both sides that there existed a fundamental sympathy and good will between the two races in North Carolina which could be easily turned to practical account.—C. Chilton Pearson, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, XXIII (January, 1924), 1-10. (IV, 2.) J. L. D.

**Lidt Om de Tre Stammer i Norden** (*About the three nations in the North*).—These nations (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) have their differences, some of which date from ancient times. Despite these they have their likenesses and belong together. There is much chauvinism extant and anyone who presumes to speak for their unity is accounted a traitor.—Hans C. Kinck, *Nordisk Tidsskrift* (Hæft 6-7, 1923), 369-85, 462-79 (IV, 2.) F. H. S.

**Dopo un anno di dominazione fascista.**—The problems in Italy are: the restoration of the power of the state and of the authority of law; the re-establishment of the nation economically and financially. A résumé is given of what the *governo fascista* has accomplished.—G. Matteotti, *Critica sociale*, XXXIV (January 1-15, 1924), 5-7. (IV, 3.) E. P. G.

## V. COMMUNITIES AND TERRITORIAL GROUPS

**The Peasant Women of Denmark and Germany.**—What one sees in the fields of Denmark is farm animals in millions—dairy cows, beef cattle, horses, and sheep. Women and children are what one sees in millions in the fields of Germany. In ten weeks' travel in Denmark just nine girls and women were seen doing field work.—E. C. Branson, *The Journal of Social Forces*, II (January, 1924), 276-78. (V, 1.) J. L. D.

**The Reconstruction of Rural England.**—Rural England may find the solution of its agricultural problem in the development of land by intrusting the business side of agriculture and social life to the workers of all classes; by fixing prices at a fair standard figure, based on a due reward to labor; by preventing anyone coming between producer and consumer but substitute co-operative organizations; by creating a system of social or free credit available at the lowest possible rate of interest; and the allocation of surplus profits to education, social life, village clubs, and the promotion of the return of people from the town to the country.—Montague Fordham, *The Sociological Review*, XVI (January, 1924), 47-54. (V, 1.) J. L. D.

**The Land Problem.**—The agricultural problem of the twentieth century is different from that of the eighteenth century. Then the only object was to increase the output of agriculture, so as to provide for the maintenance of a greater and a growing population. This conception is changing. Land is being more regarded as a trust, which is leading up to a proposal for the establishment of administrative machinery to insure that the trust is fulfilled.—Sir Henry Rew, *The Nineteenth Century and After*, XCV (January, 1924), 38-51. (V, 1.) J. L. D.

**Rural Standards of Living in the South: Interrelation of Certain Demographic Factors.**—On comparing the statistics for the several states it will be observed that, in general, dense population, low illiteracy percentages among the whites, high percentages of improved land, and high values of equipment and yield per farm go together.—Roland M. Harper, *The Journal of Social Forces*, II (January, 1924), 253-65. (V, 1.) J. L. D.

**Communism in Ancient Greece.**—The bad social conditions before the Peloponnesian wars were the cause of the revolution and communism that followed. There are many parallels to modern Europe, especially Russia. There is one difference, however, the Greek communist sought to bring back a Golden Age from the past; the modern communist does not.—P. Solberg, *Samtiden*, XXXIV (Heft 3, 1923), 129-36. (V, 3.) F. H. S.

## VI. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

**Die Presse.**—*Eine kulturphilosophische Studie*: Public opinion as a determining factor in political life came to its full development only toward the end of the eighteenth century in continental Europe. Democracy is the political form of a society in which the relationship of the opinion of the groups constituting that society is given legal expression. All parties attempt to influence the balance of opinion in their own favor. *The function of the newspaper*: The newspaper is not only the transmitting agency of opinion but also the source of opinion. The public press is always confronted by the temptation to turn alarmist. Good news is less remunerative than bad news. *The morality of the newspaper*: The moral level of a newspaper is determined by its ability to resist the ever present temptation to excite public opinion. *The newspaper and democracy*: The outcome of the world-wide, historic experiment of democracy will depend upon whether the press will emulate Prospero or Caliban. The eighteenth century gave the press political freedom; the nineteenth put into its service tremendous technical facilities, enlarging its power; the twentieth will witness its struggle for moral status.—Julius Goldstein, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, LI (Heft 2, 1923), 362-81. (VI, 7; VII, 3, 4.) L. W.

**The County Jail and the Misdemeanant Prisoner.**—The county jail is a school in this land of free schools. It is supported by the public. It is a school of crime where the teachers, the older offenders, teach the pupils, the less experienced, all they know of criminal ways.—Amos W. Butler, *The Journal of Social Forces*, II (January, 1924), 220-25. (VI, 7; VIII, 1.) J. L. D.

## VII. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL PROCESS

**Religion among American Students.**—The writer of this article has had exceptional opportunities to come into close touch with the religious life of students in our American universities. He gives the results of an extended experience and indicates some of the prevailing tendencies in the religious life of the modern American students.—Charles W. Gilkey, *The Journal of Religion*, IV (January, 1924), 1-15. (VII, 2.) J. L. D.

**The New Educational Front in Russia.**—The whole educational system of Russia is being reconstructed in harmony with communistic ideals. Their idea is modeled more on the Dewey ideas of education than on anything else known in America. Every new book by Dewey is grabbed and translated into Russian for consultation. Then they make their own additions. The government is offering every assistance possible to realize this new form of school.—Anna Louise Strong, *Survey*, LI (February, 1924), 437-42. (VII, 2.) J. L. D.

**The Decay of Religion.**—The conflict between riches and religion seems to portend the ultimate decay of pure religion or the final failure of Christianity. The bearing of Christian principles upon a system of property, which leaves men who are in possession of enormous power also irresponsible in the use of it, demands radical thought and investigation.—George C. Cell, *Methodist Review*, CVII (January-February, 1924), 64-78. (VII, 2.) J. L. D.

**Philosophie de la quatrième assemblée de la société des nations.**—Solidarity is at the foundation of an organization of international politics. The superstate inevitably causes uneasiness and upsets the equilibrium. The Greco-Italian conflict is a timely illustration of the accidents which may interrupt progressive organization of economic international solidarity.—G. Scelle, *Revue économique internationale*, XCVII (November, 1923), 220-40. (VII, 3.) E. P. G.

**Pan-Americanism and the International Policy of America.**—Pan-Americanism presents different aspects, the most important of them being the one that refers to international relations. It presents a double peculiarity: in the first place, because it

is the first aspect that has manifested itself from the beginning of the period of independence in the countries of the New World; in the second, because the international doctrines that constitute it were born and developed in all these countries without a previous agreement among them.—Alejandro Alvarez, *Inter-America*, VII (December, 1923), 69-89. (VII, 3.) J. L. D.

**Education as a Means of World Unity.**—The San Francisco World Conference on Education, with seventy-two nations represented, proposed to establish a New-World attitude by teaching in the public schools the ideals of international justice and good will.—Augustus O. Thomas, *La Nueva Democracia*, I (January, 1924), 11, 12, 26. (VII, 3.) F. H. S.

**Raw News and Peace Views.**—By distorting the news about the European situation during the past four years, the press of the country has succeeded in building up in the minds of the American people a picture of a world which he would do better to leave alone.—Will Irwin, *The World Tomorrow*, VII (February, 1924), 40-41. (VII, 3.) J. L. D.

**The Sentiment of Patriotism.**—It is obvious that, in the present day, a new spirit is abroad, a new sentiment of patriotism different from that formerly known. If there is to be progress in the world, the nature of this sentiment must be understood, its elements of good and evil analyzed and distinguished, its toxin brought into the sun and neutralized.—Case H. Grabo, *The World Tomorrow*, VII (February, 1924), 37-39. (VII, 3.) J. L. D.

#### VIII. SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

**Nuzialità e fecondità delle case sovrane d'Europa.**—Conclusions on marriage, birth-rates, divorce, fecundity, and infant mortality, are drawn from the study of a numerically select group of twenty-five sovereign houses as represented in the *Almanacco di Gotha*.—F. Savorgnan, *Metron*, II (September, 1923), 198-225. (VIII, 2.) E. P. G.

**La prédominance des naissances masculines.**—According to the figures gathered for this study, difference in age of parents does not influence, but increase of age seems to be accompanied by a diminution of masculine births. H. Methorst, *Metron*, III (July, 1923), 20-34. (VIII, 2.) E. P. G.

**La guerra dai punto di vista dell' eugenica.**—If the war really had such disgenic effects as some writers assert, we could only look for a decadence of the white race. But recourse to figures on birth-rates and general health of offspring, during the war and since, does not uphold the argument.—C. Gini, *Metron*, I (September, 1921), 92-122. (VIII, 2.) E. P. G.

**Some Aspects of Reproduction Considered in Relation to Eugenics.**—In order that the best may be made of the inherent potentialities of the germ cells, and, the fertilized ova, it is essential that reproduction shall take place under physiologically good conditions, and, if possible, under optimum conditions.—A. S. Parker, *The Eugenics Review*, XV (January, 1924), 571-95. (VIII, 2.) J. L. D.

**Factors Influencing Longevity.**—The object of hygiene and preventive medicine, in the last analysis, is the extension or prolongation of life in individuals, and, by summation, collectively.—Raymond Pear, *The Journal of the American Medical Association*, LXXXII (January, 1924), 259-64. (VIII, 2.) J. L. D.

**The Relation of the Foreign Population to the Mortality Rates for Boston.**—The mortality rate is higher for those people having mothers of foreign birth than for those born of native mothers. But looking at the problem in a broad way the handicap is less in 1910 than in 1900. The improvement is most encouraging and leads to the hope that the handicap will grow less and less with the improvement of environmental conditions.—William H. Davis, *American Journal of Public Health*, XIV (January, 1924), 9-22. (VIII, 3.) J. L. D.

## IX. METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

**La statistica e le scienze naturali.**—A method of estimating social phenomena which so far has seemed to contribute as much as any other has been by the use of statistics, anthropometry, frequency curves, etc. We adopted the method because of its use in the natural sciences. It has not availed us so much here, however, mainly because we have not our problems in social science sufficiently before us.—L. Colomba, *Metron*, II (June, 1923), 722-29. (IX, 1.) E. P. G.

**A New Method for the Analysis of Plant Communities.**—The field work is carried out as follows: a rope, with marks at decimeters intervals and a different color for every meter, is stretched tightly on the ground between two poles. Following this rope, the record is carried over on a belt of arbitrary breadth, this depending on the closeness of the association (mostly a breadth of 1-2 cm. is sufficient). The plants are noted as they stand on the belt, and for each decimeter and meter special marks are made in the record.

When the field work is finished and the material is to be put in order, the first thing to do is to reduce the results obtained to a unit surface of 1 m.<sup>2</sup> size. In this way, numerical material is obtained representing the "absolute" frequency degree, that is, it can be compared with any desired community. The lack of comparability between analyses obtained by other methods depends largely on the lack of this important factor.—O. Arrhenius, *The Journal of Ecology*, X (November, 1922), 185-99. (IX, 1.) J. L. D.

**Statistics of Employment Derived from the Working of the Unemployment Insurance Acts.**—The purpose of this paper is to describe how statistics on unemployment are obtained, to examine the limits of their trustworthiness, and to discuss the qualifications attaching to their use as measures of general unemployment.—John Hilton, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, LXXXVI (March, 1923), 154-206. (IX, 1.) J. L. D.

**Character Traits in School Success.**—Character traits seem to be one factor in explaining the low correlation of .50 between intelligence tests and school success. A study of ninety-seven children in grades six through eight shows that all combinations of the following imply "success": (1) great care for detail, (2) lack of freedom from load, (3) lack of motor inhibition, (4) high degree of assurance, (5) high degree of perseverance.—A. T. Poffenberger and F. L. Carpenter, *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, VII (February, 1924), 67-74. (IX, 2; I, 2, 4.) W. M. G.

## X. GENERAL SOCIOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

**M. Weber's Arbeiten zur Soziologie.**—*logic of the social sciences*: The two monumental works of Weber: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (3 volumes, Tübingen 1920), and *Wirtschaft und Geschichte* (Tübingen, 1921), have done more toward the solution of the problem of the relationship between history and sociology than any other recent work. If the theoretical content of history is to be called sociology, then most of the history that we are studying today is sociology. *The history of sociology*: Sociology has been imported into Germany as an opposition science. It attacked the validity of the concept of the state and substituted the concept of society. Sociology had a strong materialistic bend and was largely sponsored by dilettantes. Through his work Weber has formulated a problem rather than staked off a domain. Whether sociology will be able to maintain itself as an independent science will depend largely on whether the type of research to which Weber has given an impetus will be continued.—E. Rothacker, *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, XVI (Heft 3-4, 1923), 420-34. (X, 1, 2, 5.) L. W.

**La métapsychique et le tact social.**—Critical observations on Richet's *Traité de métapsychique* and W. H. R. Rivers' *Instinct and the Unconscious*. Telepathy and premonitions, hysterics, "gregarious intuition," and other communications of the field of psycho-physiology are considered with an attempt to maintain "sang-froid and lucidity."—G. Papillault, *Revue anthropologique*, XXXIII (September-October, 1923), 305-13. (X, 3.) E. P. G.

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# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

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## STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

### I. THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROTESTANTISM

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#### ABSTRACT

Scientific hypothesis: A system of conditional federation prevails not only objectively in terms of constitutional law and the mutual service nexus of an economic order, but subjectively in the terms under which religious groups consociate and in which religion rationalizes the process of life. The two are closely related. The writer proposes to approach the problem of American sectionalism from the angle of religious group-mindedness; this in view of the contentious situation within the *corpus Christianorum* in America and elsewhere.

The present article sketches the heuristic principles entailed in the theories of Troeltsch and Weber. The salvation pragma of Luther and Calvin entail radically different concepts of natural law, of the positive law of Christianity, and of the relation between the two. The result is for the Calvinist a group-trust-at-law, the contractual relationship of a fellowship, an element of corporateness and a unitary order; for the Lutheran a status under a faith-trust in a dual institutional order. From different concepts of salvation follow different social types in the individual, the group, the state. Different basic concepts of law entail different relations between individual, group, and state. The justification by faith alone, in the one case, the insistence on effective faith in the other, entail different lines of individuation, different terms of consociation: a radically different behavioristic equilibration in technique and results. This technique of manipulation under a faith-trust in the one case, under a law-trust in the other, makes much of the concept of calling and *Beruf und Amt* which may be said to entail in the one case the idea of getting ahead and making the best of one's self—and of staying put and making the best of a station in the other case. This idea of calling, radiant center of social control through the transcendental rewards attached to it, entails a new stewardship of riches, of time, of place utilities, of labor, of risk and profits: a certain complementary mindedness of the two types for adequate function under capitalism. The one form of Protestantism has constituted the enterpriser, the other, quality labor; however different from each other and from Catholicism, they have laid the ideological foundation of capitalism by rationalizing the economic process under the idea of asceticism.

The fathers of the modern social order were distinguished by an unreasonable animus against religion and a mountain-moving

faith in reason. Neither of these preoccupations seems justified today. They would *écraser l'infâme* and they did, in America, separate Church and State. But it might be observed that all the churches are doing nicely, that the church stands firm and prospers while some states do neither and all is not well with the political state. Then again it might be noticed that the separation between Church and State no longer conveys, as it did to the Jeffersonians, the pride of a neat job neatly done. For the legalistic eye, the borderline between the two runs true enough. But some occurrences in contemporary history, some symptoms in American life might almost be characterized as border skirmishes on a disputed frontier; the modern political scientist might almost recognize a "No Man's Land" and if called in to identify a batch of lusty raiders, caught between the lines, the sociologist might find it difficult to say who is who. The articulation of the rights of man, we have known for some time, we owe as much to the differentiated conscience of Christian believers as to the enlightenment of universal reason. After a century and a half and after all that has been said and done, we begin to realize that we must trust that selfsame Christian conscience for their conservation.

To this generation, then, religion has become astir with possibilities: we are prepared to give religion full credit for its power as a lever of social control. By way of characterizing the function of religion as seen in the inevitable contentious situation, it may be said that both the joyous and hopeful, and the dismal and anxious, forward looker are even today groping for that lever uneasily to get some action and motion either way. Or, to use a more old-fashioned picture which suggests a static scenery, we may say that like the *deus ex machina* of old, the Bible, Christianity, the churches, the inspired Christian man are expected presently to confound the social villain whatever he may be: capitalism, radicalism, the state, anarchy, war, the divorce evil—nay, evolution itself.

The social scientist cannot accept the implications of the contentious situation, nor see religion within the focus of a fight-image alone. In the first picture he is not so much interested in the more or less momentum either way, as in the mechanism of that powerful



lever. In the latter picture, he will be an impartial observer of plot-construction with the sober reason and impartial sympathy of "guilty people sitting at a play."

What the social scientist must contribute is an accurate definition of the meaning, in given situations, of the social estate of religious concepts and forms: mind-patterns, behavior-patterns; an understanding of the social mechanism of their conservation and change; their exact function in the social process.

But such a synthesis would seem to call for much team work between the social scientists. The theologian will appreciate that the "Beloved Community Ideal" is one thing, another its sociological counterpart: the group. A group situation he will leave to the sociologist with all its possibilities of corporateness: of a *Corpus*, *Universitas*, *Institutio*, *Anstalt*, *Gemeinde*, fellowship, trust, and so on. Nor will the sociologist be long sufficient unto himself. He who has to explain to the puzzled theologian what the group has done with his "Beloved Community Ideal" has to turn to the historian to help him recognize the "group mind" in a historical individualism which seems to be its noblest function. At all events the sociologist who would discover the indicated function of religion is entitled to all the information available as to the actual, historical function of what religion we have had.

A considerable body of information on this subject has lately been assembled in Germany, information which has now become available in book form. The present writer believes that while this work may be at fault in too much rather than too little synthesis, we may not ignore it. We are justified in consulting it for suggestions, for inspiration, for heuristic principles if not for technique and conclusions. It is proposed to give a short account of the work done in Germany by Ernst Troeltsch<sup>1</sup> and Max

<sup>1</sup> Ernst Troeltsch, *Über die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, 1912. Also in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften*, Vols. XXVIII-XXX. Also "Renaissance and Reformation," *Hist. Zeitschr.*, CX, 519-56; "Das stoisch-christliche und das modern-profane Naturrecht," *ibid.*, CVI, 137-67; "Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt," *ibid.*, XCVII, 5 ff. Also Troeltsch's articles in *Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 1913, and "Religion und Wirtschaft," *Gehe Stiftg.*, Bd. 5, 1913.

Weber.<sup>1</sup> A summary of their theories of the ideological determinism of modern social and economic life will here be given. It is given with the caution of the authors, with the plea of exception and avoidance that the issue of final determinism has not been raised, but that they may throw a light on the history and typology of rationalism and on the historical process.

In a later study, the modification of American experience will be defined in the light of the history of a specific American religious group. Some conclusions will then be in order as to the influence on American sectionalism of the interpretation of American situations in terms of earlier European social experience, of this recasting of life into the ingots of religious thought.

In a general estimate of the significance of religion in modern civilization, Professor Troeltsch<sup>2</sup> has come to the conclusion that

<sup>1</sup> Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, 3 vols., 1922; first published as "Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus," *Archiv für Sozialwiss.*, Vols. XX and XXI; also *Christliche Welt*, 1906. Also "Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen," *Archiv für Sozialwiss.*, Vols. XLI-XLVI. For bibliography of the literature on Weber's thesis see *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, I, 17. The modern continental tendencies in the treatment of capitalism as a historical problem, the revision of the older historical materialism, the reorientation in the historical process—are unintelligible without a knowledge of Weber's thesis. See also Weber, *Aufsätze*, I, 38-42. Sombart, *Der Bourgeois*, 1913. Lujo Brentano, *Excursus in die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus*, III, 1916. Compare the confession of Sombart in *Archiv für Sozialwiss.*, XXIX, 753 ff., also *ibid.*, pp. 689 ff., also Weber, "Antikritisches," *ibid.*, XXXI, 576 ff., also L. Brentano, *Der wirtschaftende Mensch*, 1923, pp. 389-411, 420.

For references in American periodicals see Chalfant Robinson, "Some Economic Results of the Protestant Reformation Doctrines," *Princeton Theol. Review*, 1917; and R. H. Tawney, in the *Journal of Pol. Econ.*, Vol. XXXI, Nos. 4-6. Mr. Tawney has followed closely in the footsteps of Troeltsch and Weber, but has in his narrower field considerably widened the range of sources. He has somewhat narrowed Weber's conclusions (pp. 804, 814 ff.). The present article was practically finished before Mr. Tawney's appeared. Its scope is obviously a different one from that of Tawney: as an introduction to a series of studies in American sectionalism it stresses the group-sociological aspect of Troeltsch's thesis as well as the economic implications of Weber's theory. The purpose of the present writer is to apply the heuristic principles of Troeltsch and Weber to the problem of American group-sociology, sectionalism, and nationalism: to the problem of the structure and function of the American mind. In this pursuit, my starting-point is Zierke's "Genossenschaftsrecht," Simmel's "Sociology," Small and Burgess' "Concept of the Social Process," and Turner's "American History."

<sup>2</sup> Troeltsch, *Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus*, etc., 1911, pp. 7 ff.

the psychological foundation of the modern social order lies in the salvation complex: the fear of God, prompted by the continued belief in the transcendency of the Divine Will into this life. Pre-occupied with the consciousness of sin, as we have always been, we owe to the transcendental interest of Christianity three powerful forces: an impulse and momentum for the "Onward Christian Soldier"; a compass of direction with ways and means to get there in asceticism; and finally, a social technique of the process as implied in a church. These forces, dating back to medieval institutionalized Christianity, have not lost their potency at the threshold of modern history, not lost their hold on civilization with the Reformation. On the contrary, when the Reformation had thrust back upon the individual the full force of the awful question "What must I do to be saved?" it made the problem a matter of individual concern and worry: a greater responsibility with greater social results than ever, now that the individual had been deprived of the comforts of the Catholic institutionalized grace. The old Augustinian perfectionism became a greater force than ever. Only now was the *abyssus humanae conscientiae* to reveal its mysterious powers. The great word that one must obey God more than men once more proved its might. It brought about what all the philosophy of the Greeks, the legal-mindedness of the Romans had never thought of: that every expansion of the concept of freedom should entail the limitations as well as the contents of positive law.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the development of the earliest church concept and of the important polarity of faith and law, see *Zeitschrift für Neutestamentl. Wiss'schft.*, 1923, Nos. 1-2. It is Paul, who with his antithesis of faith and law postulated the universal church instead of a tribal law-group; hence the medieval dualism of powers: see Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, p. 94: "Die civitas dei ist schon Paulinisch." For the sociological implications of early Christianity in the Roman world, see Troeltsch, *ibid.*, pp. 66-77. Gierke, *Genossenschaftsrecht*, III, 123 ff.; 139-52; also 312: on its relation to the development of the social and legal concepts of corporateness and of the legal concept of public power. For the significance of the disappearance of a genuine corporate life in the Protestant world of Germany see *ibid.*, p. 718. Gierke's whole work is a magnificent casebook for the sociologist. A profitable study of the functional coarticulation of individualism in terms of rights and duties would seem to require a comparison of group-socialism in the two fields of law and religion: the logic of the social process belongs neither to the historical jurist in the one field nor to the historical theologian in the other, it is neither a matter of law nor of theology alone, but as the social pedagogy of the process it is a field for

In this Christian perfectionism, Mr. Troeltsch seems to see the very dynamic principle of the modern age. To the salvation interest with its God-man, sin-salvation, life- and after-life conflict are traceable the mind patterns, social situation patterns through which religion has shaped a social philosophy: a creed interpreted the social situation, a faith determined the social process.<sup>1</sup>

It is impossible to overlook the meaning of this conflict as a causal category, regardless of Troeltsch's or Weber's case. Obviously this conflict has given rise to the logical polarity of a great many modern language symbols, as well as to their emotional connotations. It has endowed with its meaning the individual, interpreted for him his relationship to every one of his groups, from the family to the state: to the League of Nations even. It has determined the structural principles of his group-life as well as its function. As an accommodation group, or a fight-group, the community of believers interprets the social process in terms of the earlier situation in religion and thereby lends it meaning. The problem of salvation has thus charged the interstitial process in the largest sense with its determinism of function. If valuation in the economic field can at all be grasped as a psychological process, it will be seen that a considerable increment of value must accrue from the ethos—that the valuation process itself is to a great extent a function of the social process of religion.

The medieval Roman Catholic solution of the conflict, that synthesis of life temporal and life eternal—the "City of God"

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the historical sociologist. A parallel study of Gierke's *Genossenschaftsrecht* and of Troeltsch's *Soziologie* has led the present writer to the conclusion that such concepts as that of relationship in law, of fundamental law, of prerogative (*Amtsrecht*) or of superpersonality—have as much to do with the structure of religious group-life in the sixteenth century and beyond as with the socialism of early Germanic law. Their preservation or modification is a historically indicated function of religion as well as of law. The subject will be taken up in a later article.

<sup>1</sup> Troeltsch, *Die Bedeutung*, pp. 7 ff. concerning the influence of the Calvinistic salvation concept on English thought: "Dies ist die wichtigste Ursache der empiristischen und positivistischen Neigungen des angelsächsischen Geistes . . ." on the other hand, in Germany "ist . . . von Leibnitz bis Kant, Fichte, Hegel . . . der Lutherische Untergrund erkennbar . . . der die Spekulation auf Einheit und Zusammenhang der Dinge hinlenkte . . . tief wurzelte die deutsche Metaphysik im Luthertum." Also cf. Weber, I, 101, 104; III, 124-25, 233-36, 415, 524, 538.

idea—has endowed the church concept with its basic attributes of universality, organic unity, and mystic transcendent power. The sociological scheme of Catholic Christianity, then, is herein given.<sup>1</sup> Again, the different Protestant definitions of grace and of the activation of faith have postulated each with a new church concept, a new structure of the social order. The differentiation of the idea of grace is basic for the modern social order because it has entailed different principles of socialization.<sup>2</sup> Where the universality of sin had postulated the universal agency of redemption, the church—the personalism of salvation—now may either demand that a universal institutional church accommodate its universal sacerdotalism, or it may entail the eminent stewardship of the purposive group, the sect. The Catholic and Lutheran consciousness of sin demand an institution of grace. The Calvinistic everlasting saints, on the other hand, will ultimately consociate in a believers' church, a sect. That the medieval church and the modern church, the institutional church and the congregational, the sect, are two fundamentally different principles of socialization, one

<sup>1</sup> Troeltsch, *Archiv*, XXX, 41, 656. It implies two powers but not two organizations. See also Figgis, "Res publica christiana," *Trans. Royal Hist. Soc.* III, Vol. 5, 1911, p. 74, but compare Maitland, *Lectures*, pp. 101 ff. also Gierke, *Genossenschaftsrecht*, III, 123 ff. on the influence of the salvation concept on a unitary world: "Die Idee der immanenten Schranken aller Staatsgewalt leuchtete auf." Figgis believes that, nevertheless, the medieval world was unitary and preserved the Roman idea of sovereignty which is ours as well: "the plenitudo potestatis in the Austinian sense. . . ." "it is from Rome that the modern doctrine of sovereignty arises," p. 73. Neither was Protestantism originally opposed to that doctrine, its logic was a true function of the social situation, and much depended on whether it was in power or not. The theory of limitations and of conditional federation, the present writer believes, has much to do with the reconstitution of religion as a law-trust and with the conflict between Christianity drunk and Christianity sober. It may be one of the most valuable implications of Christianity, but it does not seem to survive except as a function of the social process properly constituted thereunder. See Figgis, *op. cit.*, p. 88, on the indicated function of multiple sectarianism. The Catholic theory like the Western (American) daughter-churches of Calvinism maintains a unitary order. Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, p. 215; Gierke, *Genossenschaftsrecht*, III, 515-45; Hoensbroech, *Mod. Staat und Röm. Kirche*, 1906; Cathrein, *Moralphilosophie*, 1911; Theod. Meyer, *Christlich-ethische Soziallehrenprinzipien und Arbeiterfrage*, 1904; H. Schroers, *Katholische Staatsauffassung*, 1919. As an organized concurrent minority, it of course insists on the Limited State. Papal Encyclics of 1881, 1885, 1889.

<sup>2</sup> *Archiv*, XXVIII, 651-52; XXIX, 388-90. On the influence of the concept of grace on the group-concept, XXIX, 26.

sacerdotal, the other deliberative within the meaning of a group-trust at law—that is in itself a fact of the first sociological consequence.<sup>1</sup> It looms large as a factor of sectionalism.

How the logic of the social process in religion goes back to the basic concepts of grace and faith, Troeltsch has shown in the cases of Luther and of Calvin. He shows how Luther was bound to accept, with the Pauline inwardness, a Pauline beloved community ideal. Luther, in his early years at least, approached this very border of congregationalism; he all but demanded the sect.<sup>2</sup>

The implications of this Pauline radicalism of salvation and faith for Lutheran individualism have been as follows: (1) The theory that we are standing in two spheres of life, that we are of heaven and of the earth at once; pilgrims here below, strangers, guests in a hostelry. (2) The dissociation of the inner and outer life, "the retirement of the Christian spirit life behind the battle-front of life." Characterizing consistently each of these plural spheres of life, according to their logical polarity, Luther has come to the conclusion that in the one, the Christian spirit world, there can be no coercion. "In Gottes Reich geht man mit keinem Recht um." Conformity can theoretically spring only from the inner urge of faith. Hence the individual Christian conscience is and must be absolutely free. What else can coarticulate individuals into a social whole in this Lutheran city of God but the perfect love of the perfect faith? The beloved community, therefore, theoretically is governed by a supranatural principle of socialization and knows thereunder no law. It basks in the sunshine of grace, and like the individual, it abides in love and faith—somewhat *in vacuo*—in splendid isolation, a *feste Burg* indeed.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately for the original beloved community ideal of Luther,

<sup>1</sup> *Archiv*, XXIX, 20-26, "alle soziologischen Wirkungen folgen aus dem Kirchentypus." For a comparison of the basic church concepts of Calvin and Luther, see *Soziallehren*, pp. 453-68, 623-28. The basic causal factor seems the "gratia amissibilis" in the Lutheran, and predestination in the Calvinistic social order. Sect means renunciation of universality. Troeltsch, *Archiv*, XXVIII, 651.

<sup>2</sup> On the decisive historical situation leading to the development of the sectarian principle within the Calvinistic world: Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, p. 614. For the relationship between religious group-typology and individualism, *ibid.*, pp. 625, 642, 652; and socialism, *ibid.*, pp. 642, 677-81. Weber, *Archiv*, XXI, 5-14.

<sup>3</sup> This Lutheran religious order is not a reflex of actual conditions but a Utopia. Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, p. 594, also p. 440; *Archiv*, XXIX, 388-94.

the secular situation was not propitious: Luther, while attacking the supranatural sacerdotalism of the hierarchy, had to take issue with a social revolution: the *abyssus humanae conscientiae* yawned before him. He met the situation with the stark realism of the strong man of his time. He frankly admitted that the Christian individual and his beloved community had to live in a world cursed with sin. The *feste Burg*, blessed by the sunshine of grace within, had to be grounded in a wrathful and stormy world without. It had to be anchored in law. But that law could not be the Bible, which was the rule of faith and not of law.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, instead of trusting the community, which embodied faith, Luther trusted the state, which embodied force. Instead of relating law to some exertion of the will, he referred obedience to force. That force was more often drunk than sober, he accepted as the law of nature and of sin.<sup>2</sup> Thus the "Lutheran church is against moralism which makes religion a matter of right living. It is against rationalism which makes religion a matter of understanding. It is against ritualism which makes religion an appeal to the senses. It is against emotionalism which renders religion a matter of the sensibilities. It makes religion a matter of faith only."<sup>3</sup> For that

<sup>1</sup> *Archiv*, XXX, 38-41. Why Luther recoiled from the congregational (*Gemeinde*) principle: *Soziallehren*, pp. 468, 627-28; also p. 457: the social situation explaining the Lutheran church type is his conflict with the sectarians and not his conflict with the Catholic church; he retained the essential institutional character of the medieval church and thus contributed much less than Calvin of the valuable principle of fellowship, of what Gierke calls the *Genossenschaftliche Prinzip*: the sociological substratum of the idea of corporateness.

<sup>2</sup> "Die Bedeutung der Sünde hat die Gewalt ins Ungeheure gesteigert," *Soziallehren*, pp. 534, 535-36; also E. Kaufmann, *Studien zur Staatslehre des monarchischen Prinzips*, p. 96. Compare Gierke, *Das Majoritätsprinzip*, Oxford Essays in Legal History, 1913. Wozendorff, *Staatsrecht und Naturrecht in Untersuchungen*, CXXVI. F. Kern, *Gottesgnadentum und Widerstandsrecht* for the full significance of the sociological articulation of the idea of corporateness in the development of a functional individualism.

The definition of such individualism in political theory and its precipitation into positive law are never unrelated to the group situation: the social realities of corporateness have always been a decisive factor in the development of organic action. They account for the difference, as Gierke has shown (*Genossenschaftsrecht*) between the Roman and the Germanic concept of public power: the social absolutism of the one and the social relativity of the other. It is of course the development of the police power in the modern state to which these observations are relevant.

<sup>3</sup> Schmauck, "Hist. of the Lutheran Church in Pennsylvania," *Pa. Germ. Soc. Pub.*, XI (1902), 12.

very reason, because it remained a matter of faith only, and not of law, the Lutheran religion did not become effective as a creative principle of law. But even so, Luther had to find a solution for the dilemma of striving for perfection where imperfection is fore-ordained. The result was a double system of ethics, a *Gnaden Moral* and a *Welt Moral* subject to two systems of law: the one to the higher law of faith, the other to the constitution of the world. It was his practical realism which made Luther appreciate that there is a difference, that the two will conflict. It was his desire to reform the church universal and his fear for the unity of his nation which made him substitute, for his higher law of grace morality, the written law of universal Christianity: the Bible. The social order as he found it he accepted as a part of a natural law. His synthesis he accomplished by recognizing both the Decalogue and the natural law of the world as inseparable parts of the fundamental law of God.<sup>1</sup>

The practical result of this synthesis is that Luther, who had started out to constitute a man's soul as his kingdom, decreed that the essence of sovereignty in that kingdom shall be the perfect obedience of the perfect faith. In the face of the written law of God, this means the passionate literalness of the *Es steht geschrieben*; in the presence of the world it means *Überwindung*, overcoming it through the buoyancy of faith.

For the purposes of this study, two aspects of this Lutheran synthesis are of interest, the one concerning the structure of the beloved community, the church, and the other, its natural law: the structural principle of the secular order. Both obviously entail terms of accommodation for the Lutheran as a social being in a pluralistic world. A principle of federalism will accrue from this dual *Weltanschauung*. But the constitution of the church in Germany was clearly as much the result of a compromise with the state—result of a specific social situation—as of the foregoing synthesis. It is the constitution of the church in America: a free church, abutting on a limited state, which will concern us later—and not a Christian state church. But in the interstitial process between

<sup>1</sup> *Archiv*, XXIX, 388-402. For the influence of the Lutheran natural law-concept on German Conservatism, see *Soziallehren*, p. 537.



such a free church and a limited state their terms of conflict and accommodation are obviously implied in the Lutheran theory of natural law. It will determine the social process for the Lutheran as the Calvinistic natural law does for the Calvinist, as the "rationalistic" natural law is supposed to do for the limited state itself. All these natural laws (and there is a very formidable Catholic natural law as well) are part of the "higher law" of American Christianity, all four become through the ballot and through the courts creative principles of law.

The cue then for the interpretation by the Lutheran of the interstitial process in a modern world lies here: in the Lutheran conception of natural law, a conception profoundly pessimistic and a law utterly irrational. It is a law of a God who is the principle of resistless cause, as unfathomable in his power as unintelligible in his purpose. Reason is tainted with presumption in the presence of sheer absolute power. The human will is damned with the sense of futility. Salvation lies here completely in the direction of the perfect abiding faith in His love. What is, is good. God knows what he is doing, though man may not.

If this natural law is so pessimistic, it is because it entails the wages of sin. If it is so irrational, that is part of the mystery of salvation, which is its saving grace.

Luther had started with the early stoic-Christian relative natural law of sin and arrived at a natural law of might and power. In the process, the Lutheran natural law has lost the concept of a social contract, of any contractual relationship: any transfer of power *qua* contract, every egalitarian individualism and every right of revolution. The importance of the individual will is nil; organic development there is none; all is final, finished. Man takes his place as he finds it and functions therein, as in a static order: he abides in love and resigns himself to power.<sup>1</sup> From the

<sup>1</sup> *Soziallehren*, pp. 534-35. Also E. Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, also *Preuss. Jahrb.*, 1894, 1903. For Luther's theory of war, *Soziallehren*, p. 564; *Archiv*, XXX, 678-79. Luther and "ruthlessness," Darwinian pessimism, etc., *Soziallehren*, p. 555. The Lutheran mind-patterns and situation-patterns reappear with startling originality in Stöckel, *Die Conservativen*. For a comparison of theories of Church and State, see Riecker, "Staat und Kirche nach Lutherischer, reformierter und moderner Anschauung," *Hist. Vierteljahrsschr.*, 1898, pp. 370-414.

point of view of rationality, this is the most primitive natural law there is: it is the natural law of the Global Christianity of the Roman Empire, the natural law of the fifth century with its Aristotelian and Stoic elements left out. Small wonder that under this law, Luther's theory of the state and of government in the last analysis amounts to this: that with the whole social order it is divinely ordained as it is.<sup>1</sup>

Luther's consistent dualism of the two realms of faith and law has been fatal. The absolute freedom of conscience under the rule of faith has cost the Lutheran dear; it has cost him even the limited liability of the medieval theory of the political contract. What he has traded for it, is nothing less than the absolute liability to the law of might.<sup>2</sup> Luther has indeed gone back to Paul, but so has he to Caesar and his *Suprema Lex*.

In this desperate situation, the orders for the Lutheran are to make it endurable with love, permeate it with his *Gemüt*, and abide in the faith. What is called for is faithful resignation, not rational meliorism: *Gesinnung*, not action. For the Lutheran world is static, God-ordained "as is"—it must be *überwunden*. The very essence of *Weltüberwindung*, however, is function, and function is defined in terms of the old Catholic paternalism, modified by the new idea of divine calling.

This new idea of "calling," Luther's concept of *Amt* and *Beruf*, entails a system of perfect sublimation of social function in a given static order. The individualism of the free Christian conscience, the activation of the inner life, of course, is of the very essence of calling: it is the general calling of the Lutheran. For the rest, his special calling in the world is his station, an *Amt*, a Christian prerogative and trust. It means social function, *Einordnung*: do and die—not ask the reason why.<sup>3</sup> The Lutheran is social in being a Christian, a Christian by staying put and performing in his station in the best of faith. He is a conservative par excellence, a progressive if that means a return to the paternalism

<sup>1</sup> Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, pp. 545, 561, 563, 566.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 602.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 497-98: the Lutheran serves God *in vocatione*, not *per vocationem* (as the Calvinist does).

of love. A reformer he is not; for that calling there is no room in the Lutheran social order, for there is nothing that man may change. Should he take it into his head to be a liberal, he will have to live down the suspicion that having missed his own calling, failed in his own profession, he is minding other people's business. He risks being compared with those "who walk among you disorderly, working not at all but are busybodies." The indicated treatment is in this case to avoid him "that he may be ashamed." Should he so far forget his religion as to become a radical he will be easily reminded of the awful fate of the company of Korah, and the charge of criminal conspiracy lies against the *Rottierer*. Thus does Lutheran individualism betray the shopmarks of its professional origin. It is graced by the multiple functional determinism of calling, but in the presence of unlimited faith, here as elsewhere, the appeal to reason will seem presumptuous, and rationalizing beyond the self-evident truths of religion appears as of the very essence of original sin.

To sum up the situation "here below," as the sixteenth-century creed of Luther has interpreted it for the citizen of the twentieth: Life is a faithful and resigned stewardship in God's inscrutable world. This is what Troeltsch has called the Lutheran *innerweltliche Askese*. Every Christian is here a monk and the whole world is his monastery. To give an opportunity for the exercise of the Christian virtues of love, patience, and passive endurance, is what this vale of tears is for. Society is organized on the order of a patriarchal family; economically it is a natural economy, usufructuary manor, or a guildshop, held together by traditionalism and the fear of the Lord. In a world so conceived, the function of property is its use for a livelihood; of labor, its faithful performance for God's sake. Both entail the stewardship of a maintenance fund. The whole social order is an agrarian *Hauswirtschaft*, wherein the individual Christian has his place and calling as a father, or guardian, job-boss; or he may be a child, belong to the *Gesinde*, a manservant or even a slave. Whatever his station, he may not be sufficient unto himself. He is not an agent, he is an organ, is like the individual, like property in early Germanic law, a splinter of a larger whole. As the essence of that law was relation-

ship, so is relationship the essence of Lutheran individualism. For society is not an aggregate but an organism—God's wonderful work. There is a station, a *Stand*, a function for each and every-one, a trust to administer, a place to fill, a job to stick to and make the best of—for God's sake. Within his light and in his station everyone must do his Christian best: the king must rule, the peasant plow, the soldier fight, the hangman carve and hew and hang. In this social order there is not an abstract political equality but functional equality, occupational worth. Every calling, every *Stand* and *Amt* is at once self-centered and social: it is a vested right and it is contingent on function. It entails rights and liabilities enlightened by a Christian mutualism, by the Christian ideal of service by all for all. That is here the only social insurance as well as the only guaranty of individual rights: hard work and *caritas* will do the rest. Some of the blood and iron of the sixteenth century is in this system; a stark naturalism and social realism touched by religious mysticism and pathos: the duties of status are Christian rights and *Leiden, Leiden, Kreuz, Kreuz, ist des Christen Recht*.<sup>2</sup>

Transferred to the political order, this Christian ideology of manipulation must obviously demand a paternalistic hierarchy of estates, *Stände*, stations, callings, and offices, a charismatic officialdom and a *Berufsstaat*. For the very reason that so much faith, good faith, and so much mysticism has been released by Luther for social service, change will call forth terrific resistance unless it can be referred to this religious system and social technique.

<sup>2</sup> Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, p. 566; *Hist. Zeitschr.*, CVI, 237-67. "Das ist das Wesen des Luthertums bis heute geblieben: ein radical conservatives patriarchalisches Naturrecht der Gewaltverherrlichung," etc., Troeltsch, *Archiv*, XXX, 666-72, 701. The starting-point of Luther's ethics is the fourth commandment, also Wisemann, *Darst.*, 1861; Schmoller, *Das Mercantilsystem; Unrisse*, etc., 1890. Roscher, *Gesch. d. Natl. Oekon.*, 1874, for Luther's influence on the Cameralists. For Luther's influence on social policy, on social insurance, state socialism, etc., see Uhlhorn, *Katholizismus und Protestantismus gegenüber der sozialen Frage*, 1831; Goehre, *Die evangelisch soziale Bewegung*, 1896; Wenck, *Geschichte der Natl. Sozialen*, 1905; E. Richthofen, *Hist. Wandlung*, etc., 1901. For complete bibliography see Bergstraesser, *Geschichte der polit. Parteien*, 1921. For the lines of least resistance between Protestant theology and socialism in Europe see: "Why Ministers Have Become Socialists," *Archiv*, XXX, 466, and bibliogr., p. 473.

But whatever the a priori of change, Luther's perfect dualism of faith and reason will make Lutherdom as helpless as the synthesis of its rule of faith and its law of nature has made it stubborn. Thus it would seem as if the ultimate reserve power of faith in Lutherdom were at its best in passive resistance. Revolution, it must be remembered, is not permitted in the genuine and classical Lutheran creed; passive resistance is permissible only in distress of conscience. For freedom of thought, of conscience, the Christian individual must strive unto death—but should he collide with action, let him forbear. Where the principle of initiative, unlimited in theory, is to become effective in any concrete social situation is hard to see. For it has no organs, it has no strictly legal rights and must be ineffective in the interstitial process. Because the Lutheran church concept does not imply the supreme ethical organization of the *corpus Christianorum*, the Lutheran has been left without a general social principle beside his natural law. The blessings of his love and Christian socialism are limited to the primary group. They became available for a social policy of the state as long as the organs of that state came themselves within the category of a Christian *Amt* and calling. In the modern state, Lutherdom was doomed to social helplessness; its *Leidsamkeit* makes it the victim of existing power.<sup>1</sup>

Without a doubt, in Calvinism, the process of rationalization has gone much farther. Only with Calvin has the plural, reeling, unorganized personalism of modern man been converted into modern individualism, dominated by a single principle: rationalized will. For ultimately, the Calvinistic salvation concept demands the complete subsumption of the world, of the natural order of sin under the higher law of absolute salvation or absolute damnation. As a working hypothesis for the salvation process, the Calvinistic justification means not the Lutheran basking in the sunshine of grace, but a terrific spur into action. The *feste Burg* of Lutheran

<sup>1</sup> A victim of power: Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, pp. 586, 602. It has no organs, no legal rights proper (p. 550). The influence of this, its handicap as a socius, Troeltsch, 534-45, 561-66. *Zeitschr. für kirchl. Gesch.*, XXX, 295. Its moral complicity with *Gewaltspolitik*, Stillich, *Die Conservativen*, p. 218. Its affinity for a policy of "thorough," also E. Märcks, *Bismarck*.

Christian personalism was a retreat where the Christian nursed his wounds, a retreat into which he could retire whether he had won the battle or lost it. With the Calvinist it is a garrison where he trains in relentless discipline for ever new sallies; he comes back a conqueror or not at all. With Luther, as with Catholicism, the church, the institution of grace, makes the individual what he is; but with Calvinism it is the individual which makes the church, the world itself what they are: he re-creates the world for the greater glory of God.<sup>1</sup> With Lutherans, unless the original purpose of Luther has been carried out (as we shall later see in the United States), the general priesthood idea does not become effective beyond the general calling or the special *Amt*. With Calvinism, it leads to the constitution of a genuine law-trust from which the Calvinist issues forth with a roving commission to make his law the law of the land.<sup>2</sup> For sin is not of the very essence of the natural order, at least it cannot be for the personal priesthood of the chosen, for God's chosen instruments. They are not just natural vessels in the Lutheran sense. Their church will not be a universal church of sinners but a believers' church of the chosen, the everlasting saints. The everlasting saint, in his attitude toward the social order, may have been gloomy but he could not become

<sup>1</sup> With Lutherdom, the church still makes the individual; with Calvinism for the first time, the individual makes the church. Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, p. 625. For the significance of predestination as compared with the *gratia amissibilis*, Troeltsch, *ibid.*, p. 623; its importance for socialization, initiative, etc., *ibid.*, pp. 618, 642. Weber, *Archiv*, XXI, 21-25.

<sup>2</sup> Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, pp. 670 ff., see "Literature on the Calvinistic Social Philosophy," *ibid.*, pp. 667, 677. The practical significance of the Calvinistic sin-salvation concept for the development of the technique of discipline within the church and of the moral police power without is beautifully illustrated in Choisy, *La Théocratie*, and Choisy, *L'état chrétien*. The "tell it to the church" here meant political group-integration: the church becomes a political party with initiative and referendum. Thus, not only does Calvinism give rise to the development of the idea of constitutional, the idea of natural law, but the principle of consent becomes a fact through the integration of a technique for the articulation and activation of a group-mind. But obviously, politically relevant this group-mind can only become where it conceives itself as a law-trust. See *La Théocratie*, pp. 15, 23, 153, 168, 203, 239, 258, 269; also *L'état chrétien*, pp. 179, 478, 480, 483, 493-94, 496 (for a short exposition of the Calvinistic right of resistance), 498, 512. For a comparison of Lutherdom and Calvinism, pp. 558 ff. "Le Calvinisme est davantage porté à réglementer et légiférer qu'à proprement évangéliser," p. 512.

resigned; the sect is bound to capture the secular state in the name of the "higher law" of the covenant to which it stands committed as a genuine law-trust. It will always tend to assimilate the state-concept into its church-concept, make it a "plantation whose design is religion," and in spite of Roger Williams and of Jefferson, a biblical commonwealth. Nor is this church-concept all up in the clouds of spirituality: all in the realm of faith. Its constitutive principle is law as much as faith; its conscience is the conscience of a law-trust; the old dualism of the rule of faith and of Caesar has disappeared and with it the old polarity of Church and State. The new personalism can here only mean a trust of the law which is the law universal: the organic law of the world to which churches, congregations, states, and nations stand committed and related as the states of the Union are related to the Federal Constitution.

The *corpus Christianorum* has here been reconstituted as a law-trust: the ultimate reserve power of the Christian sovereign means here not faith but faith as law. That Calvin has remained far from any equality in the modern sense has not become as important as that he endowed the individual with legal rights and duties, with a stewardship-at-law. That has given the Pauline "tell it to the community" the meaning of a referendum to a sovereign: the sect became a party in the state and the principle of popular sovereignty was won for Church and State.<sup>1</sup> But if that principle came to the state from the church, it is still a child of faith. The Lutheran in distress of conscience "can do no other," because there is a realm of faith beyond the law. His creed has endowed law with the unlimited sanction of religion in a limited field: he will respect law as law. The Calvinist can do no other because faith

<sup>1</sup> Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, pp. 687-90. Calvinism, its sectarian daughter-churches and the rights of man, see Jellinek, *Die Erklärung der Menschenrechte*, 1904, and *System*, etc., 1905. Doumerque, *Les origines*, 1905; Weber, *Ges. Aufsätze*, I, 131, 135, 155. Also of course *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. VI, the well-known articles of Osgood, Borgeaud, Ritschie. For Calvin's dilemma see Osgood, *ibid.*, p. 7. Compare Ehrhardt, *La nature du droit naturel chez Luther*; E. Kaufmann, *Studien zur Staatslehre des monarchischen Prinzips*; F. Kern, "Luther und das Widerstandsrecht," *Zeitschr. Savigny Stiftg.*, 1916; also Woltzendorff, *Staatsrecht und Naturrecht in der Lehre vom Widerstandsrecht in Untersuch. z. deutschen Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte*, 1916, p. 126. It is made clear here how dependent political theory is on the actual societal technique and on the positive law of contract and consociation.

must become law. For that very reason, his law is often more than law and more often less than law. The fierce rationality of the everlasting saints simply becomes law unto both Church and State: it becomes identified with the law of nature itself.

But what are the indications for a Calvinistic law of nature? Most important perhaps that it is more positive from the beginning than that of Luther: more nearly identical with the written law of Christianity. Then it must have been of great consequence that Calvin has eliminated the dualism between the first and the second table, removed the polarity of innerworldly Christian-mindedness and worldly legal-mindedness: faith means nothing if not effective faith in conformity with the law. Effective faith means service, action, not thought. It means service *per vocationem*, not *in vocatione* as with Luther.<sup>1</sup> The state, therefore, cannot be an end in itself; its liability to the purpose of the covenant is as complete as that of the individual. Its purpose is social utilitarian entirely within the meaning of the Christian trust: *ad dei cultum promovendum, populi tunc commodum et utilitatem procurandam*.<sup>2</sup> So is its structure; a principle of legal limitations is implied in this logic. A system of checks and balances may be said to have been espied by Calvin in history itself. But the biblical covenant and the constitution of the community as a law-trust precluded that government, as with Luther, should remain unrelated to a social will. The biblical covenant secularized meant the insistence on the political contract, and the technique of a law-trust precluded the recognition of rights, of prerogatives that do not rest on consent, that do not arise from a common law.<sup>3</sup>

About the political structures reared in theory and practice on this foundation of transcendental reason, nothing need at present be said, except that obviously, where Lutherdom and Calvinism both live under the same roof, that roof is not to both the same. In other words, the tapping of the sources of social

<sup>1</sup> Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, pp. 559-65. See Calvin, *Inst.*, Lib. II, cap. 2, 24; *ibid.*, cap. 8, 11. The sociologist will find it worth while to study Calvin's rule of reason-at-law, his technique of interpretation, and his societal technique. He constitutes here the mind of a fellowship-at-law.

<sup>2</sup> Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, pp. 564-65.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 666-67.



sanction, the calculation of their volume and continuity of flow will be mere guesswork until the concurrent reason of religion in each case is known. But if these sources still spring from the subsoil of religion, then the social crisis today is a crisis of Christianity itself. The modern social order rests on the polarity of heaven and earth: it is organized under the self-evident truth of a positive law of heaven. If that polarity collapses, if salvation should change its meaning, will the positive law of an ancient heaven remain adequate? But if that law should disappear as the essence of the "Law of Nature," what is to become of the blessings of society organized thereunder as a law-trust? It would seem today as if there were much reason for lawyers studying religion—and ministers law.

In its bearing upon modern social and economic mores, Calvinism deserves the closest study. To appreciate how far Calvinism has rationalized the business of living within the meaning of the question "What must I do to be saved?" we must have a short survey of the Calvinistic mind. It stands to reason that the same utilitarian empiricism which characterizes its theory of the state will characterize its economic sanctions. Calvin was bound to discover the connection between economic progress and moral meliorism. Then in Geneva, a comparatively poor city, where the common weal depended on capital, we can expect Calvinism to lay the foundation for the religious sanction of capital formation.<sup>1</sup>

The God of the Calvinist knows not the unity and harmony of a fundamentally kind will with which all is for the best. His will is made up of a succession of volitional acts. But because there is no absolute rational causality and unity in his order, for the believer there is much occasion for a free, practical, utilitarian, spontaneous relation to things: a practical empiricism. Since this world is for the greater glory of God, and since it is the duty of the Calvinist to consider himself chosen, he will prove his state of grace by competitive effort, by working with might and main in this world. The Lutheran abiding faith has here, with Calvinism, become activated into the *fides efficax*. The Christian to be saved

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 708-15: "Calvin verliess den reinen Consumptionsstandpunkt und erkannte die Produktivkraft des Geldes an." Also Weber, *Archiv*, XXXI, 582.

must be a saint by effectual calling "visibly manifested by his profession and walk." He must make good. The salvation interest cannot be satisfied with gradual accumulation of good works as with the Catholic, a living from hand to mouth, with no performance in good faith in one's station as with the Lutheran. It must mean a systematic self-control, a systematic coarticulation of behavior into what is understood to be the purpose of God. The anxiety about this purpose, the sheer transcendental fear, becomes the greatest imaginable incentive if not of rationality, then at least of a great deal of thinking, of calculated performance. *Si non praedestimatus fac ut praedestineris*: "God helps him who helps himself." But what is God's purpose? Rational performance of *das sachlich Zweckvolle*. The law of nature is here rationality itself.<sup>1</sup>

It has been suggested above how the concept of calling, of *Beruf*, contains the functional terms upon which Lutheran Protestantism assigns to the Christian individual his place as a *socius* here below. What then are the implications of the foregoing premises of Calvinism for a Calvinistic idea of calling?<sup>2</sup>

One thing is certain: The effective calling of Calvinism is not one of place-stewardship. On the contrary, the saint of Calvinism has a roving commission, entailing unlimited liabilities and risks before God, responsibilities unlimited in time and space.

<sup>1</sup> The Calvinistic law of nature identified with rationality itself, Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 662-65. Weber, *Aufsätze*, I, 95-106; *ibid.*, p. 526: "Das Puritanertum fasst das Leben als Heiligung und setzt die denkbar stärkste innere Prämie auf die rationale sittliche Lebensmethodik." See *ibid.*, pp. 163-206, where the logic of Puritan moral theology is developed. It is of course needless to say that the Puritan never "makes good" at salvation proper, he only secures the benefit of the doubt; he secures what Weber calls "Erkenntnisgrund aber nie Realgrund," *ibid.*, pp. 104, 106.

<sup>2</sup> The calling concept: The Protestant calling concept is derived from I Cor. 7:20; Jes. *Sirach*, II, 20-21. For a sketch of its historical development from Wycliffe down through the Reformation, Weber, *Ges. Aufs.* I, 63-83 ff, especially, pp. 108-9, 110-11, 120, 136-37, 169, 172, 174-79. For the social and economic implications of these calling concepts see Troeltsch, *Archiv*, XXIX, 402-3; *ibid.*, XXX, 689. The Lutheran functional mutualism, Troeltsch, *Archiv*, XXX, 691. Weber, *Archiv*, XX, 44 ff. For the influence of these concepts in modern Germany, see Stillich, *Die Rechtsauffassung der Conservativen*; Traub, *Ethik und Kapitalismus*; Götting, *Die sozialpolitische Idee in den konservativen Kreisen der Vormärzzeit*; Planck, *Der Berufsstaat*, 1918; Othmar Spann, *Der wahre Staat*, 1922.

This is not, as with Luther, the stewardship of a job, of the things that are. It is not a static, it is a tremendously dynamic thing. It means literally to make the best of one's self and of the world, one's trust.

If the Calvinistic calling is not a stewardship of a station, it does not abut on a concrete "neighbor" and fellow-laborer equally worthy of his hire and enjoying a similar status. The Lutheran's performance as a *socius* is determined by his status as a fellow-servant in God's workshop. The situation-pattern which explains the Calvinist's performance as a social performance is that he is originally a *socius* of God alone. That is the decisive "earlier situation." In quest of salvation, the Calvinist becomes an enterpriser—the Lutheran remains a fellow-servant. The basic concept of "the bond" with the Lutheran points to a status; with the Calvinist to a covenant and to contractual relationships. But while the Lutheran is not responsible for his status, the Calvinist makes his contracts at his own salvation risks as God's chosen instrument. The religious individualism, the God-man personalism of salvation in Calvinism is bound to give the saint, the religious virtuoso, a certain social ruthlessness and absolutism; but what might appear as place egotism is nothing but the sharp competition for salvation.

Where the calling concept of Luther demands continuous traditional performance, that of Calvin entails a principle of continuous initiative. It certainly means the very opposite of staying put. Nor can there be any "effective calling" within the meaning of Calvinism without a progressive rationalization of the conduct of life, without a breeding out of impulse, good or bad, without a break with habit and tradition. But where tradition and custom are discredited<sup>1</sup> as the indicators of social function

<sup>1</sup> Religious anti-traditionalism, one of the most important exogenous incentives for the development of a "capitalistic" productive technique and of economic rationalism: Weber, *Aufsätze*, I, 40, 52-55, 160, 174 ff. The present writer is tempted to modify Weber's conclusions: Weber's low valuation of traditional performance, his high opinion of anti-traditionalism must be qualified as follows: The ethical premium of Lutherdom on staying put, on carrying on, may prove a drawback in the absence of the enterpriser type (an observation frequently made by German Americans in pure German colonies); on the other hand the enterpriser and speculative promoter with the ethical spur of Calvinism toward the "getting ahead" is not economically self-

under the generic term of calling is not there room for the principle of rational meliorism?

It is hard to overestimate the importance of the idea of calling as an *idée force*. The sense of its ethical liabilities has constituted an urge of enormous consequence. We have here a coefficient of function and an index of valuation through which the historical process entails a variation from a theoretical "true" economic indication of performance and of value.

What a wealth of suggestions for differential behavior in these two modern religious concepts of calling which we owe to Protestantism! What a check on the would-be enterpriser where the traditionalism of the group mind assumes the meaning of religious righteousness when it tells the cobbler to stick to his last! Must not the creed of Calvinism on the other hand amount to the demand for a continuous state of social mobilization? It sounds the trumpet-call of activation. If the emancipation of the individual begins here, it is contingent on the calling concept. Its social history must be recordable in the terms of "calling," of *Amt* and *Beruf*.

On the significance of this idea for the modern economic order, Weber is most outspoken. It is constitutive for the social ethics of modern civilization; it is its *conditio sine qua non*. For what is the essence of the modern social order? Not the acquisitive instinct—not economic individualism per se. Selfishness is as

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sufficient either: he needs the complement of continuous irksome performance. The increments of the two ideational types are complementary; between them they create values, and the modern technique of capitalism is conditioned on their co-operation and perfect complementary mindedness. In the United States the sociologically relevant thing is the functional complementary mindedness of those two types representing initiative and quality performance.

In this connection it may be observed that in Germany Lutherdom today is considerably more than the backbone of political conservatism. Its guildshop socialism, its idea of *Werkgenossenschaft*, its theory of usufructuary functionalism, its theory of functionally relative rights, of relationship in law, have won more friends since the revolution than Western European or American economic and legal individualism. The point of departure of this tendency is of course the notion of the functional inadequacy of the absolute and contractual individualism of Western societies. As Professor Pound has suggested: the theory of relationship is coming back. It may be coming back by way of this purely medieval and "præthomistic economic philosophy" (Troeltsch).

old as mankind, covetousness of riches is quite as old, but not our ethical sanction of self-seeking nor of success. For sheer greed of gold or pieces of eight or coppers, there is nothing that compares with the feudal baron or the buccaneer, or the cab-driver, the lazzarone, the Chinaman. None of them became accumulators, none of them can be called a capitalist—certainly not a modern one, a business man. They do not belong to the acquisitive society which is ours. The economic man is different. Capitalism became possible not on account of, but in spite of, the acquisitive instinct; at all events it is not the releasing but the taming of that instinct which became constitutive for the modern social order, and it is through the Protestant idea of calling that this taming, this disciplining, has been worked.

That without this taming of the acquisitive instinct modern capitalism would be impossible is at least plausible if we grant Max Weber's criterion of "modern" capitalism. It is the element of mathematical calculability of differential gain. Mathematical, scientific calculation is conditioned on the element of continuous performance, on the social organization—we may say—of "constants," mathematically calculable quantities. Without them, without, for instance, the calculus of the factors of risk, the calculability of future performance, our present economic order is unthinkable—at least its credit foundation is. But this very quantity, indispensable to economics as applied science, the element of continuous, regular, calculable performance, the world owes to Protestantism. It is the increment of a concept which emancipates human behavior from the caprice of impulse and subjects it to the relative social reason of a calling. It is this calling concept of the Protestant creeds which furnishes a stable social medium for capitalism to thrive in, puts the credit system upon an adequate social foundation. It has made possible that which characterizes modern enterprise as compared with early enterprise: the element of continuity.<sup>1</sup>

In the presence of riches, the caprice of impulse of natural man is incalculable, but the calling concept with its implication of

<sup>1</sup> Weber, *Aufsätze*, I, 6-13, 26, 50, 192-202. "Die bürgerliche Lebensmethodik hat allein das Puritanertum geschaffen," *ibid.*, p. 524. Its psychological starting-point is "Der Bewährungsgedanke," *ibid.*, p. 124. For the relative ineffectiveness of the *gratia amissibilis*, *ibid.*, pp. 101, 104, 111.

stewardship entails a trust: a sense of must, a categorical imperative which is more than a moral factor. It becomes an economic factor in proportion as its end-product, performance, improves in quality and quantity. Thus it is constitutive of modern free labor as well as of enterprise.<sup>1</sup> For both of them Protestantism has imputed religious value, ethical value, to mere "carrying on," and it has thus synchronized the natural and the iron man. It makes the former willing where the latter wills.

All this is not saying that capitalism could not, today, carry on without some of the ethical sanctions of religion, or that it might not have come without it in the first place. It is to say that Protestantism has enormously favored the development of Western modern industry by connecting the economic calculus with salvation ends. The *auri sacra fames*, the quest of "lucre," had to be requalified as an ethical performance before it could be rationalized in terms of economically productive performance. Time had first to become God's time before it could become daylight-saving time. A new methodism of religious performance had to precede the rational methodism of economic performance. But when Protestantism allowed the business of getting rich to be an eminently effective calling, then there was no reason for objecting to the proposition that business is business. It was no longer impossible to serve both God and Mammon. Business did not in the first place make the "everlasting saint" a "go-getter" and a hustler. It is the fear of everlasting damnation that put him on the run—whatever it is that keeps him going in business. Religion sanctioned rational acquisitiveness; it gave its blessings to sober and steady accumulation; it tabooed "conspicuous consumption." It put a moral premium on capital formation.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Weber, *Ges. Aufs.*, I, 170 ff., 200.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 165 ff., 191 ff. The importance of the salvation-credit mutualism of the sects for the credit mutualism of American economic society, see pp. 207 ff., 232-36. In this essay on "Die protestantischen Sekten und der Geist des Kapitalismus," Weber shows the importance for the social order, of the social process within the beloved community. The religious group with its own social pedagogy acts as a selective agent, securing in the case of sectarian Protestantism, for capitalism a functionally adequate type of co-operator. More might have been made of this. It bred for capital formation and production an adequate *societas*, an ideal co-operator in the credit mutualism of American capitalistic society.

Last, not least, it taught the gospel of hard work for God's sake as an indispensable quality of piety. It thus helped to free the productive process of its traditional parasitism. At the same time the new piety released distribution as well as production from the sufficient reason of consumption and usufruct. Both ceased to be related to the business of living. The one, production, became the *sine qua non* of salvation; the other, the distribution of its end-products, at any one time at least prejudiced the question of its relative attainment. But then effort was bound to prejudice the question of right. Rights, including the right in the surplus, under the older scheme of things had arisen under a divinely ordained status, a social relationship. Now they arise from the relationship of individual effort and success. This puts the approval of religion upon the proposition that the worker must earn his keep and that the enterpriser may keep what he earns. Thus does the personalism of salvation lead to the individualism of property.<sup>1</sup>

But why is the rationalization of life more relative to, more contingent on, the reason, the a priori of religion, with Calvinism than with any other creed? It is because predestination implies the entire subsumption of time under the transcendental concept of salvation time, of God's time. With other creeds the medieval notion of the hereafter as separate in time has not been lost. With others the *tempus fugit* means what it always meant: the approach of death. With Calvinism it means the terror lest it be too late, lest the angel of eternal death have already passed. Calvinism, with all its brimstone and hellfire notwithstanding, has risen to an immanent conception of spiritual life, or spiritual death: it is forever coming, it is forever here.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Weber, *Ges. Aufs.*, pp. 195 ff.

<sup>2</sup> On the Calvinistic valuation of "Time," Weber, *Aufs.*, I, 167-68. What he says here is true of Protestantism in general; in the one case (Calvinism), the ethical valuation of time stresses not only intensive use but rational use; in the other case where we have a high valuation on traditionalism, the increment lies in conscientious rather than rational performance. This means from the point of view of economic rationalism: a calculable quantity. An increment lies in the calculability itself as well as in the quality of the end-product. The latter ideology insures functional coefficient of the human factor regardless of reward; it means a high psychic income on the one hand, a greater margin of profit on the other, if for no other reason than the lower labor

In medieval, in Lutheran psychology, the devil takes the hindmost as awfully as it does in Calvinism, but it is the Calvinistic pilgrim who claps his hands to his ears and runs, driven by the terror lest the devil have him already, lest he be damned. For all his preoccupation with the devil, medieval man had accommodated himself to his presence. He lived on terms of a certain amity with him. It is the Calvinist who is most uncompromisingly, most rationally, at war with the devil.

Catholic knights and peasants, Lutheran burghers, Anglican squires, had managed to live in a jolly *Unbefangenheit*—not in spite of, but on account of, the animism in their nature concept. Pain died hard. These people were sinners and knew it as well as any, but to them, much would be forgiven. Theirs was a loving and forgiving God. If they lived none too rationally, they had a reasonably good time. But then came a creed which recognized no secular, no "natural" system of valuation, no true co-ordinates of social relationship but its own. The whole fabric of life, in every line and angle, must run true to the system of end-perspectives of this grand creed. The Calvinist was nothing if not God's chosen instrument; his life was one long religious exercise, a pilgrim's progress toward the goal of everlasting saints.

Weber's thesis then is that in proportion as the Protestant creeds have calculated the balance in the business of life in terms of a salvation end-balance, they have at once rationalized man's performance and burdened it with a sense of must, of duty, which from the point of view of the business of living is not rational.

It is not rationalism *per se*, then, which is alone constitutive of the modern social order. We are not as modern as we would like to think. The iron man is anything but reasonable, and in a sense the economic man is anything but rational. He is afflicted

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turnover. For the importance of such psychological factors in industry, see "The History of the German Iron and Steel Industry," *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, XXXVIII, 2, 365-413 (Bibl.); also *Arch. Sozw.*, XXVIII, 263 ff. This *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft* has much valuable material on the different coefficients of "efficiency." See also: Hashagen, "Kalvinismus und Kapitalismus am Rhein," *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, XLVII, 1-2; Jak. Strieder, *Kirche, Staat und Frühkapitalismus*; Hertling, *Festschr.*; Fr. Keller, *Unternehmung und Mehrwert, soz. ethische Studie der Geschäftsmoral*, 1912; "Die Objectivierung des Gewinnstrebens," *Archiv f. Sozw.*, XXIX; L. Feuchtwanger, "Eth. Grundl. d. Nat'l'oekon," *Schmoller's Jahrb.*, 1913.



with the fierce unreason of wanting more than he can use. He is satisfied with less than he might want and he has become a machine. Whence the system in that madness? If it is granted that it did not "come natural," what has made us willing to submit? Whence the *idée force* which has made the system possible? It is nothing but the old idea of asceticism, rationalized by the new concept of calling. It is asceticism in the world; *innerweltliche Askese*.<sup>1</sup>

Protestantism closed the door of that late sanctuary of the salvation purpose, the monastery; but only to point to the whole world as a monastery for everyone. The everlasting saints, at all events, became monks with a vengeance. It is a system of ascetic rationalism then which furnishes the ethical foundation of the modern industrial society of modern civilization. To this foundation the different Protestant creeds have contributed in proportion as they submitted the process of life to the logic of this ascetic rationalism. For it is this *innerweltliche Askese* which has endowed modern man originally with the willingness, burdened him with the sense of must, which mere economic reason—and were it ever so plentiful—does not make rational. It furnished the psychic disposition, an energy center for continuous initiative and performance—a stable social medium for modern capitalism to draw from and to thrive in.<sup>2</sup>

Transcendental reason, capitalism may now dispense with; the rewards of religion, it can do without. But there are some things without which it cannot, even now, exist. Its very essence, scientific calculation, depends upon them altogether; the credit system without them would collapse within a day. It is the

<sup>1</sup> "Einer der constitutiven Bestandteile des modernen capitalistischen Geistes, und nicht nur dieses, sondern der modernen Cultur: die rationale Lebensführung auf Grundlage der Berufsidee ist . . . geboren aus dem Geist der Christlichen Askese," Weber, *Aufsätze*, I, 56-62, 84-206.

<sup>2</sup> For a concise comparison between the Lutheran and the Calvinistic innerworldly asceticism, see Troeltsch, *Die Bedeutung* (1911): "Das Luthertum duldet die Welt in Kreuz, Leid und Martyrium; der Calvinist meistert sie zu Ehren Gottes in rastloser Arbeit um der in der Arbeit liegenden Selbstdisciplin willen," p. 44. Weber classifies Luther's ethics of calling under his category of *orgnische Berufsethik*, an implication of institutionalized grace. Calvin's ethics of calling on the contrary is an implication of his individualism of salvation. Cf. for a convenient summary of his theory: *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, III, 227-356, especially p. 342.

continuous performance of the human factor and the abiding faith in its ethical justification.

To give Weber's complete thesis is not here intended, it would have to be treated in its context: a comprehensive study in the typology and social logic of religion. For Weber has not ignored, as his critics seem to think, he has elucidated the pluralism of self-evident truth from which man reasons.

Of course, the rationalism of the eighteenth century, where it reasons from classical premises, where it is humanistic rationalism proper, deserves a study of its own as an element of the American mind in the making. So does the problem of cross-fertilization of the humanistic and the Christian rationalism, as well as the uneasy neighborhood of fundamentalism and scientific empiricism today. Off-hand it would seem as if Jefferson's deism and nature sentiment, his system of emotional valuation, his sublimation of God's own original honest man, the farmer, had been strongly tinged by the religion of his time. Bryan's self-denial, on the other hand, in the presence of abundant reason, may be an implication of asceticism again.

Weber's controversy with his critics over the "adequate" origin, or better, perhaps, explanation of *der Geist des Kapitalismus*, deserves attention. For it concerns one whom Weber seems to consider a sort of Moses of American acquisitive society. It is Benjamin Franklin whose "Advice to a Young Tradesman" and whose "Necessary Hints" contain for Weber some of the ten commandments for the chosen people.<sup>1</sup>

Franklin stresses here the characteristics of the credit-worthy gentleman, the obligation for the same to increase his substance. The urgency of this obligation is treated as eminently ethical, and the desirability of its increase is presented as remarkably self-evident. This ethical tinge in Franklin's maxims of conduct, Weber traces to the above salvation reason.<sup>2</sup> That the salvation interest is apt to get lost does not matter, is not the point. The point is that the salvation interest was originally the *prima causa*, that it accounts for this positive ethical valuation, while on the

<sup>1</sup> Weber, *Aufsätze*, I, 30-42.

<sup>2</sup> For Brentano's theory see *Der wirtschaftende Mensch*, p. 418.

other hand no other reason has elsewhere yielded an equally powerful urge. The ethical (not the utilitarian) valuation of honest industry and thrift at all events does not occur in cases where there is no original hereafter. Without it, as Weber shows in a study of Confucianism,<sup>1</sup> maxims of conduct may be ever so rational, the faith in them ever so effective: yet they are not efficient, the old Chinaman remains penny-wise, pound-foolish, while the young American becomes the captain of industry.

Weber's controversy with his critics turns on the definition of capitalism and on the question what it is that Franklin actually endows with ethical sanctions. His definition of the essence of modern capitalism we know; what he thinks Franklin sanctions is not so much acquisitiveness as efficiency in acquisition: getting ahead through industry and thrift. That an existing capitalism should have here sublimated into ethics its elements of survival fitness, he says, cannot be thought of. What capitalism there was, is to be found not in Pennsylvania but in the Atlantic seaboard South, where it perished together with its mores. In poor New England, on the other hand, adopted country of the Puritan complex, a much more modern capitalism did remarkably well, later on. We cannot here speak of an "ideological reflex" of a material situation and superstructure of an existing order. An adequate mind exists here before its corresponding economic order makes its appearance.

But neither is this mind in its essence traceable to the classical economic rationalism of the Renaissance. In carrying out Weber's trend of thought here, because it is of some interest to us in its bearing on the history of American capitalism, we may say this: The squire of Horseback Hall has undoubtedly been dignified by attribution of a pseudo-Roman ideal of virtue and prudence. Even so, that perfect gentleman did not become the ancestor of the modern perfect "go-getter"—if he did love to turn an honest penny and engross mightily in his day. His very *Lebenskunst*

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 522-35, for a comparison between Calvinism and Confucianism and a demonstration of the practical effect of the difference in the religious ideologies between these two types of utilitarianism. The whole extensive work of Weber in this field is dedicated to a comparison of the concomitant variations of rationalism. See Vol. II, *The Jews*; Vol. III, *The Indic religions*.

forbade that business should become business and *Geschäftsmoral*, *Sittlichkeit*. His interest in technology and a rational technic was part of the *otium cum dignitate*; it was more humanistic than utilitarian. But here, in Franklin's psychology of valuation, we find the equation: acquisitiveness = *industria*, with an ethical plus valuation to boot.<sup>1</sup> This equation and valuation is new. It is a function of Protestantism, of a middle-class religion. It is an implication of the search for the good life and not for the sensible life. It is a new answer to the Christian question: "What must I do to be saved?" and not to the pagan question: "What must I do to be happy?" The foresight of risk behind the latter question is purely secular. After life's fitful dream was over, the proud pagan wanted a decent funeral, as we would say. The Christian is "in for" something more. Uneconomical use of goods, on the other hand, for the "rationalist" was simply poor judgment—indiscreet, but nothing else. But behind Franklin's new common sense there is a common ethical sense. The uneconomical use of money has become at once unwise and *unsittlich*; it is morally wrong and it used to be regarded as sin.

Thus did the Puritan lay the ethical foundations of modern society with its basic virtue of honest industry and thrift. The sublimation of keeping everlastingly at the productive use of capital goods is a corollary of his original equation of industry with calling; of his acceptance of success in terms of turnover and gain as the secular equivalent, the visible manifestation of a calling divine. When Protestantism taught Christians to seek individual salvation in business, it went far to canonize success.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Weber, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 57-58, Footnotes: also the controversy with Rachfahl "Calvinismus und Capitalismus," *Internat. Wocäenschrift*, 1909; Sombart, *Der Bourgeois*, 1913; Lujo Brentano, *Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus*, 1916 (Excursus); Weber, *Aufsätze*, I, 38-42. For the influence of the classical economic philosophy in the eighteenth century see O. Neurath, in *Jahrb. f. Nat. Oekon.*, III, 34.

<sup>2</sup> Compare the documentation of this theory as presented by R. H. Tawney, *Jour. Pol. Econ.*, Vol. XXXI, Nos. 4-6., which is in some respects more adequate than Weber's; also L. Brentano, *Ethik und Volkswirtschaft; Die wirtschaftl. Lehren des christl. Altertums; Die Anfänge des mod. Kapitalismus in Der wirtschaftende Mensch in der Geschichte* (coll. papers), 1923.

The importance of the social process in religion in the United States for the American political and economic order is the subject of the following articles.

[To be continued]

# THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY

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## ABSTRACT

*The ecological basis of community.*—The human community may be considered as an ecological product, that is, as the outcome of competitive and accommodative processes which give spatial and temporal distribution to human aggregations and cultural achievements. *Factors determining size of community.*—The growth or decline of a given community is a function of its relative strength in the larger competitive process. Communities are in constant competition with one another, and any advantage in location, resources, or market organization is forthwith reflected in differential growth. *The internal structure of community.*—The utilities, institutions, and inhabitants of a community are spatially distributed and territorially segregated as a result of competition and selection. Redistribution and segregation are constantly in process as new factors enter to disturb the competitive relations.

The young sciences of plant and animal ecology have become fairly well established. Their respective fields are apparently quite well defined, and a set of concepts for analysis is becoming rather generally accepted. The subject of human ecology, however, is still practically an unsurveyed field, that is, so far as a systematic and scientific approach is concerned. To be sure, hosts of studies have been made which touch the field of human ecology in one or another of its varied aspects, but there has developed no science of human ecology which is comparable in precision of observation or in method of analysis with the recent sciences of plant and animal ecology.

## I. THE RELATION OF HUMAN ECOLOGY TO PLANT AND ANIMAL ECOLOGY

Ecology has been defined as "that phase of biology that considers plants and animals as they exist in nature, and studies their interdependence, and the relation of each kind and individual to its environment."<sup>1</sup> This definition is not sufficiently compre-

<sup>1</sup> *Encyclopedia Americana*, p. 555. New York, 1923.

hensive to include all the elements that logically fall within the range of human ecology. In the absence of any precedent let us tentatively define human ecology as a study of the spatial and temporal<sup>1</sup> relations of human beings as affected by the selective, distributive, and accommodative forces of the environment. Human ecology is fundamentally interested in the effect of *position*,<sup>2</sup> in both time and space, upon human institutions and human behavior. "Society is made up of individuals spatially separated, territorially distributed, and capable of independent locomotion."<sup>3</sup> These spatial relationships of human beings are the products of competition and selection, and are continuously in process of change as new factors enter to disturb the competitive relations or to facilitate mobility. Human institutions and human nature itself become accommodated to certain spatial relationships of human beings. As these spatial relationships change, the physical basis of social relations is altered, thereby producing social and political problems.

A great deal has been written about the biological, economic, and social aspects of competition and selection, but little attention has been given to the distributive and spatial aspects of these processes. The plant ecologist is aware of the effect of the struggle for space, food, and light upon the nature of a plant formation, but the sociologist has failed to recognize that the same processes of competition and accommodation are at work determining the size and ecological organization of the human community.

The essential difference between the plant and animal organism is that the animal has the power of locomotion which enables it to gather nutriment from a wider environment, but, in addition to the power to move in space, the human animal has the ability

<sup>1</sup> As indicated later on in this paper, ecological formations tend to develop in cyclic fashion. A period of time within which a given ecological formation develops and culminates is the time period for that particular formation. The length of these time periods may be ultimately measured and predicted, hence the inclusion of the temporal element in the definition.

<sup>2</sup> The word "position" is used to describe the place relation of a given community to other communities, also the location of the individual or institution within the community itself.

<sup>3</sup> Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 509.

to contrive and adapt the environment to his needs. In a word, the human community differs from the plant community in the two dominant characteristics of mobility and purpose, that is, in the power to select a habitat and in the ability to control or modify the conditions of the habitat. On first consideration this might seem to indicate that human ecology could have nothing in common with plant ecology where the processes of association and adjustment result from natural unmodifiable reactions; but closer examination and investigation make it obvious that human communities are not so much the products of artifact or design as many hero-worshippers suppose.<sup>1</sup>

The human community has its inception in the traits of human nature and the needs of human beings. Man is a gregarious animal: he cannot live alone; he is relatively weak and needs not only the company of other human associates but shelter and protection from the elements as well. Brunhes says there are three essentials to the inception of the human community: the house, the road, and water.<sup>2</sup> Food may be transported more easily than shelter or water; the latter two therefore constitute, even under the most nomadic conditions, the essential elements in giving a location and a spatial fixity to human relations.<sup>3</sup> This is exemplified under our present régime of automobile tourist life, where water and shelter become the determining factors in the location of the camp.

The size and stability of the human community is however a function of the food supply and of the rôle played in the wider ecological process of production and distribution of commodities. When man makes his living from hunting or fishing, the community is small and of but temporary duration; when agriculture becomes the chief source of sustenance, the community is still small but assumes a more permanent character; when trade and commerce develop, larger communities arise at points of break in conveyance,

<sup>1</sup> Although the actions of individuals may be designed and controlled, the total effect of individual action is neither designed nor anticipated.

<sup>2</sup> *Human Geography*, p. 52.

<sup>3</sup> Brunhes points out by a series of maps the very intimate relation between the distribution of human habitations and the water systems of different countries. He also demonstrates the relation of the modern industrial community to the regions of coal deposits.

that is, at the mouths of rivers, junctions of streams, at waterfalls, and shallows where streams are forded. As new forms of transportation arise, new points of concentration occur and old points become accentuated or reduced. Again, as goods for trade are made in communities, still other points of concentration come into existence, determined largely by sources of power and raw material.<sup>1</sup>

## II. ECOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION OF COMMUNITIES

From the standpoint of ecology, communities may be divided into four general types: first, the primary service community, such as the agricultural town, the fishing, mining, or lumbering community which serves as the first step in the distributive process of the outgoing basic commodity and as the last stage in the distributive process of the product finished for consumption. The size of such communities depends entirely upon the nature and form of utilization of the extractive industry concerned together with the extent of the surrounding trade area. The community responds in size to any element that affects the productivity of the economic base or the extent of the area from which it draws its sustenance. But, in any event, so long as such a community does not assume any other function in the larger ecological process, it cannot grow in population beyond a few thousand inhabitants.

The next type of community is the one that fulfils the secondary function in the distributive process of commodities. It collects the basic materials from the surrounding primary communities and distributes them in the wider markets of the world. On the other hand, it redistributes the products coming from other parts of the world to the primary service communities for final consumption. This is commonly called the commercial community; it may, however, combine other functions as well. The size of this type of community depends upon the extent of its distributive

<sup>1</sup> The close relation existing between the coal and iron areas and the location of modern industrial communities has frequently been pointed out. L. C. A. Knowles says: "Apart from special and exceptional circumstances industry in Europe and the United States tends to grow up within easy railway access to the great coal areas and on these areas the population is massed in towns." (*The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century*, p. 24).



functions. It may vary from a small wholesale town in the center of an agricultural plain to that of a great port city whose hinterland extends halfway across the continent. Growth depends upon the comparative advantages of the site location.

The third type of community is the industrial town. It serves as the locus for the manufacturing of commodities. In addition it may combine the functions of the primary service and the commercial types. It may have its local trade area and it may also be the distributing center for the surrounding hinterland. The type is characterized merely by the relative dominance of industry over the other forms of service. There is practically no limit to the size to which an industrial community may develop. Growth is dependent upon the scope and market organization of the particular industries which happen to be located within its boundaries. Industrial communities are of two general types: first, those that have diversified and multiple industries organized on a local sale of products, and, second, those that are dominated by one or two highly developed industries organized on a national or world-sale of products.

The fourth type of community is one which is lacking in a specific economic base. It draws its economic sustenance from other parts of the world, and may serve no function in the production or distribution of commodities. Such communities are exemplified in our recreational resorts, political and educational centers, communities of defense, penal or charitable colonies. From the standpoint of growth or decline such communities are not subject to the same laws that govern the development of towns that play a part in the larger productive and distributive processes.<sup>1</sup> They are much more subject to the vicissitudes of human fancies and decrees than are the basic types of human communities. Of course, any community may and usually does have accretions added to its population as a result of such service. It may, for instance, be the seat of a university, of a state prison, or it may be a recreational resort for at least certain seasons of the year.

<sup>1</sup> To be sure, if the interests in question are commercialized, the growth of the community is subject to the same laws of competition as the other types of communities, with the exception that change is likely to be more rapid and fanciful.

III. DETERMINING ECOLOGICAL FACTORS IN THE GROWTH  
OR DECLINE OF COMMUNITY

The human community tends to develop in cyclic fashion. Under a given state of natural resources and in a given condition of the arts the community tends to increase in size and structure until it reaches the point of population adjustment to the economic base. In an agricultural community, under present conditions of production and transportation, the point of maximum population seldom exceeds 5,000.<sup>1</sup> The point of maximum development may be termed the point of culmination or climax, to use the term of the plant ecologist.<sup>2</sup> The community tends to remain in this condition of balance between population and resources until some new element enters to disturb the *status quo*, such as the introduction of a new system of communication, a new type of industry, or a different form of utilization of the existing economic base. Whatever the innovation may be that disturbs the equilibrium of the community, there is a tendency toward a new cycle of adjustment. This may act in either a positive or negative manner. It may serve as a *release* to the community, making for another cycle of growth and differentiation, or it may have a retractive influence, necessitating emigration and readjustment to a more circumscribed base.

In earlier conditions of life, population was kept down to the community balance by variations in the death-rate, or, as in the case of Greek cities, the surplus population emigrated in groups to establish new colonies—offshoots of the mother-city. Under modern conditions of communication and transportation, population adjustment is maintained by a ceaseless process of individual migrations. As a result of the dynamic conditions prevailing throughout the civilized world during the last fifty years, many communities have passed through swift successive cycles of growth or decline, the determining factors being changes in forms and routes of transportation and communication and the rise of new industries.

<sup>1</sup> See H. P. Douglass, *The Little Town*, p. 44.

<sup>2</sup> F. E. Clements, *Plant Succession*, p. 3. Carr-Saunders refers to the point of population adjustment to resources as the "optimum."

Some advantage in transportation is the most fundamental and most important of the causes determining the location of a distributing center. It may almost be said to be the only cause for the formation of such centers. For some reason or reasons a particular place is more conveniently and cheaply reached by many people than any surrounding point; and, as a result, they naturally exchange commodities there. The country store is located at the crossing of roads. There also is the village. In a mountain country the market town is at the junction of two, or, still better, of three valleys. Another favorite location is the end of a mountain pass, or a gap that is a thoroughfare between two valleys. If rivers are difficult to cross, settlements will spring up at the safest ferries or fords. In a level plain, a town will be near its center, and a focus of roads or railroads in such a plain, fertile and populous, will almost surely make a city.<sup>1</sup>

It is the railroad and the steamship that determine where a new business shall be developed, quite as often as the government policy. The grant of special rates and privileges to shippers is nowadays the most efficient kind of protection.

It is this quickening and cheapening of transportation that has given such stimulus in the present day to the growth of large cities. It enables them to draw cheap food from a far larger territory and it causes business to locate where the widest business connection is to be had, rather than where the goods or raw materials are most easily produced. And the perfection of the means of communication, the post-office and the telegraph, intensifies the same result.<sup>2</sup>

The entire net increase of the population of 1870 to 1890 in Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota was in cities and towns possessing competitive rates, while those having non-competitive rates decreased in population, and in Iowa it is the general belief that the absence of large cities is due to the earlier policy of the railways giving Chicago discriminating rates.<sup>3</sup>

The advent of the trolley line and more recently of the automobile has produced still further disturbing elements in the growth of human communities. Their effect has been chiefly to modify the life of the small town or village, causing the decline of some and the sudden growth of others. The introduction of these two forms of transportation, more particularly of the automobile, has been the most potent force in our recent American history in affecting redistribution of our population and in the disorganization

<sup>1</sup> J. Russell Smith, *Industrial and Commercial Geography* (1913), p. 841.

<sup>2</sup> A. T. Hadley, "Economic Results of Improvement in Means of Transportation," quoted in Marshall, *Business Administration*, p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> L. C. A. Knowles, *The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century* (1921), p. 216.

of our rural and small-town institutions which grew up on the basis of a horse-and-vehicle type of motility.<sup>1</sup>

The evolution of new types of industry is another feature that becomes a determining factor in the redistribution of the country's population. As we review our census reports we see the emergence each decade of one or more important industries; first, the textile industry causing concentrations of population in the eastern states, then the development of the iron and steel industry with its center of operations gradually shifting farther and farther west, and more recently the advent of the automobile and oil industries making for enormous concentration of population in certain states of the Union, also the motion-picture industry with its concentrated center in southern California. The emergence of a new industry has a far-reaching effect in disturbing the *status quo* of communal life. Competition soon forces the new industry to concentrate its productive enterprises in one or two communities; these communities then serve as great magnets drawing to themselves the appropriate population elements from communities far and near.

#### IV. THE EFFECT OF ECOLOGICAL CHANGES ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF COMMUNITY

Population migrations resulting from such sudden pulls as are the outcomes of unusual forms of release in community growth may cause an expansion in the community's development far beyond the natural culmination point of its cyclic development, resulting in a crisis situation, a sudden relapse, disorganization, or even panic. So-called boom towns are towns that have experienced herd movements of population beyond the natural point of culmination.

On the other hand, a community which has reached the point of culmination and which has experienced no form of release is likely to settle into a condition of stagnation. Its natural surplus of population is forced to emigrate. This type of emigration tends to occasion folk-depletion in the parent-community. The younger and more enterprising population elements respond most sensitively to the absence of opportunities in their home town. This is particu-

<sup>1</sup> See Gillette, *Rural Sociology* (1922), pp. 472-73.

larly true when the community has but a single economic base such as agriculture, lumbering, mining. Reformers try in vain to induce the young people to remain on the farms or in their native villages, little realizing that they are working in opposition to the general principles of the ecological order.

Again, when a community starts to decline in population due to a weakening of the economic base, disorganization and social unrest follow.<sup>1</sup> Competition becomes keener within the community, and the weaker elements either are forced into a lower economic level or are compelled to withdraw from the community entirely. There are, of course, periodic and temporary fluctuations in the economic balance due either to circumstances which affect the entire economic order or to the vicissitudes of the particular industry from which the community draws its sustenance. These temporary fluctuations, however, while important from the standpoint of social well-being, do not comprise the basic determinants of community development.

The introduction of an innovating element into the adjustment of a community may be designated as the initial stage of an invasion which may make for a complete change in the structure and organization of the community. The introduction of a new mode of transportation, for instance, may transform the economic organization of a community and make for a change in population type.

Thus the Harlem Railroad transformed Quaker Hill from a community of diversified farming, producing, manufacturing, selling, consuming, sufficient unto itself, into a locality of specialized farming. Its market had been Poughkeepsie, twenty-eight miles away, over high hills and indifferent roads. Its metropolis became New York, sixty-two miles away by rail and four to eight miles by wagon-road.

With the railroad's coming, the isolated homogeneous community scattered. The sons of the Quakers emigrated. Laborers from Ireland and other European lands, even negroes from Virginia, took their places. New Yorkers became residents on the Hill, which became the farthest terminus of suburban travel.<sup>2</sup>

The establishment of a new industry, especially if it displaces the previous economic base, may also make for a more or less

<sup>1</sup> For a good statistical summary of the decline in village population in the United States from 1900 to 1920 see Gillette, *op. cit.* (1922), p. 465.

<sup>2</sup> Warren H. Wilson, "Quaker Hill," quoted in Sims, *Rural Community*, p. 214.

complete change of population without greatly modifying the size of the community. This condition is exemplified in many of the small towns of the state of Washington which have changed from lumbering to agriculture or from one type of agriculture to another. In many cases few of the previous inhabitants remained after the invasion of the new economic base.

As a community increases in size, however, it becomes better able to accommodate itself to invasions and to sudden changes in number of inhabitants. The city tends to become the reservoir into which the surplus population drains from the smaller communities round about.

#### V. ECOLOGICAL PROCESSES DETERMINING THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF COMMUNITY

In the process of community growth there is a development from the simple to the complex, from the general to the specialized; first to increasing centralization and later to a decentralization process. In the small town or village the primary universal needs are satisfied by a few general stores and a few simple institutions such as church, school, and home. As the community increases in size, specialization takes place both in the type of service provided and in the location of the place of service. The sequence of development may be somewhat as follows: first the grocery store, sometimes carrying a few of the more staple dry goods, then the restaurant, poolroom, barber shop, drugstore, dry-goods store, and later bank, haberdashery, millinery, and other specialized lines of service.<sup>1</sup>

The axial or skeletal structure of a community is determined by the course of the first routes of travel and traffic.<sup>2</sup> Houses and shops are constructed near the road, usually parallel with it. The road may be a trail, public highway, railroad, river or ocean harbor, but, in any case, the community usually starts in parallel relation to the first main highway. With the accumulation of population and utilities the community takes form, first along one side of the highway and later on both sides. The point of junction

<sup>1</sup> In actual count of some thirty-odd communities in and around Seattle this was about the sequence of development.

<sup>2</sup> The axial or skeletal structure of civilization, Mediterranean, Atlantic, Pacific, is the ocean around which it grows up. See Ramsay Traquair, "The Commonwealth of the Atlantic," *Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1924.

or crossing of two main highways, as a rule, serves as the initial center of the community.

As the community grows there is not merely a multiplication of houses and roads but a process of differentiation and segregation takes place as well. Residences and institutions spread out in centrifugal fashion from the central point of the community while business concentrates more and more around the spot of highest land values. Each cyclic increase of population is accompanied by greater differentiation in both service and location. There is a struggle among utilities for the vantage-points of position. This makes for increasing value of land and increasing height of buildings at the geographic center of the community. As competition for advantageous sites becomes keener with the growth of population, the first and economically weaker types of utilities are forced out to less accessible and lower-priced areas. By the time the community has reached a population of about ten or twelve thousand, a fairly well-differentiated structure is attained. The central part is a clearly defined business area with the bank, the drugstore, the department store, and the hotel holding the sites of highest land value. Industries and factories usually comprise independent formations within the city, grouping around railroad tracks and routes of water traffic. Residence sections become established, segregated into two or more types depending upon the economic and racial composition of the population.

The structural growth of community takes place in successional sequence not unlike the successional stages in the development of the plant formation. Certain specialized forms of utilities and uses do not appear in the human community until a certain stage of development has been attained, just as the beech or pine forest is preceded by successional dominance of other plant species. And just as in plant communities successions are the products of invasion so also in the human community the formations, segregations, and associations that appear, constitute the outcome of a series of invasions.<sup>1</sup>

There are many kinds of intra-community invasions but in general they may be grouped into two main classes: those resulting in change in use of land, and those which introduce merely change

<sup>1</sup> Compare F. E. Clements, *Plant Succession*, p. 6.

in type of occupant. By the former is meant change from one general use to another, such as of a residential area into a business area or of a business into an industrial district. The latter embraces all changes of type within a particular use area, such as the changes which constantly take place in the racial and economic complexion of residence neighborhoods, or of the type of service utility within a business section. Invasions produce successional stages of different qualitative significance, that is, the economic character of the district may rise or fall as the result of certain types of invasion. This qualitative aspect is reflected in the fluctuations of land or rental values.

The conditions which initiate invasions are legion. The following are some of the more important: (1) changes in forms and routes of transportation;<sup>\*</sup> (2) obsolescence resulting from physical deterioration or from changes in use or fashion; (3) the erection of important public or private structures, buildings, bridges, institutions, which have either attractive or repellent significance; (4) the introduction of new types of industry, or even a change in the organization of existing industries; (5) changes in the economic base which make for redistribution of income thus necessitating change of residence; (6) real estate promotion creating sudden demands for special location sites, etc.

Invasions may be classified according to stage of development into (a) initial stage, (b) secondary or developmental stage, (c) climax. The initial stage of an invasion has to do with the point of entry, the resistance or inducement offered the invader by the prior inhabitants of the area, the effect upon land values and rentals. The invasion, of course, may be into an unoccupied territory or into territory with various degrees of occupancy. The resistance to invasion depends upon the type of the invader together with the degree of solidarity of the present occupants. The undesirable invader, whether in population type or in use form, usually makes entry (that is, within an area already completely occupied) at the point of greatest mobility. It is a common observation that

<sup>\*</sup> For good discussions of the effect of new forms of transportation upon communal structure see McMichael and Bingham, *City Growth and Values* (1923), chap. iv; also Grupp, *Economics of Motor Transportation* (1924), chap. ii.



foreign races and other undesirable invaders, with few exceptions, take up residence near the business center of the community or at other points of high mobility and low resistance. Once established they gradually push their way out along business or transportation thoroughfares to the periphery of the community.

The commencement of an invasion tends to be reflected in changes in land value. If the invasion is one of change in use the value of the land generally advances and the value of the building declines. This condition furnishes the basis for disorganization. The normal improvements and repairs are, as a rule, omitted, and the owner is placed under the economic urge of renting his property to parasitic and transitory services which may be economically strong but socially disreputable and therefore able and obliged to pay higher rentals than the legitimate utilities can afford. It is a well-known fact that the vices under the surveillance of the police usually segregate in such transitional areas.<sup>1</sup>

During the course of development of an invasion into a new area, either of use or type, there takes place a process of displacement and selection determined by the character of the invader and of the area invaded. The early stages are usually marked by keenness of competition which frequently manifests itself in outward clashes. Business failures are common in such areas and the rules of competition are violated. As the process continues, competition forces associational groupings. Utilities making similar or complementary demands of the area tend to group in close proximity to one another, giving rise to subformations with definite service functions. Such associations as amusement areas, retail districts, market sections, financial sections, and automobile rows are examples of this tendency.

The climax stage is reached in the invasion process, once the dominant type of ecological organization emerges which is able to withstand the intrusions of other forms of invasion. For example, in the development of a residential district, when it is not controlled in advance by building restrictions, the early stages

<sup>1</sup> By actual count in the city of Seattle over 80 per cent of the disorderly houses recorded in police records are obsolete buildings located near the downtown business section where land values are high and new uses are in process of establishment.

of growth are usually marked by wide variations in the type and value of buildings constructed. But, in the process of development, a uniform cost type of structure tends to dominate, gradually eliminating all other types that vary widely from the norm, so that it is customary to find a considerable degree of economic homogeneity in all established residential districts. The same process operates in areas devoted to business uses, competition segregates utilities of similar economic strength into areas of corresponding land values, and at the same time forces into close proximity those particular forms of service which profit from mutual association such as financial establishments or automobile display-rooms. Once a dominant use becomes established within an area, competition becomes less ruthless among the associational units, rules of control emerge, and invasion of a different use is for a time obstructed.

The general effect of the continuous processes of invasions and accommodations is to give to the developed community well-defined areas, each having its own peculiar selective and cultural characteristics. Such units of communal life may be termed "natural areas,"<sup>1</sup> or formations, to use the term of the plant ecologist. In any case, these areas of selection and function may comprise many subformations or associations which become part of the organic structure of the district or of the community as a whole. It has been suggested that these natural areas or formations may be defined in terms of land values,<sup>2</sup> the point of highest land value representing the center or head of the formation (not necessarily the geographic center but the economic or cultural center), while the points of lowest land value represent the periphery of the formation or boundary line between two adjacent formations.

Each formation or ecological organization within a community serves as a selective or magnetic force attracting to itself appropriate population elements and repelling incongruous units, thus making for biological and cultural subdivisions of a city's population. Everyone knows how racial and linguistic colonies develop in all

<sup>1</sup> A term used by members of the Department of Sociology in the University of Chicago.

<sup>2</sup> This has also been suggested by the Chicago group.

of our large cities, but the age and sex segregations which take place are not quite so obvious to common perception. In the city of Seattle, which has in general a sex composition of 113 males to 100 females, the downtown district, comprising an area inscribed by a radius of  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile or so, has from 300 to 500 males to every 100 females. But in the outlying districts of the city, except in one or two industrial sections, these ratios are reversed. Females predominate in numbers over males in all the residential neighborhoods and in the suburbs of the city. This same condition is true with regard to the age distribution of population. The school census shows an absolute decline in the number of children of school age in the central districts of the city although the total population for this area has shown an increase for each decade. It is obvious, then, that the settler type of population, the married couples with children, withdraw from the center of the city while the more mobile and less responsible adults herd together in the hotel and apartment regions near the heart of the community.

This process of population-sifting produces not only increasing mobility with approach from the periphery to the center of the formation, but also different cultural areas representing different mores, attitudes, and degrees of civic interest. The neighborhoods in which the settler type of population resides, with their preponderance of women and children, serve as the custodians of the stabilizing and repressive mores. It is in the Seattle neighborhoods, especially those on the hill-tops, that the conservative, law-abiding, civic-minded population elements dwell. The downtown section and the valleys, which are usually industrial sites, are populated by a class of people who are not only more mobile but whose mores and attitudes, as tested by voting habits, are more vagrant and radical.

# SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY

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## SECTION XVIII. THE SOCIOLOGIZING MOVEMENT WITHIN POLITICAL SCIENCE<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

Recurrence to the middle of the nineteenth century is necessary in order to place a factor which appeared most notably among the political scientists, and which thenceforward interpenetrated the influences which were making for sociology. Orientation with reference to the Comtean factor among the formative influences of sociology. The Ahrens-von Mohl proclamation of the need of a "science of society." Treitschke's attempt to stifle the demand.

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This is the point at which it would be profitable to bring into the field of view all that can be reconstructed of the pre-sociological movement in France, especially the tradition most plainly marked by Montesquieu, Condorcet, and Comte.<sup>2</sup> This résumé has not attempted to cover all the antecedents of the American sociological movement. Its argument has been throughout that the movement was not isolated. It was a consequent of antecedents. We have exhibited only the group of antecedents whose relations to the American sociological movement are the most indubitable, and whose effects have been most prominent since the 1890's.

The present writer feels bound to emphasize the conviction that Ward improvised an entirely mistaken interpretation of cause and effect when he led Americans to believe that they owe sociology to Comte. This myth, which Ward started into circulation,<sup>3</sup> has ever since been accepted as self-evident truth. In fact, at the time of publishing *Dynamic Sociology* Ward had given no serious or at least no adequate attention to the antecedents of the demand which he voiced for a new science of society. The Preface to his first edition betrays his naïveté with reference to the evolution of social science

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Encyc. Amer.*, "Sociology," p. 211.

<sup>2</sup> See "A Comtean Centenary," *American Journal of Sociology* (January, 1922).

<sup>3</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 1, 85.

since 1800. Without a suspicion that he was doing violence to the historical reality, he could and did substitute an unauthorized impression for the facts. He thus confused the record by inserting a dictum which is refuted by the evidence we are presenting. This reading of the actual facts is in no sense an estimate of the merits of Comte. That is a problem by itself. No quarrel is involved with Bodenhafer, for example.<sup>1</sup> The present contention is that the evolutionary process in American sociology actually found comparatively little use for Comtean elements, and that the efficient cross-fertilization came from the German tradition.

The present writer made his first venture as a sociologist by printing in 1890 a syllabus of 110 pages for the use of Seniors in Colby College. Some copies were submitted for review, and someone not recorded disposed of the book with a curtness which was all that its intrinsic demerits deserved, but the particular form of the judgment seemed to the author a wild shot. Accordingly sometime during the year 1890 he entered on the interleaved sheet opposite the first page of the Introduction, the following memorandum. It is reproduced here because it is pertinent evidence as to more than one feature of the situation.

For the benefit of critics of a class represented by one who dismissed this syllabus with the astute dictum: "It exhibits the usual merits and defects of the Spencerian School," it is to be said that the system here outlined is anti-Spencerian Spencerism; it is egoistic altruism; it is social individualism. Critics who think they can tell the character of a system without reading an outline of it may possibly hesitate before selecting a ready-made tag for what follows in these pages. Whatever the merits or defects of the system, they are certainly not those of any single master, or any single school. To Christian Ethics I owe the fundamental conception of the Good as grounded in the nature of God. To Utilitarian philosophy I owe the perception that concrete good with which we are practically concerned is a function of the nature of man. To Comte I owe my conceptions of scientific method, and *my consequent wonder at the comparative uselessness of the method to Comte himself*. To Spencer I owe the same debt which a subsequent surveyor owes to a preliminary explorer of pathless ground. To what I like to think of as my share of triumphant common sense, I owe my abomination of the *laissez faire* social doctrines which Spencer first glorifies, then abandons. In other words, the label of no school will ever cover the thought here sketched. Such as it is, it is the author's own version of social wisdom.

<sup>1</sup> "Comte and Psychology," *Proceedings of the Amer. Sociol. Soc.*, Vol. XVII, 1922.

This memorandum may be trusted as indicating in principle the state of mind of all the earlier American sociologists except Ward. In the first place, the writer was not long in discovering that his syllabus contained not a system but a hodgepodge. In the second place, he was not long in discovering that the methodology which he thought he had taken over from Comte was being displaced by a methodology of his own derived chiefly from reconsideration of the whole body of social science criticism to which he had been introduced by the Germans. Something like this went on in the minds of most of the American sociologists. We were not committed to any theory except that traditional history and economics were failures, and that a better way might be found to interpret and improve human society. Our minds were in a ferment of reaction between all the antecedent impressions which had gone into the making of our intellectual state. A review of the syllabus mentioned emphasizes the reference to Comte above quoted. He had advertised the need of a "science of society," and he had made a plausible argument about its place in the "hierarchy of sciences." In these two respects he helped the present writer to articulate vague feelings for which no adequate expression of his own had been found. In both respects, however, the writer found that after one or two more years Comte ceased to be edifying. He soon parted company with him for a long attempt to find reality by the method of Schäffle.<sup>1</sup> As the latter began to be found wanting, the present deponent gradually developed the tendency reflected in the other syllabus to which frequent reference has been made in this argument.<sup>2</sup>

Returning from this digression to the subject of the section, we cite von Mohl, as we have previously treated representative historians and economists, not as necessarily the most energetic agency of the tendency which he is chosen to illustrate, but merely as a representative of the tendency. He amply shows that the movement did not begin with himself, and that many men beside himself gave impulse to the movement. While he does not fully agree with Ahrens, he stops only a little short of the explicit judgment

<sup>1</sup> Cf. chapter xvii, above.

<sup>2</sup> I.e., *Encyc. Amer.*, title "Sociology."

that Ahrens is entitled to rank as the chief promoter of the movement to develop a distinct *science of society*, parallel with the *science of the state*. It is nevertheless more convenient to take von Mohl as exponent of the movement. His presentation of the argument is more compact than that of Ahrens.

In brief, the movement among the German political scientists to form an independent science of society, which culminated about 1855, so far as the political scientists themselves were concerned, was an interesting blend of mysticism and objectivity. It was an attempt to found a science of a supposed entity, viz., "society" quite as unreal as the supposed entity "state." That is, German political philosophy of the period posited an existence, "the state," which to our minds appears to have been conceived as occupying a definite portion of space, above, outside, and independent of people, but brooding over and controlling people by sovereign power. The fact that the most arbitrary state that ever existed was in a real sense of, for, and by the people, and could not have existed otherwise, does not seem to have disturbed this philosophy, nor to have interfered with its use as the working presumption for the corresponding political science.

Briefly, by processes of suggestion which we cannot attempt to analyze, certain political scientists began to be impressed by the perception that there are considerable ranges of human activity which are not primarily political. Thereupon their activities were conceived as constituting an entity, to be called society, presumably occupying its preserve in space, with relations similar to those of the state toward people, and presenting subject-matter for a science to balance the science of the state. We may represent this conception graphically by two intersecting circles, the one labeled the "State," the other "Society," the contents of each presenting the material to be controlled by a distinct "Science."

Here was a dualism as difficult as that of the supreme church and the supreme state in the era of Henry and Hildebrand. Our immediate concern is not its defects as philosophy or science, but its instrumental value in the drive toward objectivity which we are observing; especially in that portion of its outcome which appeared in the differentiation of the American type of sociology.

It is impossible for us to establish specific connections between the Ahrens-von Mohl group and the earlier American sociologists. The latter, however, certainly did start with a conception of "Society," if not identical with, at least closely related to, that of the Ahrens-von Mohl group, as the subject-matter about which a new science must needs be created. The whole section in von Mohl's first volume, entitled *The Political Sciences and the Societary Sciences*,<sup>1</sup> might well be incorporated into our material. Space permits only brief excerpts.

The section begins in this way:

The marking out of a knowledge area usually begins historically not with the sharp logical definition of the whole idea that is fundamental, nor with precise bounding off from contiguous areas. Both the need and the possibility of such by no means always easy undertakings begin to make themselves felt only after a considerable quantity of ideas and facts have been assembled and considered, after particular doctrines have been worked out, and the relations to life in all respects have become more distinct. Then only, but assuredly, then, arises the subjective necessity of excluding and bounding: i.e., the scientific demand for eliminating that which is alien, which follows fundamental principles. Therewith also arises the practical demand for control of the entire material, in order that no gaps may be left, and that attention be not diverted to matters which belong to other men and other doctrines.

Not infrequently the definite awareness of the common conception, and consequently of the content and extent of a science, arises relatively late. Especially may it happen that an alien area may long not be excluded. This may be in consequence of a lack of precision in the dominating conceptions, which permits inclusion of heterogeneous facts and principles; or because no attention is given to a certain subject-matter, and thus its nature may remain uninvestigated. The latter is possible indeed even in the case of very important relations of life, or in the case of entire provinces of the psychic world. Suddenly then a new idea, or a previously unconscious need, may rouse the slumbering powers and may operate as a ferment and solvent.

Once the need of a definite exclusion and delimitation has arisen, the work must proceed with circumspection and prudence. It need not be argued that a science cannot arrive at completeness, whether in content or in form, so long as it has no intrinsic unity, and so long as it is uncertain what subject-matter it is to bring within the scope of its consideration. In particular, neither is a logically tenable sub-division and correlation of the particular components possible previous to a determination of boundaries and an inventory of assets; nor can the history of the science be undertaken consciously and critically,

<sup>1</sup> *Die Staatswissenschaften und die Gesellschaftswissenschaften*, pp. 69-110.



or even with correct reference to material and biography, so long as heterogeneity reigns in its premises.

At this moment the sciences of the state have reached such a turning point. That the state is the unitary organism of the total life of the people, and therewith that the science which embraces and interprets it is in antithesis with the science of the individual life, has been clear and recognized since human relationships have been grasped in their nature and have been logically expounded. Public law and private law; public finance and private thrift; civic history and description of life; have for thousands of years been regarded as distinct areas of thought and knowledge. It would accordingly be wholly superfluous to rehearse here the long familiar conceptions in order to be clear to oneself and to one's readers about the boundary lines of political science on this side. The case is different with a differentiation between the life of the state and the life of society, and with precise definition of conceptions and determination of boundaries between the respective sciences. Only now has this become possible, and consequently it has become a demand. Only quite lately have we arrived at a definite recognition that the life which men lead in common by no means has its existence in the state alone; but that intermediate between the sphere of the single personality and the organic unity of the life of the people there are many life circles which likewise have communitary objects as their aim, which do not originate from or through the state, even if they are already present in it, and are of the highest significance for weal or woe.<sup>1</sup> These two circles of thoughts and doctrines, which for more than two thousand years have appeared to be similar, or at most as part and whole, have now shown themselves as essentially different, and must also be treated separately, so that henceforth they may exist side by side as dissociated but equally privileged divisions of human knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

This is one of the cases in which life has brought science into movement. The fact of the various orders of life circles was in existence ever since human beings were together. There was need only of clear vision for recognition and discrimination. But this was precisely the lack. Science remained blind, although, from Plato on, the communitary reality aside from the state was often sensed and vaguely mentioned, and particularly a number of peculiar and eccentric minds now treated this relationship with artistic playfulness, again in wrathful paradox in the attempt to make it tell against the existing conditions. These writings appeared to be equally beneath the notice of serious scholars and of intelligent statesmen. They passed merely as diversions in moments of leisure. At last the word *Society* was uttered; at first by visionaries and their followers; then gradually also upon the rostrum, in the

<sup>1</sup> What was the supposed nature of the supposed intermediacy? Was it spatial, or logical, or conceptional in some other sense? One may labor in vain to decide precisely what picture the vague figure of speech suggested to the writer's mind.

<sup>2</sup> This figure of spatial side-by-sideness, or graduated up-and-downness, instead of functional togetherness of sciences, still gums up the imaginations of most scholars.

public house and in the secret assemblies of conspirators; it was borne aloft as a banner in frightful street battles. Then eyes suddenly opened. The whole indifference was converted into measureless alarm, so that now the formerly quite unknown word acted as a head of Medusa, which petrified the accustomed habits of freedom and the demands of the cultured and the moderate, and in a land otherwise not content with a reasonable measure of liberty, made possible an otherwise incomprehensible reign of lawlessness. It was not long before the seething in the market place and in the hovel had produced a numerous literature. A part of it was intended only to spread and incite wild revolutionary schemes, if not redistribution of goods by robbery. Other writings undertook the intelligent and not merely admissible but urgently necessary task of dismissing the conception of that existence which is distinguishable from the state and from the individual spheres of life—the needs, the present and the future of *Society*.<sup>1</sup> Thus through word and deed a quite new object of consciousness, volition and thought came into existence. What at first appeared to be wholly vague and even nonsensical gradually acquired form and relative sanction, and it stood out with increasing definiteness in its contrasts with the related but still the different. Yet not all the promoters of political science have been able to make up their minds to admit the legitimacy of this new modelling of things. Many, however, of those who are actually entitled to a vote are agreed as to the necessity of the separation between State and Society, and consequently they concede the necessity of a separation of their scientific preserves and systems.

While, therefore, singularly enough, until the most recent times insight and will passed by unsympathetically, a new and great task is now presented. The science of society must be established and developed. Particularly its boundaries with respect to political science are to be determined. This has, moreover, not merely significance for society, but almost equally for the state and the science of it. In fact this new science will make it possible to eliminate from the old irrelevancies with which it has thus far been burdened; in fact a whole series of practical questions will now for the first time find their correct solution.

It might appear as though it would be sufficient for the purpose of this work—which proposes only contributions to the history of the *political* and not also of the *social* sciences—to take merely general notice of this change in the treatment of the political sciences, so that a secure staking out of the region to be traversed may be possible, and a standpoint gained for evaluating many hitherto necessarily confused doctrines. More precise consideration shows, however, that in the present condition of the new discipline a bare application of its results cannot so out of hand occur. Rather must, in the first place, its own sort of investigations be undertaken, and points of attachment must be gained upon its own responsibility.

<sup>1</sup> So far, this was precisely the task which the early American sociologists set for themselves. It is impossible to tell precisely how far their content for the term "Society" differed from that of men like von Mohl.

Up to the present, indeed, even those who recognize the necessity of the new science are by no means settled in their views about it. If a secure basis for delimitation and judgment is to be gained, the promoters of the new science must make their own way and drive down the boundary stakes as they go along. Only in that event can one be secure against being diverted into byways by leaders who are not agreed among themselves.

For going so far afield compensation will be found also in the fact that, in the course of the investigations about the societary questions, opinions and writings will be discovered which in many ways refer to the political sciences, and facilitate later judgment of the same.

In the following section (pp. 72-83) von Mohl reviews and characterizes the attitude of the political scientists up to date toward the facts which he distinguishes as societary,<sup>1</sup> and in the third section (pp. 88-101), he elaborates his own conception of the concept "Society." For the present purpose it is enough to state that his analysis consists virtually in the enumeration of sample groups, peculiarities of which he briefly suggests, which are either partly or wholly outside the range of political science. Thus: (1) *Stände* (vocational); (2) *Gemeinden* (parishes) as something more than administrative areas; (3) economic associations (laborers, promoters, capitalists); (4) nobility; (5) clergy; (6) artisans; (7) peasants; (8) land owners; (9) castes; (10) races; (11) creedal groups; (12) the educated strata versus the uneducated; (13) the family, etc.

With the foregoing indication of von Mohl's outlook, we may dismiss him from consideration. The essential point is that a group of German political scientists at the middle of the nineteenth century came into view of societary problems, in terms which correspond essentially with American formulation of sociological problems today. That is, they assumed that there are phenomena of many human groups besides the state and subdivisions of the state which must be investigated, and that a distinct science is needed for the investigation. We need not wonder that the further proposals, by such men as Ahrens and von Mohl, for the organization of the needed science were unworkable. Our present knowledge of developments in the line of these suggestions does not enable us to trace the sequence between von Mohl and Kohler. It is to be

<sup>1</sup> On p. 77 von Mohl casually mentions Comte. I had overlooked this fact when I made a statement to the contrary. *Encyc. Amer.*, title "Sociology," p. 212.

hoped that followers of Deans Pound and Wigmore in this country will write this chapter in the history of methodology.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, for more reasons than one, it is memorable that Heinrich von Treitschke took it upon himself to extirpate the Ahrens-von Mohl heresy. In 1859 he published a monograph entitled *Gesellschaftswissenschaft, ein Kritischer Versuch*. It was an argument to the effect that political science was amply able to deal scientifically with all groups in human society, and that a new science for that purpose would consequently be superfluous. Instead of silencing forever the claims of the innovators, Treitschke's opposition served to keep alive the spark which had been kindled. Whether a direct connection can be made out between these mid-century sociologists and those who succeeded in winning a place in the sun, is one of the questions which must remain for the present unsettled.

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## SECTION XIX. THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES

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### ABSTRACT

The "drive toward objectivity" of which the previous sections have exhibited incidents initiated the American sociological movement, not by foisting formulas upon passively receptive minds, but by generating a critical spirit, by means of the entire tradition of social science methodology, both toward that methodology itself and toward tried and untried proposals of social programs. The immediate antecedents of American sociology were the *Verein für Socialpolitik* and its offspring, the American Economic Association. Until now American sociology has covered only the necessary rudimentary period of determining working categories. The place of Lester F. Ward in the movement is indicated. The modicum of identical ideas among the beginners is described. The sociologists had to take their turn in learning that objective reality, not antecedent definition, eventually molds science. An appropriate title for a sympathetic story of the American sociological movement up to the present time would be *Up from Amateurism*.

We have thus followed the growth of a tradition of objectivity. It did not so much precipitate dogmas as it enlarged and clarified consciousness of the complexity of human relations. It stimulated awareness of the many-sidedness of the requirements, if there is

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<sup>1</sup> A note on p. 750 of Small's "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI (1916), is so worded as to convey the impression that von Mohl, like Treitschke, opposed those who demanded a new science of society. Just before the note was written I had given in a lecture substantially the same account of von Mohl's relation to sociology which appears in this chapter. The blunder is therefore without excuse.

to be competent research into these relations. It induced keenness of discrimination between mere fictionizing and opinionizing about the human lot, and discovery of actual correlations of cause and effect. It produced among the most teachable learners a deep humility of conviction that the human mind had been mostly meandering in the field of social discovery, and that serious research was due to begin.

All that has been said in this survey thus far might be compressed into the single sentence which has been repeated in various versions, viz., *Sociology has a venerable genealogy*. Sociology was not like Topsy, not even like Minerva, born in complete maturity from a single creative brain. Sociology is a branch of the great trunk of social science. Social science itself has been developing into increasingly definite self-consciousness, and consequently into increasingly adequate self-expression. Sociology is merely one of the latest articulations of this completer self-expression by the great body of students of human experience.

This outline has doubtless provoked the questions, perhaps it has encouraged the corresponding attitude—What of it? What does any body care? Why is it worth while to dig up the record of all these people who are no more to us than we to them?

This is the answer: Whatever we may construct as a logical statement of what ought to be true, it is true that *we cannot be as intelligent as we might be about the present problems or the present processes of any science, unless, among other things, we have joined company with the people who have at length differentiated the processes; in other words, unless we have acquired our sense of the present condition of that branch of knowledge in part by the historical approach, i.e., our sense of the present condition is not a sense at all, it is a numbness, without this historical approach*. We do not fully take in the problems as problems, unless to a certain extent we have put ourselves back into the state of mind of people before our time who were pioneering through blind trails that opened at last upon the problems of our own time, and were experimenting with devices for dealing with pioneering difficulties.

A secondary reason was also referred to in the introduction, viz., that this historical approach enables us to reduce the amount of

duplication into which we might be betrayed if we were ignorant of what had been attempted, with what positive and negative results, before our time. In the survey thus far is many a clue to things to avoid, and things to continue, in the present pursuit of social science in general and of sociology in particular.

This section will be repetitious in the sense that it will characterize the beginnings of the American sociological movement, and to a certain extent its continuance, from two or three slightly varied angles. As an eyewitness, and as a participant, the writer has been impressed at different times by different aspects of the same facts, and he hopes that his testimony and judgment about the facts, in slightly different versions, will be of service to future students of the movement. The story has also been told at some length in a previous version.<sup>1</sup>

Few historical facts are better attested than that the tradition which we have sketched was at once transmitted to the United States.<sup>2</sup> It was not taken over bodily. It was not reproduced here inscribed upon tables of stone, visible, intelligible, categorical. It was brought over piecemeal. It was brought as impulse, as preferred valuation now of this factor, now of that in the tradition. It was brought as ambition to count in the work of bringing forth

<sup>1</sup> Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI (1916), 721.

<sup>2</sup> No attempt has been made to complete the catalogue, but without referring to earlier and later decades, as an index of the thought movement the following list is impressive. It includes merely the men whom the writer recalls as having studied in German universities during the seventies, or the whole the most stimulating decade in German social science: William G. Sumner (in the previous decade), Marburg and Göttingen, Social Science; Herbert B. Adams, History, Johns Hopkins, Heidelberg, 1876; John W. Burgess, Political Science, Columbia, Leipzig, Berlin, 1871-73; Richard T. Ely, Economics, Johns Hopkins and Wisconsin, Halle, Heidelberg, Geneva, and Berlin, 1877-80; Henry W. Farnam, Political Economy, Yale, Strassburg, 1878; Frank J. Goodenow, Political Science, Columbia, Paris, and Berlin, 1879-82; Arthur T. Hadley, Economics, Yale, Berlin, 1878-79; George E. Howard, Sociology, Leland Stanford, Nebraska, Munich, and Paris, 1878-80; Edmund J. James, Political and Social Science, University of Pennsylvania, Halle, 1878-79; Simon N. Patten, Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Halle, 1878; E. R. A. Seligman, Economics, Columbia, Berlin, Heidelberg, Geneva; William M. Sloane, History, Princeton and Columbia, Leipzig, 1876; Albion W. Small, Sociology, Chicago, Berlin, and Leipzig, 1879-81; Frank W. Taussig, Economics, Harvard, Berlin, 1879; William H. Tilghast, History, Assistant Librarian, Harvard, Berlin, 1878-80.

things new and old from the scripture of human experience, and of using them so as to help American society become wise unto salvation. In some cases it was a conviction of the woeful superficiality and vacuity, or at best fractionality of everything in the world at the time, which passed as scientific interpretation of any part of human experience. In these cases it was not a ritual, not an authority, it was a ferment, brewing a new attitude, a new procedure toward all problems of knowledge and conduct of human life.

In most cases (to change the figure) the shock absorber was the traditional division of social science in which each of these recruits enlisted. In a few cases the traditional divisions of social science became so uncomfortable that bearers of this or one of the other parallel traditions began to yearn and then to design for an *independent science of society*, to achieve understanding of the human lot which the older social sciences had failed to interpret. We need not apologize for their superfluity of sanguineness. If they had not been actuated by zeal in excess of discretion their variant in social science might not have been appreciable for generations. It turned out that for several of these men the American Historical Association (1884) or the American Economic Association (1885) became a halfway station between traditionalism and sociology. The connection between each of these bodies and the tradition we have sketched is plain.<sup>\*</sup>

The entire tradition, of which we have indicated only some of the most outstanding elements, together with much elaboration to which we have been unable to give space, was partly the undivided inheritance with other heirs, partly the creation of the men who formed the *Verein für Socialpolitik*. It determined their plane of thinking. It molded their attitudes. It formed their policies. Much of this tradition was mobilized in the formation of the American Historical Association. The American Economic Association was formed in conscious and avowed emulation of the *Verein*. Its organizers transfused the spirit and much of the creed of the parent-body into the current of American thought. The American Sociological Society was incubated within the American

<sup>\*</sup> For index to history of the two associations, see Small, *ibid.*, pp. 776-84. The remainder of this outline is parallel with that monograph from p. 748.

Economic Association, with crossings from the Historical Association. The sociologists carried along the same tradition, and developed certain of its implications beyond the limit set by the historians or the economists.<sup>1</sup>

To anticipate a conceivable though unreasonable objection, we add the superfluous remark that if Americans had never heard of the Germans they would still have had a tradition of their own, derived from the many other sources of their intellectual life. Sure enough! Americans had not lived in a vacuum, nor was German thought their only medium of existence. Our statement is that the American intellectual atmosphere, without the German admixture, would not have contained the variants that could have generated the sociology which actually appeared, and when it appeared.

It came about that by 1890 the academic atmosphere of the United States was thick with germs of ideas which came from or through this German tradition. The consequence was not, as has often been charged by Americans who mistrusted the German influence, a program of mechanical copying or simian imitating of German methods. It was rather a self-respecting effort to learn and apply all that was legible in the experience of the Germans in projecting a procedure of our own. If only for examples of what not to do and how not to do it, German social scientists between 1800 and 1890 would have been well worth studying. Their academic follies, rightly considered, are full of instruction. We have turned the searchlight rather upon some of the constructive ideas which they developed. Not as patterns, but more as tonics,

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 779-85. Students who pursue the study of methodology might well, in this connection, follow the professional career of Karl Lamprecht (born 1856) as an exhibition of the effect of this tradition upon one German historian. Lamprecht was not a sociologist, but it is evident that if he had migrated to the United States, he would have shown more sympathy than most of the American historians ever had with the sociological movement. An introduction to Lamprecht's variation in historical methodology may be found in the article by Earle Wilbur Dow, "Features of the New History," *American Historical Review*, III, 431-48. For Lamprecht's own documentation of his crusade, see the bibliography in the twelfth volume of his *Deutsche Geschichte*. (For these references I am indebted to my colleague, James Westfall Thompson.) The most important of Lamprecht's controversial writings are (1) *Alle und neue Richtungen in der Geschichtswissenschaft*, 1896; (2) *Zwei Streitschriften*, 1897; (3) *Die historische Methode des Herrn von Below*, 1899; (4) *Die kulturhistorische Methode*, 1900; (5) *Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft*, 1908 (translated by Andrews with the title: *What Is History?*); (6) *Einführung in das historische Denken*, 1912.



these ideas actually entered into the formation of a distinct tendency in social science which German professors presently, partly in ridicule, partly in admiration, referred to as the "American Science."<sup>1</sup>

If there had been no other impulse to innovation, the stimuli which we have described would have been enough. In fusion with the other influences which we have not traced, they created a movement which today need not shun comparison, whether as to quantity or quality of its effectiveness, with the influence of history, or economics, or of political science. We must specify that Lester F. Ward, whose influence was for a long time the most evident factor in American sociology, avowedly represented the Comtean succession, while William G. Sumner and Franklin H. Giddings developed more immediately, though not exclusively, the initiatives of Herbert Spencer.<sup>2</sup>

American sociology is now so well established that it can afford to be self-critical. It no longer needs to rest its claims on bombastic proclamations of what it hopes to do, nor upon inflated estimates of what it has done. While we gratefully recognize the educational value of sociological study for those who have devoted themselves to it during the past generation, the results to be passed along, as permanent acquisitions, to the next generation, are to all outward seeming meager. This form of statement should be corrected by reference to the enormous mass of insights into specific group reactions collected by local surveys, by social analysis, by the case method, by the anthropological and ethnological sociologists and by the social psychologists. Referring now exclusively to the contribution of sociology to objectivity in general scientific method, its function thus far has amounted chiefly to constructive criticism of the limitations of the technique employed by the other divisions of social science, and to the sharpening of an armory of tools for further warfare against the powers of darkness. More literally

<sup>1</sup> Herbert B. Adams, who was one of the most influential promoters of the spirit, not the letter, of the German drive toward objectivity, told me that he had never once opened a "Heft" of his German notes since he returned to this country. I can vouch for one more identical case, and I fancy these instances illustrate the rule.

<sup>2</sup> One division of the English sociologists is committed to fabrication of a legend to the effect that Le Play is the almost greatest fountain head of sociology (cf. Swinny, *Sociological Review*, XXI [1919], 3; already quoted in the Introduction). American sociologists were weighing the merits of the Le Play movement a quarter-century ago, but the cult failed to hold their attention. See *American Journal of Sociology*, I (1896), 802, and II (1897), 662.

expressed, we have been doing work which will equip our successors with categories of social inquiry, most of which, and even the most important of which were not above the threshold of consciousness when the sociological movement began.

In recent years changes have been rung frequently upon the proposition that the main achievement of political economy thus far has been the perfecting of its working categories. MacLeod presents the idea in his *History of Economics* (pp. 24 ff.). We have already referred to this author above.<sup>1</sup> He must not be understood as representing a consensus among English theorists; and even if his main theorem were indorsed, it is not probable that his table of particulars would be accepted. He is cited, therefore, merely by way of illustration.

Every science consists of two parts, first, general concepts or definitions, or a due classification of the quantities it treats about, and secondly, the laws which govern their relations, called by Bacon, Newton and many others axioms or general principles.

By that mysterious correlation which holds between reasoning and reality, it is invariably found that if concepts of things are framed which are true to nature, and results are calculated according to reasoning which is also true to nature, they will be found to correspond with reality. That is, if true concepts are framed, and truly reasoned about, results may be predicted. But if results are calculated, and it is found that they do not correspond to nature, but are palpably and notoriously erroneous, then we are immediately certain that either the concept or the reasoning must be erroneous. . . .

Now, the formation of definitions, or concepts, is not arbitrary, or dependent on the will of the writer. Their formation, as well as that of axioms, or general laws, is strictly subject to certain general philosophic laws. We may state two canons of fundamental importance:

- I. *The fundamental concepts and axioms of a science must be perfectly general.*
- II. *No general concept and no general axiom must contain any term involving more than one fundamental idea.*

The truth of this latter canon is manifest, because, if any term involve more than one fundamental idea, it limits the concept or axiom, which is contrary to the first canon.

Consequently, if we wish to bring economics to the state of an exact science, we must carefully examine all its fundamental concepts and axioms, and reduce them to the state of generality and simplicity required by the above canons. Hence, if we meet with concepts and axioms which violate them by containing several ideas, we must apply the general principles of inductive logic to discover which is the true general idea, and eliminate all other accidental, particular, or intrusive ideas.

<sup>1</sup> Section x.

MacLeod's schedule in accordance with these preliminaries appears in his table of contents (Book II) as follows:

THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND AXIOMS OF  
ECONOMICS

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We need not commit ourselves to an opinion as to whether the foregoing is an adequate apparatus of economic concepts. We may

trust the economists themselves for both additions and subtractions. The point is that the foundations of no science are fairly laid until it has reached precision in defining the elementary facts and relations with which it has to deal.

Nor need we turn aside from our main exposition to contend that the sociologists have worked out an adequate apparatus of elementary concepts. Our proposition is that working toward such an equipment is the most fundamental merit of general sociology thus far. The future must test the categories now most in use.<sup>1</sup>

We must refer to it later in another way, but it is in order to record here the further item, important enough in itself to mark an epoch in the growth of thought, that in the generation since the sociological movement began, the presumption that linear causation is the main connection of human events has given place to the presumption which we may call vortex causation. In other words, the early sociologists shared the idea of all social scientists at the time, that some single great principle would ultimately be discovered, running in the trail of chronology, which principle would be the sole master key to human experience. Whether we still believe that or not, we are not aware that there are any sociologists left who still think we can at present most profitably employ our time in search for such a principle. On the contrary, we are convinced that every actual social situation, innumerable cases of which we must learn to interpret if we are to arrive at objective understanding of life, is a resultant of causal factors which run in on that center from every point of the compass—to speak in a figure of only two dimensions. Among these numberless influences the consecutive or historical in a particular case may be greatest; but it may also be least; and it may have any place in the scale between the extremes. We are therefore less inclined to formulate questions of group cause and effect as problems merely or chiefly of one-direction causation. If we had to choose between alternatives neither of which is sufficiently objective, we should say now that the best picture we have of social causation more nearly

<sup>1</sup> For a tentative list of sociological categories—not up-to-date—see Small, *General Sociology* (1906), pp. 401-3. A better winnowed collection is in use as subtitles in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, and samples of categories of another order are furnished by the chief titles in Ross, *Principles of Sociology*.

resembles a chemical reaction than a cable transmitting an electric current straight down from the beginning of the world. If this were all that had come from the sociological movement; it would have been worth much more than it has cost.<sup>1</sup>

We have thus characterized in the most summary way the meaning of the sociological movement in the United States, from its appearance (marked, let us say, by the publication of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology*, 1883) to the time of this writing (1923). Stages in the movement are indicated by the literature listed under the title, "Development of Sociological Consciousness in the United States" (*American Journal of Sociology*, XXVII [1921], 226-31). All that our space permits by way of further interpretation of the movement will be devoted to selected phases of this development.

In his *Principles of Ethics* Herbert Spencer makes much of the difference between the sentiment of ethics and the idea of ethics. Borrowing that idiom we may say that the pioneers of American sociology were equipped with a high power of the sentiment of sociology, but we can now see that they lacked a dominating idea of sociology as a definite procedure. In place of a precise pivotal conception of sociology, there were feverish longings for a better way of interpreting human experience than the older interpretations had achieved. There were only slight resemblances between several types of experimental substitutes proposed by these innovators, for the methods which they declared abortive. The intervening generation has accomplished much dead work for which future scholars may or may not award full credit. The most prolific result of this dead work is the perception, now elementary and commonplace among sociologists, that human experience always and everywhere runs its course in and through groupings of persons. At first glance these groupings often appear to be permanent, structural, static—a family or a family institution; a church or a given ecclesiastical system; a state or a particular type of government; unionized labor, as contrasted with isolated workmen. In reality, these groupings, which for brevity we permit ourselves to indicate by the less precise substantive form *groups*,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI (1916), 792-95.

are always interactions of persons, that is, processes. We have come to see then that the inadequacy of which our present insight convicts the older social sciences is neglect to find out all that it is possible to discover about the forms, modes, methods, proportions, and intensities of these group processes throughout the range of human experience. Accordingly it has become the sociological division of labor first of all to elaborate the categories of group processes in which human activities occur; and secondly to supplement the other social science techniques by adding to their exposition of given human situations everything that can be discovered by reducing them to terms of these categories.

Whatever then may have been the hopes, and the ideals, and the definitions of the pioneers, sociology in the United States has come to be, first and chiefest, one of the numerous interdependent techniques by means of which research into the facts and the meanings of human experience is now conducted. The sociological technique consists in brief, first, of discovery of categories of recurrent group forms, group movements, group motivations, group appraisals, and group controls. So far as subject-matter is concerned, sociology deals with the same reality which has provoked the theorizings of all the rationalizers since men began to observe the human lot and reflect about it. Respectable as many of these systems are, considered as attempts of earnest men to correlate all that was known about human events, for sociologists they have only the interest of material to be observed. As procedure, as science, they rate with sociologists as negligible except in so far as they bring to light or keep in the light facts which are pertinent regardless of previous theories. From our viewpoint as to the essentials of objectivity, nothing has any claim to our attention which does not proceed from or adjust itself to conceptions of the human reality which gather around these categories of group formation and processes. Everything strictly sociological pivots upon objectively established and precisely characterized group categories. As a practical matter, it is as undesirable as it would be difficult to keep treatment of the categories themselves sharply separated from application of the categories to interpretation of selected social situations.

It must be repeated over and over again that American sociology was, at first, hardly more than a negative movement. Not in spirit, not in purpose, not in prospectus, but in fact. At the start American sociology, always excepting Ward's system, supposed by its author to be in principle complete, amounted in effect to little more than an assertion that all the traditional ways of interpreting human experience were futile. Thereupon sociology became an assertion of intention to invent new and better ways to take the place of old ones. With the exception noted, sociology was not primarily a promulgation of doctrines about society. It was an assertion that better ways must be invented than all the rationalizers about society had practiced in their attempts to understand the fortunes of men in the past, and to point out wise courses for the future. The sociological movement in the United States was principally faith that the needed better ways were discoverable, and gradual transformation of that faith into search for the better ways. Thus what was first scarcely more than a hope for improvement presently became the voluntarily assumed duty of realizing the hope. The movement which we have called "The Evolution of Sociological Consciousness in the United States,"<sup>1</sup> has been the partially unconscious effort to discharge this obligation. It is impossible to say how many men, even now, are clearly aware of this vocation. Not by any means all that calls itself sociology has emancipated itself from the old habits of sheer rationalizing, in blissful unconsciousness that, barring happy accidents, objectivity can be arrived at only by systematic use of some specialized intellectual apparatus which establishes credible contacts with reality. Impelled by the desire for objectivity which was our inheritance from the scientific tradition of nineteenth-century social science scholarship, a few men have persisted in making out group categories fit to be tools of more reliable exposition of human experience than had previously been used; or better, group categories which are capable instruments of research into aspects of human experience neglected by previous interpreters; aspects which cannot be ignored without leaving explanations of human experience at an unconvincing stage. The essential part of soci-

<sup>1</sup> See *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVII (1921), 226.

ology, then, is not opinions which sociologists have arrived at about the realities of human experience. The essential part of sociology is the thought apparatus which sociologists have developed for reaching insights into human experience that entitle them to any opinions at all. In other words, the right of sociologists to recognition as scientists is valid only in so far as the categories which they use, and their manner of using them, enable them to probe at some points deeper into human reality than other techniques have penetrated.

Returning to our point of departure, the one impulse which the early American sociologists had in common was belief that there is such an entity as "society"; that this entity is the inclusive mystery of human experience; that social science, as it had developed up to their time, was an aborted and futile provision for interpreting this mystery, and that the time had come for invention of a science which would be equal to the task in which previous social science had failed. No apology for these enthusiasts is necessary. Their conception of the calling wherewith they were called was grandiose, but they had the courage of their convictions, and they accepted the mandate which they believed to be their commission. The results, so far as results are visible, have been in the first place a radical transformation of the sociologists' conceptions of the reality which they proposed to investigate. This supposed thing, "society," has steadily resisted expression as a thing at all. It has gradually resolved itself into a near-infinity of group relationships and processes. Accordingly, the procedure, the technique, which sociologists have found themselves obliged to invent, has turned out to be mental tools for detecting and interpreting all sorts of group phenomena. Meanwhile sociologists have very greatly modified their conceptions of the relation between their own technique and that of the other divisions of social science. At the same time sociological procedure has differentiated itself into research into numerous distinct phases of group relationships.<sup>1</sup> When we speak of the sociological movement, or general sociology, in the United States, we mean then *everything that followed the expression of deliberate and avowed purpose to work for a scientific interpretation of cause and effect in human society at large.*

<sup>1</sup> See *Encyc. Amer.*, title "Sociology," p. 215.



In this connection reading of the article "Sociologie" in *La Grande Encyclopédie* is recommended. It was published in or about 1900. In some respects it presents a better case for sociology than American sociologists had been able to agree upon at the time.

As we have repeatedly urged<sup>1</sup> from 1833 to the present moment sociology has been a *something in the process of becoming*. Over and over again, meanwhile, sociology has been defined as though it was, and as though it was destined to remain as it was.<sup>2</sup> In fact, sociology was principally, and most respectably, *an earnest attempt to become something*, and what it from time to time got to be was covered only in part, and often in least part, by the successive definitions and descriptions. Still less has sociology been finally determined by these antecedent definitions.

At many points in this survey it would have been in order to remark that no "science" has turned out to correspond precisely with advance definitions of the science. It might have been asserted over and over again that sociology is among the most evident cases under this generalization. Long before a few scholars had explicitly declared their dedication to a scientific adventure for which they adopted the name "sociology," there were sporadic attempts in different parts of Europe to construct a "social science," or a "science of society," or (after 1839) a "sociology." In each instance the desideratum of a new social science was advertised along with more or less explicit details as to the constitution of the desired science—what it should be, or what it should do, or both. In no case have the subsequent activities of sociologists conformed very closely, or very long, to the definitions. The substantial reason for this is that science cannot be essentially a thing, it must be essentially a procedure. Science is first endeavor to find out something. Science is secondarily endeavor to set in an order corresponding with their operating places in reality whatever items may be learned about reality. What a science actually is, as it develops, is determined by the nature of the things which it proves possible to find out, by the nature of the things which prove

<sup>1</sup> E.g., *ibid.*, under subhead "Description."

<sup>2</sup> A lurid instance is Mr. Benjamin Kidd's article "Sociology" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, referred to below.

to be beyond finding out, and by the procedures that prove to be available for the feasible finding out.

In principle a science is like an exploration of an unknown country. Suppose the survivors of the first winter in Plymouth, instead of being content to struggle longer for existence on Cape Cod, had formed the more ambitious purpose of finding out the geography of the earth's surface in its utmost reach toward the west. We can hardly make our minds in imagination as blank with reference to the experiences that would be involved as the minds of the Plymouth colonists must have been. Let us suppose that before starting to realize their ambition they had composed a definition of the procedure which would supposedly accomplish their purpose. If it went beyond the most non-committal commonplace—like "We must go west as far as we can"—it would begin to be inadequate before an exit had been made from Cape Cod. Suppose their powers of endurance and of achievement had been supported by the miraculous reinforcement which alone would have sufficed to sustain the enterprise. The incidental result would have been that the adventurers' conceptions of the procedure which would actually be involved in the completion of their effort would have been revolutionized before they had covered the first tenth of the distance. Several reconstructions of their conceptions of adequate procedure would have followed before they were within sight of their goal. They would have been compelled to extemporize a technique of locomotion adaptable to all the topographical variations, from meadow brooks to the Mississippi, from seaboard forests to swamp and prairie and desert and mountain. They would have been forced to devise a technique of provisioning, adaptable to the parts of the journey in which they could live from hand to mouth off the country, and to those parts of the journey in which calculation would have to be made for supplies to last, under different climatic conditions, through months of scarcity. They would have been obliged to devise a diplomacy of intercourse with different types of savages, a diplomacy convincing enough to insure themselves against all the antecedent probabilities of extermination. Suppose all this were accomplished. What would be the probable degree of resemblance between the

final account of the actual *modus operandi* of the trek from Atlantic to Pacific, and the visions of what the journey would be like which occupied the minds of the colonists before they left Plymouth?

No exact parallel can be drawn between this imaginary experience and the features of evolving social science, but in principle the analogy is perfect. If we use the term "science" in the sense of "approximately complete knowledge," not merely in the sense of an orderly arrangement of such makings of knowledge as a certain limited procedure may gather, then science is predetermined by the relations of cause and effect which operate in the reaches of reality in question, not by any definition of scope or method which can be arrived at before those reaches of reality have been explored. For example, whether the "history" of Herodotus or Thucydides is to be classed rather as good reading, from the standpoint of literary critics, or as science, from the standpoint of the modern methodologist, depends upon the degree in which the books respectively have reflected all the different kinds and ratios of cause and effect, as interpreted by all the pertinent rules of evidence, involved in the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars. History, as science, is not merely that reflection of a portion of the past which has been cast upon the mind of a given writer by the particular mirrors which happened to be at his disposal. History as science is reconstruction of past units of experience by use of all the mirrors which reflect any important factors in the given experience, and by correction of all the reflections, and refractions and optical illusions by all auxiliary means at command. In other words, and more literally, history as science is necessarily, in the first place, incessant improvisation of increased accuracy and comprehensiveness in the discovery of evidence, and of increased objectivity in the organization of discoveries reached by the improved methods, especially by correlating historical results with the findings of other techniques.

The like, on the side of method, is the case with each division of social science and with social science as a whole. Speaking now particularly of sociology, it is a humiliating fact that, until now, as a rule, all the sociologists have blandly disregarded this foreordination of nature. In recent years there have been notable exceptions to the rule; but in general the sociologists have dupli-

cated the age-old folly of defining their science before they had been taught what their procedure must be by hard experience with their phenomena.

Each of us who has tried to promote development of sociology has had his own doctrine of what sociology will turn out to be when it is developed, and each of us has tried to give that doctrine a share in the elaboration of sociology out of proportion to the share which belongs to docile search into the facts. Gradually, however, reality is prevailing over preconception. In effect, each man's doctrine as to what sociology is has turned out to be a hypothesis as to what sociology may be. Each has attempted to vindicate his hypothesis by using the apparatus which it gave into his hand. The aggregate result has been, first, negatively, demonstration of the futility of an enormous scrap-heap of sociological preconceptions. Then positively the result has been, first, accumulation of an enormous body of insights into actual types of recurrences in human experience; second, visualization of all these recurrences under the aspect of group formations; third, development of a capable but constantly differentiating apparatus of categories for further interpretation of group processes.

The most notable exception to the rule of becoming was Lester F. Ward.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps never in the history of thought has a man in middle life launched a rounded and complete system of doctrine, and lived to be a leader of a company of younger men glad to make that system their point of departure, and for years produced monographs and books in elaboration of his doctrine which all the younger men were bound to study, yet with no more modification of the original structure of his doctrine than Ward ever made in the system proclaimed in his first book. The consequence has been that Ward's work occupies in general sociology very much the place of the Tower among the institutions of London. *Dynamic Sociology* was such a massive work that it cast a spell over a small group, and then recruits to their ranks, and it held them in an attitude of awe for years, even while some of them were forging

<sup>1</sup> Cf. "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI (1916), 749 ff.

ahead in paths that carried them beyond its control. Yet in principle *Dynamic Sociology* had better chance for permanent influence the day it appeared than ever after. It was as though a duplicate of the Tower of London had been created in Philadelphia on July 4, 1776. *Dynamic Sociology* affected the few who valued it most highly, and the present writer was of the number, as a pillar of fire. But the currents of the world's thought were already moving so fast that its leadership was bound presently to be overtaken and passed.

It is impossible to assign a date for this readjustment of sociological values. The present writer had not formed the judgment just expressed at the time of Ward's death (1913), or at least he had not advanced it from his subconsciousness into verbal expression. He has no means of knowing how many of the American sociologists at that time were aware that the high spots of their thought-world were no longer identical with those of Ward's. The fact was, however, that this colossus of generalization<sup>1</sup> held a place of splendid uniqueness for decades. Other men, meanwhile, felt themselves obliged to begin at the bottom and to construct a sociology of their own, partly with the help of Ward, and partly in spite of him.

With the exception of Ward, the story of the earlier sociologists in the United States may be told most objectively in this way: Taking the date 1890 for convenience, there were a considerable number of social scientists—historians, economists, etc.—who, with little or no knowledge of one another, were moved by a common unrest about the unconvincing character of everything that had been done up to that time in the way of interpreting human life. These men felt that social science in its current forms was all shallow, and unsatisfying and misleading. They wanted to do something about it. In sober truth, they cannot be likened more tellingly than to the spoiled boy who was crying at the top of his voice, whose governess questioned, "What do you want?" He answered, "I don't want nawthin', I want ter want somethin'."

<sup>1</sup> I.e., Ward's system of cosmic philosophy, with sociological corollaries, as set forth once for all in *Dynamic Sociology*, and the later books which were virtually not additions to but expositions of it.

Even Ward, who was more sure of himself than any other among the pioneers, does not begin by expressing himself directly about the problems of sociology. He speaks rather of the place which belongs to sociology in the company of other sciences. Thus he says:

The subject of the classification of the sciences and of the natural order of phenomena will come up for a more special consideration in an early part of the work.<sup>1</sup> Its introduction here is for the purpose of calling attention to the position and to the importance of sociology in such a system. Whatever may be the difficulty in fixing the position of any other science, that of sociology, as Comte clearly showed, must occupy the last place in the series. Its highly special character, its great complexity and, above all, the dependence which a careful study of it shows it to have upon all the rest, all point unmistakably to the end of the chain as its only natural position. Not only does it depend more or less upon all other sciences but *it cannot be shown that any other science is in the least dependent upon it*. This last fact is even more decisive than the others as to its true character and place. Its logical position at the end of the series is further shown by the manner in which it comprehends all other sciences. It is, as it were, all sciences combined, embracing all that they embrace, together with a large differentia.<sup>2</sup>

In detachment from one another, as a rule, the majority of these innovating men were already, in various ways, vexing their souls with some form of the question: Just what is it that I want? It is probably already too late to reconstruct the precise course by which this question began to be articulate and to reach the ears of others than those who uttered it. An incident in the writer's recollection will give an idea of how attenuated the process of evolving a sociological group was at first. It was at a meeting of the American Economic Association. Someone had the enterprise to suggest that those who were interested in sociology should gather for an informal talk. The picture that remains in the writer's mind indicates that more than twenty responded. We were seated in a circle within a private dining-room of a hotel. The general impression that we were feeling each other out, and hoping to get some suggestion that would be a credible pointer for our pent-up impulses against conformity to traditional social science, is all that remains in our memory about the session except this episode:

<sup>1</sup> I, 97, 187, and chaps. iii-vii.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, p. 9.

The only individual in the company who lingers in deponent's recollection as having spoken was the president of a theological seminary in New England. He had been quite free in utterance. Presently he asserted: "What we need as a starter for sociology is a radical reconstruction of the classification of the sciences." Lester F. Ward was sitting directly opposite the writer. He vigorously nodded assent and bent forward with a look of eager interest in what might follow. Someone prompted: "Dr. —, what would be your idea of the way to reclassify the sciences?" Dr. — hesitated, but after a little urging, in which Ward joined, he continued: "Well, I suppose few of you will agree with me, but in my judgment there never will be any reliable sociology until it has its place in a system of sciences founded on theology." Ward threw himself back in his chair with a gasp that was almost a groan, and a legible look of disgust and despair. The effect on the rest of the company was probably identical in all but degree. So far as our information goes this was the last appearance of that particular Doctor of Divinity as a constructor of sociology. Nor have we any evidence of any positive outcome from that first meeting of American sociologists.

Unsatisfied bewilderment was the original state of the American sociologists, if they may be referred to as a group before they arrived at visibility or self-consciousness as a group. Thus when the present writer published his syllabus, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, in 1890, his Thesis I read:

*Sociology is the science which has for its subject-matter the phenomena of human society, viz., the varieties of groups in which individuals are associated, with the organization, relations, functions and tendencies of these various associations.*

In other words, *Sociology is the science which combines and correlates all the special social sciences.*<sup>1</sup>

It would require a high voltage of imagination to invent a more cheerful *non sequitur* unafraid. The first sentence contains an explicit premonition of the conclusion about the group center of attention toward which the sociologists converged during the following thirty years. The second sentence affirms a judgment

<sup>1</sup> Schäffle, *Bau und Leben*, I, 17, also IV, 480.

which the sociologists have meanwhile become more and more inclined to disclaim, which at best is not involved in the first.

On the other hand, Professor Giddings from the first maintained that sociology is the *fundamental* social science, thus, apparently, contradicting Ward's formula. (The qualifier *social*, however, furnished ground for arrest of judgment as to the measure of disagreement.) In *Principles of Sociology*,<sup>1</sup> Giddings says:

While sociology in the broadest sense of the word is the comprehensive scheme of society, coextensive with the entire field of the special social sciences, in a narrower sense, and for purposes of university study, and of general exposition, it may be defined as *the science of social elements and first principles*. . . . Moreover, sociology is the inclusive and co-ordinating, only as it is the *fundamental* social science. So far from being merely the sum of the social sciences, it is rather their common base.

From our present outlook it is easy to see that each of these formulations was an expression of the author's wish and longing and ideal rather than of anything that had been or could be realized. Moreover, and indicative of the unsettled state of mind as to precise problems and programs, while stoutly maintaining such incongruous views, these innovators actually at the same time gave asylum to the opinions which they fought, as though they might somehow be harmonized.

In spite of the jumble of unreconciled ideas, of which the foregoing are samples, the innovators were doggedly one in the Hamlet attitude:

The time is out of joint:—O, cursed spite,  
That ever I was born to set it right!

They were trying to present Hamlet, however, as an optimist, by amending so that "cursed spite" should read *blessed grace*.

Future sociologists will gain a clear perspective of their place in general social science in the degree in which they adjust themselves to the facts about the visible beginnings of sociology. They must realize that the early innovators had virtually only two working principles in common—indeed, we might better say *not yet* working principles—one negative, viz., *Current methods of explaining human affairs have failed to give us all that is knowable about human*

<sup>1</sup> 1896, pp. 33 ff.



*affairs*; the other positive, but still merely formal, viz., *Methods may be devised for learning more about human affairs, and we are going to try to devise them.* Reduced to their substantial content, all the professions and programs of the sociologists, from the earliest to the present, have amounted chiefly to workshop bulletins that the devising of more penetrating search processes was still going on. Whatever knowledge has been gained incidentally, and the mass of it has been great, is still inferior in significance to what has been learned about ways of approach to the reality of human experience in order to compel it to reveal the most of itself. It was necessary even for the sociologists to stay a long time in the purgatory of obscurity before they assimilated the primary lesson that, if human reality is in any sense a simple addition of the fortunes of individuals, that sense is qualified by the further fact that human reality is also incessant actions and reactions of groups. In pursuit of the facts, and the consequences of the facts, under this latter aspect of reality, sociology has now found its distinctive vocation. Indeed it may be said that *sociology has become the first attempt to organize a technique for scientific interpretation of human experience upon the basis of the group hypothesis in contrast with the individual hypothesis.*

From the present standpoint, then, the case for sociology may be stated in this way: There are manifestations of energy which have their impulse at one end and their impact at the other in people. These manifestations make up a cosmos of interpersonal relations. It extends over and through all the time and space which ever have been and ever will be occupied by human beings. Wherever two or more human beings are together givings and takings of influences occur between them. The involutions of these reciprocities of influence are the processes of the interpersonal cosmos. In and through these interchanges human facts have their most credible values. The realm of these relations is just as real as the physical cosmos. In its aspect as a correlation of processes of personal influence, it challenges investigation just as literally as the movements of the heavenly bodies provoke astronomers' inquiries. There can be no such thing as social science worthy of the name until interpretation of human affairs includes and assim-

lates, among other things, the completest possible investigation of this interpersonal cosmos. Incidental to the required investigation, an account of all discoverable modes of interpersonal influence is demanded, with formulation of the involved relations of cause and effect.

The sociologists began to grow articulate in attempting to express their feeble grasp of these facts in terms of "society." Our latest conceptions of the outstanding facts and problems voice themselves in terms of "group processes."

By way of summary, we compress into a few paragraphs an appreciation of the American sociological movement as a whole.

The true story of the American sociological movement would be a treatment of the theme: *Up from Amateurism*. The early sociologists were grimly in earnest in their ambition to do something about "Society." As it looks from our present standpoint, they were pathetically uncertain as to what or how. The whole intermediate period has been occupied mostly indirectly and unconsciously in answer to the questions: What? and How? At the same time the bulk of the American sociologists' activities has been given to study of social phenomena with various degrees of detachment from these fundamental questions: What? and How? These promiscuous labors have, however, preserved the common trait of desire to improve "Society," either in whole or in part, along with the negative trait of not wanting to do their work in the manner in which historians and economists and political scientists had done theirs. The result has been enormous accumulation, both edifying and confusing, of observations within the range of societary phenomena, and a considerable volume of practical conclusions about the different areas of "social work." More significant than all these results, from the methodologists' standpoint, has been gradual discovery of a criterion by which to distinguish between amateurish and scientific procedure in sociological pursuits. That criterion had been semi-consciously employed long before it was formally defined. It did not arrive at the rank of a demonstrated methodological principle until Bodenhafer showed that it had actually become the distinctive mark of socio-

logical procedure.<sup>1</sup> The demonstration was not an operation of logic, but an exhibit of gravitation in practice. In a word, the sociologists had found their distinctive function in the discovery of categories of group structure, and group processes and group behaviors, and in applying those categories to interpretation and control of human situations.

Our aim at this point is not to magnify sociology, not to assert for it any specific ratio of importance among the social science techniques, but simply to bring its distinguishing features as a technique into clear light.

In brief, a sociologist, properly speaking, is a man whose professional procedure consists in discovery or analysis of categories of human group composition or reaction or behavior, or in use of such categories as means of interpreting or controlling group situations.

This definition is by no means acceptable to the majority of sociologists. It seems to many of them unduly to restrict their range of operations. On the contrary, it merely defines the range of operations within which one functions as a sociological specialist. No ban of law or caste bars the sociologist from functioning in any other portion of the field of social science for which he is equipped. In order to function with the peculiar competence of a sociologist, however, one must be an expert in the interpretation of group phenomena as such. Unless one is at the same time an expert in the use of some other social science technique, his contribution, as a scientific specialist, to solution of problems of social theory or practice will be limited by his ability to make analysis of group phenomena throw light upon subjects under investigation.

In other words, a man may be greatly interested in some phase of human fortunes, he may be exceptionally learned about certain aspects of human conditions, he may be notably subtle in certain types of reflection about human affairs. In spite of these facts, he may have no more nor other claim to the designation "sociologist" than he has to the title "historian" or "economist" or "philosopher" or "psychologist." He may be simply a rationalizer at large, with no claim to recognition as an intensive worker in any scientific specialty.

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVI (1920-21), 273, 425, 588, 716.

This discrimination is not a mere matter of vindicating words. It is a necessary means of distinguishing functions, and of discovering degrees of scientific competence. A man might have read hundreds of historical books, and be able glibly to cite in human annals more or less distinct analogues for any social situation, past or present; yet he might have no scientific equipment as a historian. A man might have insistent opinions and large stocks of miscellaneous information about every current question of national economic policy, yet without the primary qualifications or outfit of an economist. So a man may be an eminently useful citizen, an important public functionary, and an author of useful books about social facts, yet conspicuously not a sociologist. The late Carroll D. Wright, with his misnomered volume *Practical Sociology*, is an instructive example. In short, a humiliating proportion of the so-called "sociology" of the last thirty years in America, both inside and outside of the goodly fellowship of scholars who were self-disciplining themselves and one another into the character of scientific specialists, has been simply old-fashioned opinionativeness under a new-fangled name. This confession is in the nature of a purgatorial experience in qualifying for salvation.

In other words, a scientific specialist is constituted not principally by the subject-matter of his interest but by the peculiarity of his procedure. The Dunes, at the southern end of Lake Michigan, are an object of various intensities of interest to the casual picnicker, to the believer in park preserves, to the man with the hoe, to the florist, to the geologist, to the physicist, to the chemist, to the botanist, etc. This fact does not authorize picnicker, park enthusiast, man with the hoe, or florist to figure as geologist, physicist, chemist, or botanist. No more does it authorize geologist, physicist, chemist, or botanist to claim authority as one of the other types of specialists. The climb of a few up to the genuine rank of scientific specialists has been through mazes of obscurity, not only in the public mind, but to a certain extent in their own minds, about this relationship. Schoolgirls visiting a workhouse or a criminal court, or their mothers in club meeting assembled discussing the pros and cons of birth control, are reported in the newspapers, and perhaps rated by themselves as "sociologists";

and, what is more, genuine sociologists have had no accepted standards by which to draw the line between real and spurious sociology. Thanks to a more mature sense of reality, rather than to authorized definition, we do not, except facetiously, refer to the hot-stove group of neighbors at the general store, when the talk turns to grumblings about the tax-rate, as "economists."

The time will come for relentless weeding out of our literature masses of confusing material consisting of opinions about phases of human experience, to be sure, but not for that reason entitled to consideration as sociology or any other social science. The discourses of an ancient Church Father or of a modern free lover on the morality of sex relations may, as social phenomena, be equally subject-matter for sociology, but probably neither of them can properly be included in the category "sociology." Sociology, like any other procedure which is entitled to the rank of science, is the application of a distinctive method to a designated type of problem.

Criticism, like death, loves a shining mark. We are not at a loss for an illustration to make our observations concrete. Let us consider the article "Sociology" by Benjamin Kidd in the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. What is the matter with it? First and foremost, it is the deliverance of a man who may have called himself, and may have been called by others, a sociologist, but who shows to members of the craft no authentic evidence of qualification for membership in their guild. It is imposing sententiousness without the saving grace of sociology. It is simply a specimen of what Professor Robinson calls "rationalizing." Mr. Kidd's opinions are worth whatever they are worth, but if they were immigrants landing at Ellis Island they would be returned to the port of departure for lack of identification. A concatenated scheme of opinions about things in general is not sociology. It is just what it is, and we are under no obligations to make out its place in the scheme of human knowledge, beyond entering our protest against confounding it with sociology.

On the other hand, the sociologists cannot too soon abandon the notion with which they set out, that they have, or are on the way to discover, a unique and complete interpretation of human experience. At best, sociologists have found a clue by means of which

social science as a whole closes in on the facts and meanings of human experience somewhat more adequately than our knowledge could extend without this addition to research equipment. That is all, and that is enough.

Enough for beginnings, not for endings. Our descriptions have merely located the point at which sociology, after wide perturbations, found its center of equilibrium. It would be neither pertinent nor possible to calculate the content of its future operations. We may draw the moral, however, that not sociologists alone, but social scientists in general, will be squanderers of the lessons of experience, unless they habitually allow to criticism of their methodology, and to calculated co-operation between all of their techniques, a more constant and decisive rôle in their procedure than has been their rule in the past.

## A DURKHEIM REVIVAL

A letter from Professor Frank H. Hankins, of Smith College, contains the following:

"Have just had a letter from my friend, Marcel Mauss, Durkheim's son-in-law, with whom I became intimately acquainted while abroad several years ago, saying that the publication of *L'Année Sociologique* is to be renewed next February. For the purpose of this venture there has been organized L'Institut Français de Sociologie. I am inclosing herewith a list of the members of the Institute, together with their official positions. I am sure all American social scientists, and particularly sociologists, will warmly welcome this publication. In times past it was absolutely indispensable for the American scholar who wished to keep in touch with the current output of European scholars in the fields of his sociological interests. This time it is to be published yearly. In addition, Professor Mauss states that the *Collection des Travaux de l'Année* will also begin to reappear with greater frequency. There is soon to be brought out Durkheim's *Education Morale* and Halbwach's *Conditions Sociologiques de la Mémoire*.

"Naturally this group is anxious to secure every possible aid from every interested American, and especially from the American Sociological Society, both as a body and as individual members, particularly through the supply of books and reprints, university publications, and so forth. Will you not see that this information is presented in a forthcoming number of the *American Journal of Sociology*?"

## INCLOSURE

Liste des Membres de l'Institut Français de Sociologie: M. AUBIN, Inspecteur Général de l'Instruction Publique, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique; C. BOUGLÉ, Professeur à la Sorbonne; G. BOURGIN, Archiviste aux Archives Nationales; H. BOURGIN, Agrégé de l'Université; V. BRANFORD, Directeur de la *Sociological Review*; S. CZARNOWSKI, Warsaw; G. DAVY, Doyen de la Faculté des Lettres de Dijon; C. DE FELICE, Professeur à la Faculté de Théologie de Montauban; A. DEMANGEON, Pro-

fesseur à la Faculté des Lettres d'Alger; P. FACONNET, Chargé de Cours à la Sorbonne; M. GERNET, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres d'Alger; M. GRANET, Directeur d'Etudes à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes; M. HALBWACHS, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg; L. Hourtico, Inspecteur d'Académie, Commissariat Général, Strasbourg; H. HUBERT, Directeur d'Etudes à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes; P. HUVELIN, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de Lyon; P. JEANMAIRE, Chargé de Cours à la Faculté des Lettres de Lille; P. LAPIE, Directeur Général de l'Enseignement Primaire, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique; R. LENOIR, Agrégé de l'Université; E. LEVY, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de Lyon; H. LÉVY-BRUHL, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de Lille; L. LÉVY-BRUHL, Membre de l'Institut, Professeur à la Sorbonne; CL. E. MAITRE, Directeur Honoraire de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient; J. MARX, Archiviste Paléographe; R. MAUNIER, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit d'Alger; M. MAUSS, Directeur d'Etudes à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes; A. MEILLET, Membre de l'Institut, Professeur au Collège de France; D. PARONDI, Inspecteur Général de l'Enseignement Secondaire, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique; G. RAY, Agrégé de l'Université; L. ROUSSEL, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg; F. SIMIAND, Professeur au Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers.



## PROGRAM OF THE NINETEENTH MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

President Charles A. Ellwood announces the following preliminary program of the nineteenth annual meeting of the American Sociological Society to be held in the Auditorium Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, December 29-31. The central topic for the meeting is "The Trend of Our Civilization."

Meeting in Chicago at the same time are the American Economic Association, the American Statistical Association, the American Farm Economic Association, the American Association for Labor Legislation, the Association of Training Schools for Social Work, and the National Community Center Association. Information in regard to the programs of these associations may be secured by writing to their secretaries: Ray B. Westerfield, American Economic Association, Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut; Robert E. Chaddock, American Statistical Association, Columbia University, New York City; John B. Andrews, American Association for Labor Legislation, 131 E. 23d Street, New York City; Virginia P. Robinson, Association of Training Schools for Social Work, 339 S. Broad Street, Philadelphia; LeRoy E. Bowman, National Community Center Association, Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York City.

### MONDAY, DECEMBER 29

9:00 A.M. Registration

10:00-12:00 A.M. Meetings of sections of the Society.

Section on Social Research. In charge of W. F. Ogburn, Columbia University. Ten-minute reports on research projects.

"The Contributions of the Income Taxpayers of Dane County, Wisconsin, to Charity, Religion, and Education." John L. Gillin, University of Wisconsin.

"Familial Differential Fecundity." Hornell Hart, Bryn Mawr College.  
"Relative Rate of Change in Custom and Belief of Modern Jews." Jessie Ravitch, University of Minnesota.

"Personality Studies from Life History Documents." E. T. Krueger, Vanderbilt University.

"Historical Textbooks and International Differences." Donald R. Taft, Wells College.

"Some Researches in Rural Group Analysis." John H. Kolb, University of Wisconsin.

"Commodity Distribution in Rural Communities." C. R. Hoffer, University of Minnesota.

"A Measure of Rural Migration and other Sources of Urban Increase." J. M. Gillette, University of North Dakota.

"Some Tendencies and Aspects of the Race Problem, 1912-24." Monroe N. Work, Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute.

"Standard of Living and Population Pressure in China." C. I. Dittmer, University of Wisconsin.

"Causes and Consequences of Absenteeism in Industry." Harry Wembridge, Joseph and Feiss Company.

"A Dependency Index for Minneapolis." F. Stuart Chapin, University of Minnesota.

Section on Educational Sociology. In charge of W. R. Smith, University of Kansas.

Section on Sociology of Religion. In charge of Herbert N. Shenton, Columbia University.

Charles A. Ellwood, University of Missouri, presiding.

The *raison d'être* of this meeting, Charles A. Ellwood.

"Sociology of Religion." Herbert N. Shenton, Columbia University.

"Practical Application of Sociology to Current Religious Problems." Justin W. Nixon, Rochester, New York.

"Possibilities and Limitations of a Section on Religious Sociology."

Warren H. Wilson, Department Church and Country Life, Presbyterian Board Home Missions.

Discussion. Leading to action determining the future of the section.

#### 12:30 P.M. Luncheon Conferences:

Section on Rural Sociology and American Farm Economic Association.

"Rural Income and Standard of Living." In charge of C. J. Galpin, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Washington, D.C.

For the economists, M. L. Wilson, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Washington, D.C. For the sociologists, Dwight Sanderson, Cornell University. Discussion, Hildegard Kneeland, Bureau of Home Economics, Washington, D.C.

#### 3:00-5:00 P.M. Division on Social Psychology. In charge of Ellsworth Faris, University of Chicago.

"Psychology and Culture." A. A. Goldenweiser, New School for Social Research.

"Cultural Trends and Technique." Robert E. Park, University of Chicago.

"The Subjective Aspect of Culture." Ellsworth Faris.

5:00 P.M. Meeting of the Executive Committee.

8:00 P.M. Joint Session with the American Economic Association and with the American Statistical Association. Presidents' addresses:  
Charles A. Ellwood, University of Missouri, American Sociological Society.  
Wesley C. Mitchell, Columbia University, American Economic Association.  
Louis I. Dublin, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, American Statistical Association.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30

9:00 A.M. Business meeting for the reports of committees.

10:00-12:00 A.M. Division on Statistical Sociology. In charge of Walter F. Willcox, Cornell University.

"The Vital Statistics of American Immigrant Stocks Compared with Those of the Same Stocks in the Mother Country." Niles Carpenter, University of Buffalo.

"The Need for Improved Child Welfare Statistics." R. M. Woodbury, Institute of Economics, Washington, D.C.

"The Development of American Family Statistics in Fifty Years." Walter F. Willcox.

12:30 P.M. Luncheon Conferences:

Section on Rural Sociology. "Next Steps in Rural Social Research."

A. "Emphasis Regarding 'Knowing Your Own State' and 'Making a Special Contribution.'" *Statement:* J. H. Kolb, University of Wisconsin. *Outline:* S. H. Hobbs, Jr., University of North Carolina.

B. "Special Needs for a Social Psychological Emphasis." L. L. Bernard, University of Minnesota.

Discussion. Carl C. Taylor, North Carolina State College; C. E. Lively, Ohio State University.

Section on the Teaching of Social Sciences in the Public Schools. In charge of Hornell Hart, Bryn Mawr College.

3:00-5:00 P.M. Section on International Relations. In charge of Herbert A. Miller, Ohio State University.

Report of the Committee on International Relations and Co-operation. Herbert A. Miller, chairman.

"Surveying the Press." Walter Williams, University of Missouri.

Discussion. Robert E. Park, University of Chicago.

"The International Activities of the Soviet Government." Pitirim Sorokin, University of Minnesota.

Discussion. Jerome Davis, Yale University.

"The Sociological Factor in the Interpretation of International Relations with Specific Illustrations from Southeastern Europe and the Near East." Earle E. Eubank, University of Cincinnati.

Discussion. Herbert A. Miller.

2:45-5:00 P.M. Section on Rural Sociology. In charge of John H. Kolb, University of Wisconsin.

"Significant Factors in Rural Population Affecting Our Civilization."

"Farm Population." John M. Gillette, University of North Dakota.

"Village Population." Luther Fry, Institute of Social and Religious Research, New York City.

"Rural Demography." Warren S. Thompson, Scripps Foundation, Miami University.

Discussion. W. L. Bailey, Northwestern University.

6:30 P.M. Annual Dinner of the American Sociological Society. In honor of Albion W. Small and Franklin H. Giddings. Speakers: George E. Vincent and James P. Lichtenberger.

### WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 31

9:00 A.M. Annual Business Meeting of the American Sociological Society.

10:00-12:00 A.M. Division on Biological Factors. In charge of Frank H. Hankins, Smith College.

"Race Crossing in the Light of Modern Genetics." L. C. Dunn, Storrs Agricultural Experiment Station.

Discussion. Frank H. Hankins.

"Human Hybrids as Illustrated by the Mulatto." E. B. Reuter, University of Iowa.

Discussion. Kimball Young, University of Oregon.

"An Anthropological View of Race Mixture." Ralph Linton, Field Museum, Chicago.

"On a Method for the Study of the Phenomenon of Nationalism." Max S. Handman, University of Texas.

*Local Committee.*—Scott E. W. Bedford, *chairman*, Edith Abbott, Thomas L. Elliot, Ellsworth Faris, Frederic Siedenburg, Arthur J. Todd.

*Reduced rates.*—Reduced railroad rates of one and one-half the regular adult tariff for the round trip have been granted. Full announcement of conditions under which the reduced rate may be secured by members of the Society and dependent members of their families will be made in the programs mailed to the members of the Society, November 20.

*Headquarters.*—The headquarters for the annual meeting will be the Auditorium Hotel, 430 S. Michigan Boulevard. The rates are as follows: rooms without bath for one occupant, \$2.50 and \$3.00, for two occupants, \$4.00 and \$5.00 per day; rooms with private bath, for one occupant, \$4.00 and \$5.00, for two occupants, \$6.00 (double bed) and \$8.00 (single beds) per day.

All meetings, except the business sessions, are open to the public, and unless otherwise indicated, are held on the ninth floor, the Auditorium Hotel.

NATIONAL COMMUNITY CENTER ASSOCIATION

MONDAY, DECEMBER 29

10:00-12:00 A.M. Practical Programs of Community Organization.

"Why Chicago School Centers Fail and Succeed." Report on the Survey of Sixty Centers of the Chicago Joint Committee on School Affairs. E. L. Burchard, Educational Publicity Expert, Chicago.

Discussion. Mrs. Henry W. Cheney, Woodlawn Community Center, Chicago; Azile B. Reynolds, Armstrong School Center, Chicago; William L. Smyser, Norwood Park Center, Chicago.

"Whiting Memorial Community House." R. J. Smoyer, Community Service, Whiting, Ind.

"Democracy in the Settlements." William E. McLennan, Buffalo, N.Y.

"Community Organization in Park Centers." V. K. Brown, South Park Commissioner, Chicago.

Discussion. John Richards.

6:00 P.M. Dinner Meeting, Hull House.

"A Report on Community Organization of the United States for Better Films." E. M. Barrows and Wilbur Barrett.

Report on a Study of Community Centers in Public Schools through the Board of Education. Mrs. Eleanor T. Glueck.

"Community Politics." Harriet Vittum, Northwestern University Settlement, Chicago.

Motion Picture Showing Community Organization Activities.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30

10:00-12:00 A.M. Studies in Community Organization.

"The Buffalo Study of Community Organization." Eugene T. Lies, Community Service, Inc.

"Human Resources for Community Welfare." Carl W. Strow, Knox College.

"The Chain Store as an Index to Community Organization." E. H. Shideler, Franklin College.

"Community Implications of Parent-Teachers Associations in the United States." Mrs. B. F. Langworthy, National Conference of Mothers and Parent Teachers Association.

"Community Aspects of Red Cross Work." J. B. Gwyn, Southwestern Division, American Red Cross.

12:30 P.M. Luncheon Conference. City Club, 315 Plymouth Court.

"Community Aspects of Settlement Work." Albert J. Kennedy, National Federation of Settlements.

"Community Organization through College Extension Departments." W. S. Bittner, Indiana University.

"Present Status of University Extension in America." Joseph W. Scroggs, University of Oklahoma.

"A Study of Rural Community Halls." Ralph A. Fenton, Cornell University.

3:00 P.M. Trip to Community Centers in Chicago.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 31

2:00-4:00 P.M. The Theory of Community Organization.

"Methods of Determining the Comparative Efficiency of Racial Communities." Robert E. Park, University of Chicago.

"The Church and the Community." Von Ogden Vogt, Oak Park, Illinois.

"Comparative Studies of New York City Communities." LeRoy E. Bowman, Columbia University, and Mary Johnston, New York Community Committee.

"Chicago Community Studies." E. W. Burgess, University of Chicago.

"Rehabilitation of the Local Community." Clarence A. Perry, Russell Sage Foundation.

Discussion. E. C. Lindeman.

4:00 P.M. Trip to Whiting Memorial Community House.

## NEWS AND NOTES

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Notes of interest to readers of the *Journal* should be in the hands of the editor of "News and Notes" not later than the tenth of the month preceding publication.

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*American Sociological Society.*—The request for reports on research work in progress by members of the Society has brought more than one hundred replies to the president and the chairman of the Committee on Research, Professor W. F. Ogburn, of Columbia University. As the Section on Research of the Annual Meeting of the Society will give time for only about ten reports on research work in progress, the committee finds itself somewhat embarrassed in making out a program. The committee will endeavor to select those lines of research for report which promise to be of most value for the development of sociology, and asks those members who have been kind enough to report on their research work to be indulgent in their judgment of the work of the committee.

*Section on the Sociology of Religion.*—President Charles A. Ellwood of the American Sociological Society announces the organization of a section of the Society on the sociology of religion. It will hold its first session Monday morning, December 29, in connection with the meetings of other sections of the American Sociological Society. The papers presented at this meeting will center upon the purpose, scope, and objectives of the new section. The members of the committee on the organization of this section are: Herbert N. Shenton, Columbia University, *chairman*; F. Ernest Johnson, Federal Council of Churches; Samuel Z. Batten.

*American Association of Social Workers.*—A meeting of the National Council of the American Association of Social Workers will be held in Chicago December 28, 1924, just before the meeting of the American Sociological Society and the other social science associations. The National Council is composed of over seventy members representing different fields of social work in all sections of the United States. The executive secretary of the Association is Philip Klein, 130 East Twenty-second Street, New York City.

*Alpha Pi Zeta Advisory Meeting.*—At the suggestion of President Charles A. Ellwood, of the American Sociological Society, and also president of the University of Missouri chapter of Alpha Pi Zeta, an informal

meeting of accredited representatives of chapters of the fraternity was held at the University of Chicago July 19, 1924, to consider the formation of a national organization of the chapters. Chapters were represented as follows: Northwestern University, S. G. Martin (president of his chapter) and C. L. Grose; University of Missouri, Robert J. Kerner; University of Minnesota, L. L. Bernard. Professors Faris and White, representing a committee on organization for the social sciences of the University of Chicago, and Professor Albion W. Small, of the *American Journal of Sociology*, participated informally. Professor Kerner was elected chairman of the meeting and Professor Bernard secretary. Letters were read from Professor David Y. Thomas, of the University of Arkansas, and Professor C. Perry Patterson, of the University of Texas, representing a group of five honor societies designed primarily for undergraduate students, proposing meetings in September when the Institute for Political Research should meet. General discussion then arose as to whether the Alpha Pi Zeta societies should seek affiliation with the southwestern societies and it was decided that this could not be determined until after the proposed September meetings. The question was also raised as to whether the purpose of the societies should be merely honorary as in the case of Phi Beta Kappa or whether the societies should also attempt to stimulate interest and research and encourage scholarship through discussion of common problems in the local societies. It was pointed out that the policies of societies had hitherto been in keeping with the latter plan. The following resolutions were formally adopted after discussion:

1. A national organization should be adopted.
2. Alpha Pi Zeta is a very fitting name for the organization.
3. This organization shall have the character of an honorary society.
4. It shall encourage investigation and scholarship in the field of the social sciences.
5. The local societies should exercise a large degree of autonomy as to methods of work and details of organization.
6. Until the question of uniform membership is decided by national action of the society, the matter of the determination of full, associate, honorary, and permanent membership shall be left to the chapters according to their separate problems and situations.

The action of this informal conference was intended merely as advisory to the official committee on national organization appointed at and following the December, 1923, meetings of the social science associations.

*The American Country Life Association.*—The Seventh National Country Life Conference will be held in Columbus, Ohio, November



7-11. The central topic for papers and discussion is "Religion in Country Life."

The official organ of the Association, *The Country Life Bulletin*, has been consolidated with *Home Life*. The Association announces in its September issue a competition for a new name for this publication.

*Institute for Social Research.*—The second annual meeting of the Institute for Social Research under the auspices of the Society for Social Research was held at the University of Chicago, August 18-27. The registration at the Institute was over ninety. Sessions at which research projects were presented for discussion were held on human ecology, personality (two sessions), anthropology, sociological use of literary materials, and social groups (two sessions). Four round tables were devoted to the organization and direction of research, the discussion of the interview, recent books in sociology and social psychology, and the use of maps in sociological research.

*International Migration Service.*—The international migration work originated by the Department for Work with Foreign-born Women of the National Board of the Young Women's Christian Associations, and carried on in co-operation with other bureaus in foreign countries developed by the World's Committee of Y.W.C.A., is now to emerge into an independent organization. On October 1 the American Committee of the new International Migration Service organization opened offices at 1 Madison Avenue and takes over the international case work carried by the Department for Work with Foreign-born Women, which resumed its former title of Department of Immigration and Foreign Communities under which it operated from 1911 to 1918.

*Boston University.*—The School of Education announces a course of fifteen lectures on "Social Conditions of the Home: Family Adjustment," by Professor Ernest R. Groves.

*University of Chicago.*—*The Origins of Sociology*, by Professor Albion W. Small, is a fall publication of the University of Chicago Press.

Professor Robert E. Park, who has been on leave of absence for nine months in his work as director of the Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast under the auspices of the Institute of Social and Religious Surveys, is again in residence.

*University of Cincinnati.*—The name of the department of social science of the university has been changed by the board of directors to the department of sociology.

Professor James A. Quinn is on leave of absence during the current year, completing his graduate residence requirements at the University

of Chicago. The following persons have been added to the sociology faculty of the university: Instructors, W. W. Holland, A.M.; Eugenia Lea Remelin, A.M.; Lecturers, Edith Campbell, A.M.; and E. N. Clopper, Ph.D.

Program of education for social work of the university which is being carried on under the auspices of this department has opened its second year of work. Forty-three students are enrolled, eight of whom are college graduates.

Earle Edward Eubank has resumed his work at the university after an extended trip through the Balkans, Turkey, and Palestine.

*Goucher College.*—Dr. Ivan McDougale, who for five years has been professor of economics and sociology at Sweet Briar College, Virginia, has accepted an appointment as associate professor of economics and sociology at Goucher College. Miss Elinor Pancoast and Miss Vera Friedland come as instructors to the social science department this year from graduate work at the universities of Chicago and Columbia, respectively.

*University of Illinois.*—J. B. Lippincott Company announce the publication of a volume entitled *Criminology*, by Dr. E. H. Sutherland. This is a new book in Lippincott's sociological series, edited by Professor Edward Cary Hayes.

*University of Iowa.*—Professor Maurice Rea Davie, Assistant Professor of the Science of Society, of Yale University, offered courses during the first term of the summer session, supplementing the courses offered by Professors Reuter, Haynes, and Hart of the regular staff. The summer courses in sociology enrolled about two hundred and fifty students.

Mr. Reuter, who is chairman of the Sociology Division, has been promoted to the rank of full professor. The sociology staff for 1924-25 has been increased to seven persons: Mr. C. J. Bittner, Mrs. Grace E. Chaffee, Miss Gail DeWolf, Mr. Clyde W. Hart, Mr. Frek E. Haynes, Mr. B. Reuter, and Mr. T. D. Yoder.

*University of Minnesota.*—Dr. Pitirim A. Sorokin, formerly chairman of the Department of Sociology at the University of Petrograd, and vice-president of the Russian Sociological Society, gave two graduate courses in sociology in the second term of the 1924 summer session at the University of Minnesota. Dr. Sorokin has been appointed for the academic year 1924-25 as part-time full professor of sociology at Minnesota.

He will give the following courses in the winter and spring quarters: "History of Social Theory," "Contemporary Social Theory," "Sociology

of Revolution," "Rural Social Institutions," and two graduate seminars, one in social theory and one in rural sociology.

The following appointments have been made: C. C. Zimmerman as instructor in rural sociology; Mr. O. M. Mehus, Miss Dorothy P. Gary, and Miss Ruth R. Pearson as teaching fellows; Mr. Roscoe H. Larson and Miss Dorothy White as assistants.

Henry Holt and Company announce the publication of *Instinct, a Study in Social Psychology*, by Professor Luther L. Bernard. This volume represents the results of research begun in 1909 in a graduate seminar, but rounded out and completed through the grant of an Amherst Fellowship for the year 1920-21.

*University of Missouri.*—Miss Bessie A. McClenahan has been appointed assistant professor in rural sociology. Miss McClenahan will have charge of the courses in community organization, social case work, and field work. Miss McClenahan was formerly assistant professor in the Missouri School of Social Economy at St. Louis and is the author of *Organizing the Community*, published by D. Appleton and Company.

Professor Charles A. Ellwood has been elected an honorary corresponding member of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Sociologie*, of which Professor Ferdinand Tönnies, of Kiel University, is president.

The American Book Company has just published a new revised edition of Ellwood's *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*.

*University of North Carolina.*—Dr. Jesse F. Steiner gave two courses during the second half of the University of Chicago summer session on Community Organization. Dr. E. C. Branson has returned from his year in the study of the country life of Denmark, France, and Germany. Wiley B. Sanders is on leave of absence during the year 1924-25 and will be at the University of Chicago where, along with his research and study, he will give two courses in the School of Social Service Administration. George Lawrence and Miss Katherine Jocher will give his courses on family case work at the University of North Carolina. Guy B. Johnson will come from Baylor University and join the staff of the School of Public Welfare, and will do special researches on race problems.

Through a special co-operative grant the University of North Carolina has organized an institute for research in social science. For the first year nine research assistants are available.

The School of Public Welfare in co-operation with the State Department of Public Welfare is putting on a special Four-County Demonstra-

tion for the twofold purpose of evolving workable technique for social work in rural districts and for demonstrating the North Carolina plan of public welfare.

The University of North Carolina Press will bring out in the early fall an outstanding volume by Professor Giddings under the title *The Scientific Study of Human Society*, in thirteen chapters. The press freely predicts that this will be one of Professor Giddings' most popular and valuable contributions. The press is also bringing out in the early fall Professor Ross's recent articles under the title *Roads to Social Peace*. The chapters are written in Professor Ross's usual style and will make a valuable contribution.

Gerald W. Johnson will join the staff of editors of the *Journal of Social Forces* and will head the new department of journalism at the university.

*Oberlin College*.—Professor Newell L. Sims, of Massachusetts Agricultural College, has been appointed professor of sociology to succeed Professor Herbert A. Miller.

*Ohio State University*.—Professor Herbert A. Miller, of Oberlin College, has accepted a professorship of sociology in the field of race relations. Lippincott has announced the publication in its sociological series of a volume entitled *Races, Nations and Classes*, by Professor Miller.

*University of Omaha*.—The department of sociology wishes to announce the following publications: *Social Ministry in an American City*; *Survey of the Cause and Extent of Crime among Foreigners in Omaha*, *How Two Hundred Thousand People Spend Their Leisure Time: A Recreational Survey of Omaha*, *The Young Malefactor: A Study of the Juvenile Delinquent*, edited and written by T. Earl Sullenger, head of the department. A new course in the scope of social work is being taught the first semester. The department, in co-operation with the Woman's Club of the city, has made an extensive survey of illiteracy in Omaha.

*University of Southern California*.—Harcourt, Brace and Company announce the publication on October 1 of *Outlines of Introductory Sociology. A Text Book of Readings in Social Science*, by Clarence M. Case. The volume is divided into four main divisions, "Social Origins," "Social Evolution," "Social Processes," and "Social Problems."

*The Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas*.—During the summer the department of rural sociology had a good class in general sociology and, at the same time, was carrying on two social surveys in the state: one a survey of rural churches and the other a survey of farmhouses. A

child welfare exhibit has been planned and will be given at the Dallas State Fair in October.

The importance of sociology in the college curriculum is increasing; for the first time since the establishment of the department, two fellowships have been granted to the department with a stipend of \$600 each.

*The State College of Washington.*—Dr. Fred R. Yoder, of the department of sociology, made a survey of the social-service agencies of the Spokane, Washington, Community Welfare Federation during the summer and made a report to the Federation concerning the efficiency, duplication, and possible lines of improvement for the various agencies. Dr. Yoder also finished a study of rural communities for the College of Agriculture and the Division of Farm Life Studies of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and is preparing a bulletin on *Rural Community Life in Washington* which will be published late in the fall.

Thomas Y. Crowell Company announce the publication of a volume *Blockade and Sea Power: the Blockade, 1914-19, and Its Significance for a World State*, by Maurice Parmelee, formerly professor of sociology of the City College of New York.

## REVIEWS

*Individuum und Gemeinschaft: Grundlegung der Kulturphilosophie.*

Von THEODOR LITT. Zweite völlig neu bearbeitete Auflage.  
Leipzig-Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1924. Pp. x+265. Bound,  
8 gold marks.

This is one of a considerable body of comparatively recent German publications which challenge Americans to take notice. We have been losing touch with developments in German sociological theory since, let us say, the publication of Simmel's *Soziologie* (1908). Meanwhile new tendencies have developed which are striking out lines of inquiry quite different from these which we are following. I have not yet made myself sufficiently acquainted with the cross-currents in this recent movement to be able to speak with assurance about the connections between the different writers. I began to be aware, however, that a new sociology was developing in Germany, from reading the first number of *Kölnner Vierteljahrshefte für Sozialwissenschaften*. (See this *Journal*, XXVII, 92.) Pending closer acquaintance with the movement, I am testing out, as designations for it, the terms post-, super-, and neo-Simmelism. I am by no means certain that either of these phrases is the most intelligent index to the movement. I am not even sure that in its present peculiarities it does not largely antedate Simmel. Tentatively, however, without pressing the question of origins, we may indicate a mere chronological zone of the movement as post-Simmelism. The present author almost expressly classifies himself in that way when he credits Simmel with having laid the foundation for his distinctive argument (p. 113).

Litt adopts from Simmel the triad formation—the *Ego*, the *Alter*, and *Third*—as the key group in social structures. He promotes it to the rank of a leading category, which he designates as “the closed circuit” (*der geschlossene Kreis*). In the functionings of “the closed circuit” he finds promise of penetration into the mysteries of the relations between persons in general and their social milieu.

The book is thus an attempt to restate the issues between the atomistic and the societary preconceptions of the human lot, and to reach an adjustment between them. It is impossible briefly to indicate its importance. Indeed it cannot be justly evaluated except as a term in an already complicated dialectic.

The author warns his readers (p. vii) that he is not addressing himself to a general public, not even to sociologists at large, but only to the

esoteric few whose thinking is most closely related to his. The debate has isolated certain concepts, each of which calls for an introduction. It has developed an idiom of its own, which would yield up its full meaning only to wide contextual interpretation. It could not be literally translated. It could not even be adequately paraphrased without extensive enlargements or drastic adaptations of our vocabulary. Yet Americans cannot afford to be ignorant of this movement. I fancy that I detect an analogy between the relation of this volume to present German sociology and the place of Professor Cooley's first book in the American sociological movement. The prospect that this impression may be correct should insure for the German book and its connections careful study in this country.

The closing paragraph indicates the place which, in the author's judgment, his analysis occupies in the growing scheme of sociological interpretation. It is a link in the evolutionary chain on which Simmel began to work in his earliest ventures in the methodology of social exegesis (e.g., *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*, 1892, and *Zur Methodik der Sozialwissenschaft*, in Schmoller's *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, etc.* 20 (1896), p. 575.):

"It thus appears that turning of attention to the object of the psychical sciences implicitly carries with it a portion of the methodology of the physical sciences; the epistemological theory of history is imbedded in the metaphysic of the mind. But whatever comes to light, in especially tangible form, in the particular case of history, as a central member of the psychical disciplines, the same is true in fact of each science in the group. This is not the place for further elaboration of the proposition. Accordingly the foregoing may be characterized as a basis for a metaphysic of the *psychical sciences*, and as containing the principles of the epistemological theory of the same."

Prophecy would be rash, but it is quite possible that post-Simmelism will prove to be a pillar in the ultimate sociology.

ALBION W. SMALL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*Soziologie: Untersuchung des menschlichen sozialen Lebens.* Von DR. PHIL. A. ELEUTHEROPOULOS, Professor an der Universität Zürich. Dritte gänzlich umgearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1923. Pp. xv+238.

To the best of my recollection nobody has attempted to reduce all the different projected sociologies to a single pair of types. To supply that lack, I propose the following: All the different schemes of sociology have been either, first, projects to assemble from all sources accessible to

the author all the information available about different kinds of happenings wherever human beings have lived together, and efforts to arrange those happenings into correlations which to the author seem plausible; or on the other hand they have been, second, attempts to devise a technique for discovering new facts about human beings living together, or new relations of cause and effect between previously known facts. For convenience I will call these respectively the rationalizing type and the research type. To be sure, a precise line of separation could not be drawn between the sheep and the goats without dismembering the majority of both. Few sociologists could be assigned absolutely to either category. Whatever their prevailing tendency, each has his fortunate or unfortunate moments of wandering into the other path.

The book before us is an example of the former type. It presents sociology as "the investigation and understanding of the organized living-together of mankind, or 'social life'" (p. 3). It adds: "Analytically expressed, the task involved in investigation of the organized association of human beings requires that we shall arrive at understanding of the origin of this association, together with its conditions, the development of this association together with its conditions and laws, in short that we shall comprehend this associated life of human kind in accordance with its nature." That is, a philosophy of the human lot in general.

The book is also an excellent illustration of how soothing such a sociology may be to readers whose critical faculties are unobtrusive. One after another, obvious phases of human life are assigned to places in which they do not disturb the author's conception of other phases nor provoke disturbing inquiries. This particular philosophy will satisfy no one, however, who cannot repress his demand for proof that reality runs in accordance with its scheme.

ALBION W. SMALL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*Pleasure and Behavior.* By FREDERIC LYMAN WELLS. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1924. Pp. xvi+267. \$2.50.

*Anger: Its Religious and Moral Significance.* By GEORGE MALCOLM STRATTON. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923. Pp. 267. \$2.25.

*Constructive Conscious Control of the Individual.* By F. MATTHIAS ALEXANDER. With an Introduction by JOHN DEWEY. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923. Pp. xxxiii+317. \$3.00.

These three books are essays in the applications of the newer social psychology. Each has its aspects of significance for sociology. Pro-



fessor Wells thinks that civilization has brought no increase in pleasure. "Pleasure values tend to decrease as one's desires are further removed from the direction of the fundamental instinctive urges. Such removal is an inevitable effect of civilization, and this is one reason why the pleasure-value of life exhibits no general increase with civilization's advance but moves in cycles, with some tendency to become lower as life grows more complex" (pp. ix, x). He wishes to reduce the psychology of pleasurable response to the categories of science in order that enjoyment may be increased. He recognizes the relative or subjective nature of feeling and specifically points out that feeling-values may become conditioned to various types of responses (p. 238). Yet he does not make adequate use of this fact in building up his theory of pleasure control. He reviews the correlations of feeling with self-maintenance, eroticism, gregarious contacts, ethics, emotional expression, and the intellectual life. He has a more complete treatment of the feeling complements of frustrated urges than one usually finds in a psychological work of this sort. Much of the content of the book is rather commonplace, but the treatment after all is primarily for the general reader. The viewpoint is also rather subjective. If he could have brought the outlook of a thorough knowledge of social processes and pressures to bear upon his interpretation he might have found more room for a constructive treatment of methods of utilizing our resources for the redirection of pleasure experience through the control of conditional responses. Certainly pleasure patterns may be more effectively and constructively manipulated than he has indicated. But this is a problem which must be worked out jointly by the sociologist and the social psychologist. A rather pessimistic conclusion challenges attention to the problem which he has raised: "The general tendency of advanced civilization seems to be toward concentrating the resources of pleasure among relatively few persons. In the later stages of society's life, the moralist contrasts the luxury and extravagance of the rich with the misery of the poor. Uneven distribution of pleasure means social tension; and this sufficiently increased means explosion, spontaneous or otherwise. Ancient kingdoms were mostly shattered from without. Pre-revolutionary France and Russia broke under their own internal strain. The one thing which is practically as sure as that the world endures is that science will advance and make life more complicated. The historical result of this change is increased inequality in pleasure distribution. This means more unstable societies and shortening cycles in the life of nations" (pp. 263-64). This view is scarcely justified. Pleasure is a function of adequate expression through organization. It is by no means impossible to have increas-

ing complexity of social life with a decrease of conflict. Hence pleasure might easily be made to increase rather than diminish with social progress through science. But a society in which this was brought about would have to be scientifically planned by the sociologist and other social scientists.

Stratton's volume is a rather detailed study of the place of the anger emotion in the great world-religions. It strikes this reviewer that its chief sociological significance is to be found in the implied correlations between forms of emotional expression and environmental conditions. Certainly anger is extolled most highly in those religions which have been evolved in the regions of the melting-pots, or, perhaps better, the boiling-pots of the world. The isolated peoples have had religions of peace. The author's general reflections on the geography of hatred, anger and the origins of religion, the psychic forces creating religion (pp. 192-96), and the relation of anger to war have decided significance for the sociologist. He believes that anger may be of great value socially and morally as an energizer, especially of the higher social values in the conflict with social evils. But to secure this service of anger for society, it must be freed from the direction of instinct and rationalized by means of socialized knowledge. He summarizes his ideas in this connection in his final chapter on "Rules for the Fighting Mood."

Mr. Alexander has written a peculiar, and in many ways a valuable book, in a most abominable manner. This volume is a continuation of his former work entitled *Man's Supreme Inheritance*. It carries the strong approval of Professor Dewey. Mr. Alexander is a practitioner of the art of correcting postural and similar physical, and resulting mental and moral, defects. His thesis, repeated scores of times, is that effective physical and moral reintegration cannot be accomplished on the basis of following verbal directions in a subconscious manner. It is necessary to think out the plan of action or of conduct before we even attempt the correction; otherwise the old errors will be perpetuated through re-innervation of the old habit responses. His insistence is upon what the philosopher calls rational response to stimulus. What is really implied, in behavioristic terms, is that the old internal or neural habits must be replaced by the establishment of new internal or neural habits as the initial stage of the act before the second stage of overt habit response can be set up successfully.<sup>1</sup> The author refers to this process as the building of new instincts; he does not distinguish instinct from habit.

<sup>1</sup> For an explanation of the mechanisms involved in this process see the present writer's article, "Neuro-Psychic Technique," *Psychological Review*, November, 1923.

He is not a trained psychologist. Hence he does not see or present the problem from the standpoint of its wider implications for individual or social behavior. Yet the principle has the greatest significance of this sort, as the reviewer has attempted to show in other connections.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

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*Studies in Evolution and Eugenics.* By S. J. HOLMES. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923. Pp. 261. \$3.00.

Chapters i to iii present a clear statement of the diverse theoretical tendencies in modern biology. In chapter iv the familiar arguments of eugenics are presented. Chapter v is a critical examination of earlier theories of social evolution. The evidences and arguments relating to the problem of heredity and environment are examined in chapter vi, which concludes with a satisfactory summary under fourteen points. Chapter vii contains data of great interest to sociologists, and shows how a lowered infant mortality rate nevertheless is accompanied by a relatively higher male death-rate. This is taken to show that a lowered infant mortality rate acts selectively. The argument has important social implications, for if a lowered infant mortality rate acts selectively for other congenital traits than sex, the result refutes the pessimistic conclusion that the prevention of high infant mortality has dysgenic effects. In chapter viii data and arguments are presented to show that the selective death-rate has not been seriously reduced by civilization and that selection now works chiefly on mental traits. Chapter ix presents data and arguments to show that sexual selection among modern men acts dysgenically. In general, early marriages appear (chap. x) to be advantageous. Birth control is studied in chapters xi and xii with the conclusion that it acts dysgenically unless the custom is widely diffused and augmented by a higher birth-rate among the socially more desirable. Misconceptions of eugenics are critically discussed in chapter xiii, and although the author's stand is judicious and fair-minded, it seems doubtful, in view of recent case work with the psychopathic and discovery of the rôle played by emotional disturbances and psychological mechanisms, whether we yet know enough of the heredity of feeble-mindedness and insanity (the term insanity is a purely legal term and has no scientific significance whatsoever, and mental diseases form a varied and uncertain complex when it comes to matters of heredity) to justify any absolutely inclusive program of limiting fecundity. Such concrete problems as immigration and the Negro are considered in chapters xiv, xv, and xvi.

The author takes the stand that the burden of proof should be shifted to the immigrant to prove that he is fit to be admitted, rather than for us to prove that he is biologically unfit. In default of exact knowledge of human hybridization, a policy of restricting race intermarriage is wise. The American Negro seems well on the way to race absorption, although dogmatic prediction cannot be made.

Professor Holmes's book is well written, stimulating, scientific and judicial. I know of no more fair-minded and satisfactory treatment of the social applications and implications of modern biology.

F. STUART CHAPIN

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

*Charles E. Chapin's Story.* By CHARLES E. CHAPIN. With Introduction by BASIL KING. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons (The Knickerbocker Press), 1920. Pp. xv+334. \$2.50.

*News and the Newspaper.* From Addresses by Editors, Writers, and Readers at the Fourteenth Annual Journalism Week. Columbia, Missouri: The University of Missouri Bulletin, Vol. 24, No. 15, 1923. Pp. 124.

Charles E. Chapin began life as a newspaper man, in a small western town. He was in Chicago when Wilbur F. Storey was editor of the *Times*. He has a newspaper man's appreciation of that amazing personality and of his disreputable newspaper, for he refers to Mr. Storey as "one of the greatest editors of his time," which he undoubtedly was.

Mr. Chapin worked for a time on the *Chicago Tribune*, finally going to New York and becoming city editor of the *New York Evening World*. This book is the story of his adventures covering a period of forty years' association with the press. They are the adventures not of an editor, but of a reporter. That defines their importance. The modern newspaper—that is to say, the newspaper since 1883, when Pulitzer bought the *New York World* and ushered in the era of yellow journalism—has been made by reporters. The managing editor and the city editor are not editors in the earlier sense of that word—they are news-gatherers. The modern newspaper is a device for gathering and distributing news. The great changes which have taken place since the news and the reporter have assumed a greater importance than the editorial and the editorial writer are not fully understood.

It is only from such original sources as Mr. Chapin's autobiography that the modern newspaper can be understood, its history be written, and its rôle in politics and social life be defined.

Incidentally, it is interesting that the autobiography was written in Sing Sing. The first chapter was contributed to the prison paper, of which the author was at the time editor. The autobiography closes with the story of the tragedy which resulted in the author's being sent to prison for a term of twenty years.

A collection of addresses by tired business men, on any subject, are usually more edifying than interesting. This is true even when the business men are publishers and they are talking about so interesting a subject as the modern newspaper. However, there are some interesting variations on the usual press association themes. In the collection of papers which the University of Missouri School of Journalism published in its last Bulletin, under the title "What News to Print," Willis J. Abbot, publisher of the *Christian Science Monitor*, has undertaken to explain and defend a newspaper policy which refuses to print "any stories of disease, crime, disaster or scandal."

A newspaper which can pursue such a policy successfully is certainly unique enough in the field of journalism to be worthy of a more intimate study than it has yet received. What makes the matter still more interesting is that the *Christian Science Monitor* is not only printed, but read. Most of the other papers in this collection are addressed to an audience that is interested primarily in the technique of journalism.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*Expressionism in Art—Its Psychological and Biological Basis.* By OSKAR PFISTER. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923. Pp. 272. \$3.00.

Dr. Pfister has attempted to answer two questions in this study: What is the meaning and place of expressionism as a tendency in modern life? What is the genesis and function of expressionistic art in the life of the individual artist?

The methodological procedure (suggested, no doubt, by Freud's study of Da Vinci) is that of an intensive case study of an individual artist by an examination of his drawings supplemented by psychoanalytic questioning of the artist. Dr. Pfister proceeds on the theory that the artistic productions of an expressionist can be used for the analysis of the personality in the same way as dreams.

Accordingly, the author concludes in regard to the case studied that the artist symbolizes in his pictures the discord, hatred, and cruelty in his "soul." This content of the soul of the artist is traced back to a conflict of the "mother image" and the "father image" in the artist's childhood.

As a cultural phenomena, Dr. Pfister sees expressionism as a breaking away "from impressionism which embodied so perfectly our materialistic, de-spiritualized culture" (p. 269). "Expressionism is the art of inwardness"; and he feels that if it can free itself from the influence of autism (i.e., living within the Inner World of Phantasy) and become "cosmophoric" (i.e. world-destroying) in character that the movement will mean a re-vitalization of man's creative energies.

E. N. SIMPSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*The Populist Movement in Georgia.* A view of the "Agrarian Crusade" in the Light of Solid-South Politics. By ALEX. MATHEWS ARNETT, PH.D., Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, edited by the faculty of political science of Columbia University, Vol. CIV, No. 1. New York, 1922. Pp. 239. \$2.50.

*The Fascist Movement in Italian Life.* By DR. PIETRO GORGOLINI, with Preface by PREMIER BENITO MUSSOLINI. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1923. Pp. 217. \$3.00.

Here are two books dealing with mass movements that have expressed themselves in political action. In the United States the economic difficulties of the farmer following the Civil War created widespread dissatisfaction. This resulted in co-operative movements, at first educational, social or ritualistic, and later political. Finally it produced the Populist Party, which assumed characteristics of a crusade to "turn the rascals out." When the platform was adopted at Omaha in 1892 we are told that "women shrieked and wept, men embraced and kissed their neighbors, locked arms, marched back and forth, and leaped upon tables and chairs in the ecstasy of their delirium."

In Italy political reform took on a revolutionary aspect. The sudden spread of communism in industry and politics moved the Fascist legionaries to a course of violence. As Fascism came into power, its negative character changed; it acquired policies and political dogma.

Dr. Arnett's book is a historical monograph. It is a careful narration of events and their causes. It takes up in succession the political entrenchment of the Democratic oligarchy in the seventies, the "Basis of Agrarian Dissent," the "Embattled Farmers," the rise of the third party, the effect of the business depression of the nineties, and the unsuccessful attempt of the Populists to capture the national democracy.

The last chapter suggests later political manifestations of the impulses beneath the Populist movement. There is a good bibliography.

Dr. Pietro Gorgolini's book is a group of loosely related chapters, each attempting a critique of some aspect of Fascism. Dr. Gorgolini is himself a Fascist. The style is redundant and oratorical. There is little attempt to trace developments; emphasis is placed on a presentation of Fascist aims and policies. Stress is laid on the nationalistic reaction against internationalism, the individualistic reaction against communism. Fascism may to a large extent be identified with the personality of its dominating leader, and the book contains many excerpts from Mussolini's speeches and writings.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*Foundations of Educational Sociology.* By CHARLES C. PETERS.  
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924. Pp. x+447.

That there is a rapidly growing interest in educational sociology is shown by the fact that in the seven years since the writer's introductory book appeared, four other volumes bearing a similar title have been published. While there is abundant demand for a better general text than any of the five, at least four of them have made definite contributions. Not the least of these are contained in this latest volume by Professor Peters.

Like his predecessors, Professor Peters has found difficulty in organizing the hybrid materials that must be dealt with. Educational sociology appeals to two types of thinkers, the sociologist who is interested in the sociology of education and in the school as a fundamental social institution, and the practical educator, who is interested in the contributions sociology can make to educational theory and the aid it can render him in the solution of his daily problems. Both phases of the subject are important and need vital scientific treatment. Professor Peters' approach is that of the professionally trained educator, but he has dealt quite effectively with such phases of the social process as association, socialization, social control, and social progress. His conception of educational sociology is sound and is embodied in the following statement: "Educational sociology should not be construed as merely sociology for teachers. It should not seek to study sociology from the standpoint of education but rather to study education in its sociological aspects. The educational psychologist shows how education should be adjusted to the needs of the individual; the educational sociologist should show the

adjustment of education to the needs of society and the bearing of group phenomena upon the educational procedures by which these needs must be met."

Professor Peters' most significant contribution lies in his insistence upon sociological research into educational problems. He has outlined special techniques for making specific quantitative studies for determining educational objectives as a basis for curriculum-making. It is to be noted, however, that he has scarcely mentioned the sociological aspects of administration, discipline, and method, which are as vital parts of a genuine educational sociology as the determination of aims and curricula. The book is well written and adapted to text-book use by the inclusion of bibliographies and suggestive lists of research problems at the end of each chapter. It is worthy of wide reading among sociologists and will find a useful place as an introductory text in schools of education.

WALTER R. SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

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*La Poblacion del Valle de Teotihuacan.* Por la Direccion de Antropologia siendo director de las Investigaciones MANUEL GAMIO. Direccion de Talleres Graficos, Dependiente de la Secretaria de Educacion Publico. Mexico, 1923. 60 pesos.

The schemes of reform—political, economic or educational—which Mexicans have so liberally produced have proceeded upon the assumption that Mexico is a nation. Realizing that Mexico is rather a group of heterogeneous, isolated, rural communities that have remained disorganized since the shock of racial and cultural interaction four hundred years ago, Dr. Gamio proposed to study his country before curing it. He divided it for study into eleven dissimilar areas. These three volumes give the result of the first survey, of a community of eight thousand taken as typical of the plateau area. The report embodies one of the most thorough regional surveys ever made. It presents the economics, vital statistics, physical anthropology, social organization, and folklore of the valley, in text, tables, photographs, maps, diagrams, and plates. The present disorganization of the community, involving isolation, peonage, loss of primitive organizations and handicrafts, malnutrition, and disease, is contrasted with the highly organized aboriginal community evidenced by the extensive pre-Aztec ruins lying in the valley. To the archaeology of these a part of the work is devoted.



This is an excellent study of an isolated community. Interesting also is the account of its partial rehabilitation by means, among others, of connecting it by automobile road with Mexico City, by reorganizing primitive industries, and by giving employment in the archaeological excavations and thus raising the standard of wages.

The "Introduction, Synthesis and Conclusions," with illustrations, is published in English in one inexpensive volume.

ROBERT REDFIELD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*A Course in Personnel Administration.* Syllabus and Questions.

By ORDWAY TEAD. New York: Columbia University Press, 1923. Pp. x+246, 11 forms. \$3.00.

*The Economics of Unemployment.* By J. A. HOBSON. London and New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923. Pp. 157. \$1.75.

*The Young Industrial Worker, A Study of His Educational Needs.*

By MARGARET PHILLIPS. With an Introduction by C. W. Valentine. London and New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1922. Pp. 142. \$1.50.

These three volumes, which were sent together to the reviewer because all of them were considered to fall within the general field of labor problems and industrial control, have in fact widely divergent objectives. Mr. Tead, as the title of his book would indicate, has sought to prepare a manual primarily for college and university students of personal management, to supplement the earlier textbook of which he is with Henry C. Metcalf the co-author. Mr. Hobson, as the readers of his well-known earlier writings would have expected, has sought to preserve the point of view of the more or less mythical "public interest" we are all fond of invoking on occasion. Miss Phillips writes from the point of view of the teacher or educational administrator, interested in the possibilities and methods of reaching with a general, primarily non-vocational educational program a particularly difficult and inaccessible body of pupils—the young industrial workers.

What is said above about Ordway Tead's *Course in Personnel Administration* will suggest both its uses and its limitations in part. Parts of the volume are almost intelligible without the Tead and Metcalf text to which it is intended to serve as a student's guide. It was originally prepared for correspondence students and subsequently put in use in classes

of resident students at Columbia University. For the purposes of a classroom or correspondence textbook the two volumes should, in the opinion of the present reviewer, prove very valuable. The author has prepared carefully selected references for wider reading and well-planned questions and exercises. To the sociologist it should be interesting to know that the conception of the worker as a person, with attitudes and behavior shaped by his status and his ambitions, is quite freely adopted in these books. What is still more unusual, the author has embodied in a volume taking the point of view of the prospective manager a very sympathetic and intelligent, though brief survey of the rôle of labor organizations of the trade-union type. Not the least valuable feature of the volume is the series of appendixes containing over one hundred pages of case material.

Mr. Hobson's little book is written in the *a priori*, academic manner which has so commonly characterized British studies in the social sciences. There is practically no illustrative material given or suggested, and very few references are given in support of the thesis or as suggestions for further reading. The author's thesis can be briefly stated by giving two sentences from his Preface, "Excessive saving operates, through deficient demand for commodities, to slacken the sinews of production and produce more capital goods than are able to be put to full productive use. The current distribution of income throughout the industrial world tends normally to evoke a rate of saving and capital creation that is excessive, in this sense." The book will probably be very interesting to those sociologists who are interested in that margin of their field which borders on social ethics and social politics.

Miss Phillips has written a tiny, but very readable, account of her first-hand experiences as teacher and supervisor in English continuation schools. The result has no direct interest for the student of industrial relations, but should be extremely interesting to those who are interested in education as a phase of the social process. The pages are packed full of concrete material illustrating the points made. The book could be taken as a study of the personality of the young worker in modern industry.

Miss Phillips' study would probably constitute a worth-while addition to the personal library of any sociologist; the same could not be said of the other two volumes, which, however, are worth the while of those who have special interests in the fields with which they deal.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

*Business Fluctuations and the American Labor Movement, 1915-1922.*

By. V. W. LANFEAR. New York: Columbia University. Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Volume CX, No. 2. Whole number 247, 1924. Pp. 132.

*A Study of the Cyclical Fluctuations Occurring in the National Bank System during the Years 1903 to 1921.* By LINCOLN W. HALL. University of Pennsylvania Doctoral Dissertation, privately printed. Philadelphia, 1923.

The title of Dr. Lanfear's monograph, *Business Fluctuations and the American Labor Movement*, is somewhat misleading. Only the last of five chapters deals with the correlations of observed phenomena of the business cycle with aspects of "the American labor movement." The first four chapters have to do with the examination of variations in wages, employment, and labor turnover and absenteeism, which appear to be correlated with the business cycle. As is indicated in the title, the data used are of the period 1915-1922 only, which period, however, is a sufficiently unique and interesting one to justify study in a separate monograph. For the same reason, however, some question might be raised as to the representative character of the data, regarding them as a basis for the study of the relation of labor to the business cycle. The reader who is reasonably familiar with the literature of industrial relations will find little in the present study which is new to him; to the student of sociology it may be of some value as an example of the marshaling of a body of data into reasonably compact form on the basis of which the material can be treated as a case.

The content of Doctor Hall's dissertation will be of little interest to the sociologist as such. Of that content the title is sufficiently indicative. To those who are interested in the possibilities of statistical procedure in the social sciences, this example of the application of the method may be of considerable interest. So far as the present reviewer is qualified to judge, the material has been very ably handled, and the findings are presented in an understandable fashion.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

*Town and Country Relations. Country Community Education.*

Proceedings, Fourth and Fifth National Country Life Conferences. Two volumes. Edited by Henry Israel. New York: Association Press, 1923. Pp. 222, 212. \$2.00 each.

These volumes consist of papers given at the fourth and fifth National Country Life Conferences at New Orleans in 1921 and New York in 1922,

and attack the problems of the rural village and of rural education from many angles. The first volume contains a symposium in which representatives of a half dozen successful rural communities of the Gulf States describe their development. Two papers by Dr. C. C. Taylor bring together valuable facts on the content of the rural press and give methods for its analysis and measurement. "The Present Status and Tendencies in Rural Community Organization," by Professor Walter Burr, gives an interesting bird's-eye view of the progress in this field as revealed by correspondence with leaders in many states, and provoked considerable discussion.

The volume on *Country Community Education* is the stronger of the two, and the papers of O. G. Brim on "The Handicaps of the Rural Child," by Rosamond Root on "The Public School as a Center for Rural Community Education," and by C. B. Smith on "Principles and Achievements in Adult Education under the Smith-Lever Act" are noteworthy. The after-dinner speech of Seymour L. Cromwell, then president of the New York Stock Exchange, is significant as revealing the new sense of responsibility of large business for rural welfare.

These annual conferences of the American Country Life Association are doing a unique service for rural progress in bringing together national and state leaders for the discussion of particular phases of rural life, and by placing their thoughts before the public through the published proceedings, which furnish valuable reference material for classes in rural sociology and which deserve the widest circulation among local leaders in the country-life movement.

DWIGHT SANDERSON

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

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*Then and Now in Education—1845: 1923.* By OTIS W. CALDWELL and STUART A. COURTIS. World Book Co., 1923. Pp. 412. \$2.20.

In no phase of life is the pessimist more vociferous than with reference to education. Following the universal tendency to judge the past by exceptions and the present by averages he recalls the good speller, the lightning calculator, and the laborious student of his early acquaintance and proceeds to condemn the ignorance and mental flabbiness of present-day youth. This he attributes to the fads and frills and the soft pedagogy of contemporary educators.

To all such the reading of *Then and Now in Education* ought to serve as a mental and moral purgative. It is a scientific study of the compara-

tive attainments of the best pupils of the Boston schools of 1845 with the average eighth-grade pupils of today. Fortunately we have extant a laborious survey of the schools of Boston in 1845, with the questions and answers preserved. The authors have carefully adapted these to present-day conditions and given them to about 40,000 pupils scattered all over the United States. Twelve thousand of these, unselected, were tabulated and the results are given. In spite of the fact that the comparison is with the carefully selected best pupils of 1845 and the "unselected lower fourth" of those of 1919, it will be no surprise to thoughtful people that the results are highly favorable to the superior knowledge of the boys and girls of our own day.

It is a very thoughtful and scientifically wrought-out comparison and ought to be widely read. Not only the results but the methods used, and the questions and answers reprinted, ought to be of interest and value.

WALTER R. SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

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*Poverty with Relation to Education.* By RALPH P. HOLBEN. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1923. Pp. 208.

Sociologists, desiring an example of skilful as well as accurate and painstaking use of the methods of investigation by personal interview and of statistical presentation, will find it in Mr. Holben's study of 100 families in Allentown, Pennsylvania, chosen to represent a fair and unbiased sample of that social stratum known as "poverty stricken."

The results of the study prove conclusively that poverty makes the American boast of equality of educational opportunity a mockery. This is shown by striking data, which fall into two natural groupings: The Parents and the School, and The Children and the School. Under the first it is shown that what has been demonstrated as the rule for the general population (that is, the positive correlation between years of education of the parents and the years of education which they succeeded in giving to their children) is the exception within the poverty-stricken class. The withdrawal of the children from school was in most cases contrary to parental desires and better judgment, but forced by economic necessity.

The general inadequacy of the present school system to meet the needs of the poor is made outstanding by Mr. Holben, who shows that not the present bookish training but a trade is essential to meet the requirement that school be profitable as well as attractive. The continuation school is condemned because of its failure to even approximate fulfillment of its purpose.

The second division shows that the majority of the children left school at the sixth or seventh grade and drifted into industry and "blind alley" jobs. Lack of ambition and a discrepancy between actual work and the hopes of those who could imagine something better characterized the mental state of the children studied in many instances. Mr. Holten makes clear that the social waste involved must be considerably more than society can afford to stand. One and a half per cent of the entire group possessed ambitions and talents which must go unrealized unless aided, and this is no small social loss. Multiply this by the thousands of similar groups throughout the country and the full significance is realized.

When Mr. Holten comes to the concluding part of the study and deals with remedies and solutions, he does not allow flights of vision to carry him far from earth. His conclusions and recommendations have a substantial quality. It is suggested that much could be done by reorganization of the schools, thus effecting a better adjustment to the needs of poor children. Vocational training, vocational guides, psychological clinics, and visiting teachers are mentioned as promising steps in the right direction. But of even more fundamental importance is economic amelioration. A few praiseworthy endeavors lead the way toward a solution; mothers' pensions and scholarships help. These should not be regarded as private charity activity, but as state obligations. Society must realize that children of poverty are intellectually disinherited; that it is the social environment and not a difference in innate intellect that makes class differences; that a fundamental obligation of a society, holding the democratic ideal, is a more just distribution of the mental heritage among the children of all classes; and that there is a considerable social waste in the failure of the present system to effect this justice.

NANCY BOYD WILLEY

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD  
NEW YORK CITY

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*Federal Centralization.* By WALTER THOMPSON. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. Pp. vii+399. \$2.75.

This book is a concise treatment of the constitutional phases of federal control. The author begins his work with a brief discussion of the extent of the central government's power as contemplated by the framers of our constitution. He then takes up one by one the commerce, the taxing, the postal, the treaty-making clauses of the constitution and carefully shows how from these has been developed a very effective federal "police power." The second part of the work dealing with social legislation and

the constitution should be of particular interest to the sociologist. Under social legislation he considers those congressional enactments which have to do with lotteries, vice, food and drugs, child labor, education, and intoxicating liquor. Part three deals with the extension of federal control in the economic field through the interstate-commerce clause, and part four sums up in excellent fashion the possibilities of federal centralization. The whole work is handled conservatively and for the most part scholarly. In the pages on national prohibition, however, Dr. Thompson leaves the cool, reflective atmosphere of his study and sets out with a whoop on a furious war dance in pursuit of the "drys," the Anti-Saloon League, and the allies of both. It is evident throughout the work that the author deprecates the expansion of federal activities; his treatise is, on the whole, a well-reasoned answer to those who call upon the federal government for the amelioration of all the ills which beset the body politic by statute law or constitutional amendment. Above all, it is earnestly recommended for most careful consideration by those of our fellow-citizens who cry out without ceasing, "There ought to be a law against that!"

JEROME G. KERWIN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*Sound and Symbol in Chinese.* By BERNHARD KARLGREN, FIL. DR., Professor of Sinology in the University of Goteborg. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1923. Pp. 112. \$1.00.

This book is an analytical study of the evolution of the Chinese language, which, as the author has skillfully shown, can be used as a valuable index to get at the possible life, thought, and social origins of the ancient people in China. The so-called "one of the hardest languages in the world" is here for the first time made intelligible to the English-speaking public.

TSI C. WANG

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## RECENT LITERATURE

### NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

The abstracts and the bibliography in this issue were prepared under the general direction of H. B. Sell, by M. W. Roper, T. C. Wang, D. E. Proctor, W. M. Gray, F. H. Saunders, and Emma P. Goldsmith, of the Department of Sociology of the University of Chicago.

Each abstract is numbered at the end according to the classification printed in the January number.

#### I. PERSONALITY: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE PERSON

**La phrase dans le langage de l'enfant.**—The noun is first used by the child and continues to be used more than other forms, being associated with the action of the object. The complete phrase is acquired very slowly and at the price of laborious effort and even when acquired is not used consistently because of the economy of words and effort. The phrase is not acquired by imitation.—O. Bloch, *Journal de psychologie*, XXI (January-March, 1924), 18-43. (I, 3.) D. E. P.

**Un problème premier de la pédagogie morale: la formation du caractère.**—Parents are responsible for the building up of the character of the child, which is formed largely in the early training of the child although it may be modified up to the last day. The character of French children has undergone a great change in the last few years primarily as a result of the war. Real success is to be found in just and unselfish effort.—Achille Ouy, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XXXII (March-April, 1924), 118-26. (I, 3.) D. E. P.

**L'interrogation chez l'enfant.**—The questions asked by the child show very well the strength of the psychic activity and indicate the progress of his growing intelligence. The conceptions of time and space come relatively late.—H. Wallon, *Journal de psychologie*, XXI (January-March, 1924), 170-82. (I, 3.) D. E. P.

**Quelques considerations à propos de l'intérêt chez l'enfant.**—Educators agree that the interest of children must be considered in selecting materials and methods for education. The important point is to understand what are those interests and how they develop at various ages. Several classifications of the stages of interests and experiments to show interest are presented.—O. Decroly, *Journal de psychologie*, XXI (January-March, 1924), 145-60. (I, 3.) D. E. P.

**Les acuités sensorielles et les enfants arriérés ou retardés.**—M. Foucault has made some mental, visual, and auditory tests among school children, using among others the Wecker and Masselon, Snellen, and Binet-Simon tests. He is convinced that these tests should be used more extensively by school-teachers in an attempt to reduce the number of children having defective eyesight or hearing, or suffering from fatigue.—M. Foucault, *Journal de psychologie*, XXI (January-March, 1924), 215-35. (I, 3.) D. E. P.

#### II. THE FAMILY

**New Morals for Old: Can Men and Women be Friends?**—Friendship depends upon quality and choice, and there has been very little of either in the relation of the sexes, up to the present. Relations between the sexes have been and are hedged about by conventions. What might be friendship society forces into love-making.—Floyd Dell, *Nation*, CXVIII (May 28, 1924), 605-6. (II, 1; I, 4.) M. W. R.

**The Family Ideal and Religion in Ancient China.**—Filial duty was the compelling force which controlled the ancient family relationship in China. It was more than a principle; it was a social institution and a code. Its religious activities focused upon



ancestral worship. The fear of the ancestral shades was used as a force to maintain and insure family cohesion. As the individual family worshiped its ancestral line, so the clan its line, and so for the benefit of the entire community the rulers worshiped the Supreme Being.—Herbert Maynard Diamond, *China Review*, V (October, November, 1923), 104-8; 137-39. (II, 1, 2.) T. C. W.

**New Morals for Old: Modern Love and Modern Fiction.**—Until each individual of the human species becomes a complete biological entity there can be no fear lest we should cease to live dangerously. We cannot possibly solve the problem of sex love because its most important aspects are not social but human. Modern fiction has brought much enlightenment but no solution.—J. W. Krutch, *Nation*, CXVIII (June 25, 1924), 735-36. (II, 1, 3.) M. W. R.

**New Morals for Old: Toward Monogamy.**—The dominance of man has made woman ultra-feminine to a degree often injurious to motherhood, and has made man ultra-masculine. Customs, conventions, ideas of morality, the "double standard," the linking of sex service with marriage, etc., have kept us from a state of natural monogamy. It will take several generations of progressive selection to re-establish a normal sex development.—Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *Nation*, CXVIII (June 11, 1924), 671-73. (II, 1, 3.) M. W. R.

**Ni-hwan Ung Ti.—The Divorce Problem.** Divorce is a popular subject of discussion in recent years in China, since her close contacts with the Western world, the breakdown of her old morality, the new thought movement, the movement for the emancipation of women, the rapid growth of industries and urbanization, etc. The doctrine of free divorce, proposed by Ellen Key and Ibsen, alone will not solve the problem. Social control is necessary. Legally, new laws should be made, but fundamental, adequate popular education for children and parents, a democratic family system, industrial democracy, and marriage based on real love should be promoted by society.—Kao Er-sung and Kao Er-pei, *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, I (September, 1923), 80-95. (II, 3.) T. C. W.

**The Job and the Middle-Aged Woman.**—There is today a group of women between the ages of forty and sixty-five who, after years of effective service as home-makers, are finding themselves with nothing to do. These women do not want an avocation, a fad, a filler of time. They want a real job, but what the job shall be is an unsolved problem.—Alice Wholey, *New Republic*, XXXIX (May 28, 1924), 14-16. (II, 3.) M. W. R.

### III. PEOPLES AND CULTURAL GROUPS

**Immigration and the American Birth-Rate.**—The idea that the birth-rate of the native American stock responds directly to the influx of immigrants may be dismissed as an illusion. The causes lie more on the rapid industrial and social changes. The growth of individualism and the decline of the Puritanic tradition was accompanied by the wide dissemination of information concerning mechanical means of birth control.—E. B. Reuter, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (May-June, 1924), 274-82. (III, 4.) T. C. W.

**The Immigration Peril.**—The preservation of American tradition, language, ideals, and law are threatened by the influx of aliens, largely Roman Catholic or Jewish, from Southern Europe. Like-mindedness, psychologically essential to unity, is dependent upon similar racial heredity. The dominance of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism is urged through the public school with rigid exclusion of aliens of other stocks.—Gino Speranza, *World's Work*, XLVII (November, December, 1923), 57-65, 147-60; (January, February, March, April, 1924), 256-74, 399-409, 479-94, 643-48; XLVIII (May, 1924), 62-68. (III, 4.) W. M. G.

**Women in India: Some Problems.**—Many problems arise between the orthodox Hindu woman and the English educated woman. The social customs in India conflict on every hand with ideas gained in education. In India one must accept the religion of one's family or group or be an outcast. The solution lies in the education of the orthodox woman.—Cornelia Sorabji, *Fortnightly Review*, CXV (May, 1924), 661-73. (III, 5, 1; IV, 2.) M. W. R.

**L'esprit de clan, facteur d'arrêt économique en Corse.**—Clan loyalties in Corsica are so powerful that they are an obstacle to the processes of government and the administration of justice. This anachronism retards the economic progress, and while very interesting sociologically, is profoundly regrettable from a moral point of view.—J. Probst, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XXXII (January-February, 1924), 15-21 (III, 6.) E. P. G.

**L'échange de Vêtements entre Hommes et Femmes.**—*Signification de cette coutume:* The custom of men and women exchanging clothing on such extraordinary occasions as circumcision and birth arises from a belief that such exchange gives the qualities of the other sex. In Ireland, for example, the woman giving birth puts on the clothes of the husband so that he will share her pain and she suffer less. There seems to be a belief that masculine force is transmitted in the contact with his clothing.—M. J. Kleiweg de Zwaan, *Revue anthropologique*, XXXIV (March-April, 1924), 102-114 (III, 6.) D. E. P.

**A Preliminary Consideration of the Culture Areas of Africa.**—The culture area concept, as advanced by the American anthropologists and as applied to American Indian cultures, has proved so valuable that an attempt is being made to apply it in a study of African cultures. The student is handicapped because of scantiness of material and because much of this material has been gathered by persons who were not trained as ethnologists. However, by judicious checking and comparing of these sources the handicap should be overcome. The continent has been divided into nine areas, which greatly reduces the chaos ordinarily prevalent in a study of Africa.—Melville J. Herskovits, *American Anthropologist*, XXVI (January-March, 1924), 50-63. (III, 1.) M. W. R.

**Race Types in Polynesia.**—Biological data of the inhabitants of Polynesia are beginning to indicate that "Polynesians" are in no sense a uniform racial type. The population is composed of four elements; two of these are Caucasoid in appearance, the third is Negroid or Melanesian, and the fourth, though somewhat doubtful, shows Negroid or Mongoloid characters.—Louis R. Sullivan, *American Anthropologist*, XXVI (January-March, 1924), 22-26. (III, 1.) M. W. R.

**Births and Population in Great Britain.**—An important conclusion from the statistics relating to Great Britain is that with the birth-rate (per potential mothers) of the year 1921-23 the population will ultimately diminish if there is any emigration, unless the death-rates fall further. Continuing under the present conditions the population would increase to forty-five or forty-six millions about 1941 and then diminish.—A. L. Bowley, *Economic Journal*, XXXIV (June, 1924), 188-92. (III, 4.) M. W. R.

**The Relationship between the Government and the Mission Schools in China.**—During the Manchu dynasty, the government and the mission schools did not have close contact with each other owing to religious and racial indifference. The student movement in 1919 brought the students of both groups for the first time into intimate contact. The government, however, has not fully recognized the mission schools on account of their insistence on the requirement of religion education and chapel attendance, neglect of Chinese language and culture, and the low status of Chinese teachers in mission schools.—Djin Yu-hao, *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, I (December, 1922), 1-6. (III, 5; VII, 2.) T. C. W.

**Le Rôle de la France dans l'Évolution des Peuples Attardés.**—The dominating and superior air that the British have assumed toward the natives of India, Egypt, etc., has been largely responsible for the recent disturbances in those countries. The same spirit of inequality is causing trouble for other countries. France has had little trouble because of her ideals of equality and is therefore able to play a larger rôle in the emancipation of backward peoples.—G. Angoulvant, *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, XXXI (June, 1924), 341-53. (III, 5; IV, 3.) D. E. P.

## IV. CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION GROUPS

**Klassekampens Teori.**—There are three principles involved in the theory of class conflict: (1) The interest principle, which is by no means clearly defined. The material interests are the most prominent—money, goods, power. Man usually tries to make himself believe that his interest and motives are higher than this, but in the majority of instances there is another side to the altruistic interests. (2) The class principle which was started in the proletarian demagoguery of about a century ago. (3) The power principle which was originated long before the class principle. In past times men were not powerful because they were rich but vice versa.—Werner Sombart, *Samtiden*, XXXV (Heft 1, 1924), 37–54. (IV, 1.) F. H. S.

**The Case for Industrial Dualism.**—The solution for the conflict between capital and labor is industrial dualism, that is, a rational division of the industrial field between private capitalism and public capitalism. By advancing along the path of public ownership, it may be possible to avert the decadence of democracy and the development of a capitalistic feudalism, without abandoning private capitalism and plunging into the bogs and thickets of socialism.—Edward Alsworth Ross, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XXXVIII (May, 1924), 384–96. (IV, 1, 3.) M. W. R.

**New Economic Tendencies in India.**—The economic, like the political, order is changing rapidly in India. With the demand for the right to self-government is coming the demand for the right to develop their own industries by the establishment of protective tariffs, etc. Racial considerations are at the basis of the present movement.—George Pilcher, *Edinburgh Review*, CCXXXIX (April, 1924), 260–74. IV, 2; (VII, 1.) M. W. R.

**Functional Democracy.**—Democracy is a social order in which every group may exert direct and unrestricted power on all collective interests in proportion to its members.—Arthur Wallace Calhoun, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (June, 1924), 501–5. (IV 3; X, 3.) T. C. W.

**Extremes and Means in Racial Interpretation.**—According to Ernest S. Cox's recent book, *White America*, "the white race has founded all civilization." He forgets the fact that Egypt was largely Negroid when its culture was in its height.—Melville J. Eerskowits, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (June, 1924), 550–51. (IV, 2.) T. C. W.

## V. COMMUNITIES AND TERRITORIAL GROUPS

**Les Petites Industries Rurales.**—The fact that farm labor does not furnish an interesting leisure occupation is responsible in large part for the desertion of the farms for the city. An introduction of weaving and small industry such as the manufacture of toys, furniture, lace-making, etc., would be economically practicable. A central organization and local organization should be formed. The plan has its social advantages in keeping the girls out of the factory, the men out of the beer gardens, and allowing the mother more time for her home and children. It will also furnish work for the crippled soldier.—M. Brillaud, *La Reforme Sociale*, LXXXIV (April, 1924), 201–21. (V, 1; VII, 1.) D. E. P.

**Regional Planning Next.**—The many difficulties encountered in city planning have shown that we need to look to the future in the planning of suburbs and of the open country. Many valuable and beautiful features can, in this way, be preserved for the future city. New York is taking the lead in regional planning, and Washington is considering its feasibility.—Frederic A. Delano, *National Municipal Review*, XIII (March, 1924), 141–48. (V, 2.) M. W. R.

**Quality versus Quantity: The Goal of Community Organization.**—People are not socialized when they are merely added together; socialization begins only when people are multiplied. One can only be socialized by interactions, interpretations, and interpenetrations in which the sum is not greater than the parts but different. The social sciences must evaluate the meaning of and give direction to the fruitfulness of these inevitably increasing contacts.—E. C. Lindeman, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (June, 1924), 518–19. (V, 3.) T. C. W.

## VI. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

**Charleston Breaks with the Past in Public Welfare Work.**—Public welfare activities of the city government were at the time of the recent survey carried on by seven independent municipal boards. The new plan provides for a single head in charge of the department of health and welfare.—Carl E. McCombs, *National Municipal Review*, XIII (June, 1924), 341-49. (VI, 6.) M. W. R.

**Crime Prevention through Recreation.**—Experience in various parts of the country proves that there is a reduction in juvenile delinquency following the introduction of programs of directed play activities. Playgrounds and recreation centers not only keep children occupied during their leisure time, but teach them "fair play" and good citizenship.—M. Travis Wood, *National Municipal Review*, XIII (April, 1924), 191-95. (VI, 4.) M. W. R.

**The Urban League Movement.**—The National League on Urban Conditions among Negroes began in 1910 in New York City. Its work has been to train men and women for social work, to bring about a better understanding between the races, to study negro life in cities regarding health, housing, recreation, employment, etc. Their program is based on the co-operative work of members of both races. The league now has branches in forty-one cities. Its budget in 1910 was \$5,300, while the work for 1924 calls for expenditures of \$69,800.—Hollingsworth L. Wood, *Journal of Negro History*, IX (April, 1924), 117-26. (VI, 6; IV, 2.) M. W. R.

**The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.**—The Association was started on Lincoln's birthday, February 12, 1909. The platform adopted at its first meeting stood for (a) abolition of all forced segregation, (b) equal educational advantages for colored and white, (c) enfranchisement of the negro, and (d) enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. *Thirty Years of Lynchings* constitutes the most valuable piece of research the association has done. In 1912 there were ten branches in various cities, in 1921 there were 400.—Mary W. Ovington, *Journal of Negro History*, IX (April, 1924), 107-16. (VI, 6; IV, 2.) M. W. R.

**The Changing Country Press.**—In the earlier period the country newspaper supplied all the news to the local community. The coming of the "farm papers," the daily, the direct primary, and the high price for newsprint has tended to narrow the field of the country press to local news and community welfare. In this field they are developing a community consciousness and fulfilling a long-felt need.—Charles M. Harger, *Scribner's Magazine*, LXXV (April, 1924), 446-50. (VI, 1, 7; V, 1.) M. W. R.

**Rural Germany and the Towns.**—Rural Germany today forms a political and sentimental entity, astonishing in its isolation and compactness and presenting a united front to the towns. This attitude has been due to the inflation of currency and the accusation of profiteering within the towns by the press. This will be broken up with the establishment of a stable currency and the importation of products from foreign countries.—J. L. Benvenisti, *Contemporary Review*, CXXV (May, 1924), 600-606. (V, 1, 2; IV, 1, 3.) M. W. R.

## VII. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL PROCESS

**Distortion of Economic Incentive.**—Previously social control of economic activities rested on productivity, the dignity of labor, and the quality of goods produced by the dignity as in the small community. Social distance between the modern producer and consumer allows an excessive share of consumption of goods to be concentrated within a small group, and the incentive to be placed on ostentatious display of consumption.—Rexford G. Tugwell, *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXIV (April, 1924), 272-82. (VII, 1.) W. M. G.

**The Food Resources of the World.**—The Malthusian law of population is substantially true today. The annual food production can be greatly increased by science, by more intensive cultivation of the soil, and also by an extension of land areas already under cultivation, but, even so, with the present rate of increase of population we can expect the "reasonable maximum" in a little over a century.—Henry Rew, *Edinburgh Review*, CCXXXIX (April, 1924), 312-31. (VII, 1; VIII, 2.) M. W. R.

**The German Youth Movement.**—It is a movement by young people. It is "the upheaval of life in the midst of death"—a rebirth of the soul of Germany out of the ashes of Bismarckian imperialism. Their mottoes are "self-education," "self-responsibility," and "strict truthfulness to our inner life."—Meyrick Booth, *Hibbert Journal*, XXII (April, 1924), 468-78. (VII, 2, 4) T. C. W.

**Sectionalism and Its Avoidance.**—The technique of keeping sectional feeling and loyalty within safe limits seems to embrace the following policies: Adequate proportion of representation in government, proportional sharing of the benefits and burdens of government, careful consideration of the sectional bearing of legislation, and the willingness of people of each section to listen to qualified spokesmen for other sections.—E. A. Ross, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (May, 1924), 484-87. (VII, 3.) T. C. W.

**Critical Attitudes North and South.**—The political demonstration of the southerners in 1913, the hegira of the negroes, and the rise of the Ku Klux Klan are three conspicuous phenomena which have been noted by the rest of the country with mingled emotions, among which distrust is conspicuous. As to methods of dealing with the negro problem, a divergence of opinion still exists. We need the sympathetic criticism from the North and the free expression of the true points of view from the South.—G. W. Johnson, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (May, 1924), 575-79. (VII, 3, 4.) T. C. W.

**Functional View of Legal Liability.**—The influence of sociology upon juristic theory has resulted in the rise of the idea of liability without fault. Workmen's compensation laws are an illustration of placing the burden upon the party which can most easily spread it upon society.—Maurice Finkelstein, *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXIV (April, 1924), 243-53. (VII, 3; X, 4.) W. M. G.

**What Is a Social Problem?**—A social problem means any social situation which attracts the attention of a considerable number of competent observers within a society, and appeals to them as calling for readjustment or remedy by social, i.e., collective, action of some kind or other. It is partly a state of social mind and not primarily a matter of unfavorable objective conditions in physical and social environments.—Clarence Marsh Case, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (May-June, 1924), 268-73. (VII, 4; X, 3.) T. C. W.

**Can the Masses Rule the World?**—The changes that have occurred since 1914 have been political, economic, cultural, and even hygienic, and have been practically worldwide. These include the transition from aristocracy to democracy, the liberal movement in the church, the "youth movement," the changing authority in the home, and the woman movement. All of these phenomena mean emancipation from old repressions, and a larger liberty. Authority is passing into the hands of the masses. Will they make the best use of this authority? We believe they will, because we believe human nature, however crude, is on the whole still sound at core.—G. Stanley Hall, *Scientific Monthly*, XVIII (May, 1924), 456-66. (VII, 4.) M. W. R.

**The German Youth Movement.**—The *Jugendbewegung* was initiated a few years prior to the war by Karl Fischer in the vicinity of Berlin, and before the outbreak of hostilities had reached a membership of over 1,000,000. It includes the *Freideutsche Jugend*, Proletarian, Protestant, and Catholic sections. It is a revolt against the domination of materialism in all phases of life and against the hatreds of nationalism.—Meyrick Booth, *Hibbert Journal*, XXII (April, 1924), 468-78. (VII, 4.) W. M. G.

**Does the Mill Village Foster any Social Types?**—The forces at work in the village fall into two main groups: one common to other businesses as well as the cotton industries, and the other peculiar to the cotton industry. Some of the aspects of the latter may be observed in an absence of contractual relations between employers and employees, isolated factories, a uniformity of racial stock accompanied by a sense of racial superiority, and a rural and educational psychology attempting to function in modern industry.—Jeannette Paddock Nichols, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (March, 1924), 350-57. (VII, 1, 4.) J. L. D.

**The Socialist Movement in Great Britain and the United States.**—The British Labor party, which is a socialist party, is growing in strength. The Socialist party of America has practically disappeared. The reasons for this contrast in fortunes between

the socialist movements of the two countries fall roughly under two headings, the first due to differences in economic conditions and the second to differences in political ideology and strategy.—Bertram Benedict, *American Political Science Review*, XVIII (May, 1924), 276-84. (IV, 3; VII, 2.) M. W. R.

**The Passing of Politics.**—Modern politics are based on a social organization in which town economy was the prevailing type. No special knowledge was required for a man to represent his community. This is no longer the case. Labor groups are gaining their ends by other means than political. The parties in the new social order appear as capital and labor. The discussions and compromises between these elements are disintegrating the political order.—William K. Wallace, *North American Review*, CCXIX (June, 1924), 783-92. (IV, 1, 3; VII, 3.) M. W. R.

**The China Renaissance.**—The movement is a product of long historical evolution. The Chinese Revolution, the work of returned students from foreign countries, and the Great War gave it stimulus and life. It is an expressive movement with magazines and other organs as their medium of free expression. The whole movement may be phrased as a critical evaluation of the old civilization of China and a critical introduction, instead of the previous blind imitation of new ideas and ideals from the West. The old classical language, the old family system, the old morality, etc., were all attacked.—Hu Suh, *The China Renaissance*, 1923, 1-36 (VII, 2, 4.) T. C. W.

**Shun Shi Chao U Tsai Hui Ung Tung Di Hwa Shin.**—*The Development of the Social Movement in Modern Education.* The tendencies toward universal education, its adjustment to social needs, and the social training of children, are the prevalent plan, method, and function of the modern education movement. It is a contrast with the old individualistic aim of education and education for the few. The dynamic forces back of the movement are, historically, religious revolution, philanthropic movements, political revolutions, and industrial revolution.—Wang, M. T., *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, I (December, 1922), 109-19. (VII, 2, 4.) T. C. W.

**Leaders and Led.**—The people do not tend to choose leaders of the "common level" or of the inferior type. In fact, there is a tendency to choose leaders more capable than ourselves in the hope that our habits will be corrected. No normal person detests superiority *per se*. The natural choices of the people tend to be good choices. The American public is not slow to detect the arts of political humbuggery.—William E. Hocking, *Yale Review*, XIII (July, 1924), 625-41. (VII, 4; I, 4.) M. W. R.

**Chun Kuo Tsai Hui Fun Nuan Fun Tsi.**—*An Analysis of the Causes of Social Disorder in China.* Great changes have been taking place in China, in all phases of life, since her new contacts with the Western world. Economically, poverty is increasing among her people; educationally, teachers and students are both in a period of great educational crisis and readjustment; politically, continual catastrophes and changes have taken place one after another since the Revolution of 1911; culturally, scientific spirit and old superstition, new and old morality, are engaged in war. The awakening of youth in the form of mass movements adds to the social unrest.—Chang, T. C., *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, I (February, 1922), 81-86. (VII, 4; VIII, 1.) T. C. W.

## VIII. SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

**Some Extra-Intellectual Factors in Delinquency.**—The causes of delinquent behavior are tied up (a) with the social environment of the individual as well as (b) with his inborn tendencies, and a study of each is essential. The emotional, the inadequate, the egocentric, and the paranoid personality types may be used to study psychopaths.—Franklin S. Fearline, *Journal of Delinquency*, VIII (May-July, 1923), 145-54. (VIII, 1.) T. C. W.

**Sifting and Sorting of the Poor.**—The Report of the Royal Commissioners in 1910 condemned the Poor Relief System of grouping all types in a single workhouse. The cost has increased to £38,000,000 a year, or from 35s to 68s per inmate per week.

No radical statute change is necessary to classify inmates for housing and work.—Edith Sellers, *Contemporary Review*, CXXV (April, 1924), 451-59. (VIII, 1.)

W. M. G.

**Socio-psychiatric Delinquency Studies from the Psychopathic Clinic of the Recorder's Court, Detroit.**—On the basis of case analysis of 1,988 offenders of all degrees, a high rate of psychiatric and phrenic deviation was determined, with high incidence of recidivism; and further, a very gratifying degree of unity as concerns the legal and socio-medical mechanisms. There was shown, in addition, low foreign but heavy male and negro representation in offense.—Theophile Raphael *et. al.*, *Mental Hygiene*, VIII (April, 1924), 453-65. (VIII, 1.)

M. W. R.

**Mental and Moral Problems of the Woman Probationer.**—By a special method of family case work the probationer deals with mental deviates, the inadequate and the emotionally unstable, psychoneurotic, and psychotic individuals. One hundred and sixty-two families, representing 645 children, have already been cared for. Failure in 23 per cent of the cases has resulted, largely because of mental conditions. Seventy-one per cent of these had to be hospitalized; the remaining 29 per cent are still being carried.—Nellie L. Perkins, *Mental Hygiene*, VIII (April, 1924), 506-21. (VIII, 1.)

M. W. R.

**Degenerationsproblemet. (The Problem of Degeneration).**—The idea of a golden age in the past and a degenerating world has been a common one among all peoples. The measure of degeneration should be the death-rate among any people. If we observe this, it gainsays any theory of degeneration at present. Racial intermixture is one of the weighty problems, but disease, alcoholism, and narcotics play a part. The remedy lies largely in health education in which America has made a notable progress. Unless Europe soon resumes conditions of peace, it may be that her peoples will degenerate to such an extent that they will find it difficult if not impossible to regain their place in the world.—Sören Hansen, *Nordisk Tidskrift* (Häft 1, 1923), 22-38. (VIII, 2.)

F. H. S.

**The Opium Question.**—The fight against the opium and narcotic drug traffic has progressed by three stages: (1) the edict prohibiting opium smoking by the Chinese emperor, Young Cheng, in 1729; (2) President Roosevelt's call for an international commission, which met at Shanghai in 1909; (3) agreement of the members of the League of Nations to take general supervision over execution of agreements with regard to the traffic. Discussions of the opium problem seem to have brought general agreement upon three principles: (1) The use of opium for purposes other than medicinal or scientific is an evil and should be abolished. (2) The non-medical use of opium and narcotic drugs can only be suppressed by curtailing their production. (3) Drug control cannot be effective unless it is international.—Quincy Wright, *American Journal of International Law*, XVIII (April, 1924), 281-95. (VIII, 3.)

M. W. R.

**Prohibition and Alcoholic Mental Diseases.**—Alcoholic insanity in this country is now much less prevalent than it was in 1910, but more prevalent than in 1920. The rate of alcoholic insanity is much higher among the foreign-born and negroes than among the native white. The rate is much higher in cities than in rural districts. With respect to education, economic conditions, and marriage, patients with alcoholic insanity do not differ greatly from the general average adult population.—Horatio M. Pollock and Edith M. Forbush, *Mental Hygiene*, VIII (April, 1924), 548-70. (VIII, 4, 5.)

M. W. R.

**Twelve-Months Recreation.**—Recently 281 cities with year-round recreation have sent reports to the Playground and Recreation Association of America. As a prevention of delinquencies and an insurance for health and citizenship it is greater civic economy to provide such recreation. Cities of eight thousand population or more should make such provision.—F. R. McNinch, *National Municipal Review*, XIII (May, 1924), 261-67. (VI, 4; VIII, 1.)

M. W. R.

**Chun Kuo Tsi Ye Tsi Liu Du.**—*The Course of Prostitution in China.* The spread of prostitution is proportional to the growth of modern cities in China. The greatest cause is economic; practically all prostitutes are from poor families. The old sys-

tem of buying maid-servants from poor families also had a great influence. The lack of adequate social control is another reason. A social movement for studying this problem as well as for controlling it has been started in different cities and provinces in recent years.—The Chinese Health Educational Association, *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, I (February, 1922), 63-71. (VIII, 1.) T. C. W.

## IX. METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

**Personal Experiences and Social Research.**—A fruitful method of social research is that which seeks *personal experiences*. Both the facts and the interpretations of them are found in personal experiences. It requires a period of exploration to make personal experiences objective, and to seek at the fundamentals regarding personal attitudes. The best research document is the letter written by one person to an intimate friend.—Emory S. Bogardus, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (May-June, 1924), 294-303. (IX, 4; I, 4.) T. C. W.

**The Greatest Research Chance in the World.**—As never before the world needs a great anthropological survey of the results of race-crossing in the regions where it is going on or has recently occurred. The enterprise would require a board of anthropologists, ethnologists, and sociologists to work out questionnaires for the field workers, as well as to determine the measurements to be taken and the data to be sought.—E. A. Ross, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (June, 1924), 549-50. (IX, 2; IV, 2.) T. C. W.

**Group Estimates of the Frequency of Misconduct.**—Some six-hundred odd students at the University of Texas rated the relative frequency of the ten worst types of misconduct over a period of four years. Sixteen different types were suggested and agreed upon to a correlation of over .90. The judgment of each sex regarding the other differed from the rating of each sex on itself by only a slight amount.—A. P. Brogan, *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXIV (April, 1924), 254-71. (IX, 3.) W. M. G.

**Method Employed in an Experiment in Advising a General Social Case-Work Agency on Psychiatric Social Problems.**—According to the new policy of the Illinois Society for Mental Hygiene, advice is given to various social agencies with regard to their case instead of taking over the cases from them. The experiment is being tried out in co-operation with the United Charities of Chicago. The chief aim is to give the social case-worker the psychiatric-social point of view.—Helen L. Myrick, *Mental Hygiene*, VIII (April, 1924), 522-29. (IX, 4.) M. W. R.

**The Psychiatric Clinic in the Treatment of Conduct Disorders of Children and the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency.**—Modern psychiatrists study the individual as a whole, i.e., all those factors, intrinsic as well as extrinsic, that influence his life-behavior, and map out, in the light of psychiatric understanding of his case, a well-rounded plan of treatment. Thus, modern psychiatrists are closely co-operating with psychologists, sociologists, educators, social workers, as in the St. Louis demonstration.—Victor V. Anderson, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XXV (November, 1923), 414-56. (IX, 5; I, 4.) T. C. W.

**Measurement of Intelligence.**—Existing instruments of measurement represent enormous improvements over what was available twenty years ago, but three fundamental defects remain. It is not known just what they measure; how far it is proper to add, subtract, multiply, divide, and compute ratios with the measures obtained; and just what the measures obtained signify concerning intellect.—E. L. Thorndike, *Psychological Review*, XXXI (May, 1924), 219-52. (IX, 2.) M. W. R.

**The Significance of Social Research in Social Service.**—The new point of view toward case studies, the recent emphasis upon community studies, and a knowledge of the very different ways in which the communities have succeeded or have failed to meet the fundamental demands or wishes of human nature, represent the sorts of research which are most important to social service.—Robert E. Park, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (May-June, 1924), 263-67. (IX, 4.) T. C. W.



X. GENERAL SOCIOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF  
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

**History and Social Intelligence.**—Most of the historical writings down to our generation lacked in reliability as to statements of facts. The new historical writing is to furnish us with a clear understanding of the genesis of civilization as a totality. The author confines himself largely to the intellectual aspects of the newer dynamic and synthetic history, i.e., the record of the changing opinions, attitudes of mind, and human valuations on the part of the intellectual classes from oriental antiquity to the present day. Our animal heritage, prehistoric human factors, diffusion of different cultures, increase of trade and the rise of towns, and new inventions are the major aspects showing the development of civilization. Our material civilization, produced by industrial revolution, has outweighed the intellectual development.—Harry Elmer Barnes, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (January, 1924), 151-64. (X, 2, 5.) T. C. W.

**The Spirit of Democracy.**—The main factors in the spirit of democracy are: (1) The spirit of community—the sense in each of belonging to a real whole which unites one with another at a deeper level than individual or sectional interest. (2) The spirit of equality—the right inherent in each as a human soul to be put in possession of himself through the development of his power. (3) The spirit of liberty—assignment of a place where each may work according to his capacity for common ends, and in which he may think and speak his mind.—J. H. Muirhead, *Hibbert Journal*, XXII (April, 1924), 427-35. (X, 4.) M. W. R.

**A Good Word for Our "Present Social System."**—Our social system, while shockingly defective as a point of arrival or finished product of the ages, is yet of singular promise as a point of departure or beginning of better things. It is a misfortune when the consciousness of society becomes predominantly a consciousness of social evils. The capacity it shows for self-reformation is a better characterization.—L. P. Jacks, *Hibbert Journal*, XXII (April, 1924), 417-26. (X, 4.) M. W. R.

**The Social Workers' Criticisms of Undergraduate Sociology.**—The chief criticisms of undergraduate instruction in sociology by social workers are: lack of close interdependence between the universities and the profession, too aloof abstraction in social theory, lack of enthusiastic participation of professors, and lack of field work.—Thomas D. Eliot, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (June, 1924), 506-12. (X, 6.) T. C. W.

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## THE KU KLUX KLAN INTERPRETED

By FRANK BOHN

### ABSTRACT

Two pictures have been drawn of the Klan, one by its friends, another by its enemies. Both of these are much exaggerated. The time has come to describe the Klan from the point of view of history and sociology. The author describes the organization in Marion County, Ohio, as an example of its local character and activities, and tells of the original organization of the Klan. The peculiar character of the Klan makes necessary a knowledge of the Rev. William J. Simmons, the founder. His origin and biography are discussed and his position with regard to our racial and religious issues stated. A social interpretation of various religious movements results in the placing of the Klan movement in American social history as the most important epoch of our militant nationalism. The Klan is interpreted as a result of a very general state of mind, the deepest cause of which is the fact that the original American stock is disappearing from our North and West. The future composition of the population of the United States becomes more and more evident as the racial conflict takes on a superficial religious aspect. The hooded figures of the K.K.K. are an expression of pain, sorrow, and of solemn warning. Its methods arise from anger and fear, not from knowledge and forethought. The constructive evolution of our American nation will require a different leadership, based upon a more lofty sense of human values.

Since its organization in 1915, the Klan has probably initiated a total of between four millions and five millions of members. Much of this membership is no doubt ephemeral. Yet each soldier in this enormous army has pledged his loyalty by a most solemn oath and paid sixteen dollars for his membership card and regalia. One does not take the price of sixteen bushels of wheat away from a Missouri farmer without having produced a state of considerable excitement in the ordinarily placid and inquiring mind of that citizen. Stories about the Klan are no longer front-page news for the eastern metro-

politan press. But there are several states in the Middle West and Far West where the Klan decided the presidential vote.

Two pictures of the Klan have been presented to the public: the one consisting of a skull and crossbones in black; the other, the sacred emblems of the Cross and the stars and stripes on a background of purest white. It would seem that the time has now come when a thoughtful effort may be made to understand the true nature of the Klan. Its fundamental rather than its ephemeral causes should be laid bare. The Klan may presently fade away as quickly as it came. But the general state of mind which could manifest itself in this strange way—that is a far more permanent aspect of our national life.

Marion County, Ohio, the home of the late President Harding, has furnished a most fruitful field for a study of the Klan. It is a very typical middle western agricultural county. Its black and dark-brown soils produce enormous crops of corn, wheat, and hay. The land swarms with dairy cattle, hogs, and poultry. In all the vast region from western New York to the short-grass country of western Oklahoma and Texas, there is no more representative county than this. In New England the Klan may dash itself against the granite cliffs of an immovable conservatism. In Oklahoma the political cyclone caused by the Klan last year threatened civil war. But on the psychological and social surfaces of Marion County, Ohio, the waves rolled up by the great wind of the K.K.K. are perfectly average in size and normal in movement.

At dinner in a small village in Marion County, the Methodist preacher's wife held forth in tones and terms which left no doubt as to either her point of view or her conclusions. This particular preacher's wife was herself a "local preacher." That is, she was licensed to preach but not to perform the more technical duties of the regular office in the presence of her husband and hierarchical chief.

"I'll tell you what they are doing," she went on, "they're driving all the negroes into the Catholic church; and the negroes are just naturally Methodists, too. Of course we cannot take them into our congregations; but now that we are uniting again, North and South, we shall probably have a separate church just for the negroes themselves. But I shouldn't be surprised now if some of them were



actually to turn Jewish. At M—— during the last election, the Jews united with the Catholics against the Klan. It's terrible, and what is to be done? Nothing? Why, one of them told me right here in this house, sitting before our own fire that he would fight before he would let his daughter marry a negro. What nonsense! He said he would resist rule by the negroes and foreigners even if the Constitution cracked and crumbled. Oh! You should have seen his face when he said it! I waked up that night and shivered when I remembered it. But when I got my chance I had my say, you may believe that; and he hasn't been to church since."

The next day the writer left his car on the paved highway and walked up the lonely, muddy lane that led to the home of the local organizer and leader of the Klan. In appearance this cottage was a bit more humble than the average. About it lay the sixty acres that formed the farmer's patrimony. The door opened upon a decent but extremely simple interior. The farmer was in his working clothes. A cold rain beat against the windows and we sat close to a little stove in the center of the living-room. Darkness came on but no light was struck. The day and the darkness exaggerated the somber character of both the man's face and his voice. He spoke in a monotone, his lips alone moving perceptibly. His chair was tipped far back and both his hands were sunk deep into his pockets. There was no smile, no change of facial expression, during the hour of conversation. Here was a perfect representative of the Anglo-Saxon Puritan farmer in America. This face and this voice had not altered fundamentally during the three hundred years since Charles I ascended the throne of England and undertook the task of remolding the one and silencing the other. Least of all could this man be considered secretive concerning his present state of mind. He was willing, even anxious, to tell everything he knew about the Klan, excepting only the secret parts of its ritual.

The country, he said, was in the greatest danger. We were ruled by Catholics and Jews. The Jews controlled the moving-picture houses. The Catholics dominated at least 80 per cent of the great newspapers. The movies were all worthless and immoral. The Jews were now upon every country cross-road taking in the money. They want nothing but money. All he wished our people to do was

to let them alone. "They leave us alone, except for getting our money. The Jew knows what sort of moving pictures will pay best—those which appeal to the worst side of human nature. What happens to the army of young girls who are lost every year! From 60,000 to 75,000 of them disappear annually and are never heard of again. Why, a young girl is no longer safe on our country roads! They are picked up by men in automobiles. The Jews get them and sell them as white slaves. They have a regular price list and the business is carried on from New York to San Francisco."

He went on to say that we must take the strongest measures to protect our public schools. There are districts where the Jews would not even permit a Christmas celebration in the public schools. But the greatest danger to our school system was the Catholic influence. The Catholics and Jews together were, in his opinion, a much greater danger to the world than the Germans had ever been. He repeatedly returned to his belief that the country was in a state of terrible and unprecedented danger. It was within the "shadow of destruction." Whenever a Catholic world-war veteran died and the local post of the American Legion conducted the funeral, we were enabled to witness a strange sight at the door of the Catholic church. At that point the flag was always pulled from the coffin. The Legionnaires durst not bear the flag into the church. How could the Knights of Columbus loyally support the Constitution of the United States when they had previously sworn allegiance to the Pope? "To them the Pope is Christ."

As there were no negroes at all in his vicinity, and but a few of them in Marion City, the county seat, one would hardly expect to find the race issue uppermost in the mind of this man. Yet his views on this matter were most pronounced. He accepted and stressed the Klan's position on every point. It was his belief that "when a mixture of the races occurred Providence intervenes." The children of mixed parentage, after a number of generations, were born sterile. He had no definite notion as to what might be done regarding the negroes beyond preventing them with relentless firmness from intermarrying with the whites.

In replying to the question as to what action was required in the presence of such dangers as he described, his answer emphasized the

necessity of the solidarity of the native white majority at the ballot box. "There are less than 20,000,000 Catholics in America and about 3,000,000 Jews. If our 100 per cent Americans are properly organized we can speedily control the country politically." Again and again he returned to his main contention—it was the sole purpose of the Klan to serve and save the country. The principles and purposes of the Klan, he was assured, contained no element inconsistent with sound patriotism, genuine Christianity, or the most spotless personal honor. His mind seemed to be obsessed by the fear that the Klan might have come too late, that the Nation might be already lost. Just before the conversation ended he let fall a sentence more significant than any other which the hour had brought fourth. "We want the country ruled," he said, "by the sort of people who originally settled it; this is *our* country and we alone are responsible for its future."

Less than a week after this conversation the local Klan at C—— held a propaganda meeting for the instruction of the public in the town hall. The main event of the evening was an address by a young clergyman who had been sent in from another state. He appeared to be entirely sincere and intensely in earnest. "There are two lines," he said, "along which our plans are to be carried out—education and the ballot. Let us make ready now. There is still time. We intend to work lawfully and through officials lawfully elected. Our antagonists are the lawbreaker, the prostitute, the negro, the Jew, the Catholic, the foreigner, and the misguided Protestant. If there be any such here this evening you may know with whom you class yourself."

Marion County had at the last census 42,004 inhabitants, of whom 27,891 live in Marion City. Within the city there were only 239 negroes and 1,655 persons of whom one or both parents were of foreign birth. This latter figure included 954 foreign-born. In Marion County outside the city, the 14,000 inhabitants of the farms and villages include an infinitesimal fraction of either negroes or foreigners. Hence the Klan in Marion City and County does not derive from any sharp lines of cleavage along racial or national lines. Klan and anti-Klan are here divided primarily into Protestants and Catholics. It is only a new form of a conflict which began at

Wittenberg in 1917. In the Marion municipal election last November, Rev. Buckley, pastor of the local Disciples Church, was supported by the Klan for the office of mayor. Mr. Buckley's name appeared in the regular Republican primaries and he was nominated. He stated publicly that the Republican City Committee did not help him in the campaign, although certain individuals of the Committee lent their aid entirely on their own initiative. In the election Mr. Buckley was successful by a majority of 1,300 votes.

Yet the political aspect of the conflict in Marion City is much less than half the story. The struggle has been carried, and with a vengeance, into the business life of the community. Which side began this phase of the conflict cannot be easily discovered. Both parties proceeded to boycott retail stores which were owned by individuals belonging to the other side. After the issue had struck deep, the Knights of Columbus proceeded to construct a handsome brick market house. This appears to be the best institution in the city for the marketing of food products of all sorts. It is divided into several sections for grocery and delicatessen stores, a butcher shop, and a restaurant. It was promptly boycotted by the Klansmen and their friends. It failed and so went into the hands of a receiver. More recently it has been purchased by a group of Klansmen, and now only white Protestants are permitted to conduct business under its roof. Such is the present state of political and economic life in this very typical Ohio city where the last president of the United States elected previous to 1924, during a period of forty years developed his business and political career.

WILLIAM J. SIMMONS

William J. Simmons, the Klan's founder and first Imperial Wizard, was a private soldier in an Alabama infantry regiment during the Spanish-American War. Hence his claim to the title of "Colonel" is perhaps better deserved than that of many another gentlemen in Kentucky and elsewhere. He prepared for the church and preached for a number of years, serving the regular Baptist organization as well as another denomination akin to the Baptists which flourishes in the Far South. During this period he was much impressed by the need for fraternal organization among the scattered

white people of the rural South. He became a professional organizer and an expert in the development of such institutions. Isolation is the curse of the southern white farmer. "They need organization, co-operation, clannishness," said Mr. Simmons.

The peculiar character of the Klan makes a knowledge of its founder necessary to its understanding. Mr. Simmons not only founded the Klan. He gave it form and purpose. His relation to it was exactly the same as that of Brigham Young to the Mormon church, or of Pastor Russell to the peculiar sect which he created.

During 1920-21, while making an investigation of the Klan, the writer became so intimately acquainted with the first Imperial Wizard as to leave no doubt in his mind concerning his peculiar character, talents, and attainments. Both intellectually and socially, Mr. Simmons is an excellent representative of our well-known type of rural, Protestant clergyman. It is customary among metropolitan Americans, untraveled in their own country, greatly to exaggerate sectional differences among our people; but our rural Americans, north and south, east and west, are remarkably alike. Indeed, these United States hold together in hub and tire because of this foundation of our national social unity. Our sameness is particularly evident as regards the mentality, the social manners, and all the other fundamentals of our country clergy. Mr. Simmons, when in good health, could have served, with equal success, any rural Protestant church of an informal sort in any state of the Union. He is not a member of the old-fashioned gentry of the South. He belongs rather to the country-bred middle class which is now as dominant in every southern state, Virginia and South Carolina excepted, as in the Middle West. While a bit more opinionated in matters of theology than the average of his colleagues in either New England or California, he is inclined to be less austere than they in manner and spirit. He enjoys horse-racing, for instance, and is not averse to going to a prize fight or enjoying a social drink with a party of boon companions. Religious liberalism among our people has different sectional ways of expressing itself, that is all.

Mr. Simmons' mind, until his recent illness, was considerably above the average of his profession. He read widely and devoted

time to the task of thinking about what he read. His intellectual interests centered about the history of the South and the solution of the race problem. Before the recent war and the Peace Conference had brought the issues of national self-determination and the control of subject peoples to the attention of a larger public, Mr. Simmons was reading widely concerning the world-aspects of inter-racial contacts. He was constantly examining the map and reflecting with a troubled mind upon the spread of the colored races long before popular books upon this subject had begun to be written.

#### THE PREACHER BECOMES PROPHET

The mind of Mr. Simmons cannot be explained, however, by reference only to ordinary things and to everyday studies and activities. In its earlier manifestations, as in its more recent sickness and suffering, his mentality has been quite extraordinary. The student of the religious element in American history, seeking to classify this man and his work, is led at once into a most interesting way. Evangelical Protestantism in America has always had a way of suddenly boiling over into fields of political and social agitation. Indeed the background of American Colonial history was largely dominated by the efforts of seventeenth-century religious leaders to reorganize the whole of human society. "God's Kingdom" in the form of a middle-class democracy was the ultimate goal. The pope was looked upon as anti-Christ. The king was permitted to be the vice-regent of the Almighty until he wanted to lay and collect ship money or a tax on tea. Then he, too, was anathema. The religious mind of seventeenth-century England has yet to be psychoanalyzed. If this task be well done we shall have a most fascinating volume.

The religious factor has been far more important in American political life than in that of any European country since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Any effort to understand the history of the American mind which does not take full cognizance of this element must be like a presentation of Hamlet with no reference at all to the ghost of Hamlet's father. Rev. Theodore Parker is remembered as a fighting abolitionist, not as a preacher of the gospel of meekness and forgiveness. Most American social reformers have been drawn from the pulpit. To the European ecclesiastic a brief history of

nineteenth-century Protestantism in America must furnish many incomprehensible chapters and personalities.

Rev. Simmons must be placed with that prophetic group of American religionists which has probably given our country, during the past century, more ardent exponents of new and startling religious ideas, and at the same time more militant warriors in advocacy of ideas which are old, than all the rest of Christendom put together. And what names, indeed, do we not find in this list? Jonathan Edwards, preaching on the subject of hell-fire and damnation, struck hundreds to the floor in fits of fear and fainting. Two centuries later, the dauntless William Jennings Bryan, armed *cap-a-pie*, leads whole states into violent reaction against the Darwinian theory. In this list are Beecher and Moody; Brigham Young and Mrs. Eddy; the Dowieites and the "Holy Rollers"; Colonel Ingersoll on one side and Billy Sunday on the other. John Brown and Stonewall Jackson agreed perfectly in this—each believed and felt to the very marrow of his soul that Almighty God was on his side. Each spent hours daily on his knees in earnest prayer.

Our American list of new religions and queer religious movements runs into the hundreds. We have had religious sects which, like the Shakers, abjured all sex relations. Others, equally sincere, have attempted to make the sex relation the basis and purpose of all religious worship and practice. One of these recently fell into the toils of the law in Michigan. Religious animosity has decided national elections. The religious influence in politics has just written a most important amendment into the federal Constitution. The state of Utah was created by a sectarian movement in the nineteenth century, as Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut and Pennsylvania were founded by similar efforts in the seventeenth. The founder of the K.K.K. laid hold of human material which many potters like himself had previously wrought into new and fantastic shapes. During the decade from 1905 to 1915 Mr. Simmons grew from preacher into prophet. In the following decade he was to rend Oklahoma and Oregon by furious political and social conflicts, set his crosses flaring in the farthest fishing village of the Maine coast, and addle heads in Marion County, Ohio, as above described.

In 1915 Mr. Simmons brought together a small group of veteran

members of the old Ku Klux Klan. A Georgian statute permits ex-members of any such disbanded organization to re-establish it and use its name. So the present K.K.K. is not looked upon as a new organization. It is a direct reorganization and continuation of the Klan of the Reconstruction period.

#### WHY WAS THE KLAN ORGANIZED AND HOW

Mr. Simmons had come to look upon the race conflict as the crucial issue in the struggle to save, to regenerate, and to Christianize the world. In his youth he found continual entertainment in persuading older people to relate the strange story of the Reconstruction period and the Ku Klux Klan. The issues of this period came to represent in his mind a gigantic conflict between the forces of good and evil, of God and the devil. The sectarian religious mind of America seems to have an innate tendency to throw itself with great violence into the advocacy of a single doctrinal belief or social ideal. So, one evil, or an imaginary evil, comes to be looked upon as all the evil in the world. As Everett Dean Martin has so clearly pointed out in his *Behavior of Crowds*, the *idée fixe* holds out peculiar temptations to the social reformer. A single social problem proves to be so exciting that all other problems are temporarily forgotten. The extreme Abolitionists were willing that the free states should wreck the Union if, by so doing, they could hasten the demise of slavery. Prevent the manufacture and sale of alcoholic drink, and all our other economic and social problems would speedily fade away. So moves the inspired word of prophecy through the mass mind. Those who have read a good biography of Loyola or of William Lloyd Garrison will have no difficulty in understanding Mr. Simmons. The solution of the race problem came to occupy the center and circumference of Mr. Simmons' brain.

One day, about ten years ago, our prophet was seated on a bench outside the door of his cottage. Without premonition of any sort he suddenly beheld a vision. What he saw on that occasion was not to be quickly forgotten. The sky was overhung with light mackerel clouds, showing the deep blue beyond. Suddenly, to the eye of the seer, the clouds reshaped themselves and moved rapidly across the sky. Their aspect now presented the form of a vast army of



warriors, superbly mounted and robed and hooded in white. Their steeds were garmented in similar fashion. It was the Ku Klux Klan, reborn and re-animated by a high and holy purpose, returning to save America from "un-American elements"; to save the white man's civilization around the whole world from being undermined and finally dominated by the various colored and heathen races. He determined to put his theories to the test.

The Imperial Wizard's general social philosophy was simplicity itself. Probably at that time he had never heard the word "Nordic," or seen it in print. In its place he used the expression "White Protestants." For his purpose it amounted to the same thing. He would segregate the negroes, perhaps transport them all to Africa. "We must choose," he would say, "between segregation, amalgamation, and extermination." He would stop immigration. He would fight to the last ditch in defense of the secular schools. He would Americanize the foreign born. He would disfranchise our illiterates everywhere. The missionary efforts of Protestantism were to be redoubled. It might still be possible to save the situation. Yet often enough he expressed the gloomiest forebodings, not only for America, but for both Protestantism and the white man's civilization throughout the world.

This brings us to the object of his supreme desire—the object which lay at the very core of the heart of this simple man. The first Imperial Wizard wished to construct in the city of Atlanta a great national university. This university was to be the head and center of the movement to regenerate Americanism and Western civilization. It was to be the "One Hundred Per Cent University." Each state of the Union was to erect a building. The thriving condition of the Klan as early as 1921 was indicated by the fact that four state organizations had each promised the required funds. The students of this university, like its teachers, were to be drawn from the forty-eight states. The poorest among them, their expenses being paid through a system of fellowships, were to associate on equal terms with the richest. Here was to be trained the future leadership of America. The buildings were to be erected out of the imperishable marble-like rock to be quarried at the base of Stone Mountain, near Atlanta. The outward material form, the intel-

lectual foundations of its teaching, the inner spiritual life—all must be changeless through the ages, a veritable ark of the new covenant. At this university the American mind was to be mobilized for its stupendous task. This task was the salvation of the white man's civilization from submergence by the colored races, and the execution of the plan formed by Almighty God for the Christian, Protestant redemption of the world.

During many conversations, the fact which again and again impressed the interviewer was the wide differences in mental clearness and grasp which were all too evident when the results of the different sittings were compared. On certain days the Wizard's thought, however narrow his convictions, showed within its radius a rare profundity and grasp. On other occasions his mind, all befogged and listless, seemed incapable of fruitful application. There came a day when this matter was finally cleared up. The Imperial Wizard was in New York, and the writer was paying him a call. The former was lying down and his eyes were closed. "I'm afraid I'm done for," he said. A distinguished specialist in the field of nervous diseases had warned him that there could be no permanent hope. He expressed a fear that his work must draw to a close. Others must carry on. His mental condition led to periods of deep melancholia bordering upon despair. The first Imperial Wizard was a broken reed. He organized the Klan but he never really commanded it. During that period the Klan was no doubt mismanaged. Its coffers were pilfered by insatiable grafters. It may be added that Mr. Simmons, his mind surrendered to his dreams, never shared in this loot. His final "sale" of the Klan to the present holder was no doubt indecent, but it was not dishonest.

#### WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN

It is a matter of profound interest, dramatic as well as historical, to reflect upon the probable outcome of the Ku Klux Klan, had Mr. Simmons fully measured up to the early expectations of his followers. His organization has swept through America as the Crusades, eight centuries before, swept through Europe. Following Henry James in dividing humanity into two classes, the "hard-minded" and the "soft-minded," we may say that the Klan, by the autumn of

1923, had succeeded in enlisting hosts of the hard-minded, militant, younger element among the "100 per cent Americans." In the counsels of the Imperial Wizard, and among the more knowing of his organizers in the field, there were flintlike purposes in formation. "We propose to do the deed," said an athletic, soldierly young Klansman to the writer, one day in Atlanta. "This is a military organization. We are under discipline and command. If anybody thinks we don't mean business let him wait and see. We are going straight through to our goal. God pity those that get in our way."

Here were the beginnings of the American Fascisti. The later development of the Klan was to show that this young man's mind was representative of a vast current moving through our national life. Let us suppose that the first Imperial Wizard, beside his far-flung visions, had possessed the eloquence and capacity for organization shown by Mussolini. Even as he was, had he possessed perfectly sound health, his talents and character would have taken him far. In that case we might have seen something very remarkable evolve out of all the strange nomenclature and fantastic rites of his American white shirts.

The most extraordinary political and social aftermath of the world-war did not happen in Russia, but in Italy. Militant internationalism has been a sad failure in our age. The dominant currents of the world's mind have been running toward its exact opposite—militant nationalism. "Italy is a religion," said Mussolini. The Russian bolshevistic régime might be compared to a political beanstalk, wrapped round a dead weed of theory, until the call to Russian patriotism thickened and hardened it to the point of standing alone. The illiterate and childlike masses of Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe, if given power, run quickly to crowd emotionalism and social disaster. The day on which the illiterate majority of the Italian workers and peasants were enfranchised—on that day the seed of Fascism was planted.

Mr. Simmons himself never really foresaw this Fascist drift of his movement. By 1920 it was running away from him and scattering its forces according to sectional, racial, and religious animosities. By 1921 the Wizard resembled the hen which had hatched out a mixed brood of goslings and turkeys. Simmons' attitude toward

acts of illegality was that of the average Christian clergyman. "I want the Klan to be a pillar of law and order," he said. It was his fervent hope, among others, that the Klan would stimulate a renewed interest in religion and the church. Repeatedly he emphasized to the writer the fact that he hated none because of his religion or race; nor did he desire to develop a feeling of hatred in others.

At this point the Imperial Wizard may be charged with a degree of unexpected simplicity of mind. To go into a county of 25,000 inhabitants and organize a thousand healthy, sturdy, adventure-loving young men, half of whom have just been mustered out of the army and navy; to fire their hearts with the thought that their beloved country was in imminent danger of destruction; and then expect them to be satiated by repeating the Klan ritual twice a month and waiting for election day, surely that was expecting to pluck figs from thistles. Such a regiment of a thousand strong, mounted on the best horses of the county, with automatic pistols bulging from hip pockets and glistening through the thin white cotton cloth; such an outfit would quite likely look around for a way of saving the country described neither in the four gospels nor the federal Constitution. Our American youth in general never had quite enough excitement out of the experience of the recent war. Over three millions of men had been armed, excellently drilled, keyed up to the fighting point by a very clever propaganda, and then sent home without having seen battle service. On the day of the Armistice this tremendous force was "spoiling for a fight." Now behold them, in the summer of 1919, hoeing weeds in potato patches or cleaning carpets for critical mothers in village back yards. One must grasp in its fulness this aspect of our national psychology during the two years immediately following the war in order to understand the forward thrust of the Klan at that time. In most western and southern states the Klan outgrew the American Legion three to one, sometimes ten to one.

#### THE DRIFTING FORCES

Once organized the force must be kept occupied. In Marion County it led the Protestant forces in an inter-religious conflict. In many middle western industrial cities and towns it has set itself the

task of keeping the incoming negroes in order. There have been whippings and tar-and-feather parties. More ardent and more general, however, than any other conflict waged, has been the fight against the "bootlegger." This appears to be the main issue in Oklahoma. It has been important in Herrin County, Illinois. Among a foreign or a purely industrial population, it appears quite impossible to organize the will of the majority behind the Eighteenth Amendment. In such communities law enforcement is exceedingly difficult. The K.K.K. has been a club thrust into the hand of the prohibition minority. The amount of illicit liquor manufactured and sold has no doubt greatly surprised the dry forces in the small towns. With this as with so many American social problems, impatience has grown into anger, anger into law-breaking. Where two issues are blended, as at Herrin, the explosive quality of the situation is greatly multiplied. At Herrin the combined labor and liquor parties have been in political control of the county. The anti-labor and anti-liquor forces have made use of the Klan.

It would be a great error to conclude that, generally, the Klansmen engage in illegal activities, good or bad. Probably nine-tenths of the minority who attend the meetings ordinarily do nothing but repeat the ritual, pass pious resolutions, and go home. It is the extraordinary occasion which invites to action. And where deeds are done, they are usually accomplished by the few rather than by the many. But the moral responsibility lies with the inactive majority.

Cloaked with secrecy, a larger or lesser group may be accused of working its will in a hundred whimsical ways. While one group raises a purse to succor a starving widow and her children, another in the next county is accused, justly or unjustly, of manifold crimes. A single unworthy act, of course, is enough to damn the entire organization throughout a state. No doubt the Klan suffers much in its reputation by reason of lawless deeds accomplished by obscure and irresponsible members, or by outsiders in the name of the Klan. The state of Ohio has recently been the scene of a dreadful crime committed in the name of the Klan by a half-crazy woman. This person sent "poison-pen" letters to a harmless rural laborer who was working by the day in support of his family. These letters, type-

written and signed "K.K.K.," threatened extreme measures of violence in case the recipient did not immediately leave town. The poor wight literally ran away, suffering a nervous collapse en route. His family heard no news from him for months. Later he was discovered, still shaking with fear, by a pursuing detective, far off in another state. The masks and mysticism of the Klan inevitably invite both insiders and outsiders to commit such crimes.

The reputation created by these methods must surely weaken and finally destroy the organization. Some honest and characterful men may join from the highest motives. Eventually they will be led to fear nothing so much as exposure of their membership. There are communities in the West where every railway accident and forest fire for years past has been laid at the door of the I.W.W. Over wide areas of the country the K.K.K. now bids fair to become, like the I.W.W. of yesterday, a national bogey.

No other organization in the history of the country has received so much free advertising in so short a time. This has enabled the Klan to establish a powerful press. It includes chiefly weekly and monthly magazines. These are sold in enormous quantities on the streets of big towns and little throughout the West and South. In all this literature there is a tendency to play upon a single string. The leading articles are always of an agitational and propaganda nature. There is almost no news, except reports of new organizations and Klan meetings. A very typical publication is *The Kluxer*, a fifty-six-page weekly magazine, printed at Dayton, Ohio. Quotations from the leading editorial of an early issue are a very fair sample of such statements made by the official Klan periodicals.

The Ku Klux Klan is sweeping this great nation like a forest fire. No organization of its kind or otherwise—nothing of its kind ever has swept America like this wonderful movement for Christianity.

The fiery cross is moving on, spreading its beautiful light everywhere for the betterment of humanity and the triumph of those principles which have made this nation great.

There never has been a movement in all the history of the world that has been fought like the Ku Klux Klan because we are fighting forces of unrighteousness that have entrenched themselves a thousand years and having ahead of them a great lure—that of keeping in control or gaining control of all things which are best and noblest and most powerful in the life of the nation, and those

same forces know that just here is a movement that will deprive them of that privilege unless they be 100 per cent honest-to-God American citizens—and they fight us.

Under the ritualistic work of the Klavern of the Ku Klux Klan, we are bringing new timber into the church—and who never would join any church, had they not taken up with this great movement.

Klancraft is a science of character building—it is not an ordinary secret order; it is not a little secret society, or a secret fraternity—but a wonderful character-building machine.

The cornerstone of our great organization is white supremacy and that has been a greatly misunderstood term. This is a white man's organization and it is a Protestant organization. When we say we stand for white supremacy, we say that the white man's blood by the grace of God and according to the record of history is a royal blood. The white man has been the leader in all that has been best for the world and for humanity. Under the reign and rule of the white man all races, creeds, sects of every kind have, under the white man's rule, had more liberty, more justice, more happiness and more peace than under the rule of any other race in the world.

The white man indeed has a wonderful heritage handed down to him. You and I as white people have a wonderful heritage handed down to us from our forefathers. And with an heritage comes responsibility.

Then, too, the white race must live up to its responsibility as a race. It must measure up in every way in the supreme race if it is to continue to be the leading race of the world.

It is worth while to gather the cream of the white race together in one great organization and begin the development of that body of people to a higher strata of life. The task is going to be to bring back from the highways and hedges the recreant members of the white race who are selling their birthright. Some of them are selling it for political honor, for social position, and for mere pleasure. No white man has the right to mix his blood, the white man's blood, with the blood of any other race.

#### THE KLAN INTERPRETED

Understanding the Ku Klux Klan is like understanding the history of Protestantism or the history of the American people. Nevertheless, we shall undertake, even in so brief a space, a description of its root and branch, that we may the better understand the flower and the fruit.

The mind of our American people has recently suffered a shocking disillusionment. Our masses, in city and country, have begun to lose their old-time cocksureness. To understand the total effect of this psychological experience, we must begin by summing up the

political and social nature of the average mentality to which the new experience has come. The underlying social concepts of our primitive, rural American people were evolved during three historical periods. The first was the English Puritan Revolution of 1628-50. The second was the American Revolution, which ran through two generations from the Stamp Act Congress in 1765, to the presidency of Andrew Jackson in 1829-37. The third period included the years of our slavery contest, Civil War and "Reconstruction"—1850-76. For America the last two periods marked the growth and final completion of the first. The nation realized political democracy. Our simple country people seemed to succeed at the tremendous task of democratic self-government. Meanwhile they surrendered unconditionally to the varied implications of the most extreme democratic theory. The national mind expressed itself in scores of thoughtless catchwords and pet phrases: "The cure for democracy is more democracy"; "One man is as good as another"; etc.

Upon the basis of our cocksureness, there has been built as a superstructure, since the Civil War, a keen sense of our gigantic material wealth and physical power. Our resulting national thought and emotion is generally expressed in what might be offered as a summary of all the Fourth of July orations ever delivered:

We are the greatest people on earth. Our government is the best. In religious belief and practice we [the Protestants] are exactly right and we are also the best fighters in the world. As a people we are the wisest, politically the most free, and socially the most developed. Other nations may fail and fall; we are safe. Our history is a narrative of the triumph of righteousness among a people. We see this force working through every generation of our glorious past. Our future growth and success are as certain as the rule of mathematics. Providence is always on our side. The only war we Americans ever lost was when one-third of us was defeated by the other two-thirds. We have been Divinely selected in order to save and to purify the world through our example. If other nations will but accept our religious and political principles, and our general attitude toward life, they soon will be, no doubt, as happy and prosperous as we.

To the more critical metropolitan mind of the present, the foregoing statement may seem to be overdrawn. As a matter of fact it is not overdrawn in the least. This thought has long been our national, intellectual, and political stock in trade. It is padding for



countless sermons and popular lectures. It is written into hundreds of rustic editorials which are still printed in the newspapers of our great cities. In this thought we find the true inwardness of our "100 per cent Americanism," suddenly awakened to really alarming conditions, taking fright, and running amuck in the form of our American Fascisti, the K.K.K. For a century our Chauvinistic catchwords have acted upon the mind of the nation like an opiate. It has made any general public discussion of our social problems among the masses of our people quite fruitless. Our majorities have been rendered incapable of any critical and constructive political thinking. In our intellectual and political rambling we have accepted, written into our laws, and tried to live by, a very extreme and dangerous theory of democracy. This American theory has been that anybody over twenty-one years of age can vote intelligently; that any truck-driver or farmer can be a successful county surveyor or treasurer; that almost any decent country lawyer or editor can serve us well in the office of the presidency. "Didn't Lincoln do a good job of it? And he never went to college!"

Barbaric and totally illiterate negro slaves, directly after their emancipation, were permitted to vote and sit in the state legislatures of the South and even in the national Congress. Millions of peasants from Russia, Central Europe, and the Balkan states, millions of proletarians from the Mediterranean cities, mostly illiterate and possessed of not the slightest background of political experience in their own countries—these have been invited to join us and hastily receive all the rights and privileges of citizenship. Thousands of uneducated folk, including large numbers of the immigrants above mentioned, with a mere smattering of the English language and the law, are admitted to the bar and practice law in our courts. Many are elected or appointed to important public offices. This European peasant and proletarian population has come to dominate the governments of great cities and states. Not the utopians of the French Revolution, not even the Russian Bolsheviks, have developed the shibboleths of democracy into a completer system of crazy absurdities, both in theory and practice, than have we Americans during the century since the election of Andrew Jackson.

We are now reaping where we have sown and gathering where we

have strewn. This utopian system has at last run to seed. The members of the K.K.K. are among those who have suddenly found it out and so are disgruntled and angry. Our American people "back home" have been not only disillusioned; they have been awakened as a man is awakened by the roof falling in on him while he is sound asleep. During the recent war hundreds of thousands of American citizens of German birth turned against the country of their adoption and supported the Kaiser with a loyalty worthy of a better cause. At the same time many Irish-Americans, moved only by a relentless hatred of Great Britain, sympathized with the Germans, and supported their adopted country but lukewarmly. Hardly a foreign element among us but has had, during the past ten years, occasion to prove that its heart is with the old land and not the new. We have witnessed, both in the outcome of bolshevism in Russia, and in its propaganda among us, one of the remarkable phases of social insanity which has resulted from war psychoses. While Americans have been collecting millions in aid of starving Russia, our own Bolsheviks have spent considerable sums of Russian money to establish bolshevism in America by armed revolution. The facts will show, no doubt, that the Bolsheviks have never been a real danger in America. But they have already shown the total incapacity of large numbers in our foreign-speaking colonies, as in Southern and Eastern Europe, to share in the counsels of a democracy. Meanwhile a very lurid picture of bolshevism has been presented to the American public. Secret meetings of a few scores of misguided communists, held in deep forests or on lonely mountain tops, when sensationally described in the papers, have alarmed our people much more than the great public demonstrations in New York and Chicago. The American farmer or villager reads about them, loses his temper, cleans up his shotgun, curses "them foreigners" and joins the Ku Klux Klan.

A cow does not give milk solely because she eats grass. There are other causes, also. So with the Klan. No single cause can be alleged for its remarkable strength and its lasting power. All these fears, from real and fancied causes, this Pandora's Box full, have been let loose upon the nation at the same time. There is at present more bitterness toward the negro in the Middle West than there has

been anywhere in the South since the days of Reconstruction. As the northward movement of the negro continues, the harsher, more exacting mind of our northern white people will continue to express itself in the most intense form of race hatred that has yet been known in this country. To the average rural or small-town American the saloon was looked upon as a German institution. As such it was everywhere abolished during the war. Tammany Hall, and foul politics generally, are attributed largely to the Irish. The labor unionist, always thought to carry a pistol in one hand and a fire-brand in the other, is customarily referred to as a "foreign agitator." Indeed that expression is used on the membership card of the Klan. Finally, the plutocrats and anarchists, the profiteers and labor leaders, the international bankers and the international Bolsheviks—rural America now begins to christen them all, "the Jews." One factor has been the recent invasion of the smaller western and southern towns by Jewish retail merchants. These are disliked and opposed by their native American competitors for purely commercial reasons.

#### OUR VANISHING AMERICANS

For the most potent cause of all we must probe still deeper. Taking the point of view, for the moment, of those who suffer most from its acceptance, that we may understand it the better, we quickly discern that the American people "back home" have very considerable grounds for anxiety and fear of the future. This original American population is being displaced at a speed which requires few citations of statistics to make the process evident.

While the writer was investigating the Klan in a small college town in northern Ohio he came upon a group of seven very typical Americans at dinner. Their ages ranged from thirty-five to forty-five years. The group included three married pairs. For the purpose of this discussion an eighth member of the group, the wife of the odd gentleman present, should be included. Each and every one of the eight was in the flush of health. The four men had been college athletes. The four women were country-bred and physically sturdy. Had a competent physician examined all eight he would have found, most probably, not an unsound organ, not a physical weakness in any one of them. These four "families" had been in

existence from three to eighteen years; and they had brought forth not a single child, living or dead. Here was a group of "100 per cent Americans" who were committing 100 per cent race suicide. This group might be easily duplicated in every sizable village in the land. In a town of three thousand inhabitants in northern New York there is a literary club of some seventy members. The non-member wives and husbands of the group brought the number, several years ago when the note was made by the writer, to well over one hundred. These people were practically all descended from colonial ancestors. Their children of this generation totaled exactly fourteen.

It is this fact of race suicide among our native Americans which is, at root, largely explanatory of their present fear and anger. Meanwhile, in Chicago and Cleveland, each of which numbers more who were born of foreigners than of natives, the births total about double the number of deaths. In the Ohio college town referred to above there are two large Catholic churches, the membership of which includes nearly all the working people of the community. Among the Protestant churches is an Episcopal edifice of diminutive size. On the Sunday preceding the visit of the writer, the local K.K.K., in full regalia, marched into that Episcopal Church. The leader asked for permission to present a purse to the pastor and to interrupt the regular service with a few minutes of prayer. The request being granted, the Klan leader prayed for the Divine blessing upon that church and upon Protestantism in general. In the presence of the facts we have stated above, how vain must be any such supplication! How fruitless of permanent good to the church must be the contribution of money! Regarded purely from the biological standpoint, the survival values stressed in the teaching of the Roman Catholic church give its membership enormous comparative advantage in the growth of our population. In our cities our native Protestant population is halved, our Catholic and foreign population is doubled by each passing generation.

Within a half-century it may be more evident than now that this increase among our sounder immigrant population from Europe is to be one of the largest advantages of the white race on this continent. For, with the development of hygienic and sanitary knowl-

edge among our negroes, their enormous birth-rate will begin to show results in the census statistics. Across the Rio Grande pours an army of Mexican workers, whose blood is at least three-fourths Indian. Considering the physiographic character of our southwestern states, it would seem likely that this element will largely re-establish itself in possession of at least half-a-million square miles of our territory. To the Pacific Coast, and far inland, comes a continuing stream of the orientals. The Japanese were eight thousand strong last year, in spite of all supposed regulations and prohibitions. The birth-rate among these Japanese laborers is so great that astonishment never ceases among their white neighbors. The Japanese have annexed the Hawaiian Islands racially and socially, by reason of the fact that they already number much more than half the inhabitants. We can calculate pretty accurately when they will be two-thirds or three-fourths of the population. In Sacramento County, California, excluding the city of Sacramento, there are more Japanese babies born annually than white babies. California and the Pacific Coast are in desperate fear that, unless the Japanese are kept out altogether, there will arise a race issue even more bitter and difficult of solution than that of our South.

The civilization of the people of the United States is suffering rapid change, not only as regards its basic institutions, but also in the nature and quality of its human composition. The old American and the old America are passing into history. The hooded figures of the K.K.K. are an expression of pain, of sorrow, and of solemn warning. It is their cruel and fantastical method of dealing with the situation which is wholly wrong. The Klan has become totally unworthy of the better American spirit. Its methods arise from anger and fear, not from knowledge and forethought. The constructive evolution of our American nation—that will require a totally different motive, a different leadership, and a policy based upon a far more lofty sense of human values.

# STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

## II. RELIGION AND AMERICAN SECTIONALISM. THE PENNSYLVANIA GERMAN

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### ABSTRACT

Scientific hypothesis: For the study of the significance of religion as a principle of structural and functional individuation, the German religious groups in America furnish perfect clinical cases. In the case of the Pennsylvania German, the Lutheran traditionalism of faith has become a radiant center for the integration of a consciousness of self, of difference and of kind. A historical creed has here rationalized the process of life upon terms of its own. By conditioning an ego it determined the development of its organs of self-preservation, a functional type ideal, a specific societal technique, a language, a school system. It thus determined the performance of that type as a socius: his function in the social constitution and in the creation of values. By indicating distinct mind frontiers, by sanctioning terms of dissociation as well as consociation, religion appears here as the grandam of sectionalism and as a vital condition of the social process in America.

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With the method of Troeltsch, the sociologist may be as ready to find fault as the historian with the conclusions of Weber. The sociology of religion is not true sociology until the logic of religion has become intelligible as true social logic. But that Troeltsch has been able only to suggest, rather than systematically prove, how the logic of religion was a function of successive social situations in the historical process—that is the fault of the monographic studies on which he had to build. That there has not been enough sociological method behind the scholarship on which Troeltsch had to rely, is not his fault; nevertheless for that reason, it must seem that such a magnificent synthesis as Ernst Troeltsch's was premature. With regard to Weber's thesis<sup>\*</sup> on the significance of Protestantism in the capitalistic "mind in the making," it may be said that, unromantic as even the social sciences are, they will probably decline to ponder over a historical or causal relation of

<sup>\*</sup> This thesis should be considered in connection with Weber's general theory of the genesis and typology of religious rationalism; see especially Weber, *Ges. Aufsätze*, I, 537-38, 551 ff. For the group sociological significance of redeemer religions and of prophecies see *ibid.*, p. 543.

adequacy between Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism where that spirit makes such a vigorous appearance before it has a body, while its body seems equally hardy after having given up that *Geist*. Nevertheless the historical method of Weber, Sombart, and Brentano, and the controversy between them has done much in Germany to make the Marxian chapter on Genesis less uninteresting for its obviousness and less obvious for its interestedness. The pursuit of the original sinner here has regained in *Sachlichkeit* and objectivity what it has lost, among social scientists at least, in vehemence or assurance. At all events, the historical materialism is learning to know a much less simple social mechanism of human nature than formerly. The social scientist comes to appreciate that to deal objectively with the function of religion in the economic order means in the first place to understand the relation of both in the social process. In this spirit, many old questions will become profitably debatable again, and cases which had been closed by bias itself can be reopened in all fairness.

A criticism, therefore, of the conclusions of Troeltsch and Weber is not so much called for as a further application and testing of their heuristic principles. The categories of transcendental reason with the aid of which man had rationalized the social process seem of the first importance, and on such categories and their function, it would seem, Troeltsch and Weber have thrown much light. Enough has been said to point to the importance of specific God-concepts, of the salvation logic, the conception of the Bible as Law, the doctrine of the organic law of sin: the logic of faith and the rule of reason in religion. Enough about the new calling concept and the old ideal of asceticism, the new personalism of an *ecclesiola*, a believers' church with its affinity for a *corpus*, and the old universalism of the institutional *ecclesia* with its hankering for territoriality; the influence of such thought patterns and situation patterns is worth trailing from the city of God into the bailiwick of man wherever men have claimed citizenship in both. The beloved community must seem to be a most decisive earlier situation if religion finds within the meaning of such concepts its law of social articulation, if they determine its limitations as well as its potency as a factor of socialization.

The cores as well as the social frontiers of modern individualism and nationalism may be traceable to the personalism of sectarian, the territorialism of institutional religion. A source of sectionalism at all events may be traceable to this mind-frontier of religion. Offhand, it would seem as if the Christian who, as Luther put it, is at once of heaven and of the earth, were sectionalism personified: obedience to law at least will always with him have an element of contingency on the concurrent reason of religion. The interstitial process between such plural and sectional minds, then, will in turn be determined by the logic of religion. In its co-ordination of the law of God and of nature, religion sought its synthesis between the two spheres. But since the logic of the social process travels faster than the logic of that process working as social pedagogy can follow, that synthesis is chronically at fault. The law of nature as constituted in theological reason and the law of nature as interpreted by scientific empiricism seem to be destined to conflict.

That conflict is bound to concern once more both state and church. Historically, the modern principle of conditional allegiance has had much to do with that conflict. It is inseparable from the Pauline proposition that we are living in two spheres. But if the proposition that all government is limited has had anything at all to do with the principle that the imperium of the state shall not be coextensive with the bounds of mind, then the behavior patterns of the logic of religion concern the political scientist as well as the sociologist, the statesman as well as the student. Where there is to be a government of law and not of men, the relation between the law of God and nature as interpreted by faith, and that same law as discoverable by empirical reason, continues to be of considerable importance. The traditional situation patterns of religious creeds for the relation between religion and rationalism then would seem to be eminently a problem of social and political sectionalism and relevant to the "social crisis."

Returning then to our original problem of "Christianity in the Social Crisis," we are now ready to deal with Christianity in this sense: as the most effective organization of past experience, the structural and functional principle of individualism, the grandam



of sectionalism; a creative principle of law as well as a determinant in the idea of law.

Obviously, scientifically sound data can only be obtained where we deal with religion in its essential creed—pluralism; socially relevant such data will only be where such logic is demonstrably potent as social logic, where it becomes articulate in a social group; where it bears down upon a political section, and thus becomes effective as law.

But what group in the group-pluralism, what section in the sectionalism of American life is relevant to the social crisis? Naturally, the social scientist will think of "crisis" as a social concept in an objective way, in terms of stabilization or integral function. He will then naturally assume that the stability of the social order can be measured in the width of its narrowest possible basis, the religious sanction of a balance-of-power group. Such a group or section would seem to be relevant in this connection. The logic of its consent or dissent would seem to entail vital elements of adjustment or maladjustment; the logic of its valuation indicates the latitude, momentum, and direction of a possible shift.

That the Middle West has been and is such a balance-of-power section, cradled back and forth by the conflicting reason of such groups, has been frequently stated. With its agrarian hinterland it is the balance-of-power section par excellence of America today, and perhaps of the world tomorrow.

But since we are dealing with social and historical, and not geographical factors in sectionalism alone, we would give the Middle West a social and economic as well as a geographical meaning. We shall take it within the meaning of a social middle region, historically immanent in this sense, namely, those people who have at any critical period in American history been caught *nel mezzo camin* of economic and political change. Or, lest we prejudice at the outset the problem of "change," let us say, those people who, usually quite "unbeknownst" to themselves, have been at the time under observation a sort of pivot to the quadrennial teeter-totter. The present writer believes that for such a study in the sociology of religion, and for a perfect laboratory case, as it were, some of the

German Lutheran denominational groups in America will do as well as any.

The president of the Pennsylvania German Society, in his annual address in 1910, told a story of a peasant behind the plow who, asked what he would do if he knew that he should have to die tomorrow, answered that he would keep on plowing. He was not certain whether that particular peasant was a German, but he thought he ought to have been. At all events, it is this attitude of mind which the distinguished president of that society, Mr. John Wanamaker, considered characteristically and valuably German.<sup>1</sup> Nor would it be difficult to prove that the conservation in the earliest Middle West of American history, in Pennsylvania, of the traditionalism of the mind and mores of the European peasant is due to its efficient organization and its sublimation by the German Protestantism of the eighteenth century and especially by Lutheranism. The essence of the Pennsylvania German personality is German Lutheranism.

A study of the history and sociology of this religious group in America leads to the conclusion that the structure and function of Pennsylvania German individualism has been determined by the Lutheran faith as articulated in Halle.<sup>2</sup> The Francke school, not so much of theology as of personal practical piety, has preserved enough of the Lutheran creed to constitute this church as a group-trust at religion. Its pietism smoothed down enough of the Lutheran doctrinal edges to give this type survival fitness as a social being. For the founders of the German churches of Pennsylvania were not only godly men—men strong in the "Word," powerful in the armor of much learning—but worldly-wise and genteel. John Wesley has this to say about them: "Had tea with four German ministers. I could not but admire the wisdom of those that appointed them. They seem to consider not only the essential points, sense and piety, but even . . . good breeding, address, yea the persons of those whom they send into foreign countries."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Pennsylvania German Society Publications*, Vol. XIX, Presidential Address.

<sup>2</sup> Sachse, "The Influence of Halle," *Lutheran Quarterly*, Vol. XXXI.

<sup>3</sup> *John Wesley's Works (Diary)*, IV, 194; VI, 178, 222.

The lives of the fathers of these churches and the history of the Muehlenberg family bear witness to the eminent fitness of this type for social service within the church and without.<sup>1</sup>

In the guardianship of a specific creed, these men constituted an American self. Truly Lutheran, they would "use the Scripture as a rule of faith and life," but use it "in a historical and not in a radical way." Religion would ground the individual "not in the Puritan idea of God's law but in the gospel idea of God's love."<sup>2</sup> Traditionalism of faith would become a radiant center for the integration of the consciousness of a self. The obvious theological contrast of this faith with a Calvinistic rule of reason as a religious law would give a religious cue to the working of an ejective consciousness, religious sanction to a consciousness of difference as well as of kind. Lutheranism, by rationalizing within the meaning of a creed,

<sup>1</sup> Principal sources used on this subject: *Hallesche Nachrichten*, 2 vols., 1745-85 (ed. 1886); *Evangelisches Magazin* (1811-18), *Deutscher Kirchenfreund* (1849-56); *Lutheran Quarterly*, Vol. XXXI; *Lutheran Church Review*, Vols. XIV, XVI; *Pennsylvania German Society Publications*, Vol. IX, XI; *Deutsch-Amerikanisches Magazin*, Vol. I (letters of H. M. Muehlenberg and life of P. Muehlenberg); the lives of the Muehlenbergs by Mann, Ayres, etc. For much biographical material see Morris, *Fifty Years in the Lutheran Ministry* (1878). For bibliography: J. G. Morris, *Lutheran Church Review* Vol. XIV; Morris, *Fifty Years in the Lutheran Ministry*, pp. 306, 441. For a general history: Jacobs in *American Church Historical Series*, Vol. IV; short survey, A. R. Wentz, *The Lutheran Church in American History* (1923). For the general history of the German element in the different colonies: F. R. Diffenderfer, *German Exodus*; also Bernheim, Kuhns, Nixon, Wayland, Schuhricht. For the sociology and mores of the group and type: Rush, *Account of the Manners*, etc. (1789), in *Pennsylvania German Society Publications*, Vol. XIX; and extensively annotated and compared with other sources, *Der Deutsche Pionier* (1875), and Rattermann, *Works*, XVI, 159-95; see also Seidensticker, Rupp, Woltenweber, Knauss, and others. The publication of the Cincinnati Pioneer Society, *Der Deutsche Pionier*, 18 vols., contains a wealth of sociological material charmingly written in the style of Freytag and Riehl. Also *Pennsylvania German Society Publications*; *Pennsylvania Magazine of History*; county histories like Rupp, *History of Berks and Lebanon Counties*.

For the history of the Reformed church: Joseph Hy. Dubbs, *The Reformed Church in Pennsylvania*, (1902); *Historical Manual*; *Reformed Quarterly Review* (1892); Harbaugh, *Life of Schlatter* (1857).

For the other religious groups see Sachse, *Pietists*; Sachse, *Sectarians*; Dubbs, *Otterbein Reformed Church Quarterly* (1884); Dotterer, *Life of Boehm*; Brumbaugh, *History of the Brethren* (1910). For earlier surveys of religious conditions: Braune, *Prakt. Belehr'gn* (1829); Schaff, *Kirchliche Zust* (1858).

<sup>2</sup> Schmauck, *History*; *Pennsylvania German Society Publications*, XI, 8, 11, 12.

conserved the individualism of the German. It constituted it in America anew in the Pennsylvania German.

That the builders of this distinct social entity in America, though building with imported timbers, reared a distinctly American structure is due to the fact that the colonial situation demanded what they were doing. They ministered to a local want on successive frontiers of transition. The crisis of transition began on shipboard, as can be gleaned from the diary of Wesley, where it begins to be a journal of clinical cases rather than a diary alone.<sup>1</sup> This crisis they met as Luther had met a similar one. They found an uprooted, panicky peasantry with a thoroughly disorganized personality, "mystics in philosophy, pietists in feeling, chiliasts in expectations," seekers of "the Bridegroom" some of them, and others of broad acres whereon to be fruitful and multiply.<sup>2</sup>

The function of the soil and of a natural-economy, manorial civilization in the psychic economy of this Lutheran Christianity in transition, their use as indicated by a popular Christianity, becomes clearly evident in the Lutheran Utopia of this age: a sort of fantastic description of the promised land of the Lutheran pilgrim.<sup>3</sup> It is equally evident from their early history in America that these people felt themselves threatened with extinction of selfhood and absorption into the general mass of American emotional Christianity as constituted by the Methodists. They were exposed to many dangers, of which the Indians were the most ruthless but by no means the most subtle. For their mores they feared most from the lax rule of the rationalist Quakers and of the Franckfort company, whose motto of *vinum, linum et textrinum* covered, if not a multitude of sins in civil polity, then at least a religion whose design is a plantation.<sup>4</sup>

It becomes clear, then, that these people demanded instruction in a creed, cried out for their church, and felt the want of an agency

<sup>1</sup> *Works (Diary)*, I, 209, 198, 200-5.

<sup>2</sup> Schmauck, *History*, pp. 70-71, 82; Sachse, *Pietists*, p. 251.

<sup>3</sup> J. G. Schnabel, "Die Insel Felsenburg," *D. Lit. Denkm.* (1902).

<sup>4</sup> Schmauck, *op. cit.*, pp. 92 ff. For earliest German congregations, *ibid.*, p. 139. For moral conditions, Dubbs, *op. cit.*, p. 111. For early communal technique of guidance and correction, etc., Schmauck, *op. cit.*, pp. 62, 116, 154, 160 ff.

in parochial schools for the perpetuation, the reproduction of their mind. With the first economic surplus seems to have come the fear lest the family farm might disappear with the ancestral mores, victims of "worldliness" both, of "Heliogabalic luxuries" in a secular order which licensed sin. Thus the demand for religion did not spring from a religious pathos alone. Religion meant self-preservation in a new social order. That they first expected the mother-country to meet the expenses of their establishment is not so remarkable as that they continued to consider themselves a parish of the mother-church.<sup>1</sup> Nothing illustrates better the pluralism of the social process as constituted by religion than the relation of this colonial Christianity to its mother-churches. It is remarkable that the Reformed church of Pennsylvania, as an organized parsonage and cure of the classis of Amsterdam, with a constituency of Germans, should have continued its colonial dependency until 1791.<sup>2</sup>

The educational system of the American pilgrims in the colonies was grounded on the Calvinistic idea of the inadequacy of natural reason, and on its belief in instruction in the law of religion and the rules of its application. To the Puritans it was a condition for that rational self-direction which they seem to have considered the better part of the grace of illumination. From this idea the political rationalism of the eighteenth century was not far removed. At all events, it was seen fit to give the German immigrants of the Reformed church in Pennsylvania an education, a school system based partly on charity. "Mankind in general are scarcely raised by their nature above the brutes. . . . People are incapable of knowing their own interests or judging for themselves . . . they cannot be governed by free principles or their own choice . . . not know their true interests as men and as Protestants." They were to be taught English as well as German, so that they might "expect to rise to places of profit and honor in the country," also "buy and sell to greater advantage, understand cases in court, and . . . judge and act for themselves." In this enlightened and generous spirit, which betrays the influence of John Locke's ideas on educa-

<sup>1</sup> Schmauck, *op. cit.*, pp. 164, 172.

<sup>2</sup> Dubbs, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-65.

tion, the London Society for the Support of the German Protestants in America furnished Rev. Schlatter the means to found a parochial school system among the Germans.<sup>1</sup> The classis at Amsterdam did not approve of it, and the Germans for several reasons were as suspicious of the political disinterestedness of English Christianity as of a first contact of their children with "the others." They feared lest their children in contact with others "get foolish whims into their heads." The question was, as a matter of fact, mixed up with politics from the beginning.<sup>2</sup> The Germans in Pennsylvania had by this time been discovered as a useful though unaccountable makeweight in politics, as valuable though distrustful allies for or against the Quaker stronghold.<sup>3</sup>

The Lutheran parochial school system, on the other hand, sprang from the well-known Lutheran religious doctrine of education. Rev. H. M. Muehlenberg may be said to be its founder.<sup>4</sup> The general attitude toward education in that quarter was grounded in the functional calling concept of Lutherdom, of a peasantry who spelled getting ahead in terms of the family staying put and doing its part "each in his station." The school to them was a sort of specialized function of both the *patria potestas* and the ministerial calling. The schoolmaster<sup>5</sup> was to wield the rod by special delegation, or at least steep the paternal rod in the love or the wrath of the Lord. Education was more closely related to the family-farm-communism, the village fraternalism and their technique of institutionalized salvation, than to the organization of rational choice, the problem of individual salvation, and the reconstitution of the individual. Even so, it was enormously effective; it preserved the collective individualism of this group-mind. But that this group-mind was not an end in itself, that it cannot be dealt with under the category "nationalism," is clear from its attitude toward learning and toward the German language. Neither ration-

<sup>1</sup> Harbaugh, *Life of Schlatter* (1857), pp. 267, 272, 277-79. For Schlatter's work as an organizer of the church, Dubbs, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-70.

<sup>2</sup> For Saur and the schools, see Harbaugh, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

<sup>3</sup> Dubbs, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-70; Harbaugh, *Life of Schlatter*, p. 294.

<sup>4</sup> Schmauck, *op. cit.*, p. 154; *Hallesche Nachrichten*, I, 686-87.

<sup>5</sup> For a pioneer schoolmaster see Christopher Dock, *Rules for Children* (1764), in Saur, *Geistl. Magazin*, also Pennypacker, *Historical Sketches* (1883).

alism nor language nationalism can intelligently be dealt with apart from organized religion.<sup>1</sup>

Rev. H. M. Muehlenberg was finally forced to admit to Dr. Helmuth: "God is my witness, I worked against the English as long as I could, but I cannot longer resist."<sup>2</sup> What a tragedy that pathos hides rather than reveals can be gleaned from the history of any one parish church and congregation, not in Pennsylvania alone but wherever this type had to meet its *stirb und werde*. It will be observed that with the common language went, in those days, the unity of the parish; schism meant exodus from the ancestral church, a change in ownership. It meant the loss of emotional association of the baptismal spire with a lifetime of toil in the furrow of a life of which it marked the beginning and the end. Thus the general policy came to be that in case of filiation of an English-speaking congregation from one German, the daughter should leave in peace, and not the parent. The English-speaking daughter-congregation was felt to be united with the mother in the bond of the faith and of the church invisible. But even so, there remained behind the ancestral God's Acre; whether children would or would not be reunited with their parents in death—that question always carried an important pathos into the language problem.<sup>3</sup> It would take a later urban and metropolitan rationalism to make people care less where they rested from their labors and whether or not

<sup>1</sup> For the Catholic side see *Kathol. Volkszeitung* (Baltimore, 1867), articles by Father Oswald Moosmueller.

<sup>2</sup> Schmauck, *History*, p. 351. For references to the language nationalism of the group, see J. O. Knauss, *Pennsylvania German Society Publications*, XXIX, 112 ff. For the relative valuation of German and English in pulpit and school from the point of view of the integrity and growth of the Lutheran church, see Schmauck, *op. cit.*, pp. 117, 349, 351; Krotel, *History of Trinity Church, Lancaster, passim*; Braune, *Praktische Belehrungen und Ratschläge*, pp. 351 ff. For a survey of social forces in country and town affecting the language question, *ibid.*, pp. 213, 250 ff. 262, 279, 294, 310, 355; Morris, *Fifty Years*, pp. 91, 98, 374, 386, 395-97; *Constitution of the Evangelical Lutheran General Synod and Protocols of Synodical Conventions*, 1820, 1823; Synods of Maryland and Virginia, 1823; Synod of New York, *Minutes*, 1823; Kraushaar, *Verfassungsformen*, pp. 6, 238, 245, 253, 255, 256, 401; Locher, *Gesch. Zustände* p. 318; W. Loëne, *Kirchliche Mitteilungen* (1845), No. 12; Schaff, *Kirchenfreund* (1848), p. 91.

<sup>3</sup> For the societal technique in dealing with the language question, see Dabbs, *op. cit.*, pp. 267-72.

the family would thus rest in peace. But even then a new individualism and a new socialism would have its own pathos with its own salvation reason.

Postponing a further consideration of the problem of language nationalism until it becomes bound up with the consciousness of a larger group and functions in the rationalization of the interstitial process at large, we may now proceed to look into the technique of building such a group-mind: the connection between religion and its equipment as a social being. Thus we return to the relative rationalism of its ideal system of education.

It is true that as late as the thirties, a congregation called a tramp printer and canal-digger away from his ditch to preach to them the faith of Luther because they had heard that he was a learned man and knew Latin. But that was not because he was a German from the "old country"; it was the traditional association of learning with the effective calling of the ministry. Nor was it a general high esteem for learning as *Kultur*. That the humanities had been the heavy armor of the Reformation did not alter the fact that the Lutheran doctrine called for faith and more faith. A faith which moves mountains can, strictly speaking, dispense with much reason. At all events, the Lutheran logic of learning becomes rational only if we recall that for rational self-direction on general principles they had little use; they were afraid lest it might lead astray. The use of reason and of learning had to remain related to calling; it had to lead into a station, and prompt effective performance sanctioned by religion.

Thus provisions for higher education were made early to provide a *Nachwuchs* for the ministry.<sup>1</sup>

The Revolutionary War interrupted the connection with Halle, the supply of ministers became too scant for the increasing demand, and later the returns did not always justify outlay and expectations. Not that the connection with the fatherland was not remembered and expectantly maintained, but it seems that the new humanistic

<sup>1</sup> J. O. Knauss, *Social Conditions*, pp. 94 ff.; Seidensticker, *Gesch. d. Deutschen Ges.*, p. 180; *Pennsylvania German Society Publications*, IV, 122, 130-31; VI, 100-111; Kuhns, *German and Swiss Settlements* (1901), pp. 149-50. For the history of old Franklin College, see Dubbs, *Reformed Quarterly Review* (1887), p. 260. For bibliography, see L. Viereck, *Zwei Jahrhunderte* (1903).



individualism in that quarter had come to mean a loss in the capacity for communal direction and teamwork. The rationalistic and historical theology of the late eighteenth and of the nineteenth century did not produce as many community-builders as the pietism of the early eighteenth; their contact with this type of primary group was not as close. For obvious reasons, too, the pressure of the new blood on the hardened arteries of an old social organism was often too much; a disciple of the new school was apt to be a disruptive force. Sociologically his effect on the group was akin to that of the loper, adventurer, goliard, Latin enterpriser in the business of salvation, and Latin farmer in the vineyard of the Lord. It spelled mental dissociation and often group disruption. It will be seen, therefore, that the group had reasons of its own to consider rationalism together with the language question as the worst enemy of the group mind. The strife between *die Grauen und die Gruenen* which later raged in the bailiwick of the political mind of the Germans in America was chronic in their city of God. But if the language question here spelled temptation, the word rationalism spelled *Gottseibeius*; it was The Evil. The two issues then—the language question and rationalism—gave the group, from the family to the church itself, the cue for its orientation to its neighbors.<sup>1</sup> It is only natural, then, that in the period of transition from the relative reason of religion to the reason of science, the former should have dominated the social process. A minister who had honestly come by the conscience of his craft through the apprenticeship system<sup>2</sup> was as welcome with his home-taught theology to the souls of these people as was a self-taught doctor to their bodies with his pills. Later the new schools of the church in America turned out a body of sturdy men characterized by much common sense; they could ask the Lord's blessings on the amenities of life as well as on its tribulations.

<sup>1</sup> For the social forces at play in the struggle between traditional confessionalism and rationalism, see Dubbs, *op. cit.*, p. 92; Krauth, *Essay on the Lutheran Church* (1877); Wentz, *op. cit.*, pp. 170 ff. The *Lutheran Observer* (1833-61), contains much material on the subject.

<sup>2</sup> *Hallesche Nachrichten*, II, 282. For a comparative valuation of the American apprenticeship system and a German university education, see Muehlenberg's letters in *Deutsch-Amerikanisches Magazin*, Vol. I.

Where the humanities taught in these schools missed their original calling, they, as in Germany, furnished glebal toilsomeness a higher field of training in the capacity to take infinite pains; the Pennsylvania Germans, their church and school, can point a stately list of names remembered for honest craftsmanship in many a profession, station, and calling.

One profession they were slow to take to: lawyers were met with distrust. For the adjustment of quarrels and even for the correction of the wayward, a communal technique as indicated by the gospel was enough. The love communism of the primary group outlived the mutual-service nexus of a natural economy system; they long continued to give a customary and not a legal credit; an old traditionalism and naturalism characterizes all their relationship. Money they originally hoarded as a token and as an heirloom, as real property like land and not as a mere medium of exchange. They only slowly learned to treat it as productive capital; they loaned its use on good faith. The lender would chalk the sum and term on the kitchen door and rest easy in the good faith of the taker. Even in their dealings beyond the pale, they were often guided by a conscience which was not a contractual one within the meaning of the law of the land, but a function of their own logic of salvation and of the naturalism of precash-nexus minds. Thus a congregation in Philadelphia paid a debt borrowed before the Revolutionary War in continentals when due, and thus gave unto Caesar and unto the law. But over and above this, they "could do no other" than make good the depreciation in silver as soon as they had it, and thus do justice to their religious faith and to the conscience of a "higher law."<sup>1</sup>

For the secular order which was not of the family farm, the guild-shop or the parish, they had a deep distrust; for the state, obedience to law but alert suspicion of encroachment. Relations were at first unstable and later, when fairly established, they became traditional. For the transition from the mugwump to the "yellow

<sup>1</sup> *Evangelisches Magazin*, I, 105-7. Money concept and mores: Rush, "Acct. etc.," *Pennsylvania German Society Publications*, XIX, 45, 83; Wollenweber, *Gemaelde*, (1869), pp. 44, 120-25; Schmauck, *op. cit.*, pp. 161, 172; Knauss, in *Pennsylvania German Society Publications*, XXIX, chaps. vi, vii, 120 ff.

dog" party man, in this quarter there is a reason in the ideology of a religious group.<sup>1</sup>

The relation between church and state is here determined partly by denominational doctrine and partly by the historical situation. It was made in Europe and in America. For the *Bau und Wesen*, the structure of their selfhood as well as for their church, they imported the timbers from Europe and by a well-known route. To the Lutherans, the chaplain of St. Mary's in Savoy had combined a secular commission with the spiritual care. It seems to have been part of his charge to secure from Germany shepherds for his flock.<sup>2</sup> Of the growing independence of the reformed congregations, the classis in Amsterdam seems to have been not a little jealous. For if the Lutherans continued to exhibit in America some of the docility and helplessness of a state church, if the relation of congregation to pastor here reflects for some time the other-worldly institutionalism of the Lutheran faith, the Reformed church on the other hand soon betrays its origin as a believers' church.<sup>3</sup> It had in the beginning more social corporateness than the Lutheran church. But as the doings in the bailiwick of the soul were to influence events without, so was the situation without bound to reflect within. The fact that the City of God was not, here, going to be troubled by any secular *Burgvogt*, was not held together by any secular walls—that fact made itself felt long before the Revolution. Because there was no room for a *membrum praeceptuum* in Pennsylvania it soon became necessary to organize the Lutheran City of God as a true commune. The spiritual foundation of faith alone was not strong enough. Thus the Lutheran church at Lancaster, especially exposed as it seems to have been, from its material situation, soon found it necessary to consociate under an especially rigid covenant.<sup>4</sup>

The influence of the secular situation on the corporateness, the

<sup>1</sup> For the political mind of the group, see Knauss, *op. cit.*, chap. vii, 160 ff.; Wollenweber, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-24; Lincoln, Ch. H. *Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania*; Knauss, *op. cit.*, especially chap. ii, "Religious Creed and Social Philosophy."

<sup>2</sup> Schmauck, *op. cit.*, pp. 172, 193, 201.

<sup>3</sup> Dubbs, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-33, 266, for its early societal technique.

<sup>4</sup> *Hallesche Nachrichten*, I, 386; Schmauck, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-48, 145 ff., 160, 172, 274-348; Dubbs, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 133.

*Genossenschaftsrecht*, and its function in the beloved community, is as interesting as the influence of the latter is important on the political, social, and economic structure of life in general. These problems can only be suggested, they cannot here be dealt with. It may be observed that the Lutheran church gradually became assimilated in structure and function to a believers' church, and that from the logic of a free religious life, it increasingly insisted on the principle of consent.<sup>1</sup> Thus its Feste Burgers, trained in self-government by their church, were led by their ministry to trust in God and do their part for a republican commonwealth.<sup>2</sup>

For the study of the process of assimilation as well as of the influence of religion on civil polity, the lines of resistance as indicated in the logic of religion give most valuable cues. There can be no doubt that such a study will net valuable insight into the nature of the social process once that study proceeds from the a priori of several active principles, once the category of "assimilation" is freed from the false analogy with "digestion."<sup>3</sup>

Thus the "come together movement,"<sup>4</sup> the problem of federation and union between Christian brethren of different creeds with the same or with different native tongues, is a most worthy study for the sociologist. The importance of the religious idea of the *corpus Christianorum* is great in civil as well as ecclesiastical polity.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kraushaar, *Verfassungsformen*, pp. 5-7, 10-12, 21-26, 31, 33, 35-38, 43, 57, 61, 65, 73, 80, 83, 84. For the earliest synodical constitution, synod and congregation, *ibid.*, pp. 229 ff.

<sup>2</sup> For the influence of the Lutheran theory of a "just war" and of the German sectarian views of war, see Watson, *Annals*, II, 256; Harbaugh, *Lives* (for revolutionary sermon texts); Sachse, *Lutheran Church Quarterly*, XXXI, 173; Seidensticker, *Bilder*.

<sup>3</sup> The history of the *Genossenschaftsrecht* of the Lutheran churches, the transition from the consistorial to the synodical order, the gradual self-assertion of the lay community, describe the assimilation of the German subject into the American citizen. For the development of the rights of the *Gemeinde*, the congregation, see Kraushaar *Verfassungsformen*, pp. 5, 9, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 43, 57, 61, 65-67, 68-70, 71-75. For the synodical development, *ibid.*, pp. 219, 224, 230, 233, 266. For the influence of the westward movement on the growth of democratic tendencies, see *ibid.*, pp. 96, 99-100. The disintegrating effects of revivalism, the Lutheran group seems to have counteracted with a tightening of the confessional bond, with an increased sectional consciousness, and a marked reaction against the autonomy of the community, i.e., congregation, in favor of a more marked synodical authority. See Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, pp. 276, 289, 294.

<sup>4</sup> Dubbs, *The Reformed Church in Pennsylvania* (1902), pp. 115 ff., 125.

<sup>5</sup> For earliest interchurch relations, see *Hallesche Nachrichten*, I, 149.

Traceable to the same collective interest in the preservation of selfhood as the beginnings of the Reformed and Lutheran churches in America, the Unity movement begins with a beautiful vision of unity in diversity, with Zinzendorf's *Unitas fratrum*, based on the theory of tropes of the Bohemian brethren and thus theologically on Philippians 1:18.<sup>1</sup> With this principle Wesley had also come into a contact, fruitful for the Brotherhood idea and early technique of Methodism.<sup>2</sup> It is significant that this early movement failed because of the resistance of minds sworn to a creed.<sup>3</sup> As every later revival movement, it led to the loss of some Bridegroom-seekers in a new organization, to a new religious individualism;<sup>4</sup> it led to a keener sense of Reformed and Lutheran denominational selfhood and, furthermore, it left a sense of community of religious interest and led to a series of General Synods of Pennsylvania. Based on that community of interest, a close co-operation began after the Revolutionary War and lasted until the thirties. The twin towers of German sectionalism in America in this period, the German Lutheran and the Reformed church, trained their joint guns on their common enemies; the war was on against the disorganizing forces of revivalism and of rationalism. They carried on a joint campaign for the preservation of the German language by establishing a joint seminary and subscribing to a common *Evangelisches Magazin*.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dubbs, *op. cit.* pp. 111, 225; *Chron. Ephrat.* p. 245; Gillin, *Dunkers*, pp. 157, 386.

<sup>2</sup> Wesley, I, 209, 198, 200-5.

<sup>3</sup> The natural mutualism between the German Lutheran and the Reformed church is traceable to the "Simultankirchen" in the Palatinate. Dubbs, *op. cit.*, pp. 19, 36; *Historical Manual*, p. 264; also to the personalities of Muehlenberg and Schlatter. See Harbaugh, *Life of Schlatter*, p. 345; Schmauck, *op. cit.*; Dubbs, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-75; Wentz, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

<sup>4</sup> For the failure of the Congregation of God in the Spirit, see Dubbs, *op. cit.*, p. 135. For the *Unio Ecclesiastica* of 1787 in South Carolina, see Bernheim, *G. O. Hist. Germ. Sett.* (1872), p. 291; Krushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

<sup>5</sup> For a sketch of the struggle over the whole period, see A. R. Wentz, *The Lutheran Church in American History* (1923). The classical statement, from the point of view of this group, of the case against revivalism is Nevin, *The Anxious Bench*; cf. Jacobs, *History of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, American Church History Series*, IV, 418. The struggle was so acute within the Lutheran church because its constituent elements were forever in different stages of assimilation. The older element, in proportion

This magazine, the "social sensorium" of the religious group of the Pennsylvania Germans after 1812, is in many respects a worthy source. It tells much about the state of the "Kingdom of God in America" with its statistics, its histories of churches, its letters from the frontier, and its confessions of pious souls.<sup>1</sup> In its six volumes there is not one theological article proper, but there is a report of the collection for the Waisenhaus at Halle, taken in Pennsylvania and netting, in 1814, 2,434 dollars and one counterfeit twenty-dollar bill.<sup>2</sup> It has very vague ideas on the meaning of rationalism, which it proposes to combat, but then it knows everything about the German language in America and why it should be preserved.<sup>3</sup> Its own contributions to that language suggest the straightforwardness of Luther, the piety and practical Christianity of Spener, the new pride of self of Moeser, the tearfulness of Werther, and, for the rest, the mind of the Pennsylvania German parish.<sup>4</sup> The "other-worldliness" and cultural pluralism of these people may have been made in Germany, but they had both eyes on the milk in the pan of Pennsylvania. "We have made Pennsylvania the granary of the world, why should we not be proud of ourselves?" If this argument did not appeal to their parishioners, the next one was still more *ad hominem*: "Do you wish to leave your children a rich inheritance? Then teach them German." "Do you want your children to honor father and mother? Then see that they remain Lutherans. If they are to remain Lutherans, then they must remain Germans." But why remain German Lutherans or

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as it had become Americanized, took rather kindly to the "new measures," but the new immigration forever strengthened the irreconcilables. See Wentz, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-64. In the nineteenth century, the leaders of the American party appear hostile to conservatism, but only in proportion as conservatism has come to mean European historical and academic Christianity. Thus the *Lutheran Observer* (1833-61) is for revival methods, new measures, and personal piety against the European German historical and scientific orthodoxy; the "ministerium," mindful of the equation of its constituent congregations, is German in the language question, European in its theology, and for federalism in church organization; while the Americans are for English, for evangelical and practical Christianity, and for centralization in their ecclesiastical constitution. See *Proceedings at Fort Wayne* (1866); cf. Wentz, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-75.

<sup>1</sup> *Evangelisches Magazin*, I, 11, 105, 107-8; II, 30.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 73-74, 88.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 34 ff., 212-15; 107; II, 32, 65, 193 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 245; III, 121-25.

Lutheran Germans? Because if they do not remain Lutherans they will not remain farmers, and they are nothing if not farmers.<sup>1</sup>

In this way the question was threshed out in the second decade of the nineteenth century in every Pennsylvania German church. The problem of Americanization was given a thorough airing in the *Evangelisches Magazin* for the benefit of the pulpit a hundred years before this day; threshed out for the benefit of a very hard-headed, practical type of American of the second and third generation, a type not sicklied o'er by the pale cast of latter-day nationalist thought.

Summarized, the special plea to parents would read as follows:

Look at your farms and then look at the others'. Do you want your children to fritter away what you have earned in the sweat of your brow? How long do you think they will hold on to the family farm once they have been anglicized? Look at the *Eirishdeutsche* [sic], you can tell the difference even now. Are their churches as prosperous as yours, their farms as well kept, their horses as sleek, their cattle as fat, their families as happy, their children as loyal as yours? Beware the beginning. The children cease speaking German, they stop going to church—to the church where they are taught to honor father and mother, to esteem honest toil, where they learn to know that nothing is more pleasing to God than faithful service in a lowly station. You won't know your children any more; they won't get up in the morning, but will loll in bed like ladies and gentlemen. Neither will they be ordered about; with their new self-esteem they will be an independent, mincing set. But they will pester you from morn till night: Why don't you buy us a nice buggy so that we may do as the others do? Do what? Knock off long before Feiera-bend, dress up and go to parties, where the girls dance and the boys gamble. But then it will be forever: Father, give us money. Suppose the old folks go along to see what the children are doing. But won't mother feel foolish in such stylish, citified company of young swells with her weather-beaten face and her wrinkled cheeks, and father feel uncomfortable with his big, awkward fists! What a tearful thing when wayward children do not honor father and mother but squander the fruit of their toil.<sup>2</sup>

What becomes apparent in this early campaign for the preservation of the German language is the closest association of the Lutheran

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 43-44, 65, 174; Braune, *Belehrungen*, pp. 351 ff. For a summary of arguments for and against assimilation culled from the Pennsylvania German press, see Knauss, *op. cit.*, pp. 94, 110, 112, 119.

<sup>2</sup> *Evangelisches Magazin*, II-VI, *passim*; Braune, *op. cit.*, under "Die Englisierung der Deutschen," etc., pp. 351 ff.

church and a domestic, agrarian, natural-economy system of economic mores. An economic group and moral section with a wide-open frontier is being alarmed, called out to rally around a standard, an ideology sublimated in a religious creed and order. It is called out to mind the upkeep of its arms of self-preservation: its machinery of social pedagogy, the agency of a parochial church with pulpit and school. It is told what it is fighting for. The social estate is defined and socialized both on the ideational and on the emotional side.

Thus the social process of life in America receives from the pulpit a specific meaning, form, and issue. Experience is interpreted, articulated into an older consciousness through the agencies of the social process in religion.

There can be no doubt about the exact meaning of the issue as articulated by the church into this group mind and will. What is at stake is the medieval family and parochial group with its domestic communism, parochial communalism, and ideational solidarity. A distinct and well-tried complex of economic mores: the sanction of a labor-rhythm from sunrise to sunset, of a family proprietary system with paternalistic control of the family labor and management of production; emphasis on collective usufruct instead of individual assignment of capital and return, a traditional emotional valuation with little individualizing cash nexus and less liking for such. The legend is confirmed by the reverse, the things that threaten the social order of this medieval agrarian village parochialism. The things to beware of beyond the pale of language and creed are as follows: individualism of maintenance and enterprise; anti-traditionalism, rationalism, Calvinism, the cash nexus; the siren call of a new herd, the English language. For those who speak English are bound sooner or later to join another church, associate with "the others." They will be ladies and gentlemen, become spendthrifts or otherwise take risks. Consumption beyond the pale is "Heliogabalic luxury," and taking risks is "gambling." Speculative, acquisitive money economics, credit economics is gambling, not honest toil. No honest gain can come from there.

The aversion of the German farmer against the rationalism of the "others" goes quite as deep as his hatred of emotional, revival-



istic, "muscular" Christianity. It is rooted in the discomfort of the peasant and artisan in the presence of a trader with his cool sizing up of a social situation for a surplus of bargaining. The man is cold and designing. His handshake has not the warm feel of village fraternalism. He has no *Gemuete*, at least not *Deutsches Gemuete*, or *Zucht*, at least not *Deutsche Zucht*, or *Ehrlichkeit*, at least not *Deutsche Ehrlichkeit*. The pulpit thus reproduces, articulates into social meaning the "feel" to the peasant or the artisan of the first contact with the world which is not of the village-parish group, *id est*, in terms of an inveterately medieval Lutheran theology, the world and the devil.

Of course such comparisons are odious for social pedagogy only. A spirit of neighborliness prevails. There is no sectional animus in these arguments. "The others" have their virtues too, in fact they know a few tricks of trade and enterprise, even if they do gamble. But those tricks you do not acquire by learning English and dressing up to go to town. You only lose what is yours. It is pointed out that frequently the *Eirishdeutsche* are worse than the others; by dropping the homely German speech and parochial mores, they are said to lose all their virtue while acquiring the vices only of the others. To quote at last literally from such a Pennsylvania German Abraham as Santa Clara: "The German who becomes English is like a silkworm that leaves its safe cocoon; as a *Buttervogel* he takes a sad end."<sup>1</sup>

We can here, as usual in such quiet spots, see a little deeper below the surface of the intriguing pool of "nationalism." We see a church mobilized for secular strife, the struggle of a sectional but functional mind for self-preservation and against change.

That the entrenchment in an old religious stronghold has given this section enormous staying power, there can be no doubt. Its importance in early American history is well known; that importance is largely due to its economic mores and, through them, a function of a religious group-mind. Those economic mores have made it a balance-of-power section in the politics of at least one crucial state during the period of transition. The very structure of

<sup>1</sup> On the sociological changes noticeable within the group at that time, see *Evangelisches Magazin*, I, 4, 196, 212; II, 30 ff.; III, 65; also Braune, *op. cit.*, pp. 374 ff.

American government owes its equilibration to the presence of such a strong static force and social and economic middle region, a middle class which knew both its pocket-book and its mind. This class was hostile to "big business," to the city and city ways; averse to speculative enterprise and economics, but equally afraid of radical experiments. They could be Democrats with Jefferson, but not radicals. As a matter of fact, they were on less friendly terms with the radicalism of the frontier than with the commercialism of the East.<sup>1</sup> Their religion and economic mores frowned on both credit economics and speculative politics. Between the East and the West they held the balance of power, but whether they voted for the Federalists or for the Republicans, they were conservative German Lutheran farmers first and always. They wished to stay put.

This particular group is still in the field as a substantial economic and social section, a language frontier, and in mind and mores a parish of the German church of Luther and of Zwingli. It is today the stronghold of an American English and German Lutheran church, and the parent of a number of denominational organizations thereof.

The influence of these churches on American Christianity cannot here be traced any more than the influence of any one section of it on American civil polity and social psychology. It would lead far afield for its connection with an American German-language sectionalism of which it has laid the first foundation. But it would lead still deeper into the problem of the American mind. For of course this mentality is not merely German. It is, as a matter of fact, originally medieval global and guildtown Christianity. Stripped of its original association with historical Christianity, it has lent rationalism its tinge of sentiment, its pathos as well as its more permanent common sense. That generation at least, as we have seen, was not ashamed of its empiricism, and the logic of experience bid the logic of religion if not of a priori reason abide. A certain kinship of this logic with the hedonistic calculus of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. G. D. Luetscher, "Industries," *German American Annals*, old s. V, 135 f.; *ibid.*, V, 197-208; Knauss and Lincoln for their political equation. For a careful estimate of character and extent of Pennsylvania German industries, see Martin Lohmann, *Die Bedeutung der Deutschen Ansiedlungen in Pennsylvania* (Stuttgart, 1923), pp. 49-86.

Benjamin Franklin becomes apparent: it seems that Franklin attempted a synthesis between the farmer's and the artisan's and trader's ethics. For the understanding of American democracy, this mind is as important as this group was for its original sectional make-up and policies. The end of the sublimation of God's own original honest man, the farmer, and of his democracy is not yet.

Nor would it be at all difficult to trace the influence of this particular group mind in the process of assimilation into others. The Methodist church owes to this group some of its most zealous converts, some of its most aggressive early confessors. It owes them, it seems, to a want of emotional satisfaction and to the proselyting forehandedness of the new creeds.<sup>1</sup> It also owes them, it seems, to a certain element of resentment. To the poorer Bridegroom-seekers in the German parish, it was shocking to see a personal Christianity overlaid with the principle of territoriality; at least, they resented the ease with which it crept in. That a congregation should so become puffed up with pride that it ostracized its minister for marrying a poor girl instead of one of the more substantial daughters, that was not *nice*. It may have been due to their hard economic sense: he might have shown more consideration for their pocket-book and done his part to lighten the burden of the establishment. But it was unlovely and uncharitable just the same.<sup>2</sup> It stands to reason that those who were seated a little farther down at the table of the good parish life resented seeing the parson officiate at its head. To have him call the blessing on the good things of a fat proprietary country-side may have been in keeping with the tradition of Lutherdom, but somehow it jarred some people's sense of the fitness of things. To hear him bless the whiskey along with the other good things was shocking to their personal Christianity.<sup>3</sup> In this way, it might be shown that with the burliness and zeal of the godly village cooper and black-

<sup>1</sup> The *Acta Sanctorum* of the Methodist and other churches contain many references that bear on this subject. See Asbury's *Diary*; Peter Cartwright's *Autobiography*; Strickland, *Life of Jakob Gruber*; Orwig, *Geschichte der Evangelische Gemeinschaft*; Reitz, *Leben Bischof Seyberts*.

<sup>2</sup> Schmauck, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-48; Dubbs, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

<sup>3</sup> For comments on rum-blessing ministers: S. Reitz, *Leben Bischof Seyberts* (1862), p. 432; Strickland, *Life of Jakob Gruber* (1854), pp. 60, 77; Orwig, *Geschichte der Evangelische Gemeinschaft*, pp. 14, 128, 273. For a description by Lutheran ministers of the earlier, unregenerate mores of the group, see *Lutheran Observer*, Nos. 1107, 1114.

smith and farmer, the militant churches of the many camp-grounds and of the love-feasts absorbed much of the social asceticism and bias of the older ones. Christianity on the move, if it did lose the theoretical salvation logic of the institutional churches, blended the emotional bias of a revolutionary creed into the leveling instinct of a personal religion. Muscular and emotional Christianity still has the tang of the soil it came from; it is still of the parish, if it did learn to formulate policies of state.<sup>1</sup>

The process of naturalization into a larger and wider American City of God would seem to offer some suggestions for the general process of assimilation, the sense of nearness and distance, affinities between one congregation and another, suggest the lines of least resistance as indicated by religion. For a comparison in this respect of the situation in urban and rural communities, there is much material in the history of these religious groups. That social fellowship, business connections, secret societies, tended to cut wide breaches into the solid walls of the *Feste Burg*, is well attested: repeated filiations from German mother-congregations of English groups and the difference in their terms of consociation indicate definite lines of transition. So does the Winning of the West with its loosening of bonds.

But historical Christianity itself has its own indicated function in the process of assimilation or integration. To identity as well as to diversity, to consociation as well as dissociation, it has in every age pointed its own new ways. In this respect, it must be added that in the eighteenth century the eudaemonism of pietistic Christianity rivaled the power of the Lutheran or Calvinistic creed for individuation and consociation. A state of feeling easily conveyed a new sense of brotherhood and with it a new state of mind.

A description, in the *Evangelisches Magazin*, of the "State of the Kingdom of God among Us" throws much light upon this process. It shows at least that the process of "assimilation" had

<sup>1</sup> For the psychology of resentment in early Methodism, see Strickland, *Life of Jakob Gruber*, pp. 14 ff., 17, 19, 28-29, 31, 33, 39, 45, 55, 60-61, 77, 90-91, 94, 315, 354. For Gruber's asceticism, *ibid.*, pp. 299, 301. For his attitude toward slavery, *ibid.*, pp. 106-9, 126, 130-31, 135. Trial of a German Methodist for freedom of speech, *ibid.*, pp. 146 ff.

made considerable headway within the German group itself. Though still different from the other Americans, they had now a sense of difference and distance from Europe which was not of time and space alone:

The common people know more about religion here than in Germany. We live here among crowds of people who carry innumerable opinions to market. One refutes, sharpens, and smoothes the other and thus becomes both teacher and student. In Europe, the farmer, the tradesman, the squire reads little more than his own pet literature. Here, all parties exchange partisan tracts and not a few consider themselves strong enough to go all the way from Jakob Boehme to Thomas Paine and Voltaire. There is among us more brotherly love; an extraordinary freedom and toleration prevail in matters of faith. Members of the different churches are rarely devoted to their creed alone; they have accepted from their neighbors many "side-views" and dogmas often entirely incompatible with their own. Thus we only excommunicate for vices—for opinions, never. Controversial sermons are little known among the Germans here, and of the European universities and fencing-schools of learning they know nothing at all. Owing to intermarriage, we are more mutual in the use of our churches than are our brethren over there. The English and Quakers are far behind us in that respect. Between German Lutherans and Germans of the Reformed creed, the connection is so close that difference in creed is almost forgotten owing to the oneness of mind. But our indifference to creed and laxity of parochial discipline . . . are really deplorable. . . .

On the other hand, we have little to complain about the spirit of revolt against the teaching of Jesus. There are indeed some among us who with presumption of thought and impropriety of speech covet the distinction of enlightenment. But the example of those would-be rationalists makes little impression, for those are the most worthless people in the country.<sup>2</sup>

Obviously the "Era of Good Feeling" among the Pennsylvania Germans at least was no myth. Unfortunately, things were no longer in the "old country" what they used to be. Something had happened in Europe, and the two worlds came to be in the nineteenth century very much like the clocks of Charles the Fifth: synchronize they would not. Thus this quotation is characteristic, on the whole, of the spirit of the eighteenth century and not of the nineteenth.

With a new denominational spirit, with revivals going on next door, with the American competition all around, with the language question becoming acute, and, last not least, with that devilish

<sup>2</sup> *Evangelisches Magazin*, III, 2, 65 ff.

rationalism seeping in from Europe, that era of good feeling, here as elsewhere, could not endure.<sup>1</sup> In the twenties and thirties, the confessional spirit proved that it was to outlive the language question as a source of American sectionalism. As a matter of fact, however, the two remained closely related.<sup>2</sup> Together they caused the American Lutheran church to divide and redivide.<sup>3</sup> Not only its multiple sectarianism, its loose synodical federalism, but its integral character were therewith bound up. They could not forget that "it was the English life of the land which has swept away thousands of the church's children." Nor could they accept the English language without fearing for the identity of their church itself. "Our church may speak English. But if she does, with that her new tongue will decoy her into a new life. It will not be the old church getting a new language but a new language mastering the church."<sup>4</sup>

In spite of the anticipated ravages of the English language, the self-evident truths of the Lutheran creed and theology seem to have been most successful in perpetuating in America in the twentieth century a seventeenth-century type of mind. Thus far Americanization has gone: an earlier species threatened with extinction in Europe has found here conditions favorable for a new lease of life. Consistency is its rational principle, conservatism its purpose. "Lutheranism is the one persistent protest on this earth against humanism as a religion, against the incorporation of elements of character, love, brotherhood, knowledge, speculation, science, in the texture of the Christian faith."<sup>5</sup> If this quotation from one of their textbooks, printed in 1911, represents a general opinion, then it cannot be said that the new tongue has decoyed the Lutheran church of the General Council into a new life.

Nor is the above definition of Lutheranism as a principle of

<sup>1</sup> *Evangelisches Magazin*, I, 15; Nevin, *The Anxious Bench* (1844).

<sup>2</sup> Wentz, *op. cit.*, pp. 170 ff.; Krauth, *The Lutheran Church and the Denominations Around Us* (1877).

<sup>3</sup> In 1824, the unionism between the Lutheran and the Reformed churches failed. See Dubbs, Wentz, and others.

<sup>4</sup> Krauth, *Essay*.

<sup>5</sup> Theo. Schmauck and Th. Beuge, *The Confessional Principle*, pp. xvi, 911, 915, 916.

social reason a mere *obiter dictum*; it is a well-reasoned and well-documented conclusion. Granted a confession as an a priori, a rule of its application, laid down by the decisive precedents of Luther and Melancthon, and a confessionally conditioned individualism must logically follow. If its conscience and conception of truth are at all relative to confessional religious absolutes, it can do no other than act on the following conclusion:

The mistake in the attempt to draw the churches into a brotherhood is that it means setting up an ecclesiastical rule by a majority and thus for the sake of an aggregate of earthly power overriding the supremacy of the confessional force of truth; such a method means a new Romanism in the Protestant world . . . a new American religious papacy: its name is majority.<sup>1</sup>

We have here an illustration of the sheer might of an inalienable faith in the *es steht geschrieben*, of a priori reasoning and of the historical determination of the social process.

How far the logic of reasoning from history as the revelation of the Absolute will dominate the social process at large, that remains to be seen.

It is now apparent that the preservation in America of the social and economic mores of the German farmer cannot be accounted for except in connection with the logic of his religion. It has become evident that it is due to a judicious blending, on behalf of self-preservation and manipulation, of a priori and empirical reasoning. The question how far empirical reasoning is traceable to a salvation pragma cannot be dealt with without a similar study of other religious groups and of the social process at large. A short excursion only can here be attempted into the connection between salvation reason and the economic process at large.

Between the German Lutheran and the German Reformed church, there is in this quarter and period, as we have seen, hardly a difference. It is worth noticing, however, that sectarian leanings are more pronounced in the Reformed than in the Lutheran church. The fathers of the Dunkers and of other sects came not from the Lutheran but from the Reformed camp, or were touched by earlier Baptist traditions. The difference in the salvation pragma has

<sup>1</sup> For the movement toward orthodoxy and integration, see (on the General Synod), Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, pp. 451-54; (General Council), *ibid.*, pp. 463 ff., 473. For the federalism between the two, p. 475.

here yielded a different type of relatively rational being. The difference in communal structure and technique of guidance and direction, difference in paternalism, different orientation for the interstitial process is a function of a different salvation technique. It is due to a different hereafter reason. But different mores yielded different results. Of Dunkers, as of Moravians, it could truly be said, "By their works they shall be known": they were the most efficient farmers of them all. Such efficiency is not merely due to an accentuated asceticism as demanded by the Calvinistic doctrine of the "effective faith." Their marvelous craftsmanship in industry required more than traditional ascetic toil intensified by an especially stern salvation purpose. Their pronounced spirit of industrial enterprise betrays a decided knack for empirical reasoning.<sup>1</sup> The Lutherans of the eighteenth century produced no such phenomenal enterpriser as the two Saur, although they did put much love into their work.<sup>2</sup> A study of the salvation logic of such a man as Alexander Mack suggests a connection between the empirical logic of personal salvation and empirical reasoning in general. His rational documentation of the use of water in adult baptism is no longer mysticism; it is rather the natural philosophy and natural piety of a keen observer, of a miller gazing into his mill-race. His nature concept leads straight to the nature of the eighteenth century, to rationalism or to Rousseau.<sup>3</sup>

On behalf of the materialistic theory of causation, it must be said that these people came from a section of Germany where home industry was older than empirical salvation logic, older than sectarianism. The rut of tradition had first been broken in economic life. We might here, in the case of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Germany, speak of religion as an ideological reflex of existing economic wants. But if the mill-race suggested baptism, that need

<sup>1</sup> Falkenstein, *History*, pp. 106-8; Gillin, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-5. *History of the Church of the Brethren in East Pennsylvania*, pp. 76, 143, 510, 512; Sachse, *Sectarians*, I, 37; M. Lohmann, *Die Bedeutung*, pp. 70-80.

<sup>2</sup> Brumbaugh, *History of the Brethren*, pp. 374-75. Lohmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-65.

<sup>3</sup> Alexander Mack, *Kurze und Einfaltige Vorstellung* (1860), pp. 36, 120. For a convenient description of the productive technique and social organization of the Pennsylvania German farmers and of the sectarian co-operative enterprises of Ephrata and Bethlehem, see M. Lohmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-80; Sachse, *Sectarians*, II, v.



not have made the mill such a good thing for Baptists. Of course the manorial village and guild-shop system have been buttressed by the sanctions of the Catholic and Lutheran institutional churches. Of course the want for their disruption, the want for a new functionally adequate economic individualism, is reflected in the new sectarian, nonconformist creeds, in religious individualism. But economic individualism is one thing; another thing is the ratio of its success.

The present writer must therefore continue to plead for a study of the conditioning of that success in social organization and social technique. The thesis of the enormous importance of the social process in religion for the economic process in American history must be maintained.

From the above study of the Lutheran group it has become clear how the manorial, the village, the guild-shop ethics have been anchored in religion. Its paternalism rationalized initiative, disciplined imitation, standardized performance. In its keeping, the social estate of productive capital, of industrial technique had been safe; the human motor had been assembled, adjusted to a pre-existing want and then set for automatic continuous performance. The increment of progress in a sense was earned here.

Now with the dissolution of an earlier process of production through a new technique, with the going of the manorial lord and the guild and the village-socialism, and the coming of liquid economics, of the investor, the inventor, and enterpriser, much might have been lost. In America, with the process of migration, much was bound to get lost. The frontier, the straggling of humanity into space, spelled dissociation not only of human aggregates but of functional types. The Winning of the West spelled dissipation as well as acquisition of a social estate.

Much was lost in some sections of the United States. There is much degeneration of a higher functional societal type, much loss of technique in every respect from domestic husbandry to a rational as well as ethical concept of integral function. The idea of relationship was lost. The group-personalism of the earlier Germanic *Genossenschaft* concept disappears and with it a valuable integral concept of society itself. Economically speaking, it may be said

that in terms of marginal production the compensation of slavery, of invention, of black soil and broad acres and abundant raw material, may have made good the loss, while in terms of social economy it did not. Historically speaking, the balance of conservation has more to do with social organization than with "natural" conditions. The economic and social conscience of the "catfish aristocrat" in the bottom of the Kaw, or of the cattle-drover and stock-waterer Drew in the depth of Wall Street, is no more due to economic conditions alone than that of the New Englander or the German. They were a function of the social process of religion. If these relative consciences have been economic factors, then religion is as much a condition of economics as economic conservation has been a condition of soul-making. In American history, the transcendental purpose is a condition of economic valuation.

Whatever the connection of religion and the calculus of differential gain with the enterpriser today, in the beginning the materialization of such gain depended on production, on its social organization as an efficient and continuous performance. But here the religious articulation of self-interest looms large. The success of the Quakers in Philadelphia, the efficiency of Lancaster and Conestoga, the marvelous craftsmanship of the Saurys in Germantown depended on the continuous and conscientious performance of the man on the farm and in the workshop, on his love for the things of this world because of their relationship to the next. The same thing was true of New England. The credit foundation, the technical-efficiency foundation of American industry, the motor of labor as well as of enterprise, the ratio of production and consumption are anchored on a functional conscience blasted deeply by religion into the social soil. Religion has furnished the stable social medium for the American credit system to take hold and thrive in; it has established a behavioristic mechanism of efficient function on which American industrial efficiency is based.<sup>\*</sup>

<sup>\*</sup> The domination of the productive process by the ideology of religion; the paternalistic control of the labor motor, the ascetic valuation of labor, the religious sublimation of fruitfulness and of multiplication, resulted here in enormous economic values. Diversified farming, economic self-sufficiency of the farm-manor, an early economic surplus of great strategic importance (wheat), improved animal husbandry,

The situation in Pennsylvania was duplicated in Ohio. "Old Nic Longworth" in Cincinnati could calculate the increment of appreciation of his ground-rent from the traditional performance of his German tenants. On the New England and German conscience, the early American land-credit system was balanced in the North and West. The credit mutualism of enterprise and labor, of speculative promoter and farmer rested thereon. Of the job-conscience of urban industrial labor the same thing is true. Religion prepared here on the ethical side what the machine demanded on the technical side; conscientious performance. Professionalized labor was a fund on which industry could draw; only with this coefficient was the machine an economic success. That in the beginning it owes to this factor its technical success and perfection could easily be proved. The social organization of technical invention begins with the application of the religious idea of calling to a craft, of stewardship to raw material and tool, of honesty and truthfulness to quality in job and output. The capitalization of an invention had much to do with the supply of this spare wheel of industry, the man at the work-bench who put his soul into his work. That soul entered the calculation of profits, if not of wages. Its relationship to its maker figured in the labor turnover. Its importance as an economic factor rivals the frontier; where wanderlust and enterprise would lure to California or to Main Street, it urged staying put in Cincinnati and Milwaukee.

The distribution of capital and credit, and hence of industry, followed the attractions of raw material and conveyance, but it considered quality of performance of the human factor as well. It capitalized the increment which came from the factor of an industrial efficiency, which sprang from a tradition of good faith. Where the cost of living was low, owing to the abundant surplus of an

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an improved system of transportation, beginnings of truck-gardening, home industries, mills, textile manufactories, iron-works, paper-mills and printing trades; an excellent and frugal craftsmanship—there were in 1747 as many as thirty-two different crafts in Bethlehem alone—such are some of the results of this ethical organization of conscientious performance. Industrially, it made Pennsylvania the storage basin and reservoir, the nursery and germ-cell of the American system of industrial self-sufficiency. *Der Deutsche Pionier* (18 vols.) contains much material on the importance of the Pennsylvania German transplanted into the Ohio Valley and beyond.

industrious and frugal farming countryside; where labor was efficient, owing to adequate mind-patterns; where capital accumulated in the bank, owing to honest industry and thrift outside—there the economic process could become and did become more than speculative exploitation. It yielded more than the increment of accumulation. It led to a continuous appreciation of capital goods. Social capitalism is based on religion.

The traditional economic mores of the Lutheran creed did not produce as many enterprisers as Calvinism did, but they served American industry by keeping a valuable labor motor intact; they saved the social estate of much technical efficiency from dissipation. The relationship between master and servant is fairly stable where Lutherdom prevails; paternalism and traditionalism have drawn on the capital of social good will no more heavily than the contractual opportunism elsewhere. Today there are signs that a theoretical stewardship of riches on the one hand and an ideological socialism on the other are finding a synthesis in the old idea of *Werkgemeinschaft*; the old idea of relationship has here been preserved. The categorical imperative seems to have better things in store for economic than for political democracy.

To Weber the importance of Protestantism lies in this, that it broke with traditional performance, that it set free and stimulated enterprise. It thus constituted capitalistic enterprise and the capitalistic mind. In American history we must emphasize the functional relation of enterprise and traditional performance; whether we deal with it as it ought to be or as it is, capitalism is here conditioned on the complementary-mindedness of both. It is a function of a variety of religious experience.

## THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROFITS\*

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### ABSTRACT

Marx's fallacious theory of profits is taken as a point of departure for analysis. Marx assumed that a profit is always parasitic. On the contrary, economic profit is generically a wage. It is functionally justified in the degree in which it is fair compensation for function actually performed. The failure of capitalism in this connection is in its impotence to prevent arbitrary and chaotic valuations and counterfeiting of functions. The Webbs' arraignment of the "profits motive," in contrast with the "service motive," may be converted from a counsel of perfection into indication of a reasonable aim. Extirpation, or even control of the something-for-nothing motive, is impossible by social reorganization alone. In its most difficult phases the situation to be improved is a problem of individual regeneration. Intelligent leadership might do much toward control and even toward minimizing of both spirit and practice of the "profits motive."

On page 220 of *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization* the Webbs say:

Marx, in spite of all his pretentious blunders in abstract economic theory—*blunders which were not even favorable to socialism*—succeeded magnificently in suddenly turning the banners of capitalism with their seamy sides to the audience, and presenting the drama of modern civilization with the bourgeois as the villain of the piece.

I have not checked up carefully enough the differences between the Webbs' variation of "Fabian Socialism" and Marxism to be sure of the particulars which they would specify as illustrations of the "blunders which were not even favorable to socialism." It is evident that they mean clauses in Marx's creed which were both untenable in themselves and an embarrassment to the advance of socialistic invasion of capitalistic territory.

If we selected as illustrations of the Webbs' proposition any particular detail in the Marxian philosophy, we should involve ourselves in responsibility for showing, first, that this element of his argument was fallacious; second, that the doctrine was "not even favorable to socialism." The present argument does not undertake

\* This paper was read in one of the closing meetings (June, 1924), of a seminar which for a year had been studying "the sociology of property." Incidentally the study had included an analysis of Marx's impeachment of property in *Capital*.

to perform these two logical feats. It is merely a brief of the line of procedure by which the first part of that process might be performed in a selected instance. I believe that the Webbs' estimate can be sustained. Several of the futilities which we have found in Marx's reasoning would tend to confirm their appraisal. On the other hand, it is a notorious fact that some of the very doctrines in Marx's scheme which more conventional economists denounce as fallacious, have been most effective with those to whom they were convincing. That is, they were actually "favorable to socialism" by making converts in certain quarters, or by strengthening their faith, while they barred the advance of socialism in other quarters. Probably the fairest measure to apply in testing the Webbs' proposition would be the standard of the effect which peculiarly Marxian doctrines have had in weakening the faith of the orthodox that capitalism is unimpeachable.

Without attempting to make a list of Marxian doctrines which seem to me to illustrate the Webbs' conclusion, I specify one which I know has had in my own case the opposite effect from that which Marx tried to produce, viz., his theory of profits. In spite of my own conviction that our present capitalistic system involves structural and operative principles which cannot be permanent, in spite of the fact that I am as genuinely convinced as Marx was that there are centers of deadly infection in capitalism, certain of Marx's attempts at diagnosis have seemed to me so plainly to misrepresent capitalism that they have slowed up and confused my own attempts to find out what is the matter. At particular points the Marxian theory of what is the matter has seemed to me so wide of the truth that at times I have reacted to the extreme of wonderment as to whether there is anything the matter at all in principle with details which Marx cannot indict without falsification.

Marx's entire interpretation of profits, for example, is based upon the conception that profit is always and everywhere a parasitical and piratical levy on labor. This assumption makes it necessary for all who accept it to regard every transaction in which a seller gets from a buyer more than the former paid for goods as parasitism or piracy. If pushed to its logical limits, the Marxian conception of profits would even make it necessary for us to regard every penny

which each laborer receives for his work in excess of the amount necessary to support himself and his family in accordance with their attained standard of living as parasitism and piracy. In this respect the idea is so obviously a boomerang that the only possible defense for Marx would be denial that his doctrine carries any such implications or consequences. Of course, he did not draw any such conclusions from it, and the question whether or not such conclusions are necessarily involved if we adopt his analysis of profits is properly to be arbitrated not by economic partisans on either side, but by pure logicians.

Not pressing, then, the consequences of the Marxian theory of profits, as far as it affects wages, the theory falsifies the facts, and it rouses suspicions of fallacy in all the rest of the system, when it is tested in connection with the most rudimentary cases of profits, so called, and understood by plain people as matters of course. No sane person of adult age supposes that the retail trader can sell his goods for the mere equivalent of what he paid for them to the wholesaler.<sup>1</sup> No fairly intelligent person imagines that the retailer can sell his goods merely for the pro rata equivalent of wholesaler's prices plus all of the overhead that might be included under the titles rent, depreciation, insurance, heat, light, taxes, clerk hire, and other costs of keeping the goods on sale. The retailer himself must live. The balance, if any, which his accounts show under the head *profits*, is the wherewithal upon which he must live, and the first charge upon that balance, in any rational and defensible system of distribution, is essentially maintainable *as a wage* and not to be discredited as a parasitical or piratical levy.

So of the tailor who makes a suit of clothes; of the butcher or baker or candlestick maker who adds his fee for services to the other overhead necessary to keep the business solvent; so also in principle in the case of every functionary whose share in the industrial operation receives its upkeep out of funds which are known in bookkeeping as gross profits or dividends, or as net profits after all overhead, including salaries, is covered.

The vice in the capitalistic system at this point is not in providing a wage for this economic functioner—the retail trader. The vice

<sup>1</sup> Even Lassalle implies that he outgrew that belief after he came of age.

is that the system leaves disproportionate power in the hands of this functioner to expand his operations and to decide for himself what his wage shall be. This vice becomes more and more evident as the volume of transactions under one control increases. For example, the small trader with one assistant has hard work to get any wage at all. If we reckon peace of mind and absence of worry into the compensation for functioning, the clerk may draw a higher wage than his employer. The Marshall Field concern, however, has grown to be an organization with such advantages, at both the buying and the selling end of its operations, that its returns are far in excess of the total of labor value of all the managing personnel combined. This is true if we compute those wage values at the prevailing market rate for each kind of service, from door man to general manager. A small number of persons compose the Marshall Field corporation. They are able to assign to themselves as salaries, and to stock as dividends, the whole of the net profits, without regard to the proportion which their own labor bears, *strictly as labor*, to the labor of the other workers in the business who have no voice in the distribution of this surplus. In other words, the Marxian theory furnishes no means of discriminating between those types of profit which might more reasonably be classed as wages and those types which are piratical.

This failure is a radical fallacy in Marx's interpretation of economic facts. In consequence of it things as unlike as the actual physical labor of one man and the hold-up practices of another are dumped into one and the same scrap heap and the returns to them condemned as "profits." There can be no scientific validity in reasoning as indiscriminating as that. We are blind leaders of the blind unless we can see and admit with perfect candor that such men as the manager of the Marshall Field retail corporation and Marshall Field himself, and P. D. Armour, and George M. Pullman, and John D. Rockefeller, and Andrew Carnegie, and Judge Gary, each in his days of active business, does a certain amount of sheer physical work, and of brain work sustained by the physical work, which deserves its wage on any ground that could be maintained as a basis for the income claim of any farmer or fisherman or miner or blacksmith. At this point the size of the wage does not come into



question. That is a matter by itself. The point now is that no theory can be proposed in justification of an income for any manual laborer which does not at the same time, and on the same grounds, justify an income for the actual manager of any economic enterprise. Calling one of these deserved incomes by one name and giving a different name to income deserved for reasons different in detail but identical in principle, invalidates our analysis. It is fallacious to rate a thing as meritorious when we call it "wages," and to pronounce the same thing vicious when we call it "profits." That is like saying that water is healthful in a tin dipper but poisonous in a silver cup. We are on a wrong track, we are following a misleading clue, when we try to conduct economic diagnosis by means of such a turgid hypothesis.

Genetically, and in their elementary forms, profits are merely wages in disguise. It is accordingly an embarrassing blunder for socialism or any other economic or sociological sectarianism to risk its fortunes upon representations to the contrary.

It is more objective to start with the perception that profit is a wage collected in a peculiar way. We may go on, if we please, and say that this indirect way of collecting a wage has been perverted into ways of collecting more than the wage due, then of collecting incomes which contain no wage element at all. The legitimate element, however, in a profit which is functionally justified is compensation for service rendered. This fact should never be obscured.

It is in order to repeat that capitalism has given a scope to the creation of profits far in excess of reasonable charges for services; so that in many cases a reasonable wage for labor has now disappeared as a negligible fraction in a total income which is mostly a parasitical and piratical levy. That, however, is a totally different matter from a major promise that profit is graft, which was what Proudhon meant by his charge "Property is theft."

We must return to a rudimentary perception to which appeal has to be taken at various points in judgment of Marx, viz., no occupation ever became legitimized in the *mores* of any group unless it appeared to the group that the occupation on the whole justified itself as a group value. From one angle all culture history,

that is, the experience itself, not the write-ups of it called "culture history," is a process of testing, revising, superseding judgments of group values. The capitalistic system is not an exception to this rule. In its entirety and in its details it is a wholesale illustration of the rule. Modern commonwealths have "first endured, then pitied, then embraced" detail after detail which built up what we now understand by the term "capitalism." In many cases that order of procedure has been reversed. Groups have first rapturously embraced instruments, like machines driven by steam, or practices like wage-paying and wage-taking in place of home artisanship directly bartering the products of its own handiwork. After a while their rapture has cooled into endurance, then it has become pity of itself, and later indictment of the system which men of the accusers' own kind had helped to create. One of the clues to this tragedy always is, however, that both individuals and the group concerned always saw reasons for at least tolerating and often for welcoming the innovations which made more or less directly and energetically toward evolution of conditions not to be foreseen. Selling goods for more than they cost the seller was one of these innovations.

We have heard so much of the tragic consequences of the Industrial Revolution that our generation tends to regard that transition as little less devastating than the invasions of Roman civilization by the Goths and Vandals. It is not good form in our generation to remember that the Industrial Revolution had also its aspects as a gospel, as an emancipation, as a salvation. Human energies seemed to be released for far more effective exercise than had been possible under the older conditions. Over and over again the Industrial Revolution has been referred to in terms which tend to leave the impression that the people who became factory workers were previously living in conditions of enviable plenty, with ease and security, from which they were impressed as sailors were captured for the navy, or as Negroes were kidnapped on the African coast and transported into slavery. This is, of course, a caricature of what actually happened. People became factory workers because they thought they were bettering themselves; and their employers thought they were bettering not only themselves and

their employees but also the public. In certain particulars these premature beliefs were temporarily if not permanently justified. The other side of the picture was not visible until later. A money wage, instead of the doubtful and cumbrous possession of a product in kind, seemed to many people almost like a gift from heaven. With that wage in hand it was no longer necessary for the artisan to wander over the countryside trying to find another artisan with something which could form one of the objects in a barter. With the money wage the man, woman, or child that the factory employed seemed to be set free from narrow confinement.

On the other hand, the Industrial Revolution was a sort of apotheosis of the merchant class. One of the main evolutions in culture history has been appropriation and exploitation of the function of merchandizing. The trade centers of the Mediterranean world are monuments of different stages in the process. Sheba and Seba, Tarshish and Tyre, Carthage and Rome, and Venice, then the Hanse cities and the shifting of the center of trade from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic are among the punctuation marks for the western world's epic of merchandizing. The merchant has probably never been regarded as an unmixed blessing, but in civilized times he has always been accepted as at least a necessary evil. He closes circuits with parts of the world which produce goods that his neighbors want; and though he has been accused of demanding excessive returns for his adventures, people have not been willing to deny themselves the benefits of his enterprise. With the Industrial Revolution the necessity of the merchant became convincing from new angles. He functioned in the new economy not merely as purveyor of luxuries from the Orient, but as agent of the European fabric-producers in getting the wool and cotton that they needed, and also in finding consumers for the manufactured goods. Trade became the main reliance of England, and in an increasing degree of all Europe. Profits were not regarded as inherently wrong. They were taken for granted as among the new means of salvation. In so far as the merchant or the manufacturer is a functioner in the necessary processes which mediate between human desires and the physical means of catering to those desires, merchant or manufacturer, I repeat, has every claim to

a corresponding income which any other type of functioner has. We shunt ourselves on to a side track in our analysis of social facts and relations the moment we allow any cloudiness about this elementary perception to gather around our reasonings. The question whether a given laborer is entitled to his hire is no more settled by labeling one man's hire "wages," and another's "profits," than the question whether both of two men are necessary to a given business is decided by the fact that one of them wears a starched collar and the other overalls. Either, neither, or both of them may be necessary, but in no case is the fact dependent upon externals. It should not be necessary to repeat that there is a certain profit element in every wage, and there is a certain wage element, or at least a reminiscence of what was once a wage element, in every profit. All of which reduces to the conclusion that we are simply children playing on the surface of things so long as we bar ourselves from digging beneath the surface by using inhibitive labels.

The crucial fact about the distribution side of capitalism is not that it furnishes incomes for functions so unlike that it requires a liberal education to discover that some of them are functions at all. The radical fault is that capitalism lends itself to creation and maintenance of arbitrary and chaotic valuations of functions. This formula is intended to cover all the cases of mere absentee owners legally permitted to set their own valuations upon their fictitious functions in the business; or in principle, worse still, the middlemen who are able to wedge themselves into the functionally legitimate and necessary buying and selling processes, and to levy a highwayman's toll for what may have been originally a necessary function, but is now, through a monopolistic grip on the situation, either no longer a necessary function or an arbitrarily overrated function. Such perversions as these—creation of counterfeit functions and successful devices to enable the people who control them to draw correspondingly meretricious incomes—are the evils of capitalism on its distribution side. This is an indictment which calls for discriminations which the Marxian categories have never promoted; discriminations which must lead to more searching tests of capitalism than the Marxian agitations have ever projected.

Any system of deciding conflicting claims about justice by

allowing to one of the contending parties more arbitrary power than the other to settle the dispute between them is so obviously a confusing of the relations between co-operators that it will not be permanently tolerated in human society. Coercion, either by organized labor or by organized capital, to settle terms of distribution, is simply the medieval wager of battle with the uniforms changed. Political fighters have become industrial fighters. Their means of warfare in both cases is force, and force decides only a more and less of force. It leaves questions of function, which must be the final criterion of justice, unadjudicated. Just as civilization will remain uncivilized in the degree in which it falls back upon war to break international deadlocks, so industry will remain uncivilized in the degree in which it depends upon measures of force to settle counter claims as to the relative importance of functions performed. The "pre-established harmony" doctrine, which was the classical economists' substitute for the "natural-rights" myth of the age of innocence and happiness, appears under capitalism as superinduced disharmony. Conceptual "free competition" has never put in an appearance. The sort of competition that has existed has developed an offense on the part of piratical profiteers which the defense of genuine industrial functioners has thus far been unable to neutralize.

This is the situation at which we have arrived, not because an economic profit is in principle unwarranted, but because we have found no way to keep profits within the limits which the warrant for profits prescribes. As was pointed out above, the warrant for profits is in the last analysis identical with the warrant for wages, namely function. The homely proverb contains the truth for both—"The laborer is worthy of his hire." This brings us also to reassertion of the labor doctrine as the core of every valid theory of economic justice. There is no conceivable claim to share in the economic output equal in universal validity to the claim based on labor, or, in our more precise technical term, "function."

All the attempts to go back of function, and to build theories about economic rights on conceptions of the human lot that end in the more or less thinly disguised doctrine "the world owes every man a living," or still worse, "the world owes the favored few and

their offspring the favors secured by convention," are bound to leave the majority of men unconvinced. The farthest we can go in that direction, and carry the indorsement of the decisive majority with us, is a conclusion to this effect: The human race owes to itself provision that every child born shall have the most unhampered chance possible to grow into effective maturity, and to show how much of a part he or she can take in carrying on the human process. From our present outlook it is improbable that the human race will ever permanently consent to a standard of income which is not checked up at last by reference to the scale of performances, in accordance with the conditions on which men will consent to back up one another in drawing any incomes at all.

It is doubtful if any valid variant of the functional claim can be discovered which will not turn out to be merely the functional criterion in disguise. However that may be, the thesis which I hold to be necessary as the center of any valid theory of economic distribution is that income must be proportioned to function. I maintain this thesis although I am fully aware that the category "function" is no exception to the universal rule that the human intellect is permanently enjoined from discovery of an absolute measure of anything. The thesis means that the nearest approach we shall ever make to absolute justice in economic distribution will be a proportion arrived at by the best estimate we can reach of that imperfectly appraised factor, "function," modified by minor factors which from time to time get a meaning force in our scale of values. Such minor factors as these are in point:

1. *Constant vs. intermittent demand for exercise of a function.*

Assuming, for instance, that the functions of a cook and of a stonemason are rated as of equal economic importance, the wage rate per day or hour should be higher for the stonemason than for the cook, because the former must lose more days than the latter in enforced idleness from weather and other conditions.

2. *Conditions under which functions must be performed* are proper variants of the single functional measure of income. Assuming equality of function from the purely operative point of view, the stoker on an ocean liner should be paid higher per trip than the deck hand; the structural iron-worker more than the interior decorator.

3. *Initial outlay of time, labor, and goods required to qualify for the function* may properly be a variant of income. So long as this investment falls upon the individual, not upon society, the income for performance of the function should include a sinking-fund element to liquidate that obligation; for instance, a surgeon should receive a higher wage than a barber, etc.

In what follows I am thinking of the Webbs' argument more than of Marx's theory.

In brief, whatever may be the variation of average incomes from the closest estimate of proportion which could be made from the functional standpoint, capitalism has not only failed to remove kinds and degrees of inequality which occurred under previous economic systems, but it has lent itself to the sanctioning of new inequalities on a startling scale. The phenomena of income in excess of function and of income without appreciable function at all have never been as frequent and as conspicuous as they are today. A part of the Webbs' diagnosis of this condition is in terms of *usurpation of the profit motive and the exclusion of the service motive* as the animus of industry; or, as the Webbs would probably consent to express it, drowning of the service motive in the tidal wave of profit motive.

So long as this diagnosis is under consideration, the social problem becomes a matter of motives more than of economics. The condition alleged to account for the facts is a matter of morals or of psycho-pathology, or both, rather than a matter of economic technique. Whatever its location as an abstract, scientific matter, however, it is close to the foreground of tangible reality. In modern industrial countries *anxiety to increase income is more in evidence than zeal to discharge function*. This is the substance of what such writers as the Webbs mean by the changes they ring on the theme *profits motive vs. service motive*.

It would be a waste of time for us to discuss the proposition that the profits motive is more prevalent in our type of society than it has ever been before; and it would be a similar waste to argue that the facts amount to a pathological condition, both individual and social. Both propositions occupy very nearly the place of axioms in the minds of dispassionate observers. We need to remind our-

selves, however, that they are still disputed in the capitalist ranks; sometimes no doubt from sheer inability to see facts as they are, in other cases as mere debating contest tactics.

The situation defies statistical verification one way or the other; but to an open mind it appears to be indisputable that at present the disposition to reach for income regardless of function is growing more rapidly than the disposition to discharge function regardless of income. Incipient stages of this disorder are relatively innocent and even unconscious reachings after "all the traffic will bear." We want our wages or our salaries raised because we think our public should stand for the "raise," and we are sure that the function which we perform is worth it.

Perhaps this generalization is supported by more startling developments outside than inside the economic field in the strict sense, or at least the familiar sense.

For example, the medical profession is not usually thought of as a part of the economic system. It has always enjoyed the reputation not only of being on a supereconomic plane, but of being more unselfishly devoted to its function than any other large vocational group, the clergy not excepted. A physician or surgeon of wide acquaintance among medical men, however, would be able to tell, from his own observation, facts about the commercialization of medical practice in recent years that would go far toward establishing the conclusion that the ruling principle among physicians and surgeons in our cities today is not function first and profit second, but the reverse. The extent to which this change of attitude is in evidence in such a profession is a side light upon the rôle of the same motive in more strictly economic pursuits.

The leading Jewish rabbi in a certain city for the past thirty years received a salary of \$15,000. His successor accepted the position less than a year ago on the same salary. Recently (April, 1924) the papers announced that people had been turned away from every Sunday morning service but one at his temple since his arrival, and that his salary had been advanced to \$20,000. This is merely an incident which cannot serve as proof of any generalization, nor can it be accepted as a single case to support an hypothesis, unless the entire body of circumstances surrounding the incident



were first analyzed. It seems to be probable that the individual in this particular case is likely to prove as valuable a citizen as his eminent predecessor, and I would be the last to imply that I think he is overpaid. Inasmuch, however, as he came from a professorship, and that mere competition among professors has not yet carried bids for their services above \$10,000—and that only at Columbia, where a salary is probably worth at least 20 per cent less than anywhere else in the United States, outside the city of New York—tends to throw a spot light upon this incident as a symptom. The income factor in people's motives is gaining, at least in relative prominence, over the function motive. It would be instructive to know whether a similar tendency exists among the Catholic clergy. It is surely in evidence among Protestants. Few of us in any occupation can honestly profess that we are more interested in delivering the goods than we are in collecting the price. The record of the past year affords narrow ground for the hope that our politicians may be exceptions to the rule.

I have purposely gone outside the economic field proper for reminder of symptoms because, whether more cause or more effect of increased prevalence of the profits motive in primarily economic operations, this larger dimension of the service versus profits dilemma must be taken into account before conclusions can be justified about the meaning of that dilemma for our present civilization. That is, the ratio of the profits interest to the service interest in our society is itself a function of the larger ratio between the income interest in general and the service interest. In other words, desire for pecuniary gain irrespective of function is not a phenomenon peculiar to people who are within the strict bounds of the capitalistic system. Desire for gain, irrespective of function, may be called a continuous epidemic among modern people. Speculation, betting, and gambling, from working the nickle-in-the-slot machine up through Mah Jongg, bridge, and poker to schemes for cornering the market, are familiar symptoms. The eagerness of the school teacher who has saved \$500 to find an investment that will pay not 3 per cent but 5, 6, 7, or 8 per cent, is proof that the so-called profiteers differ from some of their accusers not in motive, but merely in the radius of action of the motive. Indeed, the man, woman, or child

who accepts the benefits of the most innocent and among the most useful of our capitalistic institutions—the savings bank—and starts an account by a deposit of \$1, stimulated by knowledge that at the end of a year the dollar will have become \$1.03, is a recruit to the ranks of those prospective capitalistic dope fiends whose ruling passion at its outer extreme is something for nothing.

In short, this is another case of "condition, not a theory." The modern man is a germ-carrier of the characteristic capitalist disease—desire for money—with relative indifference to the means by which it is gained. Whether capitalism is more a cause or effect of this disease, or the disease more a cause or effect of capitalism, both capitalism and its typical contagion are here, and we can neither think nor act intelligently about either without a full accounting with the other.

Suppose the wires were all laid for an anticapitalistic revolution at this moment. Suppose that the president of the *International*, by pressing a button, could blow into atoms the whole currency, credit, corporation, and criminal code structure of capitalism. Possibly he might refrain from touching that button if he had his attention called to the fact that not capitalists alone are greedy, but that we belong to a human race that is greedy. Whether this is an aboriginal trait or a result of misdirected breeding makes no difference in the existing situation. At present capitalism is both a program of greed and also a program of restricting greed within certain limits. Our greed has to operate under certain handicaps which are at least mitigants and restraints. Touch that button and along with the capitalistic apparatus in the service of greed go also the capitalist mitigants and restraints of greed. What will be left? Why, simply a world full of wholly unrestrained greedy people, in place of a world full of partially restrained greedy people. Instead of partially muzzled beasts of prey the worst of us would have become unrestricted man-eaters. Instead of remaining what the best of us are now, lambs bleating for the unearned mother's milk, we should have become ravening wolves, with no lambs left to devour, and so forced to feed upon one another. In other words, cataclysmic destruction of the capitalistic system would not only not better the human condition—the immediate

result would be not merely chaos—but it would be a fiercer chaos than existed in primitive times, before the something-for-nothing virus had infected practically everybody.

I have indulged in this flight of fancy not because I want to insinuate that the Webbs or even Marx would harbor the notion of such violent interruption of historical evolution; but in order to introduce the very practical consideration that the Webbs' conclusion of the whole matter reduces to a slightly disguised version of what the late William T. Stead used to play horse with as "copy-book commonplace," namely, *we all ought to be good*. In particular, we all ought to adopt as our standard the service motive instead of the profits motive.

On the one hand, as I have said, this is an utterly futile counsel of perfection; it gets us nowhere. It simply states the plight in which we find ourselves. It has no more means of rescue in it than megaphoning to a drowning man who can't swim that he's out beyond his depth.\*

On the other hand, in group matters it is always constructive to arrive at knowledge of anything wrong in the group. Because groups remain, while individuals pass, there is remedial and reconstructive action within group power. This power can seldom be exercised to much creative effect instantaneously, but the whole history of major and minor reforms and revolutions shows that it can be exercised so as to get results by keeping the power turned on through long periods, and sometimes within short periods. The one indispensable condition is fixation of group attention upon the condition to be changed and on devices for changing it. The rest is cumulative forcing of the change, by either physical or moral suasion, or both, provided the change is within the range of human possibility. No one is authorized to assert, in advance of demonstrative experiment, that a given change in the balance of human motives is impossible. For instance, from a scientific standpoint

\*The Webbs are much too wise to have rested with such an empty conclusion. Critical people, who had first learned of the Webbs through the particular book to which we are referring, could hardly arrive at any other version of their argument than the one previously stated. Reference to the same authors' next earlier book, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, would correct the impression that they deal in logical nullities.

the familiar dictum "We have always had wars; therefore we shall always have wars" is an absurdity. The reply to that dictum is as valid as it is familiar: "Less than a century ago men were saying the same thing of duelling and slavery. Meanwhile, both are practically banished from the western world."

Now it is an invaluable contribution, and it is likely to prove an increasingly dynamic contribution to social self-knowledge and to social self-control to have called attention to the antithesis between the function motive and the profits motive in capitalistic society; to the increasing prominence and prevalence of the profits motive;<sup>1</sup> and to its effects upon the morale, primarily of the economic processes, and ultimately upon the entire structure and behavior of individuals and their groupings. We shall have increased our every mental and moral dimension whenever one of us grasps the fact that the function motive is essentially social, while the profits motive is essentially antisocial—in each case, of course, considered in and of itself, not as it may be geared by forces superior in power to work which is contrary to its own bent. Tawney's phrase "acquisitive society" correctly characterizes a social régime in which the profits motive strikes the keynote and gives the tone. It is a social condition in which getting for self, rather than toting fair in a community trek, is the standardizer of action.

It would be a waste of time among fairly enlightened students of any branch of social science to argue that teamwork of some sort, rather than a consistently individualistic go-as-you-please program is the only promising policy in the long run for men in general. So much has become almost axiomatic among reflective men. Some of the most extreme individualists in their own practice have been the most insistent upon this doctrine in their theories. Examples range from Philip of Macedon and Napoleon I at one end of the moral scale to Woodrow Wilson at the other.

Accordingly, what the Webbs have really done for their readers is this: They have brought us face to face with a problem of social psychology, viz., how may the service motive be substituted for the profits motive as the ruling passion in industrial groups? It is a piece of constructive work to have advertised this central problem.

<sup>1</sup> The term being used now in the invidious, not the intrinsic, sense.

It exposes the shallowness of any schemes or visions of social regeneration by machinery which do not deal with the fundamental actuation of the machinery. The problem of a basic constitution of the activities by which men must appease their rudimentary wants is not merely a problem of organizing men as they are. It is the problem of getting men as they are to be different sorts of men. If we size up the problem as any less difficult than that, we deceive ourselves, and then we become deceivers and misleaders of others.

There is just this loophole for admission of a brighter light upon the situation, namely, the sociological commonplace that men in groups are capable of behaving as though they are either better or worse than they really are severally. Group behavior and thereupon in process of time group and individual character are in part functions of the kind of leadership followed. Men in groups adopt lines of conduct both above and below the level of choices which would be possible for them individually. Above and below are measured in the present connection by the standard of subordination of the individual's preferences to the group's valuations.

For instance, with the exception of a few roughnecks who would rather fight than eat; and a few new-experience-seekers who were willing to take any chances for the sake of adventure; and a possible few with a John Brown type of conscience, which would require them to assume as their own responsibility what they believed to be a national duty, not a man in the United States would have marched voluntarily and alone into the trenches to fight either for or against the Germans. Given a mass psychosis, however, which appraised military action as the supreme value of the hour, which rated as a poltroon and a traitor every man who hesitated about accepting liability for his part in military action, nearly universal personal preferences almost completely disappeared from sight. The vast majority acted upon the group impulse contrary to the detached individual impulse.

We have not worked out a science of group leadership, but from servile revolts in Rome through the Crusades, and the political and industrial revolutions, and the scientific and religious reformations, we have over and over again demonstrated the possibilities of leadership in both directions—toward substitution of both more

and less general values for prevailing values. This, by the way, is a version of what men of the social type of mind have always inarticulately reached for under the name "liberty," i.e., room for achievement of larger dimensional values, or values for more people, than the values defined by prevailing conventions or monopolized by privileged classes.

It is accordingly by no means utopian to propose as a social objective a plane of behavior which would involve subjective changes in the people of capitalistic countries, amounting in the end to adoption of the service motive in place of the profits motive as the standardizer of industrial behavior. It would be utopian to think or to act as though the substitution could be brought about in any near future. Time, and plenty of it, would have to be the most liberal item in the reckoning. With that proviso sufficiently guarded, it is quite as sane to adopt as a social objective the substitution of the functional standard for the profits standard as it is to aim at making burglary and bootlegging commercially unprofitable. I purposely choose terms of comparison which are still in the experimental class, and which no one expects ever to be in the list of things completely accomplished.

With these reservations clearly understood, it becomes quite sane to face the problems of improving upon capitalism in full view of the fact that they involve self-regeneration by people all more or less inoculated with the spirit that is chiefly responsible for making capitalism a problem, viz., the something-for-nothing spirit. It would be utopian to suppose that we can ever have a thoroughly non-capitalistic society as long as we remain capitalistic individuals. The social problem as presented by capitalism is not merely a problem of organization or program; it is a problem of physical, mental, and moral eugenics. It is a problem of breeding a population whose individual and collective wishes will aggregate a collective demand for something different from capitalism. It is impossible to foresee whether this eugenic program will ever be carried out automatically, i.e., by uncontrolled evolution. It is conceivable, but not probable, that it will. In so far as we have in mind a social program aimed at the deliberate purpose of retiring capitalism as a system and as a spirit, it would be sheer stupidity

to ignore or to minimize this personal reconstruction element in the enterprise. Capitalistic people will constitute a capitalistic society. As Herbert Spencer long ago expressed it, "You cannot get golden conduct from leaden instincts." This educational or stirpicultural side of the case may not be minimized. The big problem blocks the way of anything more than superficial and deceptive renovation of institutions. How may we insure better personal building material for our institutions? In its totality this is a sociological problem. In its technique and details it is a problem for all the arts of physical, mental, and moral influence, or of education in the widest sense. Whatever we contemplate undertaking in the way of institutional reconstruction, the sociologist must insist on the warning that reconstruction will be an illusion in the degree in which it leaves this problem of individual conversion unsolved. We must make due provision for answering the question, How may we make headway in enlarging the ratio of the functional motive to the something-for-nothing motive among the operative factors in our individual and collective personality?

With that logical precondition duly observed, we are in a position to consider plans for more direct action. The other cardinal phase of the problem of capitalism, from the standpoint which we have reached, is this: How may we, who all share in the desire to get something for nothing, so operate upon ourselves collectively as to make ourselves act as though the something-for-nothing motive were less energetic in us than it is? Otherwise expressed, the problem is: How may we get action by way of co-operating to confine the operation of the something-for-nothing impulse in the people in whom it holds the balance of power, within the limits set by our recognized and ostensible group mores, and eventually to reduce the ratio of the something-for-nothing impulse in all individuals?

The answers to this part of the capitalistic question must be sought in the political field, the term "political" being used in the most general sense so as to include all measures, whether primarily of governmental, of economic, or of other control—say public opinion in general—by means of which moral, and in the last resort, physical pressure is brought to bear to make the group will prevail

over non-conformist factions. Here we arrive at the functional setting for all the proposals and programs for coddling, nursing, surgicalizing or exterminating capitalism. Each of them is to be judged, first, by the criterion, How conclusive is its diagnosis of the condition to be remedied? Second, assuming the conclusiveness of the diagnosis, which of the proposals for treatment promises the most reliable effects?

This is one of the ways in which capitalism as a problem situation may be reduced to its lowest terms. We have analyzed, or we may say the Webbs, for example, have analyzed capitalism as a system which, on its technical side, gets large quantities of socially desirable results. On the other hand, the Webbs have partially analyzed capitalism on its human or moral side as a system which releases the acquisitive element of our human nature to an extent which incurs an intolerable ratio of undesirable results. We are entitled to sum up the case for and against capitalism up to the present time in this way: We have reached a workable formula of the merits and defects of capitalism as a system. We have isolated the microbe, so to speak, that turns capitalism as a vital economic technique into a pathological social condition, viz., the something-for-nothing spirit. We have a clearer conspectus than ever before of the factors involved in a social reconstruction conservative enough to save all that is of social value in the technique on the one hand, and radical enough to absorb the pathological factors on the other. We have also reached an outlook from which we can see, more distinctly than ever before, the general strategic relations between capitalism as a collection of problems and the different expedients, from common school education to Bolshevism, which are proposed as solutions of the problems.

What then are the most advisable things to do for the sake of promoting appropriate action?

In the concrete, for ourselves, individually, the best thing to do is to spread the news as widely as we can that this is the problem situation. If our analysis is correct, every person who gets the general purport of it lodged among his ideas will thereby have become an addition to the mental force making against expansion of the capitalistic spirit. Of course, this is merely recognition of the



most radical and most difficult phase of every social problem, namely, the immemorial and interminable problem of moral education, both individual and collective.

If we think of ourselves as immediate co-operators in attempts at direct institutional reconstruction, my conclusion is that we should first do all we can to strengthen every rational attempt to restrict the exercise of the capitalistic spirit, to reduce its radius of legal action, and to confine it within steadily contracting limits. This is what I have meant when I have used the term "patching."

It is more and more difficult for me to get excited over a quarrel between a labor organization and an employers' organization in which it is evident that the essential capitalistic spirit is as rampant in the one party as in the other. On the other hand, I can easily grow enthusiastic over any program which promises to limit the liberty of either party to beat the other by anything but rational means.

Thirty years ago, in common with many others, I was sanguine that the agitation for municipal ownership of natural monopolies was a specimen of the sort of program to which this general description points. I still believe that municipal ownership under certain circumstances tends to minimize the evils of unrestrained capitalism. On the other hand, the history of the Chicago street railways, surface and elevated, along with the abortive efforts to get subways, illustrates one of our main propositions, viz., that capitalistic people will act capitalistically. Mix the something-for-nothing spirit with party politics and capitalism is not restrained but stimulated.

Thirty years ago, in common with many others not selfishly interested on either side, I believed ardently in trade unionism, both as a means of self-expression by the many and as a curb upon the capitalism of the few. I believed, and I still believe, that the practice of collective bargaining is among the most constructive of modern inventions. I believed, and I still believe, that class consciousness on the part of wage-workers is a factor of immeasurable good or evil, according to the sort of intellectual and social spirit which actuates it; and that in its place and degree it is an effective counterweight to the tendencies of capitalism. Vocational class

consciousness on the part of organized labor has, in its turn, exhibited all the evils of the something-for-nothing spirit which have ever been brought home to the capitalistic class; and it evidently can be relied upon merely as a variant of class struggle, not as a basis for a non-capitalistic order.

Thirty years ago I believed that the idea of industrial arbitration and conciliation had brought a new gospel into capitalistic paganism. As an influence upon capitalism in general, however, industrial arbitration and conciliation in their older forms have had relatively about the same effect which spilling overboard a few barrels of oil would have upon the tides of the ocean. Yet the underlying ideas of arbitration and conciliation have spread and ramified and specialized themselves in such forms as labor representation in management, shop councils, stock sharing by employees, etc. All these together have made only microscopic impression upon capitalism, but there is a margin of accomplishment to their credit if we think of them as brakes upon the flywheel of capitalism, not as pivots of an alternative industrial order.

Again, these are what I mean by "patches," but at this point in the analysis it is evident that the word is a poor indication of the idea. Analogies of mechanical checks or impulses of all sorts, or of physiological deterrents on the one hand and stimulants or tonics on the other, might yield more expressive pictures than the word "patches." The thought I am trying to convey is that no devices are in sight to which we can pin our faith as feasible and comprehensive substitutes for capitalism, either on its subjective side as the acquisitive spirit, or on the objective side as an economic technique. Line upon line, precept upon precept, device upon device, in both restraint upon the negative side and direction toward positive results on the constructive side, must be the formula of practical social philosophy.

I predict that, along with a multitude of similar devices, public opinion, gradually assimilating this philosophy, will sometime frame a program in the spirit just indicated, which will provide for a comprehensive plan of limiting and distributing corporation profits, and thereby wholesomely restraining both the spirit and the practice of capitalism. It will be a plan along these lines:

1. Stockholders to receive not more than a maximum rate of dividends,  $x$ , calculated to be enough above the average rate of return upon securities to serve as a premium upon investment in needed industrials.

2. Stockholders to be restrained from evading the prescribed limitations by voting salaries to themselves for services.<sup>1</sup>

3. Premiums, in the form of pro rata dividends on salaries and wages, to be offered as inducements to increase output.<sup>2</sup>

4. Net profits in excess of the rate provided for in 1 to be divided, in some proportion to be determined by experience, between employees of all sorts and the state.

5. The state's share of the profits shall not be available for governmental expenses. They shall go to some holding concern, perhaps an adaptation of the present Federal Reserve banks, to be loaned to the most desirable industrial enterprises—desirable from the standpoint not of private but of public interest.

Since I have more than once expressed beliefs about desirable social changes which were at first ridiculed as the day dreams of a closet philosopher, or denounced as dangerous fanaticisms, only to see them absorbed a little later into the most commonplace practice, I do not doubt that the extravagance of the present prophecy will become a matter of course in a not far distant future.

<sup>1</sup> I do not profess to have a feasible plan for carrying out this condition, but I believe the problem will sometime be solved.

<sup>2</sup> I am aware that this is an application of the *similia similibus* policy, but it will not be a solitary instance among provisional compromises as means of social control.

## SOCIAL PROBLEMS

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### ABSTRACT

Social problems arise from social institutions and differ from scientific and political problems, proposed solutions look to sundry devices to make institutions "work" despite difficulties; problems indicate changes in habits and customs of group, accompanying technical advances; data of social problems invite study of social change and suggest solution of problems to be found in expediting these changes.

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The study of social problems has reached such an advanced stage today that, in venturing to set forth the following discussion, I feel that I must apologize for my temerity. These remarks, which are offered, not as conclusions, but merely to indicate a line of inquiry, may perhaps suggest to more competent hands an enterprise of some moment.

### I

When we speak of our social problems we refer usually to those subjects of earnest concern which are known severally as the housing problem, the infant-mortality problem, the child-welfare problem, the labor problem, the problem of crime and delinquency, and so on. And when we inquire into the occasion for housing as a problem, or any of the other numerous social problems, we find that each of these problems is associated with a situation involving a fairly large number of persons who are in distress. Further inquiry into the character of their difficulties shows that, as in the housing problem, people are embarrassed, to say the least, by an insufficient supply of houses in which to live. Or we find that the number of babies dying prematurely is too large to be viewed with complacency. Or, again, we see a large social class which we call labor unable to obtain a satisfactory basis of employment from another large class, called employers. Then, too, we find large numbers of adults and children breaking the laws of property and person so that, as individuals and as members of society, we see our rights and liberties menaced.

Being aroused by these evidences of social difficulties, we are concerned with discovering a solution of these problems which will reduce or eliminate the housing shortage, infant mortality, industrial friction, and law breaking. A social problem, then, appears to be any difficulty or misbehavior of a fairly large number of persons which we wish to remove or correct, and the solution of a social problem is evidently the discovery of a method for this removal or correction.

To all this, it is safe to say, will be given assent, as the familiar statement of a familiar theme. It is repeated here merely to assure agreement upon the topic to be discussed. And one of the first questions raised by the subject of social problems is, What are the conditions which generate these difficulties? For no one, it may be assumed, would be inclined to look for a housing problem among, let us say, the Eskimos, who construct their igloos personally from an inexhaustible supply of building materials; nor a labor problem among those African pygmies who have a hunting culture. This is merely to suggest that a social problem is related to the particular social conditions from which it arises, which is more or less a commonplace. Examining social problems and their generating conditions more closely, it appears that each social problem is specifically related to particular social conditions or social factors, namely, one or more social institutions. That is to say, a housing problem is related to the institution of private property, undoubtedly, for it may be presumed that people would not continue to suffer the housing shortage if they did not face, in the institution of private property and absentee ownership, *inter alia*, something which forced them to contemplate their uncomfortable position as a difficult problem. For, were the land upon which to build and the materials and tools needed in building available to those in need of shelter, it is not unwarranted to expect that the housing shortage would be alleviated, in rather primitive fashion, to be sure, if done individually. While, if the state were to take these requisites from their owners and construct homes in proper fashion, the housing shortage would be eliminated in appropriate form.

It may be further pointed out that each of the social problems is concerned with, or arises from, a social institution, which, like pri-

vate property, acts as a deterrent or obstacle to the direct solution of the problem, or, like marriage, permits and encourages the bearing of offspring in such surroundings and by such mothers as, jointly or severally, to lead to high infant mortality. It is sufficient here merely to mention the connection between private property and crime, between private property, the "price system," and the high cost of living, the wages aspect of the labor problem, and so on.

Now the purport of these remarks upon the apparently obvious fact that social problems arise in a society with institutions, and these problems and institutions are intimately related, is merely to call attention to what seems to be the unique character of social problems. In any other variety of practical or scientific problems, the task set by the problem is to find a method or technique for doing something, whether it be to launch a boat or bombard helium atoms with X-rays. In doing this something, we endeavor to find the sequence of operations which will lead to the accomplishment of the task involved and to remove or abolish the factors or elements in the given situation which block our efforts in that direction.

But when we inquire into one of these social problems and the efforts made to solve it, we meet with this interesting situation. Let us take the housing problem for an illustration. There develops a shortage of houses of such a magnitude that many people are distressed. Manifestly, the usual and accustomed operations of house construction have been reduced or interrupted. Now, in the discussion which ensues, we meet these proposals: that the income tax on the interest from real estate mortgages be reduced; that the property tax on newly constructed houses be remitted for a period of years; that insurance companies and savings banks be required to invest a fixed portion of their assets in real estate mortgages; that labor unions in the building trades be supervised by the state; that the producers of building materials be regulated by a state commission; that people be persuaded to move to other cities or towns; that landlords be prohibited from increasing rents above a fixed percentage of existing rents, and so on. It would require many pages to enumerate the various and sundry proposals recently made for solving the housing problem.

It would be taken as a sign of eccentricity or feeble-mindedness,

perhaps, to question the relevance of these proposals to the housing problem, so let us invoke that familiar figure of the man from Mars who views mundane affairs with an innocent eye. To this visitor, we may imagine the student of social problems, or the man in the street, patiently explaining that we had a serious housing problem. And our visitor would reply with numerous questions, we may assume, about the state of the building art: had we met with some new difficulty in constructing houses which our architects and builders could not overcome? The answer would have to be no, for there was no lack of skill there, nor in the ability of our building trades employees to erect houses. And the producers of building materials were possessed of tools and techniques for manufacturing building materials.

It is evident that our visitor would be somewhat perplexed to understand what was the nature of this housing problem, for surely there was no lack of ability and skill to build houses. What, then, was this housing problem and how were we trying to solve it? Again he would be told, with an exaggerated patience, that there was a shortage of houses for the population and that the legislators and economists, sociologists, social workers, and many other professional and lay-persons, were engaged in finding a way to overcome this shortage, as partially described above. The bewildered gentleman would knit his brows, cough apologetically, and say:

Please be patient with one who is anxious to understand and to sympathize with your difficulties, for I cannot see how, if you are concerned with a housing shortage, you talk about income taxes, mortgages, and all these other seemingly unrelated subjects. If you need houses, why, in the name of intelligence, don't you build them or address yourself to finding ways of building them instead of talking about money, capital, and so on? Your architects and builders know how to construct dwellings, your building-material factories know how to produce materials and the land awaits. Then, wherefore and why?

We should have to delegate an economist, a lawyer, a political scientist, a sociologist, and a historian to explain about the system of private property, the price system, popular government, congestion of population, transportation, and so on. And when they had severally and jointly expounded the complexities of the situation, pointing out that we cannot just build houses, but must rely upon

individual initiative and private enterprise to enter the field of building construction, that we must use the "price system" to obtain the needed land which is someone's private property, to buy the necessary materials and to hire the skilled labor, that we must borrow capital on mortgages to finance these expenditures, paying a bonus to induce someone to lend that capital and also pay interest on the loan, together with amortization quotas, and then we must contrive to rent these dwellings in accordance with a multiplicity of rules and regulations about leases and so on—after all these sundry explanations, showing that to get houses built we must not infringe anyone's rights of private property or freedom to make a profit, and that what we want is to find a way of getting houses without interfering with anyone's customary activities, our visitor would suddenly exclaim: "Yes, I begin to see; have you any other such difficult problems, for this is exceedingly interesting."

Then we should go on to explain about the problem of infant mortality, how anyone of adult age may beget children with the sanction and approval of the state, provided they undergo a ceremony called marriage. When they do beget children, despite their physical infirmities and the lack of an adequate income or any technique for taking care of their infants, large numbers of their babies die in the first year of life, but no one can say or do anything to prevent this mortality, because it is against the law and the constitution to interfere with an individual adult woman, especially in the care of her child. We have a difficult problem, therefore, of reducing these appalling losses of life, without restricting the liberty of individual mothers to beget more children than they should have, and to kill off their offspring through ignorance or the poverty which every person is by law entitled to enjoy, without let or hindrance (unless mitigated by charity). Of course, the application of modern medicine and hygiene can cut infant mortality to a very low rate, but about all we can do is to distribute enlightening pamphlets and establish infant-welfare stations, where, if they wish to do so, mothers can bring their infants for inspection and advice.

After telling about infant mortality, we would go into the intricacies of the problem of crime and delinquency, of drug addicts, the labor problem, the traffic problem (which would surely make our



visitor puzzled to see how valiantly we are striving to find ways of increasing the number of vehicles and pedestrians on our streets), and all the sundry other social problems. If this visitor possessed the usual Martian keenness and penetration, he would probably interrupt our recital to say:

If it is not indelicate of me to remark, every social problem you describe seems to have the same characteristics as every other social problem; namely, the crux of the problem is to find some way of avoiding the undesirable consequences of your established laws, institutions, and social practices, without changing those established laws, etc. In other words, you appear to be seeking a way to cultivate the flower without the fruit, which in a world of cause and effect is somewhat difficult, to say the least. And from what your historians tell me, every generation has its own peculiar social problems, or as I would prefer to say, its difficulties in keeping "business as usual" (one of your most expressive phrases) despite the exigencies of social life. I am reminded also of an account of the Melanesians written by one of your anthropologists, the late Dr. Rivers, who tells about a tribe or group in which canoe-building used to flourish as a fine art, that died out several generations ago. As nearly as he could discover, there developed such an intricate set of rituals, ceremonies, taboo-raising practices, and the like, around the making of canoes, that it became a dangerous trade, so to speak; for, to omit any step in the propitiation of deities, the collaboration of the priests, the appropriate, ceremonial application of tools, and so on, exposed the wilful or neglectful one to the wrath of the whole community. So the building of canoes, which were really needed for their island economy, became gradually more infrequent and then died out entirely. It would appear that there is somewhat of a kinship between the life of these primitive peoples and of your highly civilized nations, although your institutions are much more rational, as your social theories clearly indicate. I am sorry I can offer no help in solving your problem and I assure you I have been greatly edified by your patient explanations.

Whereupon, our visitor would withdraw to his home planet to write a monograph upon the social customs of the earth dwellers, which would probably appeal to his associates as the report of a field trip among some primitive peoples does to us.<sup>1</sup> His visit and comments while here serve, however, to call attention to the peculiar

<sup>1</sup> He might also be struck by the similarity of our social behavior to the actions of certain young monkeys when trapped by a hunter with a bottle: The hunter puts a sweetmeat in a bottle attached firmly to a tree; when the monkey finds the bottle he reaches his hand into it, grasps the bait, and then cannot withdraw his doubled hand, so he remains until the hunter comes around and bags him. Of course, no visitor would dare to offend us by remarking on this similarity.

character of social problems, for their solution apparently does not involve the discovery of a new technique or tool, nor the removal of obstacles in the way of applying known techniques and tools, at least as they are discussed; for what the discussion and the proposals made for their solution indicate is that a social problem is an enterprise in finding ways of getting something done or prevented, while not interfering with the rights, interests, and activities of all those who are involved in the failure to do, or the persistence in doing, what is the subject of the problem.

It is interesting to observe that each of these peculiar problems has a history which throws much light upon its nature. For, in the case of the housing problem, it appears that the construction of dwellings has heretofore proceeded, more or less *pari passu*, with population growth, under the institutions of private property, the "price system," and all the other social customs and laws which have seemingly fostered this construction. But that either gradually or suddenly there developed a shortage of housing (e.g., the period of the war in the present case), and somehow the old, reliable house-building operations, instead of relieving the shortage became, if anything, more defective and harder to work than ever.

This indicates that a social problem is addressed to the difficulties associated with an institution or custom which once was fairly adequate and efficient.<sup>1</sup> It is probable, therefore, that the attempt to get rid of the difficulty, by seeking some device to make the formerly reliable institution or custom work again, as of yore, testifies to our general conviction that "you cannot change human nature." It is evident, however, that a social problem is indicative of a fairly considerable change in human behavior and social institutions, else these difficulties arising from reliance upon older customs would not occur. And it is also clear that, if we could manage to discover what those changes were, and whither they were tending, we should be able to discuss these situations, if not to act therein, more intelligently, i.e., with reference to the consequences of our present behavior.

<sup>1</sup> For example, "instinctive" maternity was sufficient to keep the race going so long as woman was in surroundings where the bearing of children and their care was favored by conditions; but in large, congested cities, with decreased ability to suckle her young, among other things, the situation has altered.

This suggests that the rise of a social problem is an augury of something better, or at least more effective, in the way of doing things, and that the bigger and more complicated the problem, the greater the change it portends. From such a point of view, we should look upon our social problems, with all the confusion and even suffering they involve, as incidents of transitions in our social life, wherein we are painfully giving up our old habits and learning new ways of doing things. And if we really want to do something in the circumstances, it would appear to be the part of wisdom to try to help along the transition and get over the agony of change. But since only the young can learn new habits, the old are caught in a situation of acute distress and apprehension.<sup>1</sup> Such an attitude bespeaks a seemingly transcendent faith in human nature, but, in fact, it is merely what all our history reveals. Men will, barring a catastrophe, go on living and reproducing their kind, and, to do so, they must have houses, healthy infants, and all the other accompaniments, necessities, and luxuries of life. So, if the practices of our fathers are not sufficiently accommodating to the exigencies of the life we lead, we will come to terms with one another upon the basis of new practices. The sooner we do this the better, seemingly, for neither young nor old are happy while the transition is dragging along. And these new practices, which appear outlandish, scandalous, subversive, and so on, to our fathers, will in turn be outlawed, scandalized, and subverted by our children, world without end.<sup>2</sup> For neither our fathers, nor we, nor our children, can arrest the evolution of social life which is seemingly accelerated by the progress of science, or the discovery of new techniques for doing more effectively what we have severally tried to do, with less success.

We have a housing problem, while men are developing and trying out new practices and methods of combining the multitudinous

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Teggart, *Processes of History*, especially chap. iv, for an interesting discussion of how these large changes in social life arise and how they are received. Also see Veblen, *Theory of Business Enterprise*.

<sup>2</sup> Changes in social relations and practices, it may be noted, come about by a process very similar to "spoiling the baby": at first an aggrieved group plead for mitigation of their disabilities or the reduction in others' privileges from which they suffer. This plea is ignored; then follows a demand, which is sternly refused; then comes agitation, which is repressed in part; yet the clamor goes on, until finally we give in, as we do to an insistent baby. Cf. the suffrage campaign, which was won because its proponents made a nuisance of themselves.

efforts required, in a society of highly specialized industries and crafts, for building dwellings. All the difficulties about financing, labor, prices, and so on are indicative of the fact that the habitual activities of men have broken down or are breaking down, which is the first step in the change to a new set of habits. Bankers and money lenders are blamed for their unwillingness or inability to finance housing, but they are merely the nether millstone of the god of change. Labor is scolded for not doing this or that or the other, but labor is merely a convenient term for a host of men who, like everyone else, are groping around for a new status and a new basis of operations. Producers of materials, railroads, and everyone else involved are blamed and threatened, according to taste. Those who despair of civilization, because the days of cheap mortgages and of dollar-a-day wages are no more, have merely forgotten how their fathers bemoaned the loss of the days in which their habits were established. We may, likewise, discount the fever of apprehension over the collapse of civilization in Europe because, forsooth, the pre-war institutions of the "price system," private property, national industry, and so on are showing symptoms of obsolescence, at least in certain particulars, while those who cherish them are trying to arrest the inevitable, by all manner of antidotes, stimulants, and gestures of defiance. What is highly interesting is the disposition among those, who see war as a consequence of the greed of capitalists, and regard the late war, in particular, as a nationalistic, capitalistic holocaust, to point to the present confusion and distress in Europe as proof of the inadequacy of capitalism. In all fairness, one cannot blame capitalism for the conditions which accompany, or result from, the giving up of capitalistic practices, as is evidently the fact in the currency inflation, confiscation of capital, stoppage of trade and sundry other political interferences with capitalistic enterprise and the private operation of the "price system," incidental to developing new customs.

## II

All of this discussion may appear as pure tommyrot and baldardash, and, if the reader so thinks of it, I shall not be disposed to quarrel with his good judgment. For I am not seeking to prove

anything, least of all a point of view, taken merely as one undertakes any experiment, to see how phenomena look or behave under new conditions of lighting or through a different lens. And yet I cannot escape the notion that, in approaching these social problems uncritically, as genuine and valid scientific problems, as I fear we are frequently doing, we are diverting our time and energies to unproductive tasks. If the task of social science, as of any science, is to discover the sequence of events, then we might more profitably use the data of these so-called social problems in studying the direction and rate of social change and in revealing the sequences of behavior which make up social life. That is to say, if we took man's habits of behavior as the subject of a study, and sought to disclose the genesis, operation, and evolution of those habits, we should have *a* social science, even though, to many, it would not be *the* social science. It would be a science, addressed to a scientific problem of discovering sequences, in this case the sequences of behavior or antecedent stimulus and consequent response, the sequence of the learning process or of habit formation, in which the consequent response to an antecedent stimulus was established and the consequence of that process of cumulative change in habits which we call social evolution.

And here it might be appropriate again to remark that the evolution of social life, or of the habits of behavior which give rise to social life as we find it, appears to be<sup>1</sup> the product of scientific or technical development. In so far as new techniques provide dependable ways of handling situations, they displace the older habits and institutions with which men met those situations when no dependable, or less dependable, techniques were available. Each new generation seemingly builds up its habits of behavior around the tools and techniques which science provides;<sup>2</sup> and since science is continually developing better tools and techniques, these social habits change from genera-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Veblen's *Theory of Business Enterprise* and Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (chap. i).

<sup>2</sup> In those situations where social habits and customs are far from effective, and man has to put up with a deal of misery and uncomfortableness, it is not surprising that, like the neurotic who cannot adjust himself to his fellows, men develop elaborate theories of their own impotence against great forces, e.g., economic, social, and political, operating according to inexorable laws, which they must obey; cf. paranoia, for example.

tion to generation, always in the direction of greater effectiveness of execution of the tasks addressed by those habits and techniques. This does not imply any mystical doctrine of progress, but merely that the same old tasks of nutrition, housing, begetting offspring, and slaughter are done with more and more finesse. As an anthropologist has remarked:

What happens in an evolution of a culture is an elaboration and enrichment of these complexes, a process which we sometimes speak of as progress.

Also,

One need not be surprised that such a bewildering mass of civilization turns out to be a matter of bulk rather than complexity, for we find in it everywhere the familiar trait-complexes, each fashioned upon the same general lines.<sup>1</sup>

This relation between science and social change, if it be what it appears, carries the interesting suggestion that agitation and radical doctrines are harmless and impotent to bring change, for men do not change their habits under the spur of words and doctrines. The preaching of radical dogmas may, however, be a growing articulation of changes already taken, and taking, place; but, then, agitation is but the froth on the cup, and the technical advance producing changes are scarcely to be checked by repression of the leaders of these views. What is true of radicals who urge change is, likewise and by the same token, true of conservatives who loudly deplore change. The liberal dogma is so much the pride of the intellectuals that one dare not suggest its kinship with radicals and conservatives, in being another way of rationalizing one's habits and susceptibilities. Legislation, we may venture tentatively to point out, either accelerates or retards social changes, but seldom, if ever, does more than that. For, to pass legislation in a modern representative state, the habits of people must be fairly well changed before something new can gain sufficient support to be enacted, and, when legislation is used to postpone a change, as, for example, the anti-trust or anti-combination laws in the United States, it operates to hasten along the next further change, or stage of evolution, as we see in the development of industrial integration.<sup>2</sup> Aside from scientific

<sup>1</sup> Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture*, pp. 78 and 97.

<sup>2</sup> See the writer's paper on "Significance of Industrial Integration," to appear in *Journal of Pol. Econ.* Feb. 1925.

or technical advance, then, nothing can long delay or greatly hasten social changes, despite the fears and hopes of those who see portents in every new movement to save mankind from its own folly. Yet it might be possible, by disclosing the direction in which scientific advance is carrying social life, to make the process a little less painful and surprising, and, if someone would discover a technique of habit-breaking, whereby the ancient customs and institutions cherished by the different social classes could be gently, but effectively, replaced by others more nearly alike and more congruous with the machine technique and its twentieth-century concomitants, it is indisputable that we should all feel happier and more neighborly. In other words, if we could invent a technique for more quickly sloughing off the habits of individual activity or of person-to-person relations, which we learned in the days of agricultural, handicraft life, and would readily learn the habits of *group* activity which the machine process demands, and which we are so hesitant about adopting (as witness the law), then we should perhaps develop a *social* life. Moreover, the social problems which plague us would disappear, because the conflict of habits and customs which generate them would be abolished. But such disclosures and discoveries would conform to the foregoing intimation that social change is produced by scientific advance, for they would imply the development of that for which we eagerly wait—a social science.

## NEWS AND NOTES

Notes of interest to readers of the *Journal* should be in the hands of the editor of "News and Notes" not later than the tenth of the month preceding publication.

*The American Sociological Society.*—The registration, while incomplete, showed over four hundred persons to be in attendance at the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society held in Chicago, December 29–31, 1924. Of these, 301 persons were members of the society. The attendance at the various sessions was the largest in the history of the organization.

There were three outstanding characteristics of this meeting: the dominating influence of the general sessions, the growth of special groups, and the increased interest in social research. From three to four hundred were in attendance at the stimulating sessions on social psychology, biological factors in social evolution, and international relations, while a smaller number of persons were present at an equally significant meeting on statistical sociology. Tuesday night, President Charles A. Ellwood delivered the nineteenth presidential address on the subject "Intolerance" at a joint session where President Louis I. Dublin, of the American Statistical Association, spoke on "The Statistician and the Population Problem," and President Wesley C. Mitchell, of the American Economic Association, on "Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory."

Two new sections made their first appearance at this meeting of the society. The group on the Sociology of Religion under the leadership of Herbert N. Shenton had an auspicious initial session and laid careful plans for the development of its work. The section on the Family, with Mrs. W. F. Dummer presiding, held a luncheon conference at which Ernest R. Groves, Boston University, read a thought-provoking paper on "Modern Conditions Influencing the Family." The section on Educational Sociology, now in its third year, had two profitable meetings under the leadership of Walter R. Smith, University of Kansas. The section on the Teaching of Social Sciences in the Public Schools, under the chairmanship of Hornell Hart, Bryn Mawr College, held an informal but lively session on freedom and measure of results in teaching social science.

The oldest section in the society, that on Rural Sociology, now in its fifth year, displayed remarkable evidences of its vitality. Over one hundred persons were in attendance at its two luncheon conferences: the



first one on Monday, on "Rural Income and Standard of Living," held in co-operation with the American Farm Economic Association, the other on Tuesday noon, on "Next Steps in Rural Social Research." Its final session Tuesday afternoon was on the subject "Significant Factors in Rural Population Affecting Our Civilization." Its steering committee for next year is composed of Charles E. Lively, Ohio State University, chairman; Bruce L. Melvin, Cornell University; and E. L. Morgan, University of Missouri.

The growing interest of the society in social research was in part indicated by the session Monday morning, W. F. Ogburn, Columbia University, chairman, with its eleven ten-minute reports of research in progress, selected from over two hundred and fifty projects submitted for consideration.

The delegates of the society to the Social Science Research Council, F. S. Chapin, W. F. Ogburn, and Shelby M. Harrison, reported on the present status of the two research projects undertaken by the council: the one by the Committee on Migration, Edith Abbott, chairman, the other on the Communication of News, Herbert A. Miller, chairman. Reports were also given of the present state of work of the Committee on Social Abstracts, F. S. Chapin, chairman, and the Committee on an Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, H. B. Woolston, chairman.

A most inspiring gathering was the fourth annual dinner, held in honor of Albion W. Small and Franklin H. Giddings. After a tribute to Professor Small by George E. Vincent, of the Rockefeller Foundation, and to Professor Giddings by James P. Lichtenberger, telegrams of appreciation were sent to these two men who of all living sociologists are the most closely identified with the history of sociology in the United States.

The annual business meeting of the society was marked by several important decisions. An amendment to the constitution was passed providing for a joint membership of husband and wife in the society, with annual dues of five dollars, entitling the holder to a single copy of the publications. Provision was made for honorary membership in the society of a limited number of distinguished foreign sociologists. A significant change in the election of officers was authorized by the passage of a resolution that the Committee on Nominations submit the names of at least two persons for each of the offices.

The officers of the society for the year 1925 are: president, Robert E. Park, University of Chicago; first vice-president, John L. Gillin, University of Wisconsin; second vice-president, Walter F. Willcox, Cornell University; secretary-treasurer, Ernest W. Burgess, University of Chicago;

elective members of the Executive Committee, David Snedden, Columbia University, John M. Gillette, University of North Dakota, William F. Ogburn, Columbia University, Howard W. Odum, University of North Carolina, James E. Cutler, Western Reserve University, and Emory S. Bogardus, University of Southern California, the last three of whom are new members of the committee.

*American Council of Learned Societies.*—An authoritative *Dictionary of American Biography* which will record the life-history of twenty thousand illustrious Americans, not including any of the living, will be undertaken by the council through a generous gift of \$500,000 by the *New York Times* through the action of its publisher, Adolph F. Ochs.

The plan contemplates twenty volumes of about seven hundred and fifty pages each, the articles to be the fruit of fresh work by the writers most specially qualified in each case, the utmost effort to be made for accuracy, impartiality, and objective treatment. A permanent committee of management has been constituted, consisting of James F. Jameson, chairman, John H. Finley, Frederic L. Paxson, Iphigene Ochs Sulzberger, Carl Van Doren, and Charles Warren, editorial work to be done in Washington, where the Library of Congress affords exceptional advantages for such labors. It is expected that the first volume will appear within four years from the present time, the remaining volumes at the rate of three volumes annually thereafter.

The American Council of Learned Societies is a federative body, constituted in 1919, and consisting of two representatives from each of the following twelve national learned societies, here named in the order of their foundation: The American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston, The American Antiquarian Society, The American Oriental Society, The American Philological Association, The Archaeological Institute of America, The Modern Language Association of America, The American Historical Association, The American Economic Association, The American Philosophical Association, The American Political Science Association, The American Sociological Society.

*A National Summer School.*—Utah Agricultural College, Logan, Utah, has organized a national summer school. Twenty leading educators have been selected for the faculty of the school. The representative for sociology is Charles A. Ellwood, University of Missouri.

*Guillaume de Greef.*—*Revue Internationale de Sociologie* reports the death last August of the sociologist De Greef at eighty-two years of age.

He was one of the founders of the new university in Brussels, where he taught philosophy and sociology. His sociological works included a two-volume *Introduction à la sociologie*, 1886-89; *Sociologie générale élémentaire*, 1895; *L'évolution des croyances et des doctrines politiques*, 1895; *Le transformisme social*, 1900; *Les lois sociologiques*, 1902; *La sociologie économique*, 1904; *Sociologie, la structure générale des sociétés* (3 vols.), 1908. In 1900 he was elected president of l'Institut international de sociologie.

*The Sociological Society of London.*—The Conference on Living Religions within the Empire at Wembley from September 22 to October 3, was arranged in co-operation with the School of Oriental Studies. It is proposed to publish the transactions of the Conference in two volumes, the first to contain the papers on "The Sociological Aspects of Religion," by Sir Francis Younghusband, Professor Fleure, Professor Geddes, Professor J. Arthur Thomson, Mrs. Rachel A. Taylor, Mr. Victor Branford, Mr. Christopher Dawson, and Mr. Loftus Hare, and the second to be devoted to religious papers on Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Jainism, Sikhism, Taoism, Parseeism, the Ahmadiyya movement, the Bahahi cause, the Brahmo Samai, Arya Samaj, and some of the primitive forms of belief.

Mrs. McKillop has succeeded Miss D. C. Loch, who resigned as secretary of the Sociological Society.

*Columbia University.*—Professor Ernest R. Groves, of Boston University, is to give at the summer session, Teachers College, Columbia, two courses on the home: "Social Conditions Influencing Home Life" and a research course in problems of the modern home.

*Michigan Agricultural College.*—Dr. Kenyon L. Butterfield has resigned the presidency of the Massachusetts Agricultural College to accept the place as president of this institution. President Butterfield has been for years a leader in the field of rural sociology and is now the president of the American Country Life Association.

*University of Missouri.*—D. Appleton and Company announce the publication of the fourth revised edition of Professor Charles A. Ellwood's *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*.

A German translation of "The Social Problem: A Reconstructive Analysis" by Professor Charles A. Ellwood, will be published February 1, in Germany under the title "Unsere Kulturkrise, ihre Ursachen und Heilmittel." The publisher is W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart.

*Oberlin College.*—Professor Newell L. Sims, head of the department of sociology, has a new book entitled *Society and Its Surplus, a Study in Social Evolution* just off the press of D. Appleton and Company, New York City.

The department of sociology here has at its disposal a unique endowment known as the "Jerome D. Davis Fund." The income of this gift of Mr. Davis and others is used to encourage first-hand study of labor conditions. Students qualifying for the prize must enrol in the department of sociology, and must spend a summer's vacation as actual laborers in the occupation studied. The prize is being offered for the first time this year.

*Randolph Macon Women's College.*—Mr. Harold A. Logan, of the University of Chicago, has been appointed professor of economics and sociology.

*Texas Christian University.*—Dr. Cloice R. Howd, formerly acting associate professor of economics and sociology at Franklin College, has accepted appointment to a professorship in economics and sociology.

## REVIEWS

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*The Writings of Mankind.* Edited by CHARLES H. SYLVESTER.  
Chicago: Bellews-Reeve Co., 1924. 20 vols. \$93.50; sold  
by subscription.

The comparative student of culture will find a mine of information in these volumes. They are selections from the writings of all ages and all nations with extensive historical notes, comments, and criticisms. The selections have been so made as to illustrate the customs, character, arts, philosophies, and religions of the nations which have contributed most to civilization. The work opens with a brief survey of the literature of the Oriental nations, especially India, China, and Japan. The bulk of the work, however, is taken up with selections from the literatures of European peoples, though, properly enough, only three volumes are devoted to English and American literature.

This is a popular work, the wide circulation of which would do much to overcome the provincialism of our people. It is still a prevalent superstition with us that worth-while literature is confined to a few leading European nations. These books will help the average American to understand the culture of the non-English-speaking world. A corps of able advisers have made the work more valuable than collections of its class. The editor has been careful to give the historical and social setting of practically all the selections. It should be added that the work is handsomely bound and well illustrated.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

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*The Mystery of Religion: A Study in Social Psychology.* By EVERETT  
DEAN MARTIN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1924. Pp.  
383. \$3.00.

*Psychology of Religious Experience: Studies in the Psychological  
Interpretation of Religious Faith.* By FRANCIS L. STRICKLAND.  
New York: The Abingdon Press, 1924. Pp. 314. \$2.00.

Both books are characterized by a concern for the practical interests of religion. Both are skeptical as to the ability of behavioristic psychology to get into the secrets of religion. Professor Strickland confessedly

is interested in promoting Christian pedagogy and worship. To this end he restates and shows the practical value of the work of such scholars as Coe and Pratt. This practical interest is carried through in orthodox, evangelical terms. There is no first-hand contribution to the psychology of religion. After chapters on the nature of religious experience and the method of psychology discussion is given to the phenomena of childhood, adolescence, conversion, the subconscious, faith, worship, mysticism, and immortality.

*The Mystery of Religion* does not attempt to deal with so great a range of phenomena or in so conventional a manner, but limits itself to the discussion of religion as a mystery which expresses itself in symbolism arising from the unconscious. The method of psychopathology made familiar by the Freudians is employed for its interpretation. Religion is thus classed with art and dreams. Its function is not practical or directive, but rather that of a means of escape from reality. It is not itself abnormal, but the study of abnormal phenomena aids in understanding it. The author does not indicate acquaintance with recent criticism of the Freudian analysis, but displays the utmost confidence in the method. Some of the extensive quotations which he makes might serve as illustrations of the extremely conjectural character of these interpretations: for example, the comparison from Brill between the compulsive actions of neurotics and religious rituals, on page 286. But the inquiry is suggestive and need not be spurned because in some instances it is evidently overworked.

The book contains much real insight. It rightly views religion as the unconscious unfolding of the hidden wishes of the masses of men. It is a product of the *vulgus* and not an imposition of priests or rulers for their own power and security. It is not the work of the intellectuals, and intellectualism in the form of liberalism becomes empty and barren. Every great religion, however, has had its intellectuals who become an esoteric group within the deeper culture of a race. The point of the book seems to be the justification of such esoteric thinking, while at the same time seeking to make it sympathetic with religion by recognizing that religion is essentially a mystery born in the emotional dream-life of the race. In order to achieve this end, the symbolism must be understood for what it is and explained without explaining it away. Some symbols are directive and practical, like the map of our country, while others are emotional in their value, like the flag. The latter arise from free association and are expressive of inner wishes. These may be viewed as survivals of infantile emotional interests. The very terms in which they are pre-

sented indicate this. The notions of birth and rebirth, of the father and the family, so common in all faiths, are illustrations. By means of these notions religion leads men out of their inferiority complexes of the consciousness of sin and condemnation, into the feeling of redemption and salvation. Religion does not create moral values but it ceremonializes the values which develop in the natural relations of life. It creates above the real world a spiritual retreat. The only question is whether such a development of religion shall include and comprehend the higher cultural ideals of a time like the present, or whether it shall become a revolt on the part of the ignorant masses against the discoveries of science and the fruits of our new social order. A revival of religion seems by some signs to be imminent. The question is whether it shall be destructive of the achievements of the best souls among us or whether it shall enhance and cherish their creations. The answer depends on relating the powerful forces of the mystical elements of the unconscious to the highest values of the noblest men. "The spiritual 'revival' which the world needs is an awakening in which those who are capable of self-criticism, and of appreciating the values of civilization, find themselves and one another, and perform the task which such as they have carried on in every age" (p. 381).

E. S. AMES

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*Human Origins: A Manual of Prehistory.* By GEORGE GRANT MACCURDY, Ph.D. New York and London: D. Appleton & Co., 1924. 2 Vols. Pp. xxxviii+400; xvi+516. \$10.00.

The announced intention of these two volumes is to tell the whole story of man from the beginnings of the Old Stone Age to the dawn of recorded history.

Seldom is an author so well prepared to undertake an important study. For more than twenty-five years Dr. MacCurdy has served as teacher and museum curator at Yale University; for twenty years he has been a field worker in European archaeology; he has written many papers dealing with various phases of this subject; and since 1921 has been director of the American School of Prehistoric Research in Europe. He is thus able to present the viewpoint of the specialist while having in mind the needs of teacher and student.

In the first chapters we are given a clear presentation of the methods of establishing the chronology of prehistory, and the reliance of archaeology on geology and paleontology. It is in this field that Dr.

MacCurdy's experience makes itself manifest. The periods of geologic time, the fauna of various epochs, the extent of the ice sheets, the shifting of land connections, the actions of glaciers and rivers, and the relation of man to all these are clearly shown in charts, maps, and pictures.

Coming to the much-disputed topic of Eoliths, we find the author a firm believer in chipped stones, of intentional shaping, in strata of Pliocene and Miocene times, but when these same artifacts are found in the Lower Tertiary he becomes skeptical and agrees with Breuil that "it is evident that some of the earmarks hitherto looked upon as evidence of intentional chipping may be counterfeited by nature."

His acceptance of an Eolithic culture in Pliocene times leads him to a pre-Chellean or early Pleistocene cultural epoch; the placing of Chellean and Lower Acheulian in the second interglacial; and the Upper Acheulian in the third glacial advance.

While he is thus at variance with many archaeologists in the dating of these epochs, he is careful to present the conflicting views so that the student may be able to draw conclusions with all the evidence before him.

In these, as in all the following epochs, the author gives maps showing the distribution of each culture, a list of the known sights, and the typical fauna of each period. He also presents many drawings and plates showing the various types of tools, methods of chipping, and, in many cases, photographs of the work of excavation.

A hundred pages of description, drawings, half-tones, and polychrome reproductions give us an excellent idea of the development of decorative art, sculpture, and personal adornment. Here again we find a distribution map, a list of sights, and, finally, a repertory of the art arranged by countries, sites, and types of work or objects.

Having now fulfilled his promise to trace the origin and development of human mentality, as reflected in man's discoveries and inventions, he passes to a detailed discussion of fossil man and his relation to the higher primates.

The second volume deals chiefly with the New Stone Age, and the ages of Bronze and Iron. It is a valuable addition to our knowledge of European prehistory, but it is evident that the author's chief interest is in the earlier periods. The chapter dealing with the transition from Paleolithic to Neolithic periods is too brief to give the student a clear view of the changes taking place in population and culture. There is also a lack of careful organization of the material presented in the chapters on the Neolithic period and the Stone Age complex, where finds from the Bronze and Iron ages are brought into the discussion. This will give the



specialist little trouble, but the student and general reader will find these chapters somewhat confusing.

The ages of Bronze and Iron are handled much more satisfactorily. The treatment is rather brief, but is clear, and the methods of establishing chronology well presented.

Perhaps the most valuable part of Volume II is a section of one hundred pages reviewing the main facts brought to light by a detailed study of the principal Paleolithic sites. The sites are arranged alphabetically, the principal references for each are given, and the cultural sequences noted.

The volumes are profusely illustrated, the bibliography is unusually complete, and the material presented in a scholarly yet interesting style. They form a very important contribution to European archaeology, and contain much material of value to all students of human culture.

FAY-COOPER COLE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*The Character of Races, as Influenced by Physical Environment, Natural Selection and Historical Development.* By ELLSWORTH HUNTINGTON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924. Pp. 393. \$6.00.

This volume seeks to explain the history of civilization as the result of the selection of the best mental and physical types by migration, the flowering of the culture of this selected people, and their final degeneration due largely to climatic evils. The first example offered is that of Cambodia. A body of Brahmans, the Khmers, migrated from India into Cambodia, and the ardors of the journey were so great that on the way all the inferior individuals were killed off and a highly selected group arrived, who, by reason of their innate superiority, were able to conquer the earlier inhabitants, develop a high type of culture, and erect large and beautiful temples. For four hundred years they lived on their innate superiority, but in the end the warm and malarial climate of Cambodia sapped their vitality—and hence the ruin of Angkor Wat.

This is the type of story many times retold in this book. Expressed in general terms by the author it runs as follows:

First, in any given race there are sure to be differences of physique and character. Second, some cause, perhaps war or famine, starts a migration. Third, practically every migration is more or less selective. All types of people are not equally likely to migrate; the pioneer type migrates farther than others. In general, the longer and harder the migration, the more highly selected are

the survivors, and the more likely are they to give rise to a race which more or less permanently inherits the characteristics which have been most important in causing survival. The survivors are usually of a high type, because mental as well as physical strength seems to be a potent selective factor. Finally, there is the degeneration due to the failure of selection to operate and the evils of climate.

Very briefly suggested, the story of civilization told in these terms runs as follows: Man evolved on the high plateaus because there frequent change of temperature stimulated activity. Increasing aridity forced man to come down from the trees and scramble for a living. This scrambling involved great natural selection. Increase of population and change of climate induced migrations. Those individuals that went south degenerated into little black people. Those that went north had such a hard time that they developed European initiative. Those that stayed at home in the Asiatic highlands developed a typically Mongolian sluggish inertness which enabled them to survive. Finally, the glacial period, with its changes of climate, accelerated the process of selection.

This was the story in Eurasia. In America, civilization did not develop so far, because the migrants had to come through the Arctic, and there developed that stolidity which is characteristic of the Indian and which is incompatible with progress.

In the following chapters Huntington embraces Dixon's classification of races and attempts to correlate head-measurements with selected types. All goes well enough until America is reached. But in America it is disturbing to find the superior Caspian-Mediterranean (Nordic) type only among the Eskimo and the Alikaluf of Tierra del Fuego, and to find the inferior Proto-Negroids and Proto-Australoids among the relatively civilized Iroquois. Furthermore, it is annoying to find climate deserting one, because one ought to find the highest culture in the Great Lakes region instead of in unhealthy tropical America. By rapidly alternating the factors of environment and race, Huntington is able to achieve an explanation. The Iroquois are relatively superior, although Proto-Australoids, because of a stimulating climate. The Pueblos are superior because somehow—we aren't told how—the Pueblos came to practice agriculture. Here is one place where climate and race both fail; reluctantly Huntington turns to agriculture—which, be it noted, he uses as an *explanation* of cultural superiority, whereas it *is* the cultural superiority, or part of it.

Of course the interesting thing about all this is the immense ingenuity with which the social heritage is avoided in telling the history of man. By

assuming that any given trait in a people is innate and can be created in it by natural selection, the group-inheritance is not needed. The emphasis upon the selection which takes place in a migrating people, or among those leaving the country for the city, is well justified. This selection is indeed an important factor in social change. But it is assumed that the change is perpetuated never culturally but always biologically. The high position of American women is due to the natural selection of a high type of woman. The low position of Chinese women is due to the fact that starving fathers sold their prettiest and smartest daughters. Democracy itself, instead of being a doctrinal rationalization of a fact of pioneer life, is regarded as due to the fact that American pioneers were so highly selected that they were *in fact* equal! Farmers are conservative and have foresight because all the other kind have migrated or died off.

The faith of the eugenicist underlies the book. The Unitarians are offered as the final product of a series of selections—the racial *crème de la crème*.

Their case resembles that of the Khmers of Cambodia, the Hakkas of China, the Normans in Sicily, and the Vikings in Iceland. If such a stock as this, or any similar stock, should be isolated in a good environment and should become the sole ancestors of the inhabitants of some great state, what heights of attainment might be achieved (p. 327).

The suggestion is that the rest of us cease to breed our inferior progeny, and leave the Unitarians to repopulate a better and a nobler world.

ROBERT REDFIELD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.* By SIGMUND FREUD, M.D., LL.D. Authorized Translation by JAMES STRACHEY. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1922. Pp. 134. \$2.00.

Sigmund Freud's comment on any aspect of human life and conduct is always interesting, even if not always convincing. That much one may say even of his essay into the field of group psychology.

The first part of this book consists of a review of what LeBon, Trotter, and McDougall have had to say on the subject. LeBon's statement that the individual ego is submerged in the crowd suggests an analysis of what this ego is. This analysis occupies the whole latter portion of the book.

As might be expected, all that is peculiar in the behavior of crowds, as LeBon describes them, can be explained by application of the customary psychoanalytic formulae. It is not suggestion which produces

the so-called mental unity of crowds. It is the libido—love. The members of the crowd are bound by ties of love. "Each individual is bound by libidinal ties on the one hand to the leader and on the other hand to other members of the group." In the case of panic, this tie is broken. As Freud puts it, "panic dread presupposes a relaxation of the libidinal structure of the group."

Suggestion, imitation, the herd instinct, and every other attempt to solve the problem of human relations by the magic of a single word—all these resolve themselves into some one of the varied manifestations of the fundamental sexual impulse. The scientific value of Freud's book consists probably in the fact that, if it is anything, it is a *reductio ad absurdum* of verbal explanations of society.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*The Jews.* By HILAIRE BELLOC. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1922. Pp. xvii+308. \$3.00.

*Patriotism of the American Jew.* By HON. SAMUEL WALKER McCALL. With a Foreword by CHARLES W. ELIOT. New York: Plymouth Press, Inc., 1924.

*Truth about the Jews.* By WALTER HURT. With an Introduction by DR. RALCY HUSTED BELL. Chicago: Horton and Company, 1922. Pp. xiii+344. \$3.00.

*With the Judeans in the Palestine Campaign.* By LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. H. PATTERSON, D.S.C. New York: Macmillan Co., 1922. Pp. xvi+270. \$2.25.

*Intermarriage in New York City: A Statistical Study of the Amalgamation of European Peoples.* By JULIUS DRACHSLER. New York, 1921. Pp. 204.

One of the unexpected and unexplained consequences of the world-war has been an outburst of prejudice and persecution of the Jewish peoples. A secondary and incidental consequence has been an enormous increase in the literature in which these agitations are reflected. The most subtle, not to say insidious, of the many attacks that have been made upon the Jewish race is Hilaire Belloc's *The Jews*. Hilaire Belloc is one of the most brilliant—if sometimes erratic—of English publicists.

This volume, which we are told represents the reflections and observations of twenty-five years, rests upon one fundamental assumption: namely, that all experience and all history show that the Jew has been and always will be an alien and a foreigner in European society. The

persecutions to which he has been subjected represent merely the natural and inevitable effort of the social organism to expel a foreign and irritating substance. The fact that the Jew enters so freely into all the political and social interests of the people among whom he lives, that he even is disposed to change his name and disassociate himself from members of his own race, does not alter the situation. On the contrary, it serves merely to intensify the irritation while concealing its source. The remedy is segregation.

The inference might seem to be that this remedy might serve for other similar forms of social irritation. Might we not segregate fundamentalists, Irish Catholics, Christian Scientists, the members of the Ku Klux Klan, and other groups that sometimes irritate us? Not all. The case of the Jew is unique. There is no parallel in history or in social life, we are informed, for the problem presented by the presence of the Jew. This is "important if true."

None of the other writers whose writings head this review agrees with Mr. Belloc. On the contrary, Samuel W. McCall, former governor of Massachusetts, writes for the express purpose of defending the Jews against the attacks of Mr. Belloc and his less subtle anti-Semites.

Walter Hurt has given an added fillip to his volume, *The Truth about the Jews*, by the qualifying statement, "told by a gentile." The thesis of this book is that the Jews can only fulfil their mission by amalgamating with the other races among whom they now live, and so contributing, in this way, their superior intelligence and their superior ethical ideals to the world.

By the ultimate infusion of the blood of its people, Israel will give to the world a universal race, regenerated by its righteousness, enriched by its ideals, uplifted by its inspirations, stabilized by its integrities, exalted by its aspirations, energized by its dynamic qualities, and with a truer vision provided by its verities.

In this connection, Julius Drachsler's *Study of Inter-marriage*, published some years ago but never reviewed in this *Journal*, is interesting. This is perhaps the first statistical study of intermarriage which reckons with the Jews, since federal and state statistics are concerned with national and language groups, and Jews are neither. It shows that in the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx there is less marriage outside the race in the case of the Jews than is true of any other group except the Negroes.

In a series in which the different natural and language groups are ranked with reference to their respective percentages of intermarriage,

Jews and Negroes are at the lowest point, while the Northern, Northwestern, and Central European peoples tend to gather near the highest point. The Italians and the Irish, together with the Poles (Russian and Austrian), the Slovaks, the Greeks, and the Finns, occupy the middle-ground. This distribution with slight modifications was found to hold for both men and women, and for both the first and the second generations.

If amalgamation is the mission and the destiny of the Jew, he is not rushing to meet his fate, not at least in America.

In a second volume, less severely scientific than this one, *Democracy and Assimilation*, Professor Drachsler has made the present study the basis for an interesting theory of Americanization. His theory is what Horace Kallen aptly describes as "cultural pluralism," a co-operation of cultural diversities and a federation not of regions, but of races and cultures.

Aside from the very interesting account that it gives of the adventures of the Jewish Brigade during the Palestine Campaign, the volume by Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Patterson throws an interesting light upon the present difficulties of the Zionist program of colonizing Palestine and restoring Jerusalem in some sense to the Jews.

Aside from the merits of the issues which they raise, these volumes are valuable for the incidental materials which they offer to the student of prejudice and public opinion.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*The Psychological and Ethical Aspects of Mormon Group Life.* By EPHRAIM EDWARD ERICKSON. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1922. Pp. x+101. \$1.50.

*Mormon Settlement in Arizona: A Record of Peaceful Conquest of the Desert.* By JAMES H. MCCLINTOCK. Phoenix, Arizona: published by the author, 1921. Pp. xi+307. \$2.10.

*The Mystery of Mormonism.* By STUART MARTIN. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1922. Pp. 318. \$7.50.

The writer of the first-named volume, who is both a member and a critical observer of the Mormon group, interprets the development of the Mormon church in terms of functional psychology as the result of three great crises in the history of the group; the conflict with the gentiles in the formative period of the church; the conflict with nature during the colonization period in the West; and a present conflict with science. The study is free from emotionalism and gives insight into the factors which

cause a religious group to isolate itself and develop mores and sentiments independently of those of the nation.

Mr. McClintock, author of the second volume, is the state historian of Arizona. He gives an impartial historical account of the settlements made in Arizona by Mormon pioneers sent out by their church. He does not enter into a discussion of the Mormon doctrine or of conflicts between Mormons and gentiles.

The third volume is a contentious, semihistorical, descriptive account which claims to present "the truth" about Mormonism. The author exhumes many sensational and poorly authenticated stories current fifty years ago, disregards much available material, and gives no references for quoted material. There is some new material but one feels uncertain as to its reliability.

RUTH SHONLE

*Industrial Democracy: A Plan for Its Achievement.* By GLENN E.

PLUMB and WILLIAM G. ROYLANCE. New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923. Pp. 359. \$2.00.

*Labor and Democracy.* By WILLIAM L. HUGGINS. New York: Macmillan Co., 1922. Pp. 213. \$1.25.

*The Workers at War.* By FRANK JULIAN WARNE. New York: Century Co., 1920. Pp. 250. \$3.00.

*Labor: The Giant with Feet of Clay.* By SHAW DESMOND. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922. Pp. 251. \$3.50.

*Industrial Democracy* is a reasoned plan for the reorganization of modern industrial life on a basis which the authors believe to be in accord with the sanctions of the federal Constitution, as well as the dictates of economic efficiency and expediency. The system proposed is the well-known Plumb plan.

Characteristic of the system of industrial democracy expounded by Mr. Plumb is the insistence upon constitutional procedure and the participation of all the interested parties, rather than a new form of autocracy in industrial management. The plan for the nationalization of the railroads was first proposed by the railroad labor unions and was approved by the American Federation of Labor in its conventions of 1919 and 1920. The enlarged plan for the democratization of all corporate industries was approved by the 1921 convention of this labor body.

The Plumb plan is an attempt to find for human adjustments a logical solution. But for that very reason it may safely be declared to

be unworkable. Whatever the character of the future socio-economic organization, it will not be the outcome of a logical analysis but the result of a process of give and take, conflict and accommodation, between the parties interested in industrial democracy.

*Labor and Democracy* is an exposition of the theory and method of operation of the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations. The author served as presiding judge of this court and is therefore able to speak with the authority of one who knows the facts. The text is divided into four parts. The first, covering fifty pages, discusses some twenty topics: class rule, government and law, equal opportunity, liberty of the individual, the triumph of democracy, and so forth. It describes incidentally the situation out of which the Kansas industrial relations law evolved: the economic pressure upon the public in consequence of strikes, lockouts, and other less conspicuous conflicts, and the wrongs inflicted by the employers and employees upon each other in their unreasoning struggles.

In the second part is a brief record of the requests made upon the court by both union and non-union labor and by the employers. The intent and workings of the act are explained and false interpretations are corrected, as, for example, concerning the nature of the restriction upon dismissing labor, picketing, and the so-called compulsory servitude. The act gives the public the right to interfere in essential industries only, and subjects this right to judicial procedure.

In part three a number of cases arising under the administration of industrial justice under the law are narrated. As an example of the effectiveness of this act in settling disputes, the author cites the case of an illegal and ill-advised strike which was settled in half a day by the court. Part four consists of documentary sources, the most important of which are the text of the Kansas industrial act and the records of five court hearings and settlement of disputes.

The author has confidence in the Kansas experiment and leaves no doubt as to his conviction that the act is not merely in the interest of the employer, the laborer, and the general public, but that it is workable.

Frank Julian Warne's book is at once a eulogy of the war-time achievements of the American laborers and a narrative of the conflict between labor and capital during the war period and the year following the signing of the armistice. Labor in the main fought a losing fight in this contest against curtailed purchasing power of wages under the process of shifting cost and appropriation of large profits by the employers. But while the wage-earners incurred losses, the salaried middle class



suffered vastly more, since their wages rose even more tardily than did the wages of the day laborer. The protection and the improvement of the scale of living, the author believes, requires recognition of "the three parties to production," and the safeguarding of the consumer, whether he be the wage-earner or the salary-earner. But the consumer is injured by the very means of struggle utilized, because strikes and lockouts curtail service and raise prices. In 1919, 5,000,000 persons were directly involved in strikes; more than 520,000 work-days were lost by a strike in one industry in one metropolitan area alone. Mr. Warne seeks a solution in the adoption of "democracy in industry" and in the "organization of the consumer."

Mr. Desmond, author of *Labor: The Giant with Feet of Clay*, is a disillusioned romanticist. The labor movement, having formed lines of cleavage on the basis of economic functions and having cumulated strength, sets up new demands at variance with its early idealism. The spirit of the recent movement, the author believes, is summed up in the demand, more money for less work. This materialistic turn movement is manifest in the departure from the earlier "spiritual" emphasis of the agitators, in the demand for a "bigger trough," the insistence on direct action, and the very general negation of the idea of God.

E. T. HILLER

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*Criminology*. By EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND. Lippincott Sociological Series. Edited by EDWARD CARY HAYES. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1924. Pp. 643. \$2.50.

Several books on criminology and penology have appeared in the last few years. This volume by Professor Sutherland is, however, the first *sociological* textbook in this field. For the transition is here made from merely informational material about crime to an orientation of the subject-matter around a sociological definition of crime and to an introduction of sociological concepts like human nature, personality, the four wishes, isolation, mobility, and assimilation. At the same time, the author exhibits a mature grasp of the bearing of research in psychiatry upon the study of delinquency.

An added value as a textbook lies in its excellence in summarizing and organizing the literature, particularly the recent important periodical articles. The author makes effective use of brief description of cases, suggestive of the growing body of case studies, personal documents, and other concrete materials in this field.

Practically two-thirds of the volume is given over to the treatment of crime. Yet as a contribution to sociology the chapters on the causes of crime are, in the judgment of the reviewer, easily the best. They point the way to a work devoted exclusively to the sociology of crime.

E. W. BURGESS

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*Political Parties and Electoral Problems.* By ROBERT C. BROOKS. New York and London: Harper & Bros., 1923. Pp. x+638. \$3.50.

*The Evolution of the Politician.* By R. D. BOWDEN. Boston: Stratford Co., 1924. Pp. 248. \$2.50.

From the viewpoint of the sociologist, the new volume by Professor Brooks must be regarded as rather more of a relapse than of an achievement. It has returned to the chronological treatment of party history in the United States, and it has made little systematic effort to apply those generalized categories of interpretation which figure so suggestively in the treatise by Professor Merriam on *The American Party System* and in the one by Professor Holcombe on *Political Parties of To-day*. The book is principally concerned with a description of the pulleys and wheels of the nominating and electing system, and as such is quite serviceable to the political mechanician. The raw facts of the campaigns of 1916 and of 1920 are detailed with some care, but the attempts at analysis are frail. A concluding chapter contains much advice on how to get into active politics; this is based on correspondence and conference with a variety of public figures.

The book by Mr. Bowden is a brief, popular version of some party-history and certain legislative problems. Its chief claim to individuality seems to lie in the concealment of ideas behind such coinages as "organocracy" and "politicastocracy."

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# RECENT LITERATURE

## NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

The abstracts and bibliography in this issue were prepared under the general direction of D. E. Proctor, by C. W. Hayes, E. L. Setterlund, Mrs. G. J. Rich, Flora Levy, R. Redfield, and P. T. Diefenderfer, of the Department of Sociology, of the University of Chicago,

Each abstract is numbered at the end according to the classification.

### A TENTATIVE SCHEME FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE LITERATURE OF SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

#### I. PERSONALITY: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE PERSON

1. Biography
2. Original Nature: Instinct, Temperament, Racial Traits
3. Child Study
4. Social Psychology, Social Attitudes, and the Genesis of the Person

#### II. THE FAMILY

1. The Natural History of the Family and the Psychology of Sex
2. The Historical Family and Family as an Institution
3. The Modern Family and Its Problems

#### III. PEOPLES AND CULTURAL GROUPS

1. Social Origins and Primitive Society
2. Folklore, Myth, and Language
3. Histories of Cultural Groups (Kulturgeschichte)
4. Immigrants, Immigration, and Distribution of Population
5. Colonial Problems and Missions
6. Comparative Studies of Cultural Traits; Religion, Mores, Customs, and Traditions

#### IV. CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION GROUPS

1. Classes and the Class Struggle; Labor and Capital
2. Nationalities and Races
3. Political Parties and Political Doctrines
4. Religious Denominations and Sects

#### V. COMMUNITIES AND TERRITORIAL GROUPS

1. The Rural Community and Its Problems
2. The City and Its Areas
3. Social and Communal Organization
4. Human Geography

#### VI. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

1. Home and Housing
2. The Church and the Local Community
3. The School and the Social Center
4. Play, the Playhouse, and Playgrounds
5. Courts and Legislation
6. Social Agencies
7. Other Institutions

## VII. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL PROCESS

1. The Economic Process: Economic and Industrial Organization
2. The Cultural Process: Education and Religion
3. The Political Process: Politics and the Formation of Public Opinion
4. Collective Behavior. Social Change and Social Progress; Fashion, Reform, and Revolution

## VIII. SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

1. Poverty, Crime, and Deficiency
2. Eugenics, Dysgenics, and Problems of Population
3. Problems of Public Health and Social Hygiene
4. Insanity and the Pathology of the Person
5. Vice: Alcoholism, Prostitution, Gambling

## IX. METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Statistics, Graphic Representation
2. Mental and Social Measurements
3. Social Surveys: Community Organization, Community Education, Health, Government, Mental Hygiene, etc.
4. Case Studies and Social Diagnosis
5. Life-Histories and Psychoanalysis

## X. GENERAL SOCIOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

1. History of Sociology
2. Logic of the Social Sciences
3. Social Philosophy and Social Science
4. Social Ethics and Social Politics
5. Sociology in Its Relation to Other Sciences
6. Methods of Teaching Sociology

## I. PERSONALITY: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE PERSON

**Religion and Instinct.**—In this article the attempt is made to give a more definite explanation of the subliminal factors which become active in such experiences as religious conversions. The author suggests that conscience may be classed with instincts, as the intuitive experience of the demand for social unity. This instinct is the directing force in spiritual integration. Like all instincts, it points toward an objective world with which we are in relation.—Bruce W. Brotherston, *Journal of Religion*, IV (September, 1924), 504-21. (I, 2; VII, 2.) E. L. S.

**On Certain Aspects of the Religious Sentiment.**—Psychologically a sentiment may be defined as an organization with reference to some objects of the most persistent, powerful, and recurring impulses. A religious sentiment is an organization of a man's deeper impulses about an object that he believes to be superhuman. In its ethical aspect the religious sentiment is rationalized as the virtue of reverence. Is the religious sentiment and its virtue of reverence a logical rationalization or a pseudo-rationalization?—W. K. Wright, *Journal of Religion*, IV (September, 1924), 449-63. (I, 2; VII, 2.) E. L. S.

**Instincts, Habits, and Intelligence in Social Life.**—Fairs, Ayres, and others are disposed to deny specific inborn tendencies and account for behavior as the result of particular cultural factors under which the individual develops. Dunlap, Kuo, and others interpret behavior in terms of neural structure and functions together with other bodily functions. McDougal and Thorndike assert that man is born with a number of specific instincts which are the primary determinants of behavior. The author holds the "middle-of-the-road position." Both habit and instincts are important though opinion differs as to their relative importance.—Seba Eldridge, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XIX (July-September, 1924), 142-54. (I, 2.) E. L. S.

**The Study of the Undivided Personality.**—Any mere abstraction of personality traits ignores the fact that form quality, the combination of traits, is lost in such an

analysis. This form quality, an attribute of the entire integrated personality, is manifest in every act of the individual. In a common-sense knowledge of personality we are unaware of the signs of this perception. A thoroughgoing comprehension of personality involves a sympathetic understanding of the individual's driving interests and sentiments and the way that these are organized and expressed in his habitual adjustments to the major problems of life. Such comprehension is gained through a kind of "empathy," the genetic nature of which is not clear, but which insures an intuitive understanding of the total personality.—G. W. Allport, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XIX (July-September, 1924), 132-41. (I, 2.) E. L. S.

*Les races de l'Europe, essai de classement général.*—The principal races of Europe are: (1) dolichocephalic blondes of large stature (Scandinavians), (2) underbrachicephalic blondes of small stature (Russians), (3) dolichocephalic brunettes of small stature (Portuguese), (4) brachicephalic brunettes of small stature (Auvergnats), (5) mesocephalic brunettes of large stature (Spanish), (6) brachicephalic brunettes of large stature (Bosnians). The secondary races are: (a) Sub-Nordic—blonde dolichocephalic of large stature, (b) Vistulien—blond underbrachicephalic of small stature, (c) Nord-Occidental—brunette mesocephalic of large stature, (d) Sub-Adriatic—brunette brachicephalic of large stature.—Eugene Pittard, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XXXII (July-August, 1924), 337-50. (I, 2; IV, 2.) P. T. D.

*The Development and Evolution of Mind.*—Freud suggests that oral, anal, and muscle erotisms are psychological vestigial phases homologous with certain organic ancestral forms. The psychoanalysts are unaware of the implications of the mental recapitulation theory. Their statements lack inductive evidence. There are no evidences of biological evolution having taken place during the history of our culture. It is inconceivable that changes in culture should have been paralleled by changes in the innate endowment of cerebral development. The evolution of mind is not one in the biological sense, but involves the social processes of history and the assimilation of culture and is explained, not by biological mechanisms, but by a social psychology.—I. D. Suttie, *Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology*, V (August, 1924), 133-45. (I, 2; I, 4.) E. L. S.

*On Certain Aspects of Religious Sentiments.*—The paper indicates certain of the psychological, ethical, and theological aspects of the doctrine of sentiment that are of special interest for the philosophy of religion.—William Wright Kelley, *Journal of Religion*, IV (September, 1924), 449-63. (I, 4.) E. R. R.

*Dreams of Orphan Children.*—While giving mental tests to children in various orphanages, the writer asked 105 children about their dreams. The children are numbered. After each child's number is given his chronological age, his mental age, and his intelligent quotient, and finally his answers to questions about his dreams. A review of the cases shows that home and family life is by far the most frequent subject mentioned as filling their dream life.—Kate Gordon, *Journal of Delinquency*, VIII (September-November, 1923), 287-91. (I, 4; II, 3; IX, 5.) C. W. H.

## II. THE FAMILY

*Is the Family of Five Typical?*—The burden of dependents upon all wage-earners varies widely. The majority of workers have fewer dependents than a wife and three children, although those that do have form a considerable percentage (10-15 per cent). To pay all workers a wage sufficient to maintain a family of five would be just and adequate for only a small percentage of the workers.—Paul H. Douglas, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (September, 1924), 314-28. (II, 3; VIII, 1.) E. R. R.

*United States Divorce Rates, 1922.*—Divorce rates for 1922 are given for the United States as a whole by geographical divisions and by separate states. The divorce rate east of the Mississippi is about four-fifths of the average for the country while that west of the Mississippi is nearly one-half greater than the country's average. Among

the eastern and central states the divorce rate is greater in the South than in the North. Excluding Nevada, the rate was the highest in Arkansas, about ten times that in the District of Columbia, which was the lowest.—Walter F. Willcox, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (September, 1924), 387-89. (II, 3.) E. R. R.

### III. PEOPLES AND CULTURAL GROUPS

**Les institutions des vallées d'Andorre.**—The Andorre Valley is isolated from the rest of the world by high mountain ranges, located on the French-Spanish border. It has political, economic, judicial, and religious institutions so far advanced that contemporary sociologists think that at least some of our institutions have developed from this section.—Max Gilbert, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XXXII (July-August, 1924), 350-70. (III, 1; V, 4.) P. T. D.

**Chez les Indiens du haut Arauca.**—The life of the different Indian tribes found on the high plateaus east of Venezuela is described in terms of their homes, feelings, characteristics, religion, kinds of business, and general topography and plant and animal life of the communities.—H. Rochereau, *L'Anthropologie*, XXXIV (Nos. 3-4, 1924), 255-82. (III, 1.) P. T. D.

**Les expéditions maritimes, institution sociale en Mélanésie Occidentale.**—Comparison of the clans of the Melanesia Islands, disclose the fact that the island groups resemble one another, notwithstanding the differences which are perhaps encountered in the race, the language, culture, and the political organization, the clan *totémiques* or even to the smaller clan *totémiques*.—M. Raymond Lenoir, *L'Anthropologie*, XXXIV, 387-410. (III, 1.) P. T. D.

**Natchez Political Evolution.**—The Natchez is the only culture of the southeastern coast of North America on which there is an abundance of material for study. It is more comparable to Old World than to other known American cultures in its most peculiar and important traits of politico-social organization, and is consequently of especial interest in the general problem of convergent evolution versus diffusion by migration and by imitation. Its peculiarities of political structure, moreover, are such that all controversies as to the causes and content of social stratification must take careful account of them.—William Christie MacLeod, *American Anthropologist*, XXVI (April-June, 1924), 201-29. (III, 3.) E. R. R.

**"Pilgrim's Progress" as a Source Book of English History.**—Bunyan served in the Parliamentary Army and took part in the decisive campaign of 1645. In his allegory he gives a great deal of information concerning the England in which he lived, wrought, and suffered, not directly perhaps, but by way of observation and inference.—W. Ernest Beet, *London Quarterly Review*, CCLXXXII (5th series, No. 54) (April, 1924), 167-76. (III, 3.) E. R. R.

**La tutela e l'assistenza dell'emigrante.**—This article contains discussion and criticism of the international conference that was held at Rome. Each problem is taken up separately and reviewed with a suggestion at the outcome to be expected. Finally, the assistance and guardianship of the emigrants will not be so much in philanthropic character as of true economic property. It will be a new investment for the collaboration of the world, finally, showing on the horizon a new form for politics; in emigration.—Celestino Arena, *Rivista Internazionale*, XCIX (August, 1924), 294-315. (III, 4.) P. T. D.

**The Modern Chinese Cult of Ancestors.**—This article describes the various phases of the cult of ancestors in popular Chinese religion, including the ceremonies for the uncared-for "beggar spirits." The materials are presented as a basis for an estimate of its significance as an element of religion. Is it a continuation of an ancient custom of tendance of the dead? Is it the result in Chinese life of the special stress on filial piety and the family system? Or is it worship?—James Thayer Addison, *Journal of Religion*, IV (September, 1924), 492-503. (III, 6; II, 2.) E. R. R.

Sur les croyances des indigènes de la subdivision de Sindara.—Symbols of native religion are: (1) *Le Mouéri*—the friend of man, symbol of force, power, virility, and truth. (2) *L'Omburri*—a good-for-nothing fellow, malicious, and bad, who pleases himself by laying snares for those not deserving of his favors. (3) *L'Okoukoué*—a dance in honor of the spirits of the dead, especially of the father. (4) *Le Bouili*—the interceder of man before God, represented by a wooden statue of human form painted red and white.—Pierre M. Daney, *Revue Anthropologie*, XXXIV (July-August, 1924), 272-82. (III, 6.) P. T. D.

New Morals for Old: Modern Marriage and Ancient Laws.—Recognition of the necessity for sexual and social compatibility is accompanied by a demand for a further freedom of contract. Society is, obscurely and blindly, proposing that the law recognize a marriage contract which should continue until either party desired its termination. Revolutionary changes occur unnoticed, while our delusions persist.—Arthur Garfield Hayes, *Nation*, CXIX (August 20, 1924), 187-89. (III, 6; VII, 4.) C. W. H.

#### IV. CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION GROUPS

The Jew in Mexico.—Mexico lacks the universal Jewish question. Yet the Jew is becoming omnipresent, astoundingly unperceived. He is not hated, nor considered primarily as a Jew; therefore he is not aloof. The Jew is a Mexican and a factor in the social reorganization of Mexico.—Anita Brenner, *Nation*, CXIX (August 27, 1924), 211-12. (IV, 2.) C. W. H.

Puritanism: Its History, Spirit, and Influence.—The Puritans were conspicuous for their love of the Scriptures, integrity of conduct, and their fidelity to their conscientious convictions. We are indebted to them for the preserving industry and uprightness of character of the English people, and for our reverence for the Lord's Day. Their political principles were the outcome of their religious convictions and had a direct effect in molding the ideals of the men of that generation.—C. Sydney Carter, *London Quarterly Review*, CCLXXXIII (5th series, No. 55) (July, 1924), 79-90. (IV, 4.) E. R. R.

#### V. COMMUNITIES AND TERRITORIAL GROUPS

A Note on the Census Categories, "Urban" and "Rural."—A comparison of the votes for Farmer-Labor candidates in Minnesota shows a marked difference between the small villages and the unincorporated places. Although both of these are classified as "rural" by the Census Bureau, the Census categories fail to correspond to significant differences in the social environment.—Stuart A. Rice, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (March, 1924), 79-81. (V, 1; IX, 1.) E. R. R.

#### VI. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

A Country Parson of the Fifteenth Century.—In the British Museum is a scroll of parchment which has a very neat, accurate, and human account of the expenditures of a country parson five hundred years ago, and which shows the standard of living at that time.—W. R. N. Baron, *London Quarterly Review*, CCLXXXII (5th series, No. 54) (April, 1924), 198-204. (VI, 2.) E. R. R.

#### VII. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL PROCESS

Disappearance of Culture.—In ancient civilizations, drops in the cultural level would occur when there was a failure of the hereditary element to persist, when there had been a break in the continuity of craft or the disappearance of the ruling group. In our Western civilization, the only possibility of a great drop in the cultural level is that of the elimination of the population owing to physical degeneration.—W. J. Perry, *Eugenics Review*, XVI (July, 1924), 104-16. (VII, 2; VIII, 2.) C. W. H.

**The Old Religion and the New.**—The impulse to think of ultimate issues is religious. The old religions are Mohammedanism, Buddhism, and Christianity. The dominant attitude of the new religion is confidence in reason. It repudiates all sources of truth not open to science, history, and philosophy; is a religion of morality, pure and simple; has no fixed rituals nor authoritative creeds; arises out of modern science and art; differs fundamentally from Christianity in that it is not concerned with interpretation of texts or creeds but finds its basis in experience.—C. Delisle Burns, *International Journal of Ethics* (October, 1924), pp. 82-92. (VII, 2.) E. L. S.

**The New Scientific Religion. Essays of a Biologist. Julian Huxley.**—Mr. Julian Huxley thinks man can and ought to do without the Christian religion, and proposes a new faith which seems to have been shaped upon the conception of Carlyle that the world is God and that the gods are men.—C. A. West, *London Quarterly Review*, CCLXXXIII (5th series, No. 55) (July, 1924), 29-39. (VII, 2.) E. R. R.

**The Political Vote as a Frequency Distribution of Opinion.**—Opinion upon public issues distributes itself in a manner approximating the normal curve. Inasmuch as most elections divide this scale of opinion at one and only one point the distribution is lost sight of.—Stuart A. Rice, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (March, 1924), 70-75. (VII, 3.) E. R. R.

**New Morals for Old: Communist Puritans.**—The soviet state is omnipotent and omnipresent. Service to the state requires that luxury and license be restrained. Laissez faire is replaced by discipline. The individual communist is told how to act and live.—Louis Fischer, *Nation*, CXIX (September 3, 1924), 235-36. (VII, 4; X, 4.) C. W. H.

#### VIII. SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

**Current Problems in Mental Diagnosis.**—An examination is here made in detail of the departments of clinical inquiry to see what is their contribution from the point of view of objectivity or scientific precision. We confront the present impossibility of accurately combining the different aspects of individuality into a composite whole. What are the effects of various influences upon the mental performance of the individual? Our greatest problem is to make a comprehensive clinical survey.—Edgar A. Roll, *Journal of Delinquency*, VIII (September-November, 1923), 270-77. (VIII, 1.) C. W. H.

**A State Census of Mental Defectives.**—Past censuses of the mentally defective have been limited to mere enumeration of the number and unsuccessful at that. A new kind of census is proposed, a statewide, continuative, school census, furnishing name and address, legalized by the courts, and placed in the hands of officials. The methods and uses of such a census are set forth.—F. Kuhlmann, *Journal of Delinquency*, VIII (September-November, 1923), 247-62. (VIII, 1.) C. W. H.

**Studies in Testimony.**—The purpose of these studies was to determine roughly, first, where lie the possible psycho-legal causes of testimonial error; and, secondly, what possible psychological relations may exist between the findings of judge and jury and the original testimony upon which such findings were based. Possibilities are cited for the practical improvement of the handling of testimony.—William M. Marston, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XV (May, 1924), 5-31. (VIII, 1.) C. W. H.

**A Case of Supposed Sadism.**—This is the case of a convicted murderer whose history seems to present the sequence of cerebro-spinal syphilis, lesion of the brain, a degree of paresis and the psychopathic condition conveniently called sadism. It is not suggested that the sadistic impulse was more than an impulse which could be resisted.—William Renwick Riddell, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XV (May, 1924), 32-41. (VIII, 1, 4.) C. W. H.



**The Rehabilitation of the Morally Handicapped: A Study in Social Service.**—Studies of three hundred Jewish women were made by a private agency co-operating with the New York City Magistrates' Courts and Probation Department. Eighty-three per cent of those whose probation had terminated were living under good home conditions, steady employment, and healthful recreation at the termination of their probation.—Alice D. Menken, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XV (May, 1924), 147-54. (VIII, 1; VI, 6.) C. W. H.

**Marital Relations of Parents and Juvenile Delinquency.**—The Division of Mental Defects and Delinquency of the New York State Board of Charities collected data on a large number of delinquents and a comparable number of unselected children. An intimate association was found between abnormal marital relations of parents—i.e., death, divorce, or separation among parents—and juvenile delinquency.—John Slawson, *Journal of Delinquency*, VIII (September-November, 1923), 278-86. (VIII, 1; II, 3.) C. W. H.

**From Pathology to Criminology.**—Pathology is being extended to the field of abnormal mental conditions and in the future will go on to take in the field of abnormal social reactions. The methods of examination now used in general medicine need amplification to include the mental examination and the eleven major types of environment. By examination it is found the trouble is in all cases one of persons. The most logical method of control is to apply the principles of eugenics. A comprehensive, detailed history of five cases is appended.—Harry J. Gosline, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XV (May, 1924), 68-146. (VIII, 2, 4.) C. W. H.

**The Population Problem.**—Basic to the population problem is the question of human fecundity. Ignorance here is abysmal, as it is upon other surrounding questions. There are problems of love and mating and of international changes following fluctuations in population distribution. Wise workers will keep a wide perspective in evaluating books on the problem. The writer appraises Mr. A. M. Carr-Saunders' *Population Problem* and Mr. Harold Wright's *Population*.—J. Lionel Tayler, *Sociological Review*, (April, 1924), 153-56. (VIII, 3.) C. W. H.

**The Relation of Public Recreation to Problems of Sex.**—Vice is restrained by vigorous athletics. Sex is sublimated by music, art, dancing, and religion. Recreation and social life are the best preventives of unwholesome imagination and the ill effects of continence. The only law to which we feel ourselves subject is the law of public opinion. This is effective in direct proportion to the intimacy of social life.—Henry S. Curtis, *Journal of Social Hygiene*, X (April, 1924), 203-7. (VIII, 3.) C. W. H.

**A Case of Manic-Depressive Reaction with Psychic Impotence.**—This case is a study of a patient who had clandestine relationships for over a year, followed by a severe depression and psychic impotence which caused him to fear marriage. The author interprets the patient's struggle as one who was driven to this woman by the mother-images and the trend away from the woman caused by inhibitory ethical influences.—O. H. Boltz, *American Journal of Psychiatry* (July, 1924), 57-75. (VIII, 4; IX, 5.) E. L. S.

#### IX. METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

**The Nature of an Unequivocal Price-Index and Quantity-Index.**—A price-index is described which is based on unequivocal concepts, is readily understandable, and is easily computed. The underlying principles are elaborated and the mathematical derivation worked out.—Sir George H. Knibbs, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (March, 1924), 42-60. (IX, 1.) E. R. R.

**A New Index of Business Activity.**—A new index of trade is compared with the rate of turnover of bank deposits and found to show approximately the same variations.—Carl Snyder, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (March, 1924), 36-41. (IX, 1.) E. R. R.

**Four Types of Index Numbers of Farm Prices.**—Four types of index numbers of farm prices are described: (1) an index of prices weighted by fixed annual quantities sold; (2) an index with seasonal variations eliminated, similarly weighted; (3) an index weighted by monthly sales; and (4) an index with seasonal variations eliminated and weighted by monthly sales.—L. H. Bean and O. C. Stine, *Journal of American Statistical Association*, XIX (March, 1924), 30-35. (IX, 1.) E. R. R.

**Population Growth and the Volume of Building.**—The customary method has been to put the volume of building on a per capita basis. It is more logical to measure the volume of building by a composite index combining two factors—the absolute size of the population and the growth of population.—Willford I. King, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (March, 1924), 9-13. (IX, 1; VIII, 2.) E. R. R.

**Some Fundamental Concepts of Statistics.**—The primary function of investigation in economical statistics is purely descriptive. Various statistical devices such as tables, charts, periodic functions, and even coefficient of correlation are merely aids to a complete description. From these the statistician aims to draw an inference, usually looking to the future. In doing this the theory of numerical probability gives no assistance. The statistical conclusions, although they are expressed as probabilities, are not mathematical probabilities.—Warren M. Persons, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (March, 1924), 1-8. (IX, 1.) E. R. R.

**A New Clearings Index of Business for Fifty Years.**—An index of business is proposed which is obtained by dividing the amount of bank clearings by the index of general price level. The index obtained corresponds with the indexes obtained from industrial activity.—Carl Snyder, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (September, 1924), 329-35. (IX, 1; VII, 1.) E. R. R.

**The Relation of the United States to International Statistics.**—The statistics of the United States have been unable to take a full part in the co-operative work of the International Statistical Institute because of the unwillingness of the government to recognize it officially by sending delegates or calling a meeting in America.—Walter F. Willcox, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (September, 1924), 348-61. (IX, 1.) E. R. R.

**An Improved Method for Measuring the Seasonal Factor.**—The writer describes a method of separating the seasonal factor from a general cyclic trend in economic statistics. It is believed that the new method here presented will prove itself superior to any heretofore published because it is easy to understand, can be computed with a reasonable degree of effort, and has the outstanding merit of giving a separate seasonal index for each year during the period.—W. Willford I. King, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (September, 1924), 301-13. (IX, 1; VII, 1.) E. R. R.

## X. GENERAL SOCIOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

**Society, an Original Fact.**—Society is an original fact—not a construct. Human nature is not fallen but incomplete. In the original social group there was only social conscience and no self-awareness. The normal social conscience is one of objective social harmony. In the complete realization of the normal social conscience the individual has found himself a part of an empirical reality beyond himself and including the human race. The position of the "faith-state" attained by the normal social conscience is that a universe which has produced society as an original fact has inherent power to remake the broken unity.—Bruce W. Brotherston, *International Journal of Ethics* (October, 1924), 24-40. (X, 3; I, 4.) E. L. S.

**Work as an Ethical Concept.**—Though a universal activity of man, ethicists overlook labor. Aversion to the concept work is both Greek and Christian. This is due to the ethicist's avoidance of the drudgery of work. Work furnishes a nucleus for

ethics which common man understands. The delusion that the good life is leisure must be eliminated. There is the opportunity for idealizing common work and using machinery to eliminate drudgery. Great ethical ideal is work that makes both a living and a life.—T. V. Smith, *Journal of Philosophy* (September 25, 1924), 543-54. (X, 4.) E. L. S.

**A Code of Ethics for Business and Commercial Organizations.**—The development of a business code of ethics has not been uniform. Largely through the influence of the International Rotary at present twenty-five American national organizations are attempting the formulation of an ethical code. The first attempts were crude, but the development of a code applicable to actual business conditions will contribute much to truth and honor in business relationships.—W. Brook Graves, *International Journal of Ethics* (October, 1924), 41-59. (X, 4; VII, 1.) E. L. S.

**The Personality and Career of Woodrow Wilson.**—Of all of Mr. Wilson's qualities, his self-faith and confidence appear to have been constant, and at times to have greatly influenced his mental processes. Intellectually he always condescended. Politically he was intolerant. Socially he was unresponsive. These qualities are illustrated by many incidents in his academic and political career.—Harry Elmer Barnes, *American Review*, II (September-October, 1924), 529-42. (I, 1.) E. R. R.

**The Question of Racial Purity.**—Proof of inherent mental differences of races has not been adduced. We must not assume to be hereditary any behavior which takes place without conscious reasoning. Likewise, we must reject arguments derived from cultural achievements. There is confusion as to what is "race." Local types of man are domesticated forms which are fairly uniform only in small inbred groups. In large areas family lines differ so much that we cannot speak of the hereditary characteristics of nations or races, unless the family lines of the groups compared are throughout distinct. Widely varying anatomical forms become functionally adjusted to similar environments. Psychological tests fail because the subjects tested are not equally adjusted. Extreme somatic forms do not represent pure races but are merely the most pronounced variants of local forms.—Franz Boas, *American Mercury*, III (October, 1924), 163-69. (I, 2; IV, 2.) R. R.

**Right and Left-Handedness.**—This article is a review of the literature on the subject.—June E. Downey, *Psychological Bulletin*, XXI (October, 1924), 595-603. (I, 2.) E. R. R.

**The Nature of Suggestibility.**—In a circumstance of partial or complete helplessness the suggestible person simply relaxes and gives himself up to the situation, trusting that, as in the past, things will go well. The negativistic person, on the other hand, feeling that things are slipping, places himself on guard and resists all suggestions for fear he may think thoughts or do acts that are contrary to his ego.—John J. B. Morgan, *Psychological Review*, XXXI (November, 1924), 463-77. (I, 2.) E. R. R.

**Psychological and Sociological Types.**—In classifying individuals they may be grouped into either psychological types, on the basis of psychologically determined structure, or sociological types, on the basis of social reactions. The two sets of types do not correspond. This is especially noticeable in the classification of criminals. A possible solution is to be found in Kronfeld's concept of the individual's reactivity as a specific psychic interrelationship of functions. The types worked out on this basis turn out, however, to be sociological rather than psychological types.—Heinrich Klüver, *Psychological Review*, XXXI (November, 1924), 456-62. (I, 2.) E. R. R.

**The Interpretation of Facial Expression.**—Six facial expressions, produced on a demonstration model, were presented to 716 subjects for judgment as to the emotion portrayed. The expressions for Anger and Dismayed gave a wide scatter of judgments, those for Horrified, Disdainful, Disgusted, and Bewildered a relatively high consistency of judgment. Analysis showed that the upper part of the face, eye and brow,

is more important for correct judgment of facial expression than the mouth.—D. E. Buzby, *American Journal of Psychology*, XXXV (October, 1924), 602-4. (I, 4.)  
E. R. R.

**Stimulation Ranges and Reaction Areas.**—Among the essential factors which determine behavior are the range of stimulation to which the individual or group is subjected and the area of reaction. The extent of a reaction area is determined by the intensity and amount of stimulation and by the relative homogeneity and heterogeneity of the units composing the potentially reactive whole. On these bases, individual, social, and societal psychology may be differentiated. The response of the individual to other individuals results in conditionings and reconditionings of behavior. The conditionings and reconditionings are the means by which co-individual behavior has been integrated and fashioned into the fabric of human society.—Franklin H. Giddings, *Psychological Review*, XXXI (November, 1924), 449-55. (I, 4.)  
E. R. R.

**The Coral Tombstones of the Marianas.**—A second-hand account of the results of archaeological work of the B. P. Bishop Museum, under the direction of H. G. Hornbostel, in the Marianas. On Guam, Tinian, and Rota are found in many places two parallel rows (*latte*) of pyramidal pillars (*halege*), 2-18 feet high, capped with semi-globular stones (*tasa*). Excavations have disclosed burials between the pillars. The feet are always directed toward the water. *Latte* almost always parallel streams. Burials never took place landward of the *latte*. The flesh was cleaned from the bones before burial. The builders were evidently cannibals. Pottery, slingstones, charred bones, are found with the burials. Much variation in types of *latte* indicates a long course of development. Hornbostel believes the *latte* were not dwellings, but temples, for religious ceremonies.—Lorin Tarr Gill, *Art and Archaeology*, XVIII (October, 1924), 154-66. (III, 1.)  
R. R.

**Hawaiian Customs and Beliefs Relating to Birth and Infancy.**—A very detailed folklore prescribes minutely for the future disposition, appearance, and health of the child as established by the mother during pregnancy, especially in regard to her craving for particular kinds of food. Some of the beliefs are concerned with the birth-cry of the night bird, birthmarks, after-birth, navel cord, hair taboo, and naming customs. Two important ceremonies which are carried out for the child in infancy are the ceremony to insure milk to the mother and the ceremony of weaning. Infanticide was practiced by aristocracy in old days often as a means of preserving rank, and by commoner people to rid themselves of work.—Laura C. Green and Martha W. Beckwith, *American Anthropologist*, XXVI (April-June, 1924), 230-46. (III, 2.)  
E. R. R.

**The Origin of the Plains Earth Lodge.**—The Plains earth lodge, as a distinct type, originated in the Lower Mississippi Valley. From its constant association with rather advanced agriculture and pottery, its development and northward diffusion were probably comparatively recent. It seems to have been carried northward by tribal movements rather than solely by diffusion. In its historic form, it represented an elaboration of a much older type of circular, partially excavated earth-covered dwelling. The earlier form was related to a series of earth-covered structures found throughout a practically continuous area extending from eastern Siberia down the west coast of America and across the southwest.—Ralph Linton, *American Anthropologist*, XXVI (April-June, 1924), 247-57. (III, 3.)  
E. R. R.

**The Challenge of Fundamentalism.**—Fundamentalism challenges our modern culture, and has concentrated its attack upon science, which is the citadel of the modern point of view. The Fundamentalists underestimate the strength of the culture they have defied as it is ingrained in the very texture of our present-day society and is part and parcel of our national educational system.—John M. Mecklin, *American Review*, II (September-October, 1924), 478-85. (IV, 4.)  
E. R. R.

**Norwegian Studies: Being Notes and Records Made in Connection with the Leplay House Visit to Norway, August, 1923.**—Such physical conditions are described as must have set very narrow limits within which human settlements can have devel-

oped. Everywhere was observed the same sequence of fjord, forest, and fell and its concurrent occupations of fisher, cultivator, woodman, and herdsman united in the life of a single household—even of a single individual. Stern necessity in this sterile northland has educated the fisher peasant to efficiency. The results of human activity embody a type of social structure and activity arising everywhere from the same impulse, shaped in the same mold, and developed in the course of centuries into a steadfast tradition.—*Sociological Review*, XVI (April and July, 1924), 137-52; 235-50. (V, 1.) C. W. H.

**Charity's New Point of View.**—The new point of view in charity is that poverty must be abolished. Social workers have had a chance to see, and are blind if they do not see, that by the right sort of education and by obvious changes in industry poverty can be abolished, although, of course, the insane, feeble-minded, and disabled will have to be cared for by society.—Edward T. Devine, *American Review*, II (September-October, 1924), 469-77. (VI, 6.) E. R. R.

**Social Credit.**—Credit, which should be a national possession, is controlled by owners of capital for private gain. The sociological issue is: What social types are selected for survival by the existing system of credit allocation? A developmental policy needs to be supported by the recognition of the social character of credit, and a bold use of the national resources.—Mrs. Victor Branford, *Sociological Review*, XVI (April, 1924), 126-36. (VII, 1.) C. W. H.

**A Scheme of British Culture Periods, and of Their Relations to European Culture Developments.**—A sketch of a simple scheme of historical epochs or periods into which all the culture phenomena of their areas can be fitted. The co-ordination for ten periods of British culture from pre-glacial times to the present is as follows: (a) British periods; (b) changes in population; (c) material remains and art; (d) social and economic life; (e) religion and thought; (f) European periods.—Christopher Dawson, *Sociological Review*, XVI (April, 1924), 117-25. (VII, 4.) C. W. H.

**Constructive Possibilities of a Mental Hygiene of Childhood.**—A positive principle of mental hygiene is the maintenance of a cheerful and philosophic attitude in the face of defeat and disappointment. Furthermore, the imagination must be harnessed to constructive purposes. The child must be taught to acquire capacity for the postponement, or the total abandonment, of satisfying desires. The child tends to prolong the period of dependency in spite of the demand for gradual independent growth. A constructive mental hygiene program of childhood will include, as essential, opportunities to experience success in some direction and recognition of cause of failure.—Bernard Glueck, *Mental Hygiene*, VII (July, 1924), 649-67. (VIII, 3.) E. L. S.

**After-Care Work with Mental Patients from the Point of View of a Psychiatric Social Worker.**—A group of 205 patients were statistically studied to ascertain important factors to be dealt with in after-care work. A second group of 50 was intensively studied, and a large variety of medical and social problems was found and treated. In many cases the only treatment was advice, reassurance, or encouragement. After-care work has a value both in extension of hospital treatment and approach to the problem of prevention and early recognition and treatment of mental diseases.—Ruth A. Jegenheimer, *Mental Hygiene*, VII (July, 1924), 778-805. (VIII, 3.) E. L. S.

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## SOCIOLOGY AND PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*

### PART I

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#### ABSTRACT

As a sample of *dialectic*, *The Republic* is the foremost exhibit of what sociology is not. One section of the sociologists rate everybody as a sociologist who has thought about social relations. This paper represents the view that those only are sociologists who practice a method which is in diametrical contrast with dialectic. Plato did not regard *The Republic* as a treatise on political science or sociology but as an inquiry in moral philosophy. The Platonic method was an attempt to establish truth by arriving at consistency between concepts or propositions. The scientific method is an attempt to discover truths by observing uniformities of cause and effect in the objective world.

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In the first book of *The Republic*, Plato has Socrates leading a debate on the question, What is justice? The Socratic method, as illustrated in this scene, is to conjure up a series of hypothetical situations, and to ask of each of them, Would such and such conduct in that situation be justice? The effort aims at elimination of all conceivable cases of injustice and consequently at reaching a conclusion about justice by summing up the samples that remain.

Plato's word for this method is "dialectic." The more familiar and for general purposes synonymous word is logic. We shall gain practical immunity from compromising misconception if we bear in mind throughout this analysis that Plato's word "dialectic" was simply his term of confiding respect for the same mental operation which we now, with cautiously qualified respect, call "rationalizing."

The outstanding peculiarity of the Platonic method, as compared with the method of modern science, is that it advances valuations in the minds of thinkers to the rank of ultimate criteria of the validity of ideas and of the merits of actions.

Modern science would completely reverse this method. It assumes that the processes of the objective world are the ultimate test of the validity of mental processes, and that we must go to those external processes for criteria of subjective valuations.

Perhaps John Stuart Mill's discussion in his *Logic* of the relations between deductive and inductive reasoning is the most clarifying introduction we have to the problems involved in this contrast. It is not in order here to canvass the question of the relative importance of the two methods. As Mill has shown, our minds are so made that we can never carry thinking very far without team work between the two methods. Either alone soon develops motor troubles or comes to a stop for lack of fuel. On the other hand, the two methods are sharply contrasted in principle. The Socratic, or dialectical method, *in so far as it is able to pursue its own peculiarity*, sets up judgments inside the minds of thinkers as the final test of truth. The modern or scientific method, *in so far as it is able to pursue its own peculiarity*,<sup>1</sup> posits observable relations outside the minds of thinkers as the final test of truth. Accordingly there is sharp difference in practice between people who pin their faith to the respective methods.

As an illustration, in contrast with the dialectical problem, What is justice? the objective scientist would assert: The real problem is, What kind of conduct makes for smooth running of that scheme of things in which we find ourselves? At best, the dialectical and subjective method can arrive only at an answer to the question, What

<sup>1</sup> This qualifying clause calls attention to the fact that neither method can be absolutely divorced from the other. The contrast between dialectic and objectivism is in ratio of predominance, not in absolute exclusion. Here as elsewhere no man can serve two masters. To avoid a deadlock, one master must submit to the other. The following discussion is concerned with the differences in principle between mental processes in which dialectic dominates and mental processes in which objective research dominates. In the whole course of this discussion the danger signal must be observed: Do not confound philosophy with dialectic. There are modern philosophical methods which are as different as the most objective sociological methods from dialectic, whether Plato's or any other.



is somebody's opinion? At its worst, the scientific method tries to answer the question, What do we positively know?

In contrast with most of the sociology of a generation ago, present sociology is first and foremost an attempt to be scientific, not dialectical. It tries to find out, not what sort of scheme of things would be most compatible with the stock of ideas already lodged in sociologists' minds, or other people's minds; it tries to find out, rather, what systems of causal relations are actually in operation in the objective world, which of those causal factors are within human control, which of them are beyond human control, and the consequent economies of human effort with reference to the controllable relations.

There are two tendencies among sociologists with reference to classification of social theorists. One section of the sociologists prefer to call everybody a sociologist who has ever rationalized about social relations, and to rate as sociology the whole menagerie of opinions that have ever been held about different phases of the human lot. Of course, with this type of sociologists, Plato is Exhibit A in the sociological museum. On the other hand, some of the sociologists say that the line should be drawn between dialecticians, whether ancient or modern, and social scientists. That is, they insist that the thing which matters among people who are thinking about human affairs is not that they are all thinking about the same human affairs, but the *way* in which they are trying to pry into human affairs. There is the subjective way, and there is the objective way, the way of the speculator and the way of the scientist. The second sort of sociologist maintains that the line should be drawn between dialectical social philosophers and sociologists, so as to leave in the former category all those thinkers about human affairs whose method is primarily subjective, and so as to advertise as the finding-mark of sociologists the adoption of a genuinely objective method of research into human relations. This argument is from the standpoint of the latter type.

Whether the criterion which we propose is generally adopted or not, there is this actual difference between people who try to understand human life. Some rely for their conclusions about life chiefly upon pictures and valuations of different aspects of life which are formed by organization of ideas that in various more or less fortui-

tous ways have lodged in the mind. Others deny that conclusions about life which are derived in that way are reliable, and they pin their faith upon systematic research into life as it exists outside the mind, and upon holding the ideas which the mind forms strictly accountable to external reality. People chiefly actuated by the scientific spirit are likely to have short patience with social theories that originate with the first type of theorist. It remains to be seen whether the second type of theorist can accomplish enough with the objective method to win general respect.

It is initial fallacy to suppose that Plato thought of *The Republic* as either political science or sociology in the modern sense. To him it was an inquiry in moral philosophy, and he could conceive of no higher employment for the human mind. Perhaps he was right about that. This discussion neither assumes nor implies the contrary. This is the present thesis: Whatever the relative merits of dialectical moral philosophy and sociology, they are different and should never be confounded. The procedure of the one is radically contrasted with the procedure of the other. In one of its aspects sociology is a secession from dialectical moral philosophy. Sociology revolted not so much against the *conclusions* of any particular moral philosophy as against the belief that the methods of dialectical moral philosophy are adequate to establish any conclusions at all. Dialectical moral philosophy and sociology may arrive at identical conclusions in certain instances. If that occurs, it will not be for the reason that the two apply identical methods. The present analysis, then, is an attempt to exhibit the radical contrast in methods. It is not concerned with particular conclusions reached at any time by either method. Plato was not embarrassed by questions about the relative authority of philosophy as he understood it and science as we understand it. To him philosophy was a system of transcendental, not of pragmatic values. It did not need to be vindicated by anything more tangible than a consensus of the mind's operations, regardless of whether anything in the external, objective world corresponds to those operations. How Plato reconciled the transcendental and the mundane in his thinking is a philosopher's problem which need not detain us. The single point that is pertinent for the sociologist is that the thing which Plato was trying to do was a fundamen-

tally different thing from that which the sociologists are trying to do. Their aim is to contribute all they can to discovery of the ways in which actual causes work in the associated life of men. Their starting-point for this discovery is the fact that men are never able to be monads. They always act as members of groups. What is involved in this fact is the peculiar quest of the sociologists; and their findings must be synthesized with the findings of all the other kinds of researches into human relations, if a valid social science is to be achieved. Plato's inquiry was of an entirely different order. It was virtually this: *How would men conduct themselves if they ordered their lives in a completely logical way, my own standards of logic being the criterion?*

In short, the Socratic or Platonic method was an attempt to establish truth by arriving at consistency between concepts or propositions. The scientific method is an attempt to discover truth by observing uniformities of cause and effect in the objective world.

After the foregoing paragraph was written, Professor Paul Shorey, who now ranks as the foremost Platonist in the United States, said to me, "Plato knew as well as you and I do that the ideas which he expressed in *The Republic* wouldn't work. That is shown conclusively by certain passages in *The Laws*."<sup>1</sup>

Methodologically considered, social philosophy and sociology are as distinct from each other as wishes are from realities. This is not to imply that philosophy and wishes have no place in the economy of life. Precisely the contrary is my belief. Not to speak further of wishes, philosophy and science have complementary functions, but it is an arrest of the proper functioning of each to confuse them. Their contrasted values should be understood for themselves. Neither will be understood nor properly used if it is not clearly discriminated from the other. In order to make the most of sociology, we must give full value to the radical difference of method which distinguishes it from dialectical social philosophy, either ancient or modern.

The last paragraph in Book i of *The Republic* pictures, as well as the most uncompromising pragmatist could, the futility of dialectic as a means of discovery. It can at most rearrange discoveries

<sup>1</sup> The passages will be commented on in a later lecture. It is obvious also from certain internal evidence to be cited presently; from *The Republic* itself.

already made. It may silence one of the dialecticians, but if so it leaves the successful debater just where he was before, as far as knowledge is concerned. The argument may have been conducted on both sides on the basis of false presumptions about facts; and so long as dialectic runs true to form, i.e., does not go outside itself to get positive knowledge, it is impotent to correct those false presumptions about facts.

Book i, then, is largely occupied with discussion of the contention of one of the company (Thrasymachus) that justice is the interest of the stronger (i. 347. E), with the supporting contention that injustice is more profitable than justice.<sup>1</sup> Socrates uses the *argumentum ad hominem* to such effect that his opponent is silenced. So far as increase of knowledge is concerned, however, Socrates confesses (i. 354. B):

. . . . so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of justice. . . . And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.

I repeat that all of this is of proper interest to the sociologist not in the least because of opinions expressed by either of the fictitious speakers, or implied as the views of Plato, the author of the fictitious discussion. To the sociologist this piece of literature is of prime importance chiefly as a warning to avoid a method of procedure which is necessarily abortive. It is a classical demonstration of the futility of the subjective method as a means of research. It is an exhibit of the impotence of dialectics for purposes of discovery, and it is a dramatic picture of the mental cult which the sociologists are trying to abandon in order to adopt a method which goes to the limit of men's intellectual resources in acquiring positive knowledge.

Analysis of the discussion in Book i reveals certain clues to important facts connected with dialectics in general. For instance:

First, the discussion in Book i has kept very close to the simple conception that justice is a relation between two individuals—parent or guardian and child, debtor and creditor, ruler and ruled, etc. The

<sup>1</sup> The references in this discussion are to Jowett's translation, Third Edition, Clarendon Press, 1921.

attempt is to put a universal content into the category "justice" by generalizing all conceivable aspects of such relationships. The discussion passes on later to a larger view.

Second, Book i adheres rather closely to a *quantity* conception of justice; i.e., justice seems to be contemplated as a measuring out of some good which can be estimated in units of quantity.

The problem presented by the supposition of a promise to return a weapon to a man who has become insane, and would be dangerous to himself and others if he had it, seems to be somewhat in advance of the main current of debate, and must be regarded as anticipating a later stage in the inquiry. Its full significance for the entire dialectic does not appear at this point.

Third, the Platonic dialectic, and every mode of rationalizing which operates on similar principles, employs as its chief instruments generalized ideas represented by abstract nouns—in this instance, the noun "justice." How is this mental structure, the concept represented by the abstract noun, built up? Reduced to illustrative particulars, the process is this: Someone observes cases of conduct between persons, which conduct presents qualities that seem to be common to all the cases. Let us suppose that in a given instance the cases observed are three: (1) that of a parent toward a naughty boy; (2) that of a creditor toward a debtor or *vice versa*; (3) that of a ruler toward a subject. According to a standard previously lodged in the observer's mind, the conduct in each of these cases seems to be as it should be, or *right*. A name is needed for that right quality common to all the cases. Thereupon it is agreed to call it "justice." Henceforth the word "justice" becomes a standard of measure for every case of conduct which the minds that have adopted that word associate with the quality which they have agreed to designate by that word. In all new cases they ask the question, Does this action carry the quality which we have discovered in other actions and have called justice?

Of course the process thus reduced to its lowest terms has seldom come off as briefly as that. The description recapitulates a multitude of mental actions scattered through long periods, and participated in by many people, but at last precipitating the consensus represented by a name for a generalized judgment.

But now something disturbing occurs. Up to this point "justice" has been a relation between two persons only. The quality that satisfied the notion of right by which the relations between two persons were tested, is now brought again into judgment by a situation in which more than two persons seem to be concerned. For example, here is a case in which a man has robbed another, and a judge is called upon to do what is right, or justice, with reference to the robber. Here is not merely the simple relationship:

A, the robbed

A:B

B, the robber

There is the multiplication of relationships created by addition of C, the judge. The judge is not merely an individual C, reacting simply with the individuals A and B. The judge is an agent with complicated duties. He is not at liberty to act as his individual sentiments and standards of right and wrong prompt him toward A and B. He acts under a mandate from the lawmaking body to declare the law in such a way that the purposes of the body in making the law will be realized. To do what the law contemplates as justice, the judge must perhaps do neither what A wants, nor what B wants, nor what he himself wants. He must perhaps do a modified something which the law was intended to procure, but the precise details of which the law leaves within the discretion of the judge. The right action, therefore, that which is to be included in the abstract noun "justice," cannot be discovered by fitting the judge's action into the simple mold of the relations between A and B. Whether he will or no, the action of the judge has consequences. It does not merely have form. It does not merely have quantity. It has causal potency, and in more than one direction. It may tend to make a better or worse man of either A or B, or both. It may tend to make the community in which they live a better or worse community. It may tend to make generations yet unborn more or less competent to promote their common interests. Obviously a new calculus of this abstract conception, justice, is necessary. In our modern days we have reached the outlook, called the scientific view, that the dilemma cannot be resolved by more rationalizing. It must be removed by more knowledge. It is not to

be met by more precise comparison with primordial patterns. The problem can be solved only by going outside the mind, by learning how to trace the operation of causes in the external world, and by adjusting our conceptions of what ought to be to ascertained relations of cause and effect in human affairs.

Fourth, as I have already suggested, it is well to remind ourselves often that the most determined and uncompromising rationalizer on the one hand and scientist on the other can never absolutely dissociate rationalizing and objective discovery. This proposition need not now be illustrated in detail. Methodologically considered, the difference between rationalizing and science is a difference of priority and of proportion between the two elements. All human knowledge must be mediated by human minds. In that sense, and in the necessarily involved degree, human knowledge must forever be subjective. The aim of science is to raise objective discovery to its maximum and to reduce subjective construction to a minimum.

The immediate purpose of the present review is to show that the Platonic dialectic moved in an intellectual orbit quite different from that of modern science, and quite different from that in which any social science must move if it aspires to become objective.

It had been a hot afternoon, and both Thrasymachus and Socrates were rather fagged when they came to their lame and impotent conclusion. Not so with one of the younger members of the party.

Glaucon, who is always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus' retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me: "Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?"

"I should wish really to persuade you," I replied, "if I could."

Upon Glaucon's blunt denial that he had been persuaded, the process of approaching conclusions by rearranging ideas previously lodged in the debaters' minds begins over again in Book ii.

Now I want to repeat, with all the emphasis I can command, that the process illustrated in *The Republic* has its legitimate place in the economy of human life. For convenience I will call it "persuasion," the art of bringing ideas common to two or more minds into such

arrangement that they seem to enforce conclusions not previously admitted by one or more of the parties. Of all the conscious mental processes, persuasion perhaps bulks largest in human intercourse. Thus far it has been the chief factor in formal education of every sort, although it has been combined in countless forms and proportions with transference of knowledge, or at least of ideas, from more amply to less amply informed minds; and in later years education by discovery has begun to play a part in pedagogy. Persuasion is a chief feature of the normal process of transmitting valuations and attitudes indorsed by experience. It is a large part—not the whole—of the function of parents in the training of children, of all sorts of teachers, preachers, and leaders of every kind.

This side of the case can hardly be stated too forcibly. On the other hand, it would be hard to exaggerate the contrast, as functions, between this, which for convenience I cover by the term "persuasion," and scientific discovery. To borrow a parallel from a different sphere, intellectual persuasion is as widely separated from scientific discovery as economic consumption is from capitalization. Persuasion pure and simple, not mixed with communication of new knowledge, such persuasion as is illustrated in the first book of *The Republic*, has the same relation to knowledge which a twist of the barrel of the kaleidoscope has to the bits of glass inside. It adds nothing to their quantity. It merely rearranges their relations to one another so that they reflect the light from the outside in new forms.

This is precisely the opposite of the scientific function, whether in physical or in human science. Objective science penetrates into unexplored relations in the objective world and assembles new knowledge. Opinion, whether formed or unformed, must eventually confirm or correct itself by assimilation of this increasing knowledge, not merely by contentment with turning over and over the knowledge once for all deposited in the mind's kaleidoscope.

The perception which I am trying to convey in these notes on *The Republic* is that there is a great gulf between the processes of *persuasion*, that is, of bare dialectic, and the processes of investigative science. The gulf is wide, but it is not impassable. Indeed, both dialecticians and scientists are constantly crossing and recrossing it. This frequent mental migration from the territory of dialectics to



the territory of scientific discovery, to a certain extent blinds everybody to the contrast between the processes that belong on opposite sides of the gulf. On the one side is penetration into the unknown. On the other side is effort to utilize the already known.

Plato's *Republic* is among the most monumental examples of the latter process. As such it is among the most conspicuous specimens of the thing which sociologists have resolved *not* to do in their distinguishing character as sociologists. They are not primarily social philosophers, although it has taken a generation for them to reach this decision. They are trying to be primarily social scientists. Their peculiar function is to investigate group relations which had not previously been explored. Whether they will be content to do that and nothing more, will be determined by the peculiar equipment and circumstances of individual sociologists. In the future as in the past, some of them will doubtless give more time and strength to persuasion than to discovery. They will prefer to spend most of their energy as social philosophers, and the minor portion as social scientists. That will not change the fact that the two functions are radically different, and that the human process would end in stagnation if adequate provision were not made for constant renewal of its vitality through scientific discovery.

While I was writing the last paragraph, boys under my window were shouting the extras that told of the verdict in a notorious murder case (September 10, 1924). It suggested repetition of a part of the foregoing in the form of a concrete illustration. One of the main contentions of the defense was that the death penalty is inhuman, and ought not to be inflicted under any circumstances. It is in connection with this claim that the case has illustrative value for our present purpose.

It is a rudimentary legal proposition that, provided there is no question of unconstitutionality, an argument that a given law ought not to be in the statute-book has no standing in court. From the point of view of pure reason, the judge has no right to listen to such an argument. It should be made to the legislature, or to the electors of legislators, when the question of capital punishment is an issue. The right or wrong of the death penalty cannot properly be in question as a legal matter in an Illinois court. *Psychologically*, as an appeal

to the *man* functioning as judge, or to the jury in case of a jury trial, impeachment of capital punishment as barbarous, inhuman, repugnant to the spirit of the times, etc., is a harp of a thousand strings, and in the instance in mind the leading counsel for the defense strengthened his reputation as a skilled performer upon that instrument.

But what is the exact scientific status of the death penalty as provided in the Illinois statutes?

In the first place, let us select, as representative of all, one of the many reasons which have actuated legislators in enacting the death penalty, viz., not vengeance, not equal retribution, on the principle "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth," but protection of life against people who hold the lives of others in light esteem; in other words, the necessity of the death penalty as protection of other lives.

Let us suppose, for the sake of illustration, that this is accepted as the one and only reason for the death penalty. The death penalty is enacted then by different lawmaking bodies as an expression of public opinion that it is the most effective deterrent of crimes against life. But who knows? I may believe, with counsel for the defense in the case before me, that the death penalty does not reduce the number of murders. You may believe, with the legislatures of most of our states, and of most civilized countries, that the death penalty does reduce the number of murders. In either case, what has happened? Simply this: the believers in each of these contradictory doctrines have derived a certain body of information, and a certain collection of judgments about facts in general, and respond in ways of their own to different emotional stimuli. When these people, through their representatives, bring their entire subjective accumulations to bear upon a judgment of cause and effect in social relations, the result is contradictory valuations. *I*, and those legislators who agree with me, think the effect of capital punishment is so and so; *you*, and those legislators who agree with you, think it is the opposite. Neither of us can establish his position by proof. Each of us can at most play up certain things which he knows, or believes, that tend to lend probability to our respective views. In other words, we may perform the process of persuasion upon ourselves and others. That, however, is a tentative, provisional result. It is not scientific proof.

In this situation, science speaks. It says that neither party rests on a solid foundation. Each party expresses opinions not sustained by conclusive facts. The scientific procedure would be to find out whether it is possible to conduct an investigation, or a number of investigations, which would demonstrate actual tendencies resulting from use or disuse of the death penalty.<sup>1</sup>

This is the point of the illustration: The position taken by the defense that capital punishment does not diminish the number of killings calls attention to the fact that in this matter, and innumerable similar ones, our social practice and our social doctrines rest upon *beliefs* as to cause and effect, not upon scientifically tested knowledge of cause and effect. The aims of social science in general, since 1800 have been guided more and more by the desire to exchange opinion for proof as the basis of our social theories and programs. Whether or not this exchange is feasible is a question by itself. The striving of the social sciences since 1800 to become as objective as physical science is a fact. Sociology in particular differs from dialectical social philosophy, ancient or modern, in that it is trying to investigate certain aspects of human relations, and to make discoveries in those matters take the place of guesses in the shaping of social doctrines.

Going back to Plato, I am using *The Republic* as an extended exhibit of the contrast in method between the procedure of rationalizing our previously acquired body of impressions from our own and other people's experiences, and the procedure now known as scientific research. I am pointing out that the question with which we are concerned is not whether Plato's opinions, or any single one of his opinions, is likely to correspond in the end with the opinion which the most exhaustive scientific research will sanction. *The Republic* is worth the study of sociologists first and foremost as a series of illustrations of how *not* to do it, if one is trying to reach scientifically attested conclusions about human relations. With certain qualifications previously referred to, Plato's method was the non-scientific method of relying for social judgments upon *opinions* rather than upon facts. Modern social science, including sociology, is directly

<sup>1</sup> To forestall misunderstanding, I add explicitly that the illustration neither expresses nor implies my own opinion either about the death penalty in general, or about the verdict in a particular case.

contrasted with Platonic philosophy, by demanding positive knowledge rather than opinion as the guaranty of social generalizations.

With details changed, all dialectical social philosophy, from Plato to William Jennings Bryan, or the Soviet despotism, or the pacifists, relies on a method which in principle is abhorrent to science, and its conclusions deserve at most the rating "important if true."

Sometimes rationalizing and science utter themselves in complete accord with reference to the desirability of knowledge. For example, Glaucon says (ii. 358. B), "To my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul." Here a genuinely scientific attitude is in evidence, or what Herbert Spencer would call the *sentiment* of science, not the *idea* of science. Glaucon wanted to know the truth, but he was not within sight of the scientific conception of how truth must be established. One of the evidences to this effect is his naïve assumption that the truth can be arrived at about anything by "setting aside their . . . results." As we understand reality now, results are a part of the truth of anything. We commit ourselves to unreality from the start if we try to draw a line between anything and its results. This is merely another way of saying what I said before, that knowledge can never be complete in its subjective phases. Knowledge is one of the mind's reactions to objects external to the mind. Glaucon was now challenging Socrates to another effort to arrive at truth, not by going out after further facts, but by some further turnings of their own mental kaleidoscopes.

The sterility of the method which he was using is evident again in another phase of the presumption with which Glaucon prepares to renew the debate. He says: "I will show that all men who practice justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good." The conception behind these words is that justice is a standardized operation, having some sort of existence in detachment from the operator, and appraisable by itself, not as a function of the operator. Whatever the content of justice may turn out to be, Glaucon's idea of it was arbitrary, and so far as Socrates fell in with this arbitrary conception he allowed the discussion to become a dialectic of the non-existent. We may think of justice as a certain mechanical shifting

of ballast in social relations by performance or endurance of some process, or by transference of something of value; but the effect of introducing that aspect of justice into the debate was to convert the subject of discussion into an ambiguous middle term. All through the first book each speaker adhered rather closely to the implied presumption that justice is an attribute of persons made manifest in certain performances. This presumption is now one of the bits of material in the mental kaleidoscope jostling the other presumption for position and influence. The ring is now set for a shadow sparring-match between these conflicting refractions, without the slightest prospect that anything more productive than mental calisthenics can result; at least, nothing more than the persuasion of one of the parties, not new knowledge.

Glaucon offers to "praise the unjust life to the utmost of (his) my power" (ii. 358. D), in order to draw out Socrates in further support of justice, and he begins:

They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so, when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice; it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honored by reason of the inability of men to do injustice (ii. 358. E).

Here is dialectic nearly at its weakest. To begin with, Glaucon exposes the flimsiness of its superstructure in the opening words, "they say." In its most characteristic forms rationalizing begins with hearsay. "The newspaper says,—therefore," is the most frequent modern specimen of the fallacy. Then the confusion grows worse confounded by variations of assertions in terms of the confessedly unknown factors "justice" and "injustice." The propositions would carry more illumination if they substituted algebraic signs, so as to read "X is good, —X is bad." The fact that a term of unknown meaning is the real subject of the different predicates would then be evident. When it has been confessed that the meaning of "justice,"

and consequently of its opposite "injustice," is unknown, it should be plain that one is not saying anything when one uses those meaningless terms as subjects of affirmations. One is merely spreading a smoke screen. Yet this is the building-material out of which subjective philosophies are composed.

A little later Glaucon adds (ii. 360. D): "All men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice." Waiving the fact just discussed that "justice" and "injustice" were confessedly unknown quantities, the assertion "all men believe" may or may not have been true in Plato's time. It was at all events unverified. Supposing it had stated a fact. It would simply have formulated an existing state of mind, not an objective reality, except as that state of mind was a reality. Believing something does not make it so. If it did, the earth would have been flat at Plato's time. Facts ascertained meanwhile amount to a probability that it was not.

All this, I repeat, is not because what Glaucon thought, or what Plato thought, is directly important for us now as sociologists. I am trying to expose the futility of the kind of thinking by which they came to think anything.

In making up this case as devil's advocate, Glaucon delivers an extended monologue, the most striking feature of which is repetition of the adjectives "just" and "unjust" in a web of words which, as we have seen, simply serve to camouflage the absence of meaning. His brother Adeimantus comes to his support in still more vigorous assertion that injustice has inherited the earth. Between them they furnish a sample of pessimistic special pleading that might have issued from the same school in which Job's comforters got their training.

When Glaucon and his brother had come to the end of their word-juggling with the adjectives "just" and "unjust," Socrates was wiser than he knew in his exclamation (ii. 361. D), "Heavens! my dear Glaucon, . . . how energetically you polish them up for the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two statues." One of the original sins of the dialectical method is that it easily falls into the mode of treating all human relations as though they were so many statues. Human relations are never statues. They are always functions, and if for no other reason, that fact bankrupts the Platonic

dialectic as an ostensible means of increasing knowledge. Plato's own use of it is merely a little more subtle than this sample which he has rendered so obvious that Socrates will be able to make short work of it.

Socrates at once enters upon an account of how the state must have originated from "necessity, who is the mother of our invention" (ii. 369. C). That is, he calls to mind the diversity of human wants and the occasions for varieties of occupations to ratify those wants. He virtually anticipates all that Adam Smith said about division of labor, beginning in chapter i of *The Wealth of Nations*. Thereby he also to a certain extent anticipates the view of the origin of the state to which modern theorists tend to return after all their dallyings with other conceptions. Plato's sagacity is scarcely more evident anywhere than in this version of probabilities.

Yet the passage is an example of *persuasion*, not of scientific demonstration. We do not even yet positively know that the state originated substantially as Socrates supposed. The interpretation is essentially hypothetical. It does not supply new knowledge. It simply adds a fortunate turn to the kaleidoscope of old knowledge. From Plato's time until now, as the recorded history of thought superabundantly shows, reasoners have been able to return to the problem of the origin of the state, and they have not been estopped by conclusive knowledge from propounding theories directly contrary to the one which Socrates expounded. Our constant refrain is that dialectic can prove nothing except temporary compatibilities of mental images. To what extent these mental images and their adjustments have their counterparts in the objective world, other processes than those of dialectic must determine. In general we apply the name "science" to those processes on which we rely for the nearest approaches to proof which our minds have been able to gain. These scientific processes invert the ratio of the subjective to the objective factors which is the rule in dialectical processes.

There is delicious humor, whether intended or not intended by Plato, in the suddenness of the transformation of the two brothers from the character of irreconcilable agnostics into that of pliant disciples accepting everything the master says. There is another reminder of Adam Smith, and even of Polonius, in the tactics by

which Socrates leads his young friends out of their denunciatory temper toward the established order. Smith tried to be an economic radical. He started to reconstruct economic justice in terms of labor. Then he gave himself to further contemplation of British institutions, with the result that he found himself unable to imagine human society resting upon any other adequate foundation than the orthodox "land, labor, capital."

Socrates adroitly extemporizes that process in the minds of his two interlocutors. He draws a series of mental crayon pictures of Athenian society idealized as a functioning whole, culminating in the ruling class with the more ingratiating name "guardians." Employing analogies of watch-dogs, both savage and faithful, Socrates commends the like qualities in men who are to be "guardians." By skilful logical legerdemain he produces the illusion that the necessity of such qualities harmonized in guardians gives the actuality of them. Therefore, presto! the Athenian system is a pretty good system after all, the operation of it is justice in the concrete. Which was to be proved!

In fact, nothing has been proved. There has been clever play upon the valuations in stock in the minds of the negative debaters, and things which they knew before have been made to take on a look contrasted with their previous aspect. In other words, not discovery but persuasion.

Incidentally Socrates suggests establishment of censorship over the education of children destined to become "guardians" (ii. 377. C), and he gives illustrations of the sort of moral and theological instruction which he would deal out to future rulers. Jewish synagogue or Puritan conventicle, in the palmiest days of either, could hardly have taught more conservative and disciplinary doctrine, but it consists so obviously of pure opinion, it rests so evidently only on the fact that Socrates thinks so, that it has the effect of anticlimax, and a drop of the argument into undisguised dogmatism. All semblance of search for knowledge, as we understand that phrase today, has disappeared.

The book (ii) ends with eight pages of theology as completely speculative as any of the fabrications of the medieval scholastics.

In spite of their advance notice that they were arguing contrary



to their own beliefs, the two brothers were incredibly easy converts from their opposition. This, however, is a trifle. They served as a literary device to assist in the presentation of Plato's philosophy of the ruling or "guardian" class. He has not announced his main doctrine yet, but we may say that he has made Socrates argue thus far to the effect that justice is the manner of life in a state regulated by an ideally wise and loyal "guardian" class. With this as a presumption, he proceeds in Book iii to inquire what would be the ideal education for such a class. And we must note that soldiers seem to be numerically the chief element in this class. Except in numbers, their place in Plato's fancy was more nearly like that of the German army up to 1918 than like that of the army in any other modern system.

Book iii is a discussion of the *pedagogy* best adapted to the training of "guardians," most of whom must be soldiers, the basic constituent in whose personal equation must be *courage*.

There is wonderful shrewdness on exhibit in this whole passage. Knowledge of probable mental cause and effect under certain conditions is abundantly in evidence. But those conditions have only a hypothetical existence. A modern student of pedagogy might well read this book for stimulation of his interest in educational problems. A modern student of sociology could hardly fail to get from the book some sharpening of his perception that, for better and for worse, education and civic life are correlates. To go to *The Republic*, however, for scientific pedagogy or sociology would be like taking a long trip into a farming region to find a haymow in which to hunt for a needle, instead of buying an assortment of needles in the shop next block which is stocked with such goods.

With primary reference then to the development of courage in "guardians," and subsidiary reference to other necessary qualities, Socrates begins by drawing inferences from the latter part of Book ii about the sort of theological material that should be used or excluded in education, especially poet-lore, etc., about death and the hereafter, together with legendary material about the character of the gods. After disposing of this subject, Socrates points out that the next topic in logical order would be what should be taught about *men*. Since, however, the answer to that question depends upon the nature of justice, which must remain undecided until later in the in-

quiry, discussion of what "guardians" should be taught about men must also be postponed (iii. 392. A-C). The discourse then treats in succession of *literary style*, including dramatic imitation of virtue and vice; *melody and song*; and lastly *gymnastics*, which Plato would prescribe more rigorously than most modern trainers.

Having decided that the process of education is to be conducted by means of the material discussed under the foregoing heads, Socrates turns to the question, Who are to be rulers and who subjects (iii. 412. C)?

By a rapid process of selection, he decides (1) "there can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger" (*loc. cit.*); (2) "the best of these must rule"; (3) "they must be those who have most of the character of guardians"; (4) they must be sifted by a period of probationary service, to discover who have the staunchest convictions that the interest of the state must be the rule of their lives (iii. 413. C).

Then Socrates produces the masterpiece of his pedagogy, in the shape of what he calls the "royal lie" (iii. 414. C) to be impressed upon "guardians"; viz., that they were specially fashioned by nature for guardianship; and upon the citizens a counsel of perfection as to the duty of a practice of eugenics, which is pictured in terms of metals of graded value.

All this is with the aim of furnishing the state with real "guardians" who will be watchdogs, not wolves (iii. 416. A).

But the upshot of all the discussion is that Socrates is not very confident that in practice his ideal education would insure ideal "guardians." He confesses (iii. 416. C), "I am much more certain that true education, *whatever that may be* (!) will have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize them in their relations to one another and to those under their protection."

And while Socrates is not sure that he knows how to map out an education that will supply the state with ideal "guardians," he throws in for good measure some miscellaneous specifications as to the desirable character and manner of their life (iii. 416. C ff.):

And not only their education, but their habitations, and all that belongs to them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians, nor tempt them to prey upon other citizens. Any man of sense must acknowledge that.

. . . . Then now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to realize our ideal of them. In the first place, none of them should have any property of his own, beyond that which is absolutely necessary; neither should they have a private house or store closed against anyone who has a mind to enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more; and they will go to mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have therefore no need of the dross which is current among men, and ought not to pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture; for that commoner metal has been the source of many unholy deeds, but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them, or drink them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the saviors of the state. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other citizens; hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and to the rest of the state, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our state be ordered, and that these shall be the regulations appointed by us for our guardians concerning their houses and all other matters?

This is a favorable point for repetition of my reasons for referring to Plato at all.

*The Republic* is one of the most famous books in the world.

*The Republic* discusses relations of men in society.

Sociology used to be called "the science of society." Hence many sociologists have inferred that *The Republic* is among the most important of sociological documents.

My contention is that *The Republic* is sociologically important, but in the negative sense. It is important as a lurid illustration of what sociology is trying not to be. Sociology has found itself in the United States as a conscious and studied attempt to be something that *The Republic* is not. If *subject-matter* determines the boundaries of sciences, then *The Republic* and sociology must be classed together. If *method* is the chief test of sciences, then sociology and *The Republic* are as far apart as mechanics from magic.

[To be concluded]

## STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

### III. THE PROBLEMS OF A NATIONAL CHURCH BEFORE 1860

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#### ABSTRACT

The Christianity of the eighteenth century did not allow the logic of a creed to interfere seriously with integration and union within Christian society. It was the nineteenth century, and the social situation therein, which gave the confessional principle an important social function once more. The wants of primary groups, the inherent interests of the religious group of a church in the presence of rivalry and conflict with its neighbors, the rise of revolutionary radicalism—all militated against the pragmatic social rationalism of an older generation or tradition. The religious a priori of a creed begins to dominate the logic of the social process again. In view of the fact that religion is the "earlier situation," religious synergism and religious fundamentalism affect the political sphere. They are a cause as well as an effect.

The Germans of the eighteenth century owe their organization as a separate culture group in America, the conservation of their societal technique, as we have seen, to German Protestantism. The German Lutherans were organized as a separate religious group by H. M. Muehlenberg; the Germans of the Reformed church by M. Schlatter; the German Mystics by Zinzendorf and others. Thus it was the Christianity of the eighteenth rather than the sixteenth century which entered as the religious element in the situation. The Pietistic tradition of Halle had weakened the sectionalism of the Augsburg creed; that of the Reformed church had been tempered by the Heidelberg catechism and the Palatine tradition of church fellowship, and the Mystics were ever willing to be united in the spirit.<sup>1</sup> An intersocial element was the cultural affinity between

<sup>1</sup> See article II of this series. Schmauck, "History of the Lutheran Church in Pennsylvania," *Pennsylvania German Soc. Pub.*, Vol. XI. Kraushaar, *Verfassungsformen* (1911), p. 224. J. H. Dubbs, *The Reformed Church*, pp. 152-54, 260-66, 112. Bente, "American Lutheranism," *St. Louis Concordia* (1919). Chr. O. Kraushaar, *Verfassungsformen* (1911). *Deutscher Kirchenfreund* (1848-56). *Lutheran Church Review. Lehre und Wehre. Der Lutheraner*. W. J. Spaeth. Mann. J. W. Richard, *Confessional History*. Mann, *Lutheranism in America* (1857), H. Mann, *Life and Times of Muehlenberg*.

Bente gives an exhaustive survey of the policies and practices, doctrinal and otherwise, in his excellent survey. His studium has saved consulting further sources for the

Germans and Germans, for Germans, Lutheran and Reformed, were both farmers or small townsmen. The primary intrasocial element was the mores of the primary group of sixteenth-century peasants. The colonial situation at large also demanded fellowship; what the whole situation called for was a rational societal technique for the "be ye united." Thus the pragmatic fact of functional worth determined at the outset the more or less of creed: the decisive consideration was whether it worked. The unconcern of the eighteenth century in the presence of history, if it needed illustration, could be documented from religion. Conrad Weiser, for instance, born a Lutheran, joined the Reformed, became a convert to Ephrata, and later returned to the Reformed. The decisive element in limiting this pragmatism, as we have seen, was the inherent interest of the German settlement group, the mind of the peasant and burgher.<sup>1</sup> The want of this cultural group: solidarity, economic mutualism, became the inherent interest of its organized Christianity, and vice versa. The doctrinal rigorism of a fighting Lutheran was as subversive to a weak group as the unprincipled loper or the rationalist. It set the limits to Pietism itself.<sup>2</sup> Thus the normative element came to be in the social convenience of organization and communal constitution. Within the religious group there could be evangelical liberty of judging for themselves;<sup>3</sup> the a priori of creed could rest in abeyance as long as the a priori of custom remained unchallenged within the cultural group. Creed was no formidable obstacle to *Genossenschaft* where there was a basis of cultural *Gemeinschaft*.

Thus it is obvious that the religious a priori of social synergism, the "be ye united," had become a stronger force than the "be ye separate," the religious principle of sectionalism. Its synergism, then, was the strength or the weakness of the church of the Pennsylv-

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limited purpose of this paper. A mere sketch was here intended of a social situation with which the fundamentalists (to be treated later in full) were taking issue, from which they learned, and by which they were influenced through counter-imitation. The language question will also be treated separately.

<sup>1</sup> Discipline: Dubbs, p. 111. Schmauck, *op. cit.*, p. 343. Halle, *Nachr.*, I, 149, 386.

<sup>2</sup> Dubbs, *op. cit.*, p. 92. Schmauck, *op. cit.*, pp. 261, 274, 283-84.

<sup>3</sup> Bente, I, 110-13.

vania Germans. It was the strength of the Lutheran church before 1850.

This synergism enabled the Lutheran church to gain momentum by serving the inherent interests of one cultural group and gaining prestige with others.<sup>1</sup> The border between the Lutheran and the English churches was indistinct, and only toward the end of his career did Muehlenberg's synergism stop short of pulpit fellowship with the Methodists. It enabled the Lutheran church to drop its paternalistic societal technique which was not suited to the social situation, and follow in its constitutions Calvinistic models which were.

The New York Ministerium, which was rationalistic, could adopt the constitution of that of Pennsylvania, which was not; the absence of any reference to the Augsburg Confession did not prevent a constituent group here from considering itself part of a larger Lutheran whole.<sup>2</sup> Such creed opportunism favored both concentration of power with the central bodies and local autonomy in matters of faith. It facilitated expansion.<sup>3</sup>

For such expansion and further fellowship the Reformation Jubilee of 1817 furnished the occasion, the parallel tendency toward unionism in Germany, a model. Funds came from Germany, encouragement from everywhere to a church which decided that "Luther and Calvin agreed on all points with the exception of one which was of minor importance." For a time it seemed as if the heir of the Ministerium of Pennsylvania, the General Synod of the

<sup>1</sup> See Article II. Bente, I, 36, 90, 136. Peter Muehlenberg had sworn to the thirty-nine articles.

<sup>2</sup> 1792: Bente, I, 40.

<sup>3</sup> Bente, II, 90-91; I, 103, 216. What is true here of the Pennsylvania Synod is true of the other state synods with the exception of Tennessee (1820), the first one to revolt against doctrinal laxity and the inroad of the English language, as well as the "centralization of power" in the proposed constitution of the General Synod. Bente, I, 148, 173, 197. The initiative toward interstate federation into a general synod came from the synods of Pennsylvania and North Carolina. For its constitution, its unionism (irrespective of doctrinal differences), see Bente, II, 19; for its doctrinal basis down to 1864, Bente, II, 39, 42, 43. "Prior to 1864 the General Synod as such was not committed to the Augsburg Confession constitutionally," Bente, II, 38. Origins of its unionism, Jacob's *History*, p. 364. "Nothing more than the realization of Zinzendorf's dream of 1764."

Lutheran Church in America,<sup>1</sup> had solved the problem of a religious synthesis between East and West, a social synthesis between frontier and city, the problem of organized Protestantism itself. Its leaders planned an apostolic Protestant union, and in 1846 its guiding genius, Professor S. S. Schmucker, was given cheerful credit for the initiative in the organization of the Evangelical Alliance at London.<sup>2</sup> Nor was Professor Schaff, the leading spirit of the Reformed church, opposed to this principle. To him, as late as 1857, America seemed to be destined to become "the phoenix grave of all European churches and sects, of Protestantism and Romanism."<sup>3</sup> In the light of its activities in recent years, the General Synod cannot be called a slacker in contributing its bit to the fulfillment of this prophecy.<sup>4</sup>

Of course, it was said by a prominent member of the church itself that "a large body of men in our church have no knowledge of her history, no sympathy with her doctrine, no idea of her true character, and whose conception of the church is that of a kind of mongrel Methodistic Presbyterianism." It was also said by others that it was a concoction of rationalism and sentimentalism.<sup>5</sup> But stressing the American spirit to be that of fellowship, that organ of the church,

\* Unionism: According to Synod of Pennsylvania constitution, revision of 1841, par. 17, ministers of the Evangelical church of Prussia, Baden, and other countries of Germany (i.e., coming from the United church) were to be treated like those of the Lutheran state churches. Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 253. Secession of East Pennsylvania Synod, 1842. Protest against this "discrimination against American pastors in favor of European," *ibid.*, p. 255. (European pastors so specified could be refused admission by a two-thirds majority. American pastors and all others needed a two-thirds majority for admission.) Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 256. This provision is dropped with the constitution of 1867. Bente, I, 15-16, 40, 42, 45, 136, 5-7, 36, 7-8, 13-14, 58.

That the unionism in Prussia cut a wide breach into the walls of the church through which the rationalists entered, see *Evangelische Kirchen Zeitung* (1856); also J. Mueller, "Die Union," *Kirchenfreund* (1856), pp. 210-14. The *Kirchenfreund* is always in very close touch with unionist or anti-unionist tendencies in Germany.

General Synod Statistics, 1823: 900 churches, 175 ministers, 24, 794 communicants, 208 Congregational schools; 1843: 424 pastors, 1,374 congregations, 146, 343 communicants (Bente, I, 95-96).

Compare Muehlenberg's position. *Lutheran Church Review*, January 13, 1888. Bente, I, 73, 84-91.

<sup>1</sup> Bente, II, 63 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Bente, II, 58.

<sup>3</sup> Bente, II, 1-11; also A. R. Wentz, *The Lutheran Church* (1923).

<sup>4</sup> Bente, II, 90-91. Bente, II, 93 (1885, 1906).

the *Lutheran Observer*, found adequate compensation in the mission, "to open the blind eyes and to convert our Teutonic people from the letters of its language and customs to the light and to the liberty of this Bible-loving, Sabbath-keeping, water-drinking, church-going, and God-fearing country." The church began early with the adoption of the English language, the acknowledgment and toleration of the lodges, and proceeded in its fellowship with the sects.<sup>1</sup>

If the church had sloughed off the doctrinal rigorism of the sixteenth century,<sup>2</sup> it could make up by introducing the anxious seat as a "lever of Archimedes, which, by the blessing of God, can raise our German churches to that degree of respectability in the religious world which they ought to enjoy."<sup>3</sup> So strong was at one time the rush in that direction that mourners had to be asked to withdraw from the church into the parsonage so that the synod might proceed

<sup>1</sup> Bente, II, 81.

<sup>2</sup> Tennessee. First opposition to the General Synod and secession Synod of North Carolina. Bente, I, 108 ff. Attitude of Tennessee toward creed and history, elements of the Augsburg creed, and symbols which Synod of North Carolina rejected. Bente, I, 119-31, 198 (the Heuckels). The unionism of North Carolina is that of Shober, a Moravian.

Creed: *Synodal-vereinigung* Creed, 1748 (Pennsylvania Synod, VI, par. 2, Ministerial Order 1781, documentary history of the Evangelical Lutheran Ministerium of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1898). Liability of ministry to the symbolic books given up in revision of 1792 (Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 245). Revision of 1867. Admission of confession to all the synods of the Lutheran church, synodical order, par. 11. In modern synodical constitutions Creed basis of 1864 of the districts of the General Synod (Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 399). "The synodical order of the General Synod has no confessional paragraph," but unchanged Augsburg Confession is the proper foundation of the Synod. If part of a member community repudiates it, the remaining part of the corporation is recognized as a legitimate member (Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 400). For the influence of creed, orthodoxy, on synergistic practice, attitude toward altar and pulpit community, mixed communities, Methodists, secret societies, Turners, Socialists, and freethinkers, see Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 400. But for the actual practice in disregard of constitutional limitations, see Bente: controversial problems, Bente, II, 115-17; history and fate of the general platform, Bente, II, 93-117; attitude of General Synod toward, Bente, II, 117-30; later disruptions, Bente, II, 130-45.

<sup>3</sup> New measures: Bente, II, 87. Revivalism: influence on constitutions, North Carolina (Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 276); on Tennessee Synod, *ibid.*, p. 289. General reaction vs. autonomy of the community in favor of synodical power, tightening of confessional bond, group integration, and increased sectional consciousness (Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 294). Cause of doctrinal disputes, Bente, I, 131-34; sketch of early history, Bente, I, 77; description "worse than whiskey," see *Kirchliche Mitteilungen* (1843), Nos. 2 and 5. In the General Synod, reaction sets in against in 1845, but 1875 seasons of quickening; in 1881, synod for catechization.



with business. Unfortunately, with the coming of the "new measures," the parochial schools began to languish. If some people came in by way of the anxious seat, others, by the sawdust trail, straggled out of the German fold. They became domesticated to a different Christianity from that of their fathers, socialized through a different set of religious exercises from those that Muehlenberg had brought from Halle. They became agitated to put themselves in harmony with their social universe otherwise than in terms of the older religious sanctions thereof. They became accustomed to respond to a new type of leadership and go with a different crowd.<sup>1</sup> The first grumbling against the liberalism of the "new measures," therefore, came, as in the eighteenth century, from those constituent groups of

<sup>1</sup> Language: German, Ebenezer, until 1824 (Bente, I, 20). 1827, petitions on the language question. After 1828, English growing (Bente, I, 150-52). Tennessee Synod committed to the German language (Bente, I, 161). Germans and English do not get along together. New York, 1774 (Bente, I, 37). English church organized 1804; goes into the Episcopalian fold 1810 (Bente, I, 38). Braune, *Belehrungen* (1828), for statistics of transition. Immigrants very few join the English churches; slow to form new social connections (Morris, *Fifty Years*, pp. 375-89; Kraushaar, *passim*). Transition from German to English means transition to an English-speaking church, or complete isolation, G. Fritschel, *Geschichte*, I, 35; letter of Falckner, 1702). Trinity Congregation, St. Louis first constitution (par. 14). Later, by-laws (par. 7) becomes a new model after 1850 (Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 255). Difference of language as synodical organ cause of secession of East Pennsylvania Synod. Pennsylvania Synod had limited itself to one language, *ibid.*, p. 255. Revision of 1792, amendment (1805): Ministerium commits itself to the German language as official synodical language; concerning English congregations, treatment thereof, see Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 252. Valid until 1841. Model constitution for daughter synods, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Maryland, Virginia, and West Pennsylvania. General influence of this constitution, Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 252. With Constitution of 1867, Synod becomes bilingual (*ibid.*, p. 256). Missouri (II, 7), makes sole use of German language in synodical meetings, condition of membership (I, 2): "Amtssprache soll die Deutsche sein und bleiben." German predominating, New York, Man. Nebraska (C) (S.K.) Wart. Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio Buff. Iowa, Imm. Jeh. for those who only accept communities and pastors with service in English, see Kraushaar, *op. cit.*, p. 401.

Peculiarities of German language congregations pointing toward creed: heterogeneous in origin, mixed element coming from all parts of Germany, no likemindedness, outside influences; personality of pastor counts for more than church constitution; petty, quarrelsome, miserly (abundant evidence).

Inherent interest of the group and church; uniform creed acknowledged in constitution and sworn to would eliminate quarrels and lawsuits; definite and uniform constitutional provisions; definite relative delimitation of rights; get the women interested. German parochial independentism and sectionalism is a fright. *Kirchenfreund* (1856), pp. 96-101.

the General Synod which had a larger element of Germans. New measures were a language sectional issue; underneath there was the domestic Methodism of the family farm militating against the methodism of emotional religion. On the surface, the objections of the new immigration were concentrated upon the centralization of power in the General Synod, upon its synergism, its new measures, its doctrinal laxity.

A new principle of group centrism, a principle around which a general will could remain integrated, was wanted. The consensus had to be rationalized anew. The religious group owed its existence to the fact that it had identified itself with a real want of a culture group. If it had outgrown the language sectionalism of that group, it needed to endear itself to that group in some new way. Its own inherent interest continued to coincide with some of the wants of that group.

The trail that led to the camp meeting of the Methodist or Baptist churches had led through the jungle. First came a period of cultural attrition in the wilderness. A generation grew up which, if it had no creed, knew no church; if it had no parochial school, it had no language; a generation which spoke neither German nor English. Utterly inarticulate, it understood only what came from the flesh. When its gregarious instinct, its *Eros*, drove it to seek human fellowship on a higher plane, the mourners' bench was the logical medium for a new spiritual experience, the weird sounds of a revival sometimes the only available expression thereof. Such new measures, if they did release a new man, as has been suggested, did not lead back to the old church. But the ministers of the new dispensation did not always play the game fairly. In the beginning at least, muscular Christianity sometimes hit below the belt. But even with the competition for souls altogether fair in its means, the Lutherans of the General Synod were handicapped. Their traditional technique was indoctrination. But here was a situation in which they had forgotten their doctrines, and if they had not forgotten the Augsburg Confession, they had lost the language and "meaning" thereof. In such a situation the new churches of the many camp-grounds proved dangerous rivals. The Archimedic lever worked the other way. In the struggle for a status and for power, its synergism had helped—in the

struggle for converts it was bound to leave the Lutheran church at a disadvantage in the presence of more powerful rivals. Time was against it.

The situation pointed in the direction of the immigrant, and the new Germans pointed in the direction of a creed as the logical principle of group centrism for the Lutheran church. Furthermore, they came to be very positive in that direction. Creed *Gemeinschaft* with them was a condition of church fellowship and *Genossenschaft*. Their faith, their Christianity, had been rationalized within the meaning of a creed; thus far rationalism, humanism, had done its work in a European German city of God, whose rational principle of socialization is indoctrination.<sup>1</sup> In a creed, then, the new Germans would seek a charisma that meant salvation in the promised land. This much the fathers of the General Synod realized full well. In a letter to Germany it was intimated, in 1845, that the immigrants must not set up a new German church on American soil, that they might join with a good conscience the General Synod. A creed, then, acceptable to both Germans and Americans, the General Synod must have. It began to admit that "external organic union is not an end per se divine." The intrasocial as well as the intersocial process now prompted a search for a creed principle of unity, as well as union within the Lutheran church. But while it was admitted that "all endeavors at union which disregarded the divine norm of Christian fellowship are anti-scriptural," to Americans that divine norm lay not in tradition. They would accept the Bible as the fundamental law of their church, but not history as normative nor the precedents thereof as binding. Sailing into a great future "on the wings of the morning," they looked ahead, but not back. They looked around, thought, and found the majority principle of consensus. It might work in religion. Why should not a working majority of Lutherans in America count for more than a few dead ones in Germany? Their attitude toward history can perhaps be characterized by this: "We can do as well, nay, better, than those who have lived three hundred years ago. We are standing on the shoulders of a giant and can see farther than he. An intelligent Sunday-school child has a clearer insight into the plan of salvation than John the Baptist, the greatest

<sup>1</sup> Bente, II, *passim*; also Wentz, pp. 135, 163-64.

of prophets." Thus the Lutheran church of the General Synod was ready to make history; its leaders were, in 1855.<sup>1</sup>

Their generous spirit of fellowship had accommodated some Moravians, welcomed to its pulpit the Methodist spellbinders, clasped to its heart the surly Calvinists, been proud to hobnob with the Episcopalians, received as brethren elements of the Reformed church; deistic rationalism had come in through the German language in New York and North Carolina, and through the English language elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> To make the Germans feel at home, the Lutheran church could even stand definitely committed to the Augsburg Confession and its symbols. That is the meaning of the Definite Platform of 1855.<sup>3</sup>

It would have been better if the Augsburg Confession had not thus come back. For if it was a concession to the spirit of the nineteenth century and to the Germans, the Definite Platform was also an ultimatum. It was a bar sinister to the European fundamentalism of the sixteenth. It was meant to be an American confession of faith. It was understood to be an appeal to reason. It showed what American religious rationalism and Calvinism had done to the Augsburg Confession, to Lutherdom, and to the Germans.

To the pious immigrants it revealed what they had long suspected, that the American attitude toward history was out of date, presumption tainted with rationalism, American religion behind the time.

For American religion within the parish of the Lutheran church, the Definite Platform, like the Compromise of 1850 elsewhere, marks

<sup>1</sup> Definite Platform Controversy: Spaeth, I, 347, 175; Jacob's *History*, p. 436; Bente, II, 98-101; III-34, 145, 154-55, 175. Attitude of the Liberals toward history: Bente, II, 203-4.

<sup>2</sup> Unionism 1817, Shober. Jubilee Book. Nothing to prevent union between Episcopalians, Methodists, and Baptists (Bente, I, 121-22; Spaeth; Krauth, pp. 1, 323; Bente, II, 20-21).

Rationalism: Into North Carolina from Helmstad (Bente, I, 121-22); into New York, Quitman's *Catechism* (1814), published with consent of Synod, denies deity and atonement of Christ (Quitman studied under Semler). Report from Halle in 1875 (swine), Bente, I, 98-99.

<sup>3</sup> Creed, why we need one: Jacob's *History*, p. 361; 1829 pastoral letter points to a need of creed against socinianism (Bente, II, 33). Absence means weakness. Attitude toward negative; not binding on conscience. Maryland and Virginia Synod (Bente, I, 145).

the passing of the old régime. It is the passing of the eighteenth century, of Pietistic Christianity, of Liberalism, of an older religious rationalism with a pragmatic use of history. In the eighteenth century the lion of rationalism and the lamb of Pietism had lain down together. Both the religious man and the natural man had seen in the laws of nature as discoverable by empirical reason the revelation of the divine law. They had hoped to derive therefrom a principle of law and order acceptable to both. The new generation would seek in history a guiding principle and norm. Luther's conception of natural law came back. History came back to confound science, and "beneath the metaphysical ice-cap had always glowed the historical mind."<sup>1</sup> Original sin came back. Between the peasant, the state, and the rationalist, between those three a new social situation had arisen, which made impossible the old response to a "be ye united." Religion was called upon to rationalize its "be ye separate" once more.<sup>2</sup>

History came back in the guise of religion. The question here is why American Lutherans educated at Princeton, or owing their education to the apprenticeship system of Muehlenberg, did not see farther than they actually did. The giant on whose shoulders they were standing was an American religious rationalism. Whether they could do justice to the inherent interest of the Lutheran church with what little knowledge of its history they had was at least a question. One interest of this church lay in the continuity of its history: in the consciousness thereof in the minds of Lutherans abroad finding its way into the minds of its leaders in America. One element of superpersonality lay here, in continuity, and continuity as a reality of living minds was in Europe and came from there. In Europe it was a function which had become an organ. To European Lutherans their church, together with other heavenly bodies, would have to hum along "in *Brudersphären Wettgesang*" indeed, but ancient music, sacred music, historical music it would have to be, not man-made music—not so that they knew it, at least. That music, or put it in terms not of the romantic but of the rationalistic age—that law of

<sup>1</sup> See Lord Acton's *Historical Essays and Studies*, especially pp. 347, 348, 362, 387; "The Germans in the nineteenth century preferred the simplicity of resistless cause to the confused conflict of free wills." See also *ibid.*, p. 368.

<sup>2</sup> See also Dodd, *Cotton Kingdom*, pp. 53, 103, 117; Becker, *Declaration of Independence*, pp. 79, 216, 248, 256.

gravitation—was a function of European history, of the understanding thereof engendered by the social situation therein. But here American Christians were making this brother-sphere roar in unison with the roaring forties. Its superpersonality revolted against this performance; at least the men who came and saw with the eyes of Europe—they did. To them a church was an institution, and about institutions German historical romanticism had its own notions. One of those notions was that there are institutions and institutions, that the state is the state and the church is the church. The American church, on the other hand, had ceased to be the one without being entirely the other. American Christianity and rationalism looked dangerously alike to newcomers. It was also revolutionary.

But from the inherent interest of superpersonalities and institutions, this brings us back to the social situation in the realm of mortals. For whether in a dynamic universe institutions may harmonize, that all depends upon the behavior of mortals. But in Europe the decisive situation was *Sturm und Drang*: the counter-revolution.

A new consciousness of difference between the living had here engendered a new consciousness of kind with the dead; hence the new history as a decisive element in the situation between personalities and superpersonalities in America and elsewhere.

Concerning the social situation among the living which conditioned the "be ye separate," it must be said that the Cain's mark of the outlaw was on the European rationalist. The "swine that had been uprooting the Garden of Christ in Germany" in the eighteenth century had complicated the problem of group-cohesion in America in spite of the early vigilance of the Pennsylvania Ministerium. In the present social situation he is the original sinner. American rationalists had started a revolution by seeking a precedent therefor, and then agreed with their Christian brethren upon a day of prayer as the proper way to open proceedings. European revolutionists were remembered for other deeds. Their mimicry was not so social, and by 1850 there could be no fellowship between German rationalists and German believers. No fellowship with liberals where Liberalism meant war to the church, if not to religion.

In America the situation was even worse for German Christians. The freethinking Germans in exile were fiercely aggressive. With the wrath of baffled purpose, the suppressed desire of their loneliness,

these Arabs of the cultural desert haunted the few oases, swooped down upon any German congregation that they could find. In Europe they would "strangle the last king with the entrails of the last priest." In America they thought nothing of shooting at a window behind which they suspected a cardinal in Cincinnati, or of shying bricks in the direction of a priest in Milwaukee. They harassed cruelly the faithful. People who were so lonesome by the waters of the new Babylon that they wept at the sound of a Mississippi steamer bell (it suggested the chimes of the good communal life), were here met by their own kin with jibes at their abiding faith. They were hurt the more cruelly for the fact that those jibes came in the only language that they could understand and in terms of satire which they could not. There could be no peace with Amalek.

In the presence of the frightful preparations of those rationalists for their millennium, Protestants in Germany and Lutherans, in particular, who are "by nature conservative," had long been uneasy; especially disturbed for the fact that even as in America, rationalism had been discovered in the fold of the church itself, working havoc with the consensus within as well as without. They were revolutionizing theology itself; they had carried the war into Africa. No wonder Christians were again asking themselves, "What must I do to be saved?" The answer to that question now was history and faith: faith in history.

But because the rationalists with impious hands and sinister purpose were dabbling in history, history became taboo as a revelation. To reason, entering the sacred temple of the divine truth, the divine presented itself as historical, and the historical as the divine. The key to the mystery remained with the theologian.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Theological concept of evolution: *Kirchenfreund* (1856), p. 288; (1852), pp. 173, 348, 350, and 352. Attitude toward it of American German church organs: *Kirchenfreund* (1852), p. 400. Compare the publications of the General Synod, such as *Lutheran Observer*, *Lutheran Quarterly* (1909, 1917); *Lehre und Wehre* (1917), p. 562; (1909), p. 279.

Attitude toward the Revolution of 1848, the state, the liberals, the "new Catholics," freethinkers, etc.: *Kirchenfreund*, LII, 208; *Der Lutheraner* (1847), p. 22; *Jahrgang*, II, 11; III, 19; *Lehre und Wehre*, Vol. IX. On the "inalienable rights of man," see pastors' conference, Chester, Illinois, 1866 (*Lehre und Wehre*, XII, 297). On "natural reason," *Alt. 1900, Östl. Dist.* (1867), pp. 14-27; Wisconsin (1891), p. 19.

Reaction of fundamentalists toward American Protestantism. General Synod: "Open counterfeits, Calvinists, Methodists, unionists, traders and destroyers of the

The resulting change in the social situation in America, the coming of history as a new element in the situation—closing the circuit—that was due to the presence of the rationalist. This becomes evident from a study of the theological literature of the Germans in America. Its most intelligent and best informed "social sensorium," the *Deutscher Kirchenfreund* of Professor Schaff at Mercersburg is suggestive in this respect.<sup>1</sup> It is also important in this connection because it was intended to be a contact pioneer between the two religious worlds. It suggests the *Evangelische Kirchen Zeitung* of Hengstenberg, Gerlach, Leo, and others in its policy. In America it takes the place of the *Evangelische Magazin* of 1812. Like the latter, it criticizes the drift in Germany and in America in matters of religion and otherwise. A comparison between the two shows the change in the situation between 1812 and 1850. Like the latter, it has little use for rationalism, but it knows why. It knows its history. It is well informed on the drift of theological scholarship in Germany, on the *kirchliche Zustaende in Deutschland*. It quotes Hengstenberg's conviction that the ecclesiastical *Amt*, the calling of the ministry, comes from God, is a divine institution and not referable to the element of corporateness in the church; that all who attack the divinely ordained *Staats-und-Kirchenordnung* are revolutionists. Hengstenberg thought that had Luther foreseen the modern confusion in the relation between church and state, he would have restrained his opposition against the Roman hierarchy. Nor can the writer in the *Kirchenfreunde* in America, who apparently has studied with Hengstenberg, understand the antagonism of American Protestantism against that same church, for "rationalism is the greatest enemy of the church."<sup>2</sup> The church in the presence of those "modern Sadducees," the communists in Europe and in America, needs laws. From that point of view entirely, namely, a polemic against the radicals, it gives an excellent survey of historical theology in Germany. All the

Lutheran church," *Lehre und Wehre* (1858), 137; *Lutheraner* (1845), p. 96; Wyneken, *Die Not der Deutschen Lutheraner in Amerika* (1842); *Lutheraner*, I, 44-45; *Allg. Synode*, 1-10 (1857), pp. 310-11. Their point of view of the general character of the Lutheran church, *All. 1919*. Summary of Missouri Doctrine, *Allg. Del.* (1893), pp. 26 ff.

<sup>1</sup> *Evangelische Kirchen Zeitung* founded by Hengstenberg, Gerlach, Leo, and others, 1827 ff. *Deutscher Kirchenfreund*, Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, 1849 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Kirchenfreund* (1852), pp. 271-73, 136, 141.



tribulations of church and state it blames on the rationalist, whose ravages in theology it traces in Hundeshagen's historical account.<sup>1</sup> It also traces the influence of that theology on England and America. It quotes, for instance, E. B. Pusey's letter in the *Morning Chronicle*, attesting to the influence of his study of Tholuck on the one hand and the course of German theological rationalism on the other—on his tractarianism.<sup>2</sup> It sees in the revolution of 1848 the fruit of the seed of theological rationalism, and rejoices that the revolution has made manifest the real functions of the church within the state. What reaction has done in the political field, the new theology has done to rationalism. It has beaten it *auf das kahle Haupt*.

A new concept of history and of its Protestantism can here be traced in its sociological inception. "Baur is wrong: Protestantism does not mean the widest freedom of thought."<sup>3</sup> In the presence of the rationalists, German Protestantism in America made haste to repudiate its own radicalism, redefine its position, and explain its history. It endows it not only with a new meaning, but with a new feeling. Having taken its bearings from its dislike for rationalism and a complementary light in history, it finds a new ego and a new socius. Neighbors long known to be enemies become friends and close relatives. The Protestant rationalism of American relations has become chilling, its anti-Catholicism dangerous. Protestantism should by no means be cut off from its churchly roots. Protestantism is not the whole sphere of the church. But here American radical Protestantism "makes common cause with the revolution." What has Christianity to do with Belial?<sup>4</sup>

The American *Zeitgeist*, the enormous prestige of the idea of progress in America, had led the General Synod to repudiate funda-

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 68, 298, 325.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 323-24.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 200, 298.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 174, 192, 292, 348; *ibid.*, pp. 323-24; see article, "Die deutsche Theologie und die Kirchenfrage," pp. 338 ff., especially pp. 348-53; also "Kirchenchronik," pp. 366-67, 463; "Das Princip des Protestantismus," also Schaff Inaugural on the same subject; also Schenkel, *Wesen des Protestantismus*. For a subject of evaluation of the literature on the essence of Protestantism, born under the influence of rationalism, *ibid.*, pp. 442-50. See also articles by Dr. Nevin in *Mercersburg Review* (1852).

mentalism. "In this advanced time of Christian liberality and progress we have no sue for ministers any more who have been educated according to the antiquated system of this abnormal seminary. We need men who are alive, and no prediluvial petrefactions."<sup>1</sup> That had been the point of view of the American Lutheran Christianity of the General Synod. With the Germans in Europe it was the other way around. Here *Fortschritt* meant *Umsturz*; theology became first petrified in the presence of the terror and then turned sharply the helm of progress. The German idea of progress and the American idea of progress began to differ sharply in 1850—in theology as elsewhere.

But this is not to say that German fundamentalism came in with Professor Schaff. Schaff himself was a unionist, believing, as we have seen, in a world-Christianity with the church invisible, embracing all churches and sects. He and his co-workers of the *Kirchenfreunde* had adopted the German evolutionist conception of Christianity, only it was not to be "creative evolution." It is to say that under the influence of rationalism, personal Christianity became historically reconditioned: institutional, not personal Christianity, it was to be. Its radicalism, its wilfulness, was to become subject to the organic law of history. A majority of Christians were no longer trusted to stumble toward the right by the sheer momentum of their natural bend. Neither faith nor reason was any longer "right reason" as a matter of course. Not unless they conformed with history and a historical creed, reasoned from its major premises and followed its precedents. Hereafter "the fathers" were to sit in judgment of the performance of the living as a stern and imperative synedriion in theology and as the powers that be in the state.

But German fundamentalism was already here.<sup>2</sup> Into its coming there enters still another element: the relation of personal Christianity to the *Staats Kirche* and the new state. James, the "wisest fool" in England in his day, had driven the Puritans to set up in America their Christian commonwealth. For the German Puritans, Frederick William IV and the new state in Prussia and Saxony did the same. In the nineteenth century the Puritans came again. Some

<sup>1</sup> *Lehre und Wehre*, X, 315, quoting the *Lutheran Observer*.

<sup>2</sup> Its sociology will be the subject of the next paper.

of them came from Germany and founded the Missouri Synod, which is the most powerful German Lutheran church in America today. A perfect Christian commonwealth with a dualistic order, the social philosophy of the apostolic church in the Roman Empire it is, and of sixteenth-century Germany, awaiting a Christian statesman in twentieth-century America.

But that rationalism, and not the state or the state church was the decisive element in the situation, becomes evident from a comparison of German theological historicism and German theological fundamentalism in their attitude toward the revolution of '48.<sup>1</sup> So it is from their attitude toward Kossuth and his appeal to America to make the world and the state safe for democracy in Europe.<sup>2</sup> On this they both agreed: nothing good could come from rationalism. The forty-eighters were the original "Reds," they were the devil incarnate. Both the *Lutheraner* and its Catholic counterpart, the *Seebote* in Milwaukee, entertained their readers during the dull political season in America with accounts of the awful happenings at the bedside of dying "freethinkers." But when the political dull season was over and radicalism proved very much alive, there could be no doubt to these people of the meaning of the Revolution. It was "Satan against Christ." "Behind the dazzling sign of liberty, equality, and the brotherhood of man, the devil has designed to tear down through armed mobs the governments by the grace of God and to set

<sup>1</sup> Attitude toward the revolution in the Lutheran press: *Lutheraner*, I, Nos. 11, 12; V, pp. 30-31, 133, 161; V, No. 2, pp. 9-12; Nos. 6, 12, 13; democracy kills the calling concept, V, No. 5, p. 18. See also the Catholic view in *Brownson's Review* (1854), II, No. 18, p. 456; October, 1852; *Shepherd of the Valley*, July 19, 1853; November 23, 1851. See also *Christlicher Hansfreund*, 1848-64, especially 1854, *passim*; also the *Seebote*, Milwaukee, *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> Revolution and Kossuth, *Kirchenfreund* (1852), pp. 10-12, 94. Revolution is political Puritanism breaking with history; philosophy has outlived its usefulness. What is needed is a return to positive and institutional Christianity. American Kossuth enthusiasm is anti-Romanism. Historical theology must teach that over and against rationalism, Socialism, Atheism, Pantheism—Protestants and Catholics are allied. *Kirchenfreund* (1852), pp. 37, 43, 86, 88, 92. American Protestants don't know what they're doing. See also the order of the day (*Pol. Rundschau*) *Kirchenfreund* (1856), pp. 108, 120, 122. *Lutheraner* (1849), No. 5, p. 38 (non-resistance to evil makes the Hungarian Revolution unjustifiable). On American Lutherans and their enthusiasm for Kossuth, see "Das Kossuth Fieber," *Lutheraner*, February 3, 1852, pp. 90-96. Compare the American Presbyterian attitude: *Presbyterian Magazine*, on law and order in general, Michigan, 1909, *Alt. 1909*, pp. 30-32, 36.

up by popular sovereignty a government which would shortly destroy all ecclesiastical order and restraint, would let fleshly equality and license in, meaning communism in women and property, and would turn Germany into one great robbers', murderers', and whorers' den." A victory for the Republicans would have meant "the return of the terrors of the French Revolution and the bloody persecution of the faithful in all churches. But the Lord of Hosts has blessed the arms of monarchy, and smitten the Republicans." This, then, was the reason why Americans must have nothing to do with Kossuth and the cause of democracy in Europe. Otherwise and elsewhere, the Lutheran has no calling to meddle with politics. "The proper attitude of the Christians towards all political affairs is one of holy indifference. Let those cut each other's throats who have no treasures in heaven; the Christian is content with any temporal regiment; the state is but a hostelry, the Christian is but a guest to whom it cannot occur to overthrow the rules of the house."

In this spirit of perfect otherworldliness and with this conception of their calling, these old Lutherans had obeyed their "be ye separate," gone to Missouri, and built them log cabins with their own hands. They were the pioneers of fundamentalism and the founders of a mighty church in America.

*[To be continued]*

# A STUDY OF THE TYPE OF THE PLACE OF BIRTH AND OF THE OCCUPATION OF FATHERS OF SUBJECTS OF SKETCHES IN "WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA"

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## ABSTRACT

Replies from 18,400 persons sketched in the current edition of *Who's Who in America* indicate that 25.9 per cent were born on farms, 24.5 per cent in villages and towns, 24.8 per cent in small cities, 20.6 per cent in large cities, and 4.1 per cent in suburbs. In proportion to population at the 1870 census, cities contributed nearly 6 times as many as did farms, villages 9 times as many, and suburbs 11 times. The fathers of 70 per cent of these persons belonged to the professional or business classes (34.3 per cent and 35.3 per cent respectively); 23.4 per cent were farmers, 6.3 per cent were skilled or semiskilled laborers and only 0.4 per cent were unskilled laborers. In proportion to population at the 1870 census, these classes ranked in this order in the production of notables and had a value of about 1,400, 600, 70, 30, and 1 respectively. Clergymen fathered 2,400 times as many notables as did unskilled laborers. in proportion to number. Indicated variations in the productivity of certain professions and denominations are also given, as well as a statement as to the interpretations of these findings.

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A special request was sent to each of the persons whose sketches appeared in the 1922-23 edition of *Who's Who in America*. They were asked to indicate the type of place in which they were born (on a farm, in a country village, in a small city, in a large city, or in a suburb of a large city). They were also asked to indicate the chief occupation of their father at about the time of their birth. Adequate replies were received from 18,356 persons, about four-fifths of those still living at the time the requests were sent out.

Most of the replies were recorded by two clerks in the Chicago office, but those concerning which there was any uncertainty, also the last 600 received, were sent, with the data as to the others, to the writer for study. The writer had made an earlier study of the birthplaces by states of women in the previous edition, and had been instrumental in having the present requests for fuller information sent out by A. N. Marquis & Co.

Table I deals with the type of birthplace. The first column gives the subdivisions of the questionnaire with the population

limits assigned to villages, small cities, and large cities. The second column shows the number of persons replying who reported as having been born in each type of place; the third column the percentage each type made of the total replies; the fourth column gives the approximate percentage of the total population of the United States living in such places in 1870, the census nearest the date of birth of the largest number of persons studied. The other columns show the ratios between the third and fourth column and the

TABLE I  
TYPE OF BIRTHPLACES OF SUBJECTS OF SKETCHES IN "WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA," VOL. XII (1922-23)

Place	Total Reporting	Percentage	Percentage of 1870 Population*	Ratio between Percentages in Columns 3 and 4	Persons per Notable†	Notables per 10,000	Relative Value
Farm.....	4,750	25.9	69.9	1:2.7	9,370	1.0	1
Village (up to 8,000)....	4,488	24.5	8.2	3:1	1,171	8.5	8.9
Small city (8,000-50,000)...	4,571	24.8	10.9	2.3:1	1,546	6.5	6.1
Large city (50,000 plus)...	3,789	20.6	10.0	2.1:1	1,667	6.0	5.6
Suburb of large city.....	758	4.1	1.0	4:1	856	11.6	10.9

\* The 1870 census classed all places having a population of less than 8,000 as rural. All larger places together made up 20.9 per cent of the population. In order to subdivide these two classes further to obtain the percentages for the units "farm," "small city," etc., curves were made of the percentages at 1880, 1890, and 1900, at which censuses subdivisions were made. The curves obtained were nearly all almost straight lines, hence their projection backward ten years to 1870 doubtless gives the approximate percentages for that year. The percentage for the suburbs, however, is a mere estimate based on a number of representative cities. It is subtracted from the percentage obtained by the previous method for villages up to 8,000.

† Allowance is made for the fact that returns were not received for all persons sketched in Vol. XII, also the fact that approximately one-half of the notables were born either before 1865 or after 1875, hence should not be accredited to the people of 1870 but to earlier or later generations.

approximate share each type of place has had, in proportion to population, in furnishing birthplaces to these notable persons.

Table II is concerned with the occupations of the fathers of the persons who replied to the special requests. The occupations mentioned in the request are given in the first column. The person was requested to indicate the general type of his father's occupation by checking one of the names given in column 1, and to write in the name of the trade, profession, or denomination. These written-in names assisted in the classification of occupations, and made possible the analysis given in Table III.

In the second column of Table II is given the number of persons reporting their fathers' occupation of each general type; in the third

column is given the percentage each type makes of the total reporting. In the fourth and fifth columns are given, for each type of occupation, the number of percentages of the gainfully employed men in the United States at the 1870 census.<sup>1</sup>

TABLE II  
OCCUPATIONS OF FATHERS OF PERSONS IN "WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA," VOL. XII

Occupation	Total Reporting	Percentage	Approximate Number of Men at 1870 Census	Percentage	Ratio between Columns 3 and 5	Persons per Notable*	Notables per 10,000	Approximate Value
Farmers.....	4,310	23.4	2,955,000	29.5	1:1.3	1,100	9††	70
Laborers, unskilled....	94	0.4	4,514,000	45.2	1:116	75,000	0.013	1
Laborers, skilled and semiskilled.....	1,165	6.3	1,800,000	18.0	1:3	2,470	4	30
Business men.....	6,473	35.3	504,000	5.0	7:1	124	80	600
Clergymen.....	2,036	11.1	43,800	0.4	28:1	32†	315	2,400
Other professional men (Men of leisure).....	4,265	23.2	185,000	1.8	13:1	70	142	1,035
	49	0.3	?	?	?	?	?	?

\* Takes into consideration the fact that not all of those in *Who's Who*, Vol. XII, gave information as to occupation of father, also the fact that approximately one-half of the notables were born either before 1865 or after 1875 and hence should not be accredited to the fathers of 1870, but to earlier or later generations of fathers.

† According to the census, there were approximately 3,700 celibate Roman Catholic clergymen in the United States in 1870; this number was subtracted from the total clergymen before the calculations giving this figure were made. The figures to the right likewise refer to Protestants.

‡ This figure at first sight appears to be inconsistent with the corresponding figure of Table I, but when it is recalled that here the farmer alone is considered and there the entire farm population, including the farmer's wife and family and the farm laborers and their children (very numerous among the negroes), it is seen that the difference in these figures is not too large.

Tables I and II appear to warrant four conclusions: (1) Professional men and business men each fathered somewhat more than a third of the American notables born about 1870, and "farmers" nearly one-quarter. Skilled laborers contributed a small share, but the vast numbers of unskilled laborers almost none. (2) In proportion to their numbers in the general population, the professional men have contributed more than twice as many notables born about

<sup>1</sup> The numbers were obtained by adding up the numbers given for each of the related trades and occupations. All clerks (except 100,000 engaged in stores) were included under skilled labor, as were also all those engaged in any of the more or less skilled trades, and "governmental officials." Under "business man" were included merchants, dealers, manufacturers, brokers and bankers, and 100,000 "clerks" in stores (about 40 per cent of the men clerks in stores). This last was done because most of the merchants and dealers start out as clerks, also because many of the higher clerks are business men rather than skilled laborers. The professional group includes, besides the regular professions (except clergyman), ship captains, pilots, and officers in the army and navy. "Farmers" include only those listed as farmers. Farm

1870 as the business men, nearly twenty times as many as the farmers, about forty-five times as many as the skilled laborer class, and 1,340 times as many as the unskilled laborer. Moreover, according to these data for the period of about 1870, twice as large

TABLE III  
A PARTIAL ANALYSIS OF THE LARGER DENOMINATIONS AND CERTAIN OTHER  
SPECIAL GROUPS OF PROFESSIONAL MEN

Occupation	Total Reporting	Number of Men at 1870 Census	Persons per Notable	Notables per 10,000
Engineers.....	24	4,700	157	62
Sea-captains and pilots.....	76	3,600	38	237
Lawyers.....	625*	41,000	52	192
Physicians.....	480	62,000	103	96
Presbyterian clergymen.....	570	6,100†	11	900
Congregational clergymen.....	360	2,900	8	1,250
Episcopal clergymen.....	270	2,333	9	1,160
Baptist clergymen.....	210	9,200	44	230
Methodist clergymen.....	150	14,600	97	103

\* If the ratio present in the last 600 returns received holds throughout. Applies also to rest of this column.

† Obtained by dividing the number of church organizations at the 1870 census by the ratio between number of organizations per clergyman for this denomination at the 1890 census. This note applies to all the denominations.

a percentage of clergymen's sons became such conspicuously valuable members of society as to win a place in *Who's Who* as was the case with the sons of other professional men combined. (3) Although 25.9 per cent of the 18,400 notables reported having been born on a farm, this is a relatively small proportion when it is realized that about 70 per cent of the people lived on farms in 1870.<sup>1</sup>

laborers, of whom there were almost as many in 1870 as of farmers, were classed as unskilled laborers, which group includes also the employed men not included in one of the preceding groups. Many of the farm laborers were negroes, with large families.

In classifying the replies to the questionnaire, those fathers who were described as having more than one chief occupation afforded some difficulty. Many fathers were described as "farmer and teacher," "farmer and preacher," etc., but these were all classed as farmers, although doubtless they belong in a somewhat special class. Many of the persons filling out the questionnaire were born during or just after the Civil War, and the fathers of a considerable number (121) were described as army officers or retired army officers and a few as privates. The privates were classed among unskilled laborers.

<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, a considerable number born on farms stated that their fathers were not farmers. Some of these were born during summer vacations or in homes of relatives, others were the children of country pastors or teachers or of men engaged in a nearby village or city. In 1870, very few farmers' children were born in hospitals.



Large cities were the birthplaces of 5.6 times as many notables, in proportion to the population, as farms. Small cities did slightly better, and villages contributed nearly nine times as many relatively as did the farms. (4) The findings of the two questions on birth-place and occupation supplement each other and render almost indisputable the conclusion that the farms about 1870 did not contribute their proportionate share of the country's notables. Farmers fathered about one-fourth less than their share, but did much better than other manual workers, contributing  $2\frac{1}{3}$  times as many as skilled and semi-skilled laborers and 70 times as many as the nearly one-half of the men of the nation classed as unskilled laborers. However a considerable proportion of the farmers of 1870 were not "hereditary farmers" but were instead townsmen who had homesteaded free government land and became farmers for only a time.

Conclusions drawn from Table III are not nearly so fully supported as the four conclusions drawn from Tables I and II. However, the comparatively low rank indicated for engineers and physicians may be explained by the fact that the requirements were very low in 1870 and hence many engineers and physicians were poorly educated and not very capable. Among the denominations, the indicated comparatively low rank of the Methodists and Baptists is partly explained by the relatively large number of negro pastors. Also certain sects among the whites did not require such highly educated clergymen as was the rule with the other three denominations shown. The comparatively high rank of sea-captains is partly explainable by the fact that most of them were Yankees (New England stood very high in the production of the notable men of the last generation). Furthermore, the alertness, decision, and valor of sea-captains and their wide experience doubtless helped them father notable sons.

Studies by Odin, Ellis, Cattell, Davies, and Clarke of other notables have likewise indicated that the professional classes and the centers of population have contributed a larger proportion of notables than have the unskilled laborers or the regular farmers.\*

\* Odin, *French Men of Letters of Five Centuries* (in French), 2 vols., Paris, 1896; Havelock Ellis, *A Study of British Genius*, London, 1904; J. McKeen Cattell, *American Men of Science*, Appendixes, 2d edition, 1910, 3d edition, New York, 1921; George R.

Two radically different interpretations have been offered concerning the comparative value of the several elements of the population in the production of notable men. Galton, Davenport, and certain other biologists have believed that heredity is of prime importance and hence that the notable men come from the superior elements of the population, which are concentrated in certain types of occupation and place. On the other hand, Ward, Cattell, Davies, and others have emphasized the importance of the environment. Ward believed that there were 200 times as many men inherently capable of becoming eminent as do in fact become notable. Similarly, Cattell believes that America can have as many high-class scientific workers as we will give suitable opportunities to. On this basis of environment, the conditions revealed in Tables I and II indicate not differences in ability but instead differences in educational opportunities, encouragement, and leisure for constructive work. The high rank of clergymen may thus be due to superior opportunities along those lines supplemented by helpful home training in serious thinking, thrift, and expression.

Upon either interpretation, the situation today is probably appreciably different from that of 1870. If heredity is the main factor, doubtless a smaller percentage of the nation's exceptionally able men have become clergymen, and a larger percentage have gone into other professions and business. On the other hand, the proportion of farmers and unskilled laborers of unusual ability is probably less now than in 1870, because during recent decades there has been an active selective movement of many of the more alert and capable from these occupations. If environment is the chief influence, the last half-century has likewise seen a notable change in a widening of opportunities for education and an increase of leisure. Indeed, the children of successful merchants and business men today have about as much leisure and opportunity for education and self-expression as the children of professional men. Even the children of prosperous farmers have opportunities not common among farmers' sons of 1870.

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Davies, "A Statistical Study in the Influence of the Environment," *Quarterly Journal of the University of North Dakota*, April, 1914; and E. L. Clarke, *American Men of Letters* (1,000 born before 1851), "Columbia University Studies," Vol. LXXII, 1916.

## CONCLUSIONS

This study does not indicate whether "nuture" (environment) or "nature" (heredity) is the more important, nor does it accurately describe the conditions today, when the leaders of the next generation are being born. It does, however, clearly indicate that a large share of the notables of today have come from certain relatively minor elements of the population. More than one-third have come from the professional classes, which comprised only one forty-fifth of the population in 1870. The 5 per cent of the men of America classed in this study as business men contributed 35 per cent. Thus 70 per cent of the notables were fathered by less than 7.5 per cent of the nation's men. In contrast, unskilled laborers fathered almost none of the notables in *Who's Who*, and although farmers fathered 23.4 per cent, that percentage is about one-fourth less than their share in proportion to population.

## CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

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### ABSTRACT

That like-minded men shall form themselves into groups is psychologically natural and socially helpful. So it has always been. But there is a new grouping now, one founded on circumstance, on success and failure. The extension of an education which needs must be superficial, and the teaching of equality, have together stimulated the hope of those who are down. The rich have long possessed a class consciousness, but this has now extended to the poor—these latter are now realizing their might. Here is a phenomenon which appeals to justice, and yet which is a menace to the whole social structure. What is to be done with it? Contest here can be only destructive. There must be a readjustment in our social outlook. Education must be revised and old conventions abandoned. The rich must realize their responsibilities, and rich and poor alike must be taught the truth about society, that privileges must be earned, that duty is paramount. Love for the state will over-ride class boundaries. Let this then be taught instead of national vanity. Let the interdependence of man be ever emphasized; let the social relation be ever taught both in the home and in the school. Here is the true part of "socialism." Let us adapt this to our present social life, and thereby avoid the catastrophe of experiment.

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Like-minded people tend to gather together; institutions are formed, social, political, and religious, clubs, parties, and churches, and cliques within these. As individuals there are no two alike, but we have our resemblances, and it is upon the basis of these that we unite into groups, pooling our interests and making of our near-mindedness a composite fairly acceptable to each.

It is a happy arrangement. Here is a process of psychological sorting automatically taking place the world over, limited only by national boundaries, and by these only partially. It is a kind of natural committee formation. Out of the medley of diverse human interests, a thinkable number of crystallized ideas is obtained. The myriads of mankind are reduced to a workable number of composite individuals, and it is with these composites, these groups, that society has mainly to deal. Revolution reveals this composition, and also the utility of it. Through the disintegration wrought by revolution, we get only the mob.

Groups, then, are both natural and desirable. But these groups have not always co-operated in charity. In the emotional past, with class consciousness high, we have had our Montagues

and Capulets, our Guelphs and Ghibellines, our Inquisitions, and our Thirty-Year Wars. And today? Well, today, Islam is still thinking the psychic realities and is hoping for war, but the rest of the world, having acquired some mutual understanding, is now become tolerant. In fact, the old groups have declined or are declining; argument and wordy quarrel alone represent the old bloody contests—and yet, here is a phenomenon! Instead of being content with the new peace and quiet, new groups are now diligently forming. We have liberality in religion, we have independents in politics, and we have a democracy in “society,” but now we must needs stir up the old devil once more and see what we can do with economics.

Is this, then, but a revival, or a survival? No, there is something new here. The groups we have spoken of were founded on like-mindedness, the new groups are not. These new groups are founded on circumstance, and to them like-mindedness comes, if it comes at all, only as a result of the grouping. Theirs is the like-mindedness of a mob, it exists for destruction only, and evaporates when the destruction is accomplished.

A universal education, an education which must needs be superficial, men being as they are, a vast increase in population making the life-struggle more bitter, and an invention which has annihilated distance and time, and has thrown each and every one of us into the general world-maelstrom—all these together have brought into evidence the inequality of men.

Does such a statement need proof? There is small space for that here, but let us repeat it with a few added words.

Education reveals differences which without it would go unsuspected. The schools are but so many graded filters through which men pass according to their fineness. Two men may be for all practical purposes equal, but give them education and the one draws away from the other, leaving that other discontented and sarcastic.

The increase in population makes success more than ever dependent upon talent, and, moreover, it makes the old ways useless. Turn England back to the cottage industries and England must starve. Take away the world's centralization of capital and the world must starve.

And then invention. Well, invention has come to capital's aid to help feed the world, but invention, too, has disadvantages. It gives false confidence and may lead the unthinking to disaster. Pushing a button and getting results gives a Jack Horner pride which invites to further, and possibly dangerous, experiments.

Here, then, we have a new world, vast, complicated, and difficult, and in this new world new groups—groups of Success and Failure. I am ignoring socialistic cant and the intricacies of socialistic thought, and taking it, fundamentally, as I see it. Men able of themselves to make good in society are never to be found in the army of discontent—except maybe as poseurs—and it is in the army of discontent we must look for our new class.

One is tempted here to speak of the normal and subnormal, for logically we may assume that since social success depends upon social adaptation and this in turn upon mental capacity, the attainment of success must needs imply a mental superiority. And as a matter of fact, the proportion of the rich in the world bears a direct mathematical relation to the proportion of worth. But this generalization cannot be leaned on too heavily. Self-made riches signify much, but riches are not always self-made. A man who can carve out his own fortune is a superior man, but when he dies his money still holds together for a while, and may pass to the unworthy. It may pass even to fools, and the fact cannot be hid. The fool looks successful, he certainly has every luxury, and he tells the world all about it—how then can success be only a reward for the worthy!

Let us take these classes of the rich and the poor, and, to give to these terms some practical significance, let us define them as the poor would define them. Let us say that we have on the one hand those who have to struggle bitterly for a living, and on the other those who struggle only for privilege and luxury. What is there new in these classes? The rich and the poor we have always had with us and always will. Some primitive men had better valleys to hunt in than had others—they had probably taken them away from these others. Even with the monkeys, doubtless some were better off than their fellows. No, the fact of wealth and poverty is not new; but the class consciousness is, at least on the part of the

poor. Democracy has emphasized the "equality" of all, invention has dangled luxury before the eyes of all, and a paltry education has fostered the hope of all. "Here we are, a great army of us, toiling and struggling for a beggarly existence, and here are these few, no better than us, who are getting it all. Let us rise in our might and smite them!" It is no unnatural thought—given only an imperfect education. Nor can the class consciousness itself be complained of; it has been strong enough for all ages with the rich and with the employers, why not now with the poor and the employed?

But where are we headed? Is class consciousness, either of the rich or the poor, a thing to be desired? Will it lead, as Lenine has promised, to a universal millennium? The revolution in Russia is supposed to have failed, so say the bolshevists, because the class consciousness there was imperfect. One would not have thought this of Russia. One would have thought that class feeling was there paramount, and that the revolution there *succeeded* because of it. And then one would have expected that when it came to reconstruction this same class consciousness would have produced only failure. What did happen in Russia?

Class consciousness blinds; it is an egoistic crust which separates us from our fellows, and prevents understanding. Understanding demands open-mindedness and an outward gaze, not introversion and a centering on self. But understanding, too, lies at the root of all successful endeavor, and especially, since society is essentially co-operative in character, does it lie at the root of all social endeavor.

That mankind tends to think in groups is natural enough—it is the easiest way—but it is not a manner of thinking that need be cultivated. So long as we think only as Protestants or as Catholics, as Democrats or as Republicans, as Americans or as Czechs, so long do we hedge in our thought and stultify it. Understanding is not so arrived at—quite other than that! In proportion as our class consciousness grows, our understanding contracts; with class consciousness perfect our understanding is at zero.

But this does not mean that for the attainment of understanding the class itself must be abolished; this cannot be, our groups must remain, they are, whether psychologically or circumstantially

determined, necessary for society. No, it means simply that our classes must be understood, and the mind thereby set free to transcend them. We do not burn our houses when they need a cleaning—we clean them. And the time has now come for a mental cleaning. Our prejudices have accumulated until they are breeding disease—we need a renovation.

Understanding has two handles, one of sympathy and one of intellect, and toward one or other of these we must reach. Which each will select is a matter of character and capacity. Sympathy, depending upon psychological resemblances, is broad and comprehensive—and uncertain. Intellect is keen and practical—and limited. Sympathy is not always wise, and has often led into difficulties. The intellect is not always to be trusted, and is too often only egoistic. And yet we must make our choice, for it is only in the perfected ideal that sympathy and intellect go hand in hand.

The best understanding through feeling, through sympathy, is that exhibited by the mother for her child, but from this lovely center its influence rapidly diminishes. Theoretically it embraces in turn family and clan, the race, and all mankind, but in these extensions it is rarely practical or compelling. In these outer reaches come in more immediate and insistent claims for our attention. We forget our common humanity and become individuals again, and again fight for privilege.

On the intellectual side, the best understanding is that of the student, but, again, from this center the understanding dwindles. The student is detached, lives outside of affairs, and is seldom swayed greatly by them. He is a spectator of the world, not part of it. All the world is his stage, and he, the audience. But let him go on the stage, and at once he finds his part laid down for him. He must do as the others of his group do, or he is forever anathema. He must look through their windows, their painted windows of prejudice, and see things with the colors there provided.

What is the solution of the problem? My suggestions I fear will be meager, and yet, I hope, practical.

Let it be remembered, first of all, that imagination plays a large part in our attitudes. Sentiments vary with the focus.



A man does not belong to one group only, but to many. A man may be a father, a New Yorker, an Italian, a Catholic, a laborer—and forty other things. But he is seldom more than one of these at a time. As he concentrates for the moment, so he is—and ready to fight for it! Let us gather these five men—or forty-five—and make of them but one. Let us give this man some all embracing sentiment which shall act as a cement for the whole. Let us give him a sentiment which he can share with others, and which shall be so real as to be always in evidence no matter what his rôle for the moment. The socialists of Germany became supporters of the throne when they believed Germany under attack. The labor wars in England and France ceased when Germany invaded Belgium; even the militant suffragists were stilled. The anti-revolutionists in Russia joined the revolutionists when the allies threatened invasion.

Is there no suggestion in these examples? I believe there is; and here is my first point. It would certainly seem, in default of better, that patriotism may well serve our turn; that in patriotism we have indeed a real social cement.

Internationalism may be the theoretical ideal of society, but I suspect it rather to be but the logical extreme, and logical extremes are inevitably wrong. There are limits to the stretching of our circle of sympathetic feeling; we soon get to a point where it becomes tenuous beyond use. But here in patriotism is something real. It has already been found sufficient to over-ride the bitterest of labor contests—let it be cultivated. It stands today as the one sentiment making the universal appeal so essential to union. Am I ignoring Christianity? Would that Christianity had been sometime tried; but it has not. Patriotism has no enemies—aside from the Third International and H. G. Wells; and the Third International is antisocial in intention and must forever remain outside any social scheme, while H. G. Wells may at any time find a new hobby.

But does patriotism mean war? Not a bit of it! Not true patriotism, not patriotism thoughtfully founded. An intense family love does not impel us to throw stones at our neighbors. A blatant, self-satisfied, egotistic conception of our country, of God's own country, of a country which never is wrong, a patriotism

which despises everything not its own—this indeed may lead to war; but this is *not* patriotism. It is the exhibition of an egoism which has outgrown the individual, which has become so great that it must find something bigger than the individual to tie to. But let patriotism be taught in our homes and our schools. Let us be proud of our country, and so proud that there is no room left for any vanity. When our country goes wrong, let us know that it is wrong, and let us feel a real shame for it, and then let us try to make it better. The decent man does not do many stupid things, he does not boast, and he is not often hypocritical. Let us insist that our country, too, shall not do stupid things, that it shall not boast, and that it shall not be hypocritical. War would then be impossible.

Let us look facts in the face. Let us study our history calmly. Nature's law, as someone has said, is to be strong, or if you cannot be strong, be cunning. Nations today follow this law. Nations are measured by their power of hurting. The weak nation is constantly exposed, first, to cunning, what we call diplomacy, and then, if this fails, to force, to arms. We of the United States are good and noble, and free from all the weaknesses of others, but never yet have we of the United States failed to take what we wanted, nor failed to praise ourselves for not taking what we did not want! Let us change all this. Let us teach history with some sense of superior values. Let us teach it as a lesson and not as a handbook for the encouragement of the national vanity. Let us teach, even, that some of our successes are things no longer to be applauded. "Man is a fighting animal," says Galsworthy, "with sense of the ridiculous enough to know that he is a fool to fight, but not sense of the sublime enough to stop him." Let us get this sense of the sublime. Let us get even common sense! As Shaw has put it, "Wars are unthinkable; when they become thinkable they will cease." Let us try to make them thinkable. Let us study them, and the rest of our history, in the light of decency and reason, and not with feeling only.

But what of our social economic groups and others from which now so much trouble is rising? The rich do not understand the poor, nor the poor the rich. The normal do not understand the

subnormal, nor do, or can, the subnormal understand the normal. The orderly do not understand the delinquent, nor the delinquent those who obey the law. The cleverest of scoundrels, says Dr. MacCunn, blunders like a fool when he tries to read the character of an honest man. And is not the reverse of this true? Do not honest men often blunder like fools when judging the "scoundrel"?

The rich man often thinks of the poor man as in some way poor by choice: he probably won't work, and is vicious and stupid. And even the philanthropist makes mistakes. He extends charity, but he expects a reward. He expects God to take notice, and he expects the poor to be loud in their gratitude. But, the poor man is no animal; absurd as it may seem, he, too, is a man and, unless very far gone, still has some pride; the money dropped in his hand, as someone has said, sounds to him very like the clanking of fetters. He has by begging acknowledged an inferiority, he has announced himself as a slave, and he is not just then filled with love. Remember, the poor understand the rich no better than the rich understand them. Lack of nourishing food brings illness and loss of initiative, but it does not inhibit desire. The poor man pictures the rich as rolling in luxury and rotten with vice; he knows nothing of their hours of labor and worry. He is bitter and envious—failure invites this. Why should he have any other picture in his mind? Do not the "movies" confirm his impressions, and is there not a group of the rich who actually lead the life there portrayed? The vulgar rich, reinforced by youth, make far more noise in the world than do the decent members of society. How can the poor man know that these noisy ones are really but a small fraction of the whole, that with all their glitter they are but a contemptible excrescence on an otherwise fairly healthy body? No, there is no understanding here! The poor do not realize the rich man's responsibility, nor the rich the poor man's meager opportunity. The rich man thinks what he would do if he but had the poor man's *time*, and the poor man thinks of what he would do if he but had the rich man's money.

And so with the other groups. The orderly man thinks the delinquent a fool, or worse, and the delinquent thinks exactly the same of the orderly man. That anyone should deliberately choose

to work hard six days a week for some miserable wage, when a few moments' skill could accomplish far more, seems to the delinquent a real proof of folly.

Is it to be objected that I have descended from the consideration of the great class prejudices to mere individual misconceptions? But it is precisely from these individual misconceptions, multiplied by the thousands, that the class prejudices come.

Let the schools get to work. Let the school course be humanized; let it teach societal relations. Let us make evident the functions of the various members of the body politic. Let us study Aesopus—I know of no better textbook of psychology—the fable of “The Belly and the Members,” and others. Have you ever heard a group of college boys talking of their futures? Nineteen out of twenty are hoping for sinecures, for privilege. Let it be taught in the schools that privilege is a blow at society, that a sinecure is something to be ashamed of. Jane Welsh wrote to Carlyle before their marriage urging that he seek some sinecure. He answers: “A sinecure! God bless thee, Darling! I could not touch a sinecure though twenty of my friends should volunteer to offer it.” Let the schools lay such a foundation of character, of truth and honesty and self-respect, that a position like Carlyle’s may cease to be notable, or even worthy of quotation.

Let the schools stop emphasizing democracy. The idea of democracy has become hopelessly muddled with that of individual liberty, and this means egoism, nothing else. Egoism needs no encouragement, it is too primitively strong already. Let us not train for individual preferment, let us train our boys to be poor! Here would be an occupational training no one could object to. If destiny brings poverty, then the boy is prepared to make the most of his small opportunities; if it brings wealth, then the boy is prepared to administer this wealth wisely. Why train our boys away from manual labor? Why insist that the man who labors with hands alone—if there be any such—is socially below that one who is chained to a desk. What is there in a miserable clerkship that is expressive of freedom?

Let the schools teach something of the material foundations of society. Let them teach something of the origins of our impulses.

Let them teach the opportunities and pitfalls of the various environments. And let them teach the broad vision. Do we have foolish rich? Yes, certainly, but do not let us get excited about these; they will soon return to their proper level. From shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves is but three generations. "I have seen the foolish taking root, but, lo, their habitation was presently consumed" (I Clement xviii. 10). Society is too complex to be always right, but do not let us magnify its errors. Time will adjust them. The wise rich are the only rich who will last, and let us be thankful that these will, for without them there could be no industry on a scale sufficient to support the present world's population.

But, on the other hand, let the rich and the wise not be vain. Their worth is not of their own making. Had any one of them happened to be born under less fortunate stars, that one might never have been either rich or wise. Had the wise man's grandfather happened to have had syphilis, this wise man might have been born a fool.

I have spoken only of the schools, but the greatest of all schools is the home. Let this never be forgotten! And what do we find in the home? The home today is the last stronghold of complacent class tyranny. The relation of employer to employed there is a relation that is reminiscent of the dark ages of industry. Servants are denied their humanity. They are different! Theirs is only to serve, to sit alone in their cheerless kitchens, and then to retire to dreary attics for their rest. When they get ill it is an affront to their mistress.

"I am so provoked! I was going to give a tea on Thursday, and now Eloise thinks she has appendicitis! I don't believe there is a thing the matter with her."

Or, "Bridget says her mother is very sick, and that she must go to her! Isn't it maddening?"

Of what avail are club meetings discussing pleasantly the inhumanity of man toward women in industry, when the maid who is passing the sandwiches is being treated with a cruel disregard of all natural needs? Discipline is of course necessary, but so is respect, and the latter should be mutual, as it is in the army. Discipline well administered is accompanied by courtesy and feeling.

Let us make our homes such that our youth will grow up with a respect for all labor. Let us get in a bit of fellow-service, of common service. Let each young person take some part in the household affairs, make some little contribution to the whole. Class consciousness cannot lead to understanding, it cannot lead to peace, either in homes or in nations. It can lead only to misunderstanding and contest. Let us prevent its beginnings in our youth. No retirement within a case-hardened shell can result in other than disaster. Let us cease this imbecile practice. Let us renovate our minds. Let us get charity, and some understanding, a uniting sentiment of patriotism, civic and national, a pride in our homes, and an interest in each of our fellows. Would not the world be the better?

## CAN THE SENTIMENT OF PATRIOTISM BE REFUNDED?

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### ABSTRACT

In this paper a distinction is made between social control, which is the restraint exercised by the social group upon wayward individuals, and presupposes existing standards of conduct and morals, and social morale which implies social integration, social discipline, social stability, and the conservation of all real social values.

This question of social morale, social health, social stability, and the conservation of values is just now the question of supreme importance in sociology.

Now, this paper discusses the forces upon which we must depend for this social morale in the approaching era of internationalism—where war and group rivalry are presumably to be absent.

We seem to have reached a sort of *impasse* in social progress. War, which has been the habitual occupation of the human race in the past, has suddenly attained a development of so formidable a character that it must either cease or bring the world to ruin. If, as we dream, by means of some Disarmament Conference, or World Court, or League of Nations, we succeed in putting an end to that kind of nationalism or sectionalism which leads to war, why then it would seem we shall be deprived of that peculiar source of internal social discipline which the menace of war insures. We are familiar with Professor McDougall's description of the warlike and semi-warlike and non-warlike tribes in the Island of Borneo. He found that the advantage lay in almost all respects with the warlike tribes. Their social organization was firmer and more efficient. The people were more loyal to their leaders, their general morality was higher, and the individuals were physically and mentally superior. In a word, social integration was found to be proportional to the degree of warlike habits.

It is probable that intertribal and international rivalry have acted in all ages as powerful incentives to social discipline and social solidarity. To use Mr. Trotter's terms, it is either defensive or offensive gregariousness that has contributed through the ages to

social integration. As an example of offensive gregariousness, we think of course of Germany, not only during the war but in the long years of preparation for it. Here was a well-integrated and well-disciplined nation, in which the *mores* were well observed. There was a high degree of morality, health, and social welfare. It was the high morale of a nation preparing for a possible war. A nation attacked or about to be attacked puts its house in order. In France somewhat the same results were gained by defensive gregariousness both before and during the war.

Patriotism, using the word in its broader sense, as devotion to the interests of the group, has always been a powerful conservator of order and discipline, that is, of social morale. And it comes about in this way. The history of political groups has been a history of warfare one with another. The condition of survival in any group has been discipline and solidarity within the group. If individuals or classes fall out with one another, the group may speedily become the prey of some other hostile group. Law and government prevail within the group, if it is to offer a successful front to other groups. As Professor Faris is so fond of telling us, parents among African savages do not punish their children; they do not have to; filial discipline is one of the many conditions of survival. There can be no internal discord in surviving groups. This means that the individual observes the *mores* of the community; in our language, obeys the moral law. Even in large modern nations, such as Germany, France, England, and America, one noticed the sudden, almost instantaneous, internal peace and harmony when war was declared. We can vividly recall the alacrity with which we got to our feet when the national hymn was sung in public meetings six years ago. We didn't want to be found sitting; we wanted to be one with the group—standing.

This brings us face to face with a dilemma. War seems to be necessary to social integration, yet war is the very thing we are trying to escape from, and which it is necessary to escape from if civilization is to be saved; and this is because modern warfare has become so expensive and destructive as to threaten ruin. We are looking forward now to some sort of internationalism to replace nationalism, some world state or federation or League of Nations



to prevent war. But with the passing of nationalism there will pass the spirit of devotion to the community which has ever been the source of social solidarity and discipline, and which was kept alive and vital by the ever imminent danger threatening the group by other groups.

Now, of course, the presumption is, expressed everywhere in books and lectures with more unction than psychological analysis, that devotion to the larger world state, or devotion to humanity, will take the place of devotion to the older small groups or nations. But this is problematical; it is the problem which I wish to raise. It seems to overlook the psychological grounds of devotion to the state, which is based on the necessity of self-protection. The whole fabric of the human mind, woven by ages of biological and social inheritance, has been determined by a certain situation, the situation being a social group whose survival in conflict with other rival groups depends upon a condition of internal social discipline, involving co-operation—and, if necessary, the sacrifice of the individual.

It would seem, therefore, that the sentiment of patriotism must in some way be refunded, sublimated, socialized, to meet the new social conditions of the future. So we turn to the psychologists to ask whether there is any ground for this hope; and the answer that we get is ambiguous. We are told that while our social order is changing with startling rapidity, the human mind is changing very slowly or not at all. The ancient impulses of pugnacity and a powerful impulsive devotion to a narrow group whose interests are contrary to some opposing group, are deep-seated in the human mind, ingrained by ages of antagonistic social life. When the group becomes large and when danger from other groups is not imminent, as in our modern states, these ancient impulses take other forms. The larger group splits up into smaller ones and we have the conflict of classes; and the loyalty and devotion that was directed to the tribe or state is now directed to the political party, or labor union, or Non-partisan League, or I.W.W., or what-not. Within the party, class, or union we find the same self-sacrificing devotion that in earlier times was directed to the tribe or state. But this devotion has for its object the narrow special interests of the special class or union and does not contribute to social morale. It tends to dis-

integrate the nation as a whole, not to integrate it. Ordinarily this internal dissension would render the nation an easy prey to hostile nations, if there were any.

What is wanted in our modern society is a different kind of loyalty from this. It is loyalty to the great society as such. It is complete co-operation of every part for the good of the whole. It involves the surrender of those selfish and antisocial impulses which militate against the interests of the whole. In older times it was such unselfish devotion to the tribe which enabled the tribe as a unit to hurl itself upon some rival tribe with all its power. This implies that the *mores*, the customs of the tribe, should be rigorously observed—obedience to the ruler, obedience of children to parents, mutual regard for life and property within the tribe, each individual keeping himself fit to fight, to work or hunt, to beget children.

In the world-state of the future, and to a very great extent in the large and complex states of the present, the social group must keep itself fit, not for protection against rival groups, but for protection against disintegrating forces within; in a word, against physical, mental, and social diseases, which threaten the collapse of our civilization. But the conditions of a healthy society, be this society a world-state or a tribe, are much the same; and to these conditions we give the name social morale. This implies co-operation, unselfish devotion of the individual to the interests of society as such, justice, honesty, sexual purity, temperance, industry, fidelity to one's husband, wife, children, parents, business associates, conservation of health, conservation of our biological inheritance, conservation of natural resources, soils, forests, fuel supplies, etc.

It is all these things that are included under the term social morale. We see that it is quite a different thing from social order, or social solidarity, or even socialization. It is social health and fitness, such as will enable a group to conserve and increase the degree of civilization which it has attained. We see, too, that the forces which are to insure social morale are different from those which are to secure social order and solidarity. Something more than social control must be our quest for the future. Social control implies the control of wayward individuals by the group, the implication being that the group itself is sound, or its leaders sound.

We see, too, that like-mindedness, about which so much has been said by sociologists, is not sufficient. A like-minded people may go down to defeat before the forces which threaten our modern society. In a given community, for instance, a degenerate stage or degenerate moving pictures might not be subject to social control if they should gradually come to reflect the moral standards of the whole community, but in time of imminent danger to the community there might be a sudden awakening to the necessity of such control.

In his recent book, *The Direction of Human Evolution*, Professor Conklin points out clearly what we have to look for in the years to come. Physical evolution of the human frame ended more than twenty-five thousand years ago. Intellectual evolution is also at an end. The development of the brain has reached its limit. We may never have another Aristotle, Descartes, or Humboldt. But social evolution has just begun. We are now in the midst of it. Just as the tendency has been since the beginning from unicellular organisms to complex organisms of many cells, in which there is greater specialization and co-operation of parts, so now in society the movement is toward highly complex social groups in which there is greater specialization, integration and co-operation.

It is this conception of social evolution which must be kept clearly in mind at this critical time in the world's history. A vast number of "progressive changes" are taking place now in society which are not evolutionary. They are called progressive only because we have identified progress with a lot of variations and mutations, which give us momentary thrills of conquest over nature, in which "science," "invention," "genius," "wealth," "comfort," "luxury," "freedom," "self-expression," all figure prominently. These things we count as progress. Nature perhaps sees them, or some of them, as unhappy variations weakening racial stocks in which they appear.

Social evolution on the contrary lies in the direction of that rational organization of society which shall make the human race hardy and fit. It is the ethical society, not the wealthy, comfortable, free society which will survive. No path of progress could indeed be more fatal to the interests of humanity than the one

proposed by Lester F. Ward in his *Applied Sociology*, to-wit, increased knowledge freely imparted to all men to the end of advancing science and invention, to the end of increasing still further the wealth of the world, to the end, when equitably distributed, of the production of happiness through the maximization of pleasures and the minimization of pains.

We have only to imagine a football team organized on such a basis as this, or an army, or a primitive social group surrounded by hostile groups, to understand the fatal weakness of such a program. It is remarkable that among all the countless plans for social, economic, and political reconstruction which have held the attention of the world for years past, as well as in all the modern Utopias, and Atlantises and ideal states that have been planned, so little thought has been given to the conditions of a strong, virile, and stable society. It is, I suppose, because we live in an economic age and our minds are obsessed with economic and political ideas. What we thought we wanted was well-distributed wealth, well-distributed opportunity, and political liberty, without troubling ourselves to ask whether these things have survival value.

The ideal state of the ancients, on the other hand, as illustrated in Plato's *Republic*, was constructed on a wholly different plan. Justice in Plato's ideal society was not a social situation in which everyone should receive his full share of the good things of the world, but one in which everyone should do that which belonged to him to do, a society in which there was perfect functioning of every part, perfect co-operation, perfect morale.

It is certainly interesting to learn now from the biologists that social evolution lies precisely in this direction, through co-operation, social integration, social solidarity, as Professor Conklin tells us in the book referred to; or through "communion of men," through altruism, through fundamental organic relations of co-operation, as Nicolai tells us in his striking book *The Biology of War*.

In saying that social evolution lies in the direction of large, complex, and highly differentiated social organisms, in which co-operation, integration, solidarity, and stability are the essential qualities, it is not to be understood that such evolution will necessarily take place. Of course, neither the biologist nor the sociologist guaran-

tees any such thing. It is only that if there is to be any further human evolution, any further progress of humanity, it must lie in this direction. It is quite possible that human evolution has reached its zenith and will decline. It is merely from analogy that the biologist registers his belief in this direction of human evolution, and it is by the study of war and the general social situation of the present that the sociologist reaches the same conclusion.

If, then, progress lies in the direction of an ethical society, in which co-operation, devotion to the common good, altruism, love, are the determining forces, what are the prospects that such a society can be realized? As regards the much heralded "movements" of the day which are to solve our social problems, such for instance as democracy (in the sense of a loose social organization with extreme individual liberty), votes for women, socialism, syndicalism, communism, none of them look in the direction indicated. These are all concerned with economic and political problems; being directed to equalize wealth and opportunity, to emancipate labor classes or to equalize political privileges. The constructive work of the world at present is devoted too largely to economic reform, not sufficiently to social reform; the assumption being that social evils will cure themselves if the economic ills are done away. Only give everybody sufficient wealth, opportunity, leisure, and freedom and they will at once behave themselves. This fallacy is abroad everywhere, but it is fatal. One might even say that in proportion as our economic problems are solved, our social problems increase. Comforts, luxuries, wealth, leisure, and freedom scattered generously to a hundred million people, whose average mental age is hardly fourteen years, whose powers of self-control and restraint are uncultivated, and who have been educated in a school not of discipline but of self-expression, if not even of self-indulgence and insurgency, contribute not to social stability but to social degeneracy.

Neither is our educational system such as to encourage an integrated, disciplined, co-operative society. For many years the emphasis has been put upon other things than co-operation, obedience to law, conservation of health, conservation of natural

resources, and reverential regard for moral laws. It has been put rather upon self-expression, the purpose being to bring out all the latent possibilities of the individual, encourage him to think and act for himself, make him a free self-assertive person, develop to the utmost his genius and his talent. All of which is very well; only when the centrifugal tendencies in society are urged beyond all measure, to the neglect of the centripetal tendencies, something unpleasant is likely to happen. In the name of progress we have encouraged insurgency. Possibly we shall learn too late that real progress depends upon survival value, and that the latter lies in the direction of discipline rather than insurgency.

For many years the emphasis upon social reform has been put upon social justice, in the sense of equality of wealth and opportunity, and upon freedom of thought and action; upon genius and initiative; upon scientific discovery and invention. All these things are excellent, but we have arrived now at a crisis in the world's history in which less emphasis will have to be put upon these things and more upon social morale, social order, social health, and social co-operation. Especial emphasis will have to be put upon the conditions of social stability. A certain minimum of physical and mental health there must be in any good society. Our social order may provide peace and plenty, work for all and ample wages, leisure, recreation, art and literature, and social justice, but if the people are physically and mentally degenerate the social order cannot continue. We need not discuss here what proportion of defectives, delinquents, and dependents society can carry; but there is a limit, and perhaps that limit has already been reached in our own social order.

And be it remembered, too, that whatever of health, physical and mental, whatever of social justice, work and wages, leisure, art and literature, are necessary for this generation are also necessary for the coming generations. We cannot purchase our own comfort or happiness at their expense. We may in this generation all be very happy, with our profiteering, our tax-dodging, our price-boosting, our exploiting of the labor classes, our home-brewing, our bootlegging, our lax morals, our night living, and our sentimental moving pictures—but if our conduct is such as to bankrupt the next

generation or demoralize it or enervate it, why then our social order is a failure.

In any good society therefore, there must be what we may call morale. If we wish specifically to know just what that implies, we may say bluntly that it implies that the individual shall sacrifice his antisocial impulses to the common good, that he shall do right, obey the moral law, respect the life and property of his neighbor, respect his neighbor's wife and daughter, be faithful to his family, tell the truth, obey the laws of his state, keep himself physically fit to earn a living, to defend his country, to beget and rear and educate his children.

Let us come back, then, to our original problem, the forces which we can rely upon in the coming society to insure morale. Particularly, is patriotism such a force? In our large and complex social groups we are already beginning to notice the signs of lessening morale. To some extent we attribute this decline to the war, but we know that its roots lie deeper.

For the moment, to be sure, the world is behaving rather decently; it has had its fling in the Great War and is sobering up. Labor strikes are not quite so numerous and there are less outward demonstrations of lawlessness, anarchistic, bolshevistic, etc. But nevertheless any candid observer of the times must confess that believers in human progress have had difficulty in keeping bright their faith. There has been a disheartening display of antisocial impulses, suspicion, hatred, selfishness, avarice, greed, graft, extravagance, profiteering, price-boosting, smuggling, bootlegging, bank robbery, automobile banditry, depredations of predatory trusts, sentimentality, moral reversions and perversions, epidemics of superstition, silly dancing crazes, decadence of popular music to the jazz level, degradation of the stage to the level of the sickly moving pictures, cheap musical comedies and indecent vaudeville, increase of divorce and promiscuity, decrease of the birth-rate due not to prudence but to "racial slackers," increase of insanity and nervous diseases, and increase of diseases of degeneration—certainly social morale is not very high at present.

What, then, are the forces which in the future will check our

egoistic impulses and insure that co-operation, that unselfish devotion to the general welfare of present and future generations which will enable our civilization to survive? Here, of course, we fall back upon our pet sociological phrases and speak of social control, law, custom, habit, public opinion, religion, patriotism, etc. Some, perhaps, who have never given careful thought to this problem, will answer at once that it is the law which must enforce good behavior. Civil sanction, the laws of the state, enforced if necessary by physical means.

We need not be anarchists to admit that forceful government is not to be the power which will make for righteousness in the new social order. Civil sanction, law, the policeman's club, the jail sentence and the fine—while we are no doubt depending more upon them than the world ever did before, even in ancient Rome—nevertheless we can already see that they are doomed to failure. We are lovers of liberty and we resent the policeman's club.

We have lately tried the experiment of making people temperate by law. It is not succeeding as well as we had hoped. When the national prohibition law was passed people who had hardly given a thought to alcohol began to lay in a supply. An orgy of home-brewing began. There was a degeneracy of taste so that there was no longer a demand for good wines or liquors, but for anything with a kick—that is, a percentage of alcohol sufficient to produce the desired narcotic effect. So we have on the one hand an army of federal agents trying to enforce the law, and on the other an unknown number of recalcitrant law-breakers, smugglers and bootleggers—a most unsavory class. Civil sanction, of course, we must always have. In fact, as the state takes on more and more duties in our modern complex life, its police functions become more and more necessary. I am showing not how unnecessary these are but how inadequate.

If civil sanction is not in the future going to be adequate for social morale, what shall we say of habit? This is the factor which under the name of instinct is so powerful in animal societies in the preservation of morale. Its simplest and most instructive form is seen in the case of insects like the ants and bees. Its origin for want of a better explanation is attributed to natural selection.



Anyway, it is inbred in the nerve cells of the animals. The morale of the ant colony is perfect. The individual does not sin against the group; he lives for the group. The group is sacred and the rules by which its integrity is preserved from generation to generation are not violated.

If animal species are conserved by instinct, primitive human groups are conserved by habit. The *mores* are relatively fixed and inviolable. Social control is supreme. The group may perish by attacks from other groups or by natural calamity but not by social disintegration. Reverence for the past, ancestor worship, are factors strengthening the power of custom. But in our modern occidental societies the situation is different. The structure of our society is centrifugal, not centripetal. The forces working toward chaos and anarchy are many. Any newspaper page reveals them. The intense individualism inherent in all our modern thought, the constantly growing lack of respect for old institutions—in fact the suspicion of anything that is old and established, the critical and cynical tendencies of much of our modern fiction and drama, and the pragmatic philosophies of all kinds that rule today, these are some of the forces working against social integration. A single phrase, such as "Everybody's doing it," is sometimes sufficient to cause our young people to question the old restraints in favor of some new license. Some rationalizer, like Nietzsche, says our old cherished morality is all wrong—and at once half a nation says, "Why, possibly this is true!" Our western nations have gone forth in the quest of individual freedom, and freedom they have found, but they have not distinguished between freedom from autocracy and tyranny and freedom from the moral law. We have a new mania, says Professor Babbitt, a mania for freedom.

I am doubtful whether habit in our modern society is as powerful a motive for social integration as we have supposed. Our whole mode of thought is individualistic, insurgent, and romantic. We are restive under the restraints of old traditions and institutions. Ibsen and his class have many ready followers. The loss of confidence, for instance, in our legislative bodies is a case in point. Mr. Gardner, writing in the *Atlantic Monthly* on the "Twilight of Parliament," says, "The universal loss of faith in men, in institu-

tions, in creeds, in theories, which is the devastating product of the war, has touched nothing, not even the church, more blighting than it has touched parliament." This lack of confidence in our legislative bodies still further weakens our social morale. It is all a part of our overemphasis of the individual, his rights and his privileges rather than his duties.

Now this individualistic, expansive, centrifugal philosophy of life pervades the world—and no student of history can say that it is not going to have an enormous influence in changing our social institutions. It will weaken greatly the stabilizing effect of habit, custom, and law. Add to this that which is vaguely called social unrest, largely a kind of irritability caused by the fact that we live under new industrial and environmental conditions, for which neither the body nor mind is adapted, and we see how difficult is going to be the problem of social morale.

We do not always realize how fast social conditions are changing. We have for centuries been so zealously pursuing certain ideals, particularly two ideals, individual liberty and the conquest of nature, that it has become just a habit of thought and action, and we have failed to observe that these ideals have been attained, and that now other dangers are threatening and that it is time to think of other things—such, for instance, as conservation—conservation not only of fuels and forests and soils but conservation of racial values, and conservation of such racial morals as are vital for social integrity and stability.

If, then, in the society of the future we cannot hope that either law or habit will serve as integrating forces sufficient to preserve social morale, what shall we say of religion? In the history of the world religion has been a powerful force leading to good behavior. In the early centuries of the Christian era the social situation was as bad as it could be. Complete social disintegration was well under way. Politically the world was united into one great nation. There was no threatening Carthage across the water to integrate the Roman people. Faith in the ancient religion had been lost. Every species of sin began to flourish. Physical health, family purity, commercial honesty, were disappearing. Then there came a new religion, an inspiring leader, devotion, hope, faith, love, and

fear of wrong doing. Authorities differ as to the degree of purity, honesty, veracity, and fitness there was in the early Christian churches, but it was vastly higher than in the world from which they sprang.

From that time to this religion has been a powerful sanction of conduct and has contributed immeasurably to right living and social integration. But the chief force working in religion is not the fear of punishment for sin to be expected in a future life. Fear in any form is an ineffective deterrent from evil. Devotion is the stronger force, devotion to a beloved leader, devotion to a beloved church, devotion to any great cause. Here perhaps is the key to the whole problem. Devotion of some kind there must be. You cannot drive people to good conduct or to self-sacrifice, but run aloft the colors and they will follow. Enthusiasm is the great secret. Enthusiasm and devotion to the state, or to the flag, or to the church, or even to the *mores* of the past.

But what as regards religion are the prospects for the future? What place is it to occupy in the new social order in which disarmament conferences shall arrange for an effective restraint upon war and for increasing amity among nations? Is religion to be the source of that devotion and enthusiasm for the common good which we have seen to be necessary? How many times we have heard it said that we must have some revival or revaluation of religion to meet our new social conditions. Religion, it is said, must be socialized, revitalized, and we are witness to all sorts of attempts to socialize religion, churches becoming social centers and all that.

But the socialization of religion is a contradiction. Religion is worship. It implies a relationship with something august, noble, sublime, inspiring, something that snatches us out of ourselves and draws us upward and onward. There must be an inspired and inspiring leader, who awakens enthusiasm, devotion or fear; or there must be a cause, a great cause, for which we are willing to sacrifice our selfish wishes. Religion is social in so far as it compels us to co-operate, but the religion comes first and then the co-operation. The fruits of the spirit are faith, hope, and love, but there must be the spirit. So there is little to expect from socializing the church. The church, if it is vital, socializes the community.

Now the very essence and kernel of the Christian religion is this love and co-operation which is the condition of social morale, but whence is to come the inspiration, the vital spark which shall make this religion effective, as it was in the early centuries of our era? We are confronted with the fearsome question whether religions may not wear out and whether it may not be that we need a new religion. Since Christianity is the very expression of the motives which are needed to insure the salvation of the world, that is of society, it would seem that what we need is not a new religion but a revival of the old religion. But this may be psychologically impossible. Possibly that impetuous enthusiasm which alone can make a religion socially effective as a moralizing power belongs only to new religions. But religions are not made to order, nor do great religious leaders always appear when called for; they just come.

In conclusion, if it be true that social morale is declining, if it be true that we are entering upon a period of internationalism in which the ancient conditions of social morale are wanting, if we have evolved habits of mind which make us refractory to the socializing influences of law and habit and religion, what is the outlook for the future of our civilization? Well, one thing is sure, whatever bad habits of mind we have developed, we have not developed a habit of complaisant submission to a threatening fate. We are not the kind who say that we are entering upon a period of social decadence and must make the best of it. Fate is a back number in these days. It is not only possible but probable that the creative power of the human mind, which has been so brilliantly successful in conquering the forces of nature, can meet also this problem and solve it. We may, indeed, have to *wait* for a great religious revival, but there are other resources at hand which we can control.

Two of these are eugenics and education. Unlimited power for good resides in either of these and in both together social salvation. Right education upon educable material would insure social morale. Our first efforts in eugenics have not been very successful. Neither were our first efforts in aerial navigation.

As regards education, perhaps a more thorough reconstruction

of our present methods may be necessary than we usually believe. Mr. Wells in his plans for a world state thinks that the sentiment of patriotism can be enlarged so that it shall be directed not to one narrow self-conscious group but to all mankind, or at least to all the people of Europe, and to this end he would put a stop to one kind of education, namely the instilling into the minds of youth that narrow selfish rancid patriotism, involving suspicion and hate of surrounding political groups, which has become a habit in Europe. Indeed, we are not altogether free from it in this country. The correction of this mistaken policy would seem to be the first step. Then would follow more radical educational reforms. Our schools would have to impart habits of thought and action rather than bestow mere information, and where they impart information it would have to be of a more thorough kind. It is a little knowledge that is dangerous, the knowledge, for instance, that the state is not a kind of divine being calling for our supreme sacrifice, that our moral laws are not handed down on graven stones from God, and that our own religion is only one of many religions, all fairly good.

This is what our youth learn now. So long as the state had in the mind of the citizen a certain sacredness, awe, grandeur, or so long as he was taught, as in Germany or in the Hegelian philosophy that the state was an end in itself, or a kind of divine being, or so long as the state was symbolized in some king or emperor or grand majestic sovereign, or could be kept constantly present in the minds of the people by the flag or national emblems or marching armies in full regalia, why then we easily got that loyalty to the state which is necessary for social well-being. But our democratic ideas are sweeping all this away. We are now taught that the state has no divinity. It is nothing but humanity organized for a certain end. It exists solely for the happiness of the people. And so we have the vicious circle. Our increasing knowledge leads to our undoing, just as our increasing knowledge of the moral law convinces us that it was not handed down from God on tables of stone but is merely the sifted and not very well sifted experience of the race. It is nothing but the old dilemma, knowledge paralyzing faith and action.

It is this half-knowledge, together with the tendency of our present system of education to foster individuality, self-expression, love of freedom and indirectly all kinds of insurgency, which constitutes the danger now. And our popular fiction, our current drama and our moving pictures—the latter perhaps the real educators now of our children—lend powerful stimulus to these ideas. Fifty years ago there was need for this kind of education. The need now is for something very different. The articles by Arthur Pound in recent numbers of the *Atlantic Monthly* have set many of us thinking. Even our working young people now have lots of money and lots of leisure. Money and leisure without character are fatal. So our schools have a new task. Conduct and citizenship, work and health, discipline and obedience, thrift and economy, are some of the things which our schools must undertake to teach, and some other way to teach them than by precept and counsel will have to be found.

And then so far as we impart information, that information must be thorough. We must learn and teach that all moral laws, even though they are, or perhaps because they are, the sifted experience of the ages, are after all the laws of God; and that their violation brings greater calamity than ever medieval theologian pictured in a future life, namely the woe of our children and their children and of society itself. Then we shall learn, too, and teach that the state, that is society, is after all a sacred thing, demanding the supreme sacrifice, because the whole evolutionary movement of the world tends steadily to the goal of a highly complex, closely integrated co-operative union of men, in which, not by means of which, the individual attains unto self-realization.

## BOUNDARY LINES OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

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### ABSTRACT

I. The limits of fields of phenomena establish the boundary lines of the sciences. These scientific boundaries cannot be determined until the nature of phenomena is ascertained and their characteristics clearly denoted. But the boundaries between sciences are purely conventional and artificial, since no hard-and-fast lines between kinds of phenomena exist in nature.

II. The boundary lines of social phenomena are established by our conception of the nature of society. The influence of sentient beings upon one another constitutes social phenomena. Such influence is exerted somewhat irrespective of space and time, even certain of those long dead still having weight. Symbols and signs, written and oral language, are not social phenomena since they are resolvable into material and physical activities. Not all causes of social phenomena are social, this being notably true of the cause of the first social phenomenon. Causes of aggregations and juxtapositions out of which social phenomena arise may be merely physical and so non-social.

The boundary limits of every science are determined, it would seem, by the boundary limits of the phenomena to which it devotes its study. These in turn are fixed by ability to decide without question the exact nature of such phenomena. Unless the latter task can be accomplished, unless each science knows just where its phenomena begin and end, unless in every case it is able to pronounce whether this and that phenomenon belongs to its particular domain, there can be no very clear-cut division of labor between the sciences, and therefore, no clear-cut sciences and well-marked boundary lines.

This situation is pertinent to sociologists and other social scientists. We may picture our sociologists as being in pursuit of social phenomena in the great bewildering wilderness of cosmic forces and relationships without being in possession of certain and assured marks of real and exclusive social phenomena and how they are differentiated from all other kinds of phenomena. They are likely to seize and draw into their scientific inclosures all manner of strange data or to exclude from them many happenings or objects which rightfully belong there. They are like the hunter who goes out to hunt when the hunting season is on for chickens only and who does not know the difference between chickens and other birds.

There is no assurance that he may not return with farmers' fowl of divers kinds in his game bag.

Fortunately for the standing of sociology, or at least for the consolation of sociologists, the sociologists are not alone in being confused regarding the identity of their phenomena. For within the field of the other social sciences there is apparently the greatest confusion relative to what belongs to each. By way of illustration, what is the dividing line between history and economics or history and political science? Does industrial history belong to history or to economics? Or does constitutional history belong to history or political science? Who knows whether courses in socialism and labor problems should be taught under economics or sociology? Certainly as both are being developed they are quite as sociological as anything being taught under the caption of sociology.

Nor is this situation peculiar to the social scientists, for the physical sciences, the realm of the scientists who boast so much of their rigid scientific character and often contemptuously relegate the social "sciences" to the limbo of the pseudo-scientific, are beautifully at loggerheads with one another over where their scientific inclosures should be set. Thus, as between physicists and chemists, to whom does the electron belong? Both sets of scientists are busily engaged upon it in investigative work and that they do not have a clear-cut idea of any division of labor in the domains is evident in the altercations a physicist and chemist often have over whose datum it is. There are likewise certain forms of life which are treated alike by botanists and zoölogists; and when phenomena are still further studied it is easy to think that certain of them will lie on the boundary line between biology and physics or biology and chemistry. In the same manner it would not be difficult to designate debatable hunting grounds between physicists and astronomers, psychologists and educationists, and the like.

Such utterances as these have often been pronounced by sociological writers and in very much better terms. Professor Småll has done a most valuable work in his efforts to educate the social scientists of this country and others concerning the oneness of data of the universe for the purposes of the various sets of workers and regarding the superficiality in seeking to set up hard and fast



scientific territorial fences. It is not the purpose of this short paper to feebly rehearse what he has so brilliantly executed. The aim here, instead, is to scrutinize the field of social phenomena somewhat critically in order to bring into plain view certain uncertainties inhering in that domain.

We may take it for granted that the boundary lines of social phenomena are involved in and established by our conception of society or as to what society is. The current sociological idea as to what society is runs somewhat as follows. Society is association, i.e., a relationship between sentient beings. These relationships are psychical, being relations between minds or mental processes. Society is made up of such relations, the physical bodies of people being inconsequential, save in that they are accompaniments and determiners of psychical functioning. Social activities are activities of individuals which have an effect on one another. Social facts are mass psychical facts in that all elements and contents are psychic. These mass facts may have diverging kinds of causes and determiners, physical and social. Social phenomena, therefore, in a general way at least may be said to consist of mass activities and relationships. Mass activities and relationships may be thought of as being functional or functioning or as structural, that is as being arranged in a given way, as being a regularized, systematized way of acting and reacting.

Now for the uncertainties. For one thing, the statement that social activities—hypothetically social phenomena—are activities of individuals which have an effect on one another raises the question as to whether such relationship may exist between the living and the dead, and if so, if such relationships then do not constitute social phenomena. In attempting to answer that question it will be necessary to consider such relationships between the living and the dead in the light of the relationships between the living and the living.

Social activities are activities of individuals which affect others, and association consists of the relationship between such activities. It is a matter of indifference whether the one affecting me knows it or not in order that the relationship called association may exist. Every exchange of psychical states between socii is realized via media of some sort, either the physical attitudes and movements—

the physical expression of inner states—or language symbols involved in graphic and oral representations, or institutional forms of social activities; and the symbols may be executed directly or by way of long-time and long-distance methods; that is, by enduring records or by any of the numerous modern methods of communication at a distance. In a communication between persons in a room the time elapsing between the occurrence of stimulus and effect on others is reduced to a fraction of a second, while that between a letter written in China and its impression upon the recipient in Chicago is a matter of weeks or months. Many things may happen to the one who is influencing another between the time he has incited his influence and the time it reaches the other; that is, changes in his status or ideas; yet his influence goes on the same. He may have changed his occupation, beliefs, residence, or may have joined the great beyond; and yet the original influence he set going produces its effect. He may have written as a socialist, theist, communist, and his influence through his writings is of that sort; while by the time they reach the one influenced he has become a believer in capitalism, agnosticism, or absolute individualism, and so is sending out a new set of influences.

Thus, it may be the case of an octogenarian publicist who has developed through several stages of thought and doctrine, and published books at each time expressive of the teachings held then. He now influences readers according as they read the productions of the various stages of thought development. Various readers are receiving influences from this person which are diametrically opposed to each other; yet all of these divergent relationships are said to be with the same person, or activities of the same person. If there is only one person in the case of the publicist, and that is the one of the last stage of thought, then those who are receiving influences from the earlier selves are, to all intents and purposes, receiving messages from the dead—the selves that are dead.

Then there is the confusing case of the man who in his youth was a convivial sport, a hail fellow well met, but who has since "reformed" and become a steady "respectable" citizen. He meets companions of his youth whom he has not seen for years and who do not know of his inward change. By the erstwhile boon companions he is received with open arms as being one of their convivial

kind, with whom they expect to enjoy a jolly good time. With what is this initial association, to the self that is or the self that was? What is the quality of the relationship? As in the former case is not the association between the living convivial selves and the dead self of the one who once had been convivial?

Does it make any difference, then, whether the body of a self is dead or whether it is living in order that association shall exist? It appears to be a matter of indifference, so far as the fact of association is concerned, whether the psychic influence originated a second, a day, a month, a year, or a century prior to its effect on any given individual who constitutes a terminal in the associative relationship. Perhaps only ideas live in society and people or persons are irrelative considerations. Perhaps Ward was right in resolving society into a great meshwork of achievements and so largely leaving human beings out of account. Might it not seem an arbitrary procedure to limit association out of which society is said to be made to relationships between the living? And if we extend association so as to embrace the influences of the Aristotles, Platos, and the other great and near-great whose ideas still count, have we in any way disturbed the boundary line of social phenomena? Perhaps the sociologist is in the position here of the astronomer who must treat as a present cosmical phenomenon a light ray which was emitted from Betelgeuse hundreds of thousands of years ago.

Again, we may view social activities in relation to their results, and consider to what extent, if at all, social products are social phenomena. First, we find that the transmission media are important factors in the establishment of association and the rendering of psychic activities social. They are thus closely associated with our hypothetical social phenomena and should be examined with a view to determining whether or not they themselves constitute social phenomena.

These symbols are involved in the establishment of social relations or association in quite distinct situations or connections. In the first instance the influence of an individual may be transmitted from generation to generation, let us say, by way of symbols existing as the psychic currency of living minds. We not only speak in symbols but think in symbols. The symbols are the molds or forms into which our ideational content is poured. This content, originat-

ing ages ago, perhaps, may be passed down to us through a series of living, talking, individuals. In this case the mediating agency is a series of minds activating in terms of symbols. The symbols used in ideational processes stand so close to thought itself that it is almost impossible to separate them. Psychic energy striving to express itself is expressionless or meaningless until it is molded or clothed in symbols. It is questionable if we can think at all without employing verbal imagery. The case of bricks and their molds is not pertinent because there was no organic developmental relationship in their origin. Psychic energy in itself is only energy, but, given form, it is meaning and this meaning is absolutely essential for the establishment of association and the appearance of social phenomena.

In the second case the matter is clearer. Psychic influences may be transmitted by non-psychic media in which they have been caught, recorded, and preserved, namely, books, manuscripts, inscriptions on monuments, buildings, machines, all material artifacts whatever. Here—ignoring the preservative function of society relative to them—the transmissive agency is inert, not an activity at all, or even closely identified as it exists with an activity. However, by means of it we may receive the influence of others now living or of the dead. The only precondition is that the observer must know how to decipher the record in order to be a recipient of the original influence. I might look at a monument and pronounce that the marks thereon are inscriptions made by human beings for recording purposes, but I could go no further. An Egyptologist or other expert views the same and tells us what they say about affairs several thousand years ago. A Bushman beholds them and does not even guess that they were made by human beings and are therefore social products. It is all in the mind which beholds matter as to whether a pharaoh or an Aristotle at the other end of time is making a pronouncement.

The real difference between the latter case and the former lies, not in a difference in the nature of the symbols involved in transmission, but in that in the first case the symbols are oral and also are almost integral parts of the psychic energy; while in the other case they are independent of such activity and impersonal. The second class of symbols are clearly of another character than are the first and so have little ground for being classed as social phenomena.

But both alike are symbolic vehicles of ideas. In one case they are forms in stone, in the other forms in air vibrations. Each is a form which material elements take when acted upon by human intervention. But in no case are they psychic activities, however closely associated they may be with the same; nor are they relations between such activities.

Only by means of such a somewhat technical analytical discussion are we able to rule out symbols of all sorts as social phenomena. All such symbols are social products. But there are other sorts of social products which also are more or less symbolical and require to be examined. Institutions, organizations, customs, fashions, and the like; are they social phenomena or mere symbols? They are not only social products but also forms which social activities take.

Let us assume that we understand the distinguishing character of these phenomena, granting that the essential principle of custom is familiarity and group expectation, that of fashion is novelty, and that of institutionalism is selection and survival on account of inward merit. Each represents a form or way of ordering activities of individuals relative to one another looking toward the realization of the wants of individuals. The form of two quite dissimilar kinds of institutions, however, such as church and state, might be quite similar, the differential in this case, then, being not form but content, that is the set of ideas, sentiments, beliefs involved.

Symbols, such as language, are forms in the arrangement of material particles—either dynamic as in talking or static as in inscriptions and the like—adapted to impress one or another of the special senses and so to arouse ideational responses. Institutions, customs, and the like are forms of arrangement of psychical activities as a result of which wants and desires may be satisfied. We can say that institutions are social phenomena in the sense that they express the cause and effect relationship between socii, or individual psychic centers, whereas symbols are not social phenomena because they are certain kinds of arrangements of matter used as vehicles of communication, or of establishing the cause and effect relationship between individuals.

Yet students in sociology classes will practically always call all kinds of social products both of the material and immaterial sort social phenomena. It requires a great deal of exposition and "rea-

soning" to displace this very natural inclination to say that whatever is a social product is for that very reason a social phenomenon. Thus to them the deserted cliff dwellings are social phenomena because nature did not produce them and to explain them we must posit human co-operation and considerable social development on the part of those who produced them. Also they would say that the boy swimming alone in the lake away from other humans is engaged in a social activity because he is doing something that is not inborn but is the result of teaching. They would say further that swimming in that instance is a social phenomenon because it is an activity carried on in terms of a social product. And so on for language, customs, fashions, and institutions alike. This is the common-sense view which all but the technical and precise sociologist is likely to revert to when he is "off guard."

Some consideration should be paid to the antecedents of social phenomena. Do social phenomena always have social antecedents as their cause, or are social activities invariably produced by antecedent social activities? Society exists whenever individuals are influencing one another psychically; social activity is the psychical activity that influences others; social phenomena arise out of and are implicit in the situation. Are the causes of social activities and of association always or only sometimes social?

We may think of several cases as test cases. What kinds of causes do usual, original, and first social activities have?

In the instance of the very first or ultimate social activity that ever took place, wherever or whenever it was, it is evident that the antecedent causal condition could not have been a social activity, since society had never existed before. The cause in this case at least must have been something else. But all else there was consisted of biological equipment and the physical environmental conditions which surrounded the organisms concerned. It is conceivable that the first social situation arose from the stimulation of one such organism by another whenever the nervous organization had evolved up to the requisite point of storing experience and developing meaning. From that point forward such organisms would be expected to continue and multiply these psychical causal contacts.

Then the physical environment also might be expected to func-

tion in the direction of throwing organisms into juxtaposition and of affording stimuli which would put a premium on interstimulation. These physical conditions, therefore, would operate as a cause of aggregation, aggregation in its turn acting as a favorable condition of interstimulation and so of association. Thus physical conditions are not in themselves social causes, not immediate causes of social activity, but rather are preconditions or mediated causes of social action.

But after society was well along in its development, the antecedent cause of social activities would almost invariably be other social activities, either immediately or indirectly. Today all social activities are founded on, have grown out of, and presuppose preceding social activities. Even the original activity, or social variation, the invention—using the term broadly and sociologically—of exceptional men in whatever line, has for its essential content the experiences and achievements of society thus far, and in its form is stimulated into existence by those accomplishments. They furnish its inspiration, framework, basis of variation, and insure its appreciation and acceptance by society.

The physical environment, then, while of causal significance in producing society, is yet so rather by way of being a precondition of society. It leads to aggregation and propinquity, multiplies the probability of contact between individuals, but certainly is not social either in its origin or nature. It helps to account for aggregation, but unless the individuals have developed to the potentially social point it is powerless to produce social activity.

The biological mechanism also has causal significance, in that it furnishes the brain and other nerve structures which serve as preconditions of organic interstimulation and psychical interaction. In themselves biological organisms are not necessarily social, since they may act relative to one another purely automatically. It is only when sentient awareness develops that they have a chance of being called social; and then of themselves they possess only the ability of interstimulation and response which to onlookers may be taken to be the symptom of psychic interaction. It is not, however, until some meaning of activities is established and this meaning gets passed over from one organism to another, and so affects its activity, that the social is born.

## COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Custom has imposed upon the president of the Sociological Society the task of formulating the annual program of the Society. One motive for this procedure has been no doubt the desirability of giving to each year's program the unity of a single theme. With the multiplication of special interests and the consequent division of labor in the field of the social sciences, this has come to be, from year to year, a more difficult task.

The theme proposed for the coming annual meeting has been "The City." Since all the tendencies and most of the problems of modern life are more completely reflected in the conditions and changes of urban life than elsewhere, it seems as if the city offers a wide range of topics, and might be made the focus of a wide diversity of points of view.

There are probably more detailed studies of urban problems than in any other field of sociological observation and research. Recent developments in communication and transportation, which have brought rural communities and rural life within the circle of the city's influence, have profoundly changed the conditions of rural life.

In view of all this, the committee desires and invites the widest co-operation in making the program for the coming year. Considering the recent emphasis upon research and the large number of studies now in progress in this field, it seems important to give a greater emphasis than heretofore to reports of first-hand studies.

It is proposed, for one thing, as members have already been informed, to repeat the experiment of last year and give one session of the Society to brief reports of research in progress. In connection with this it is proposed to prepare a census of research projects under way.

All members of the Society are cordially invited to co-operate in making this census as complete and as representative as it is possible, considering the limitations under which it is necessarily made.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROBERT E. PARK



## NEWS AND NOTES

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Notes of interest to readers of the *Journal* should be in the hands of the editor of "News and Notes" not later than the tenth of the month preceding publication.

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*Research Fellowships in the social sciences.*—The Social Science Research Council announces the establishment of research fellowships to be awarded on or about May 1, 1925. These fellowships have been established to promote scientific research in the general field of the social sciences broadly construed.

Substantial stipends conditioned by the requirements of each particular research project and the needs of each particular case will constitute the awards. Evidence of exceptional ability in research must be presented by each applicant, together with a detailed outline of a project giving promise of definite scientific accomplishment. If it is certain that the project will require travel in this country or abroad, the expense of such travel will be taken into account in determining the stipend for that particular case. The terms of the fellowships may range from several months to as much as two years, depending upon the character and requirements of the particular research project concerned.

Those who are appointed on fellowships will be subject to the supervision of the Committee on Social Science Research Council Fellowships, and this committee will be available for constructive counsel and advice.

A substantial sum to cover such fellowships has been set aside by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial.

The secretary of the Committee on Research Fellowships is F. Stuart Chapin, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. All applications must be in his hands not later than March 1, 1925.

*American Sociological Society.*—President Robert E. Park announces the appointment of the following as members of the Committee on Nominations: Charles H. Cooley, University of Michigan, chairman; Charles A. Ellwood, University of Missouri, Franklin H. Giddings, Columbia University, Cecil North, Ohio State University, and U. G. Weatherly, Indiana University. In view of the important change in the method of electing officers made at the Annual Meeting whereby the Nominating Committee is required to submit two nominees for each office, members of the Society are requested to send suggestions in regard to nominations to the chairman of the committee.

*American Council of Learned Societies.*—A Conference of the Secretaries of Constituent Societies was held in New York, Friday, January 3. Secretaries or representatives were present from the American Philosophical Society, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, American Antiquarian Society, American Oriental Society, American Philological Association, Archeological Institute of America, Modern Language Association of America, American Historical Association, American Economic Association, American Philosophical Association, American Political Association, and American Sociological Society. A brief statement was made by each secretary upon the history, purposes, and present problems of each organization. Discussion then turned to the methods of financing the different associations, the possibility of joint meetings with other societies, the nature and extent of publications, and the present status and possible developments of research programs.

The Annual Meeting of the Council was held Saturday, January 24, in New York. Reports were given by the different committees of the Council, and future projects considered. The executive secretary of the Council, Waldo G. Leland, made a report of the Survey of Learned Societies. This survey includes those national associations in the United States which are devoted to the advancement of learning in the fields of the humanities and social studies (philosophy, philology, linguistics, archeology, history, economics, and the political and social sciences). The complete survey will show in a striking manner the important part played in the history of learning in America by the associations in this field and by the amount of work accomplished with very little money largely through voluntary co-operation. An excellent sign is the tendency which most of the societies seem to show at the present time to self-examination, to systematic planning of activities, and to greater emphasis upon research. The Council voted that this study should be followed by a survey of humanistic research in America. The delegates of the American Sociological Society to the Council are Franklin H. Giddings and William F. Ogburn.

*Istituto Internazionale di Sociologia.*—The International Institute of Sociology and of Political and Social Reform of Turin has organized during this year sections in Rome and Naples and is proposing to organize also sections in Milan, Genoa, and Palermo. Sessions are being planned for a seven to ten days' conference in each of these cities on themes both in pure sociology and in the special social sciences. The Board of Directors intend, in the near future, to transfer the central seat of the Institute from Turin to

Rome. According to the decision of the Third International Sociological Congress at Rome, the Fourth Congress will be held in London, where the papers will center around the general topic, "The Scientific Bases of Peace, Solidarity, and Social and International Well-being."

*Twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the first juvenile court.*—

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the first juvenile court and the fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of the first Institute for Juvenile Research were held in Chicago January 2-3. The different sessions devoted to the history and present status of the juvenile court, the rise and development of institutes of juvenile research and different types of child clinics, and the symposium upon the foundations of behavior were largely attended. The permanent value of many of the papers presented by such recognized authorities as Grace Abbott, Herman Adler, Franz Boas, Augusta Bronner, Charles M. Child, Ernest R. Groves, William Healy, C. Judson Herrick, Marion E. Kenworthy, Miriam Van Waters, and Helen T. Woolley led to a demand for their publication. The Wieboldt Foundation has undertaken this service and is making arrangements for the printing of these papers in a bound volume entitled *The Court, the Clinic, and the Child*, to be distributed at a nominal charge of one dollar. Communications should be addressed to Ferris F. Laune, secretary, Wieboldt Foundation, 3166 Lincoln Avenue, Chicago.

*Russell Sage Foundation.*—A recent publication of the Foundation is *Public Employment Offices; Their Purpose, Structure, and Methods*, a report based upon a five-year study which was prepared by Shelby M. Harrison in collaboration with Mary LaDame, Bradley Buell, Leslie E. Woodcock, and Frederick A. King.

Hastings H. Hart, LL.D., has resigned from the position of director of the Department of Child Helping of Russell Sage Foundation and has been appointed as consultant in delinquency and penology in the Foundation. He will respond to requests for service in this field from any part of the United States, especially with reference to legislation, administration, building, and equipment.

Mr. William Hodson, who was formerly director of the Division of Child Welfare Legislation of the Department of Child Helping of Russell Sage Foundation, has been appointed director of the Department of Social Legislation.

*International Industrial Welfare and Personnel Congress.*—The International and Industrial Welfare Congress will be held in Flushing, Hol-

land, June 20-26. All persons interested who are directly or indirectly connected with industry are invited to attend and are requested to apply for full particulars to the Secretariat, M. L. Fledderus, Glassworks, Leerdam, Holland.

*National Conference of Social Work.*—The National Conference of Social Work will hold its fifty-second annual meeting in Denver, June 10-17, 1925.

The Program Committee of the Conference has endeavored to make the program one of vital interest and is hoping to inaugurate several new features as regards general sessions. The program of the new Conference Division on Professional Standards and Education will be an important contribution to the status of professional social work, and the programs of the other ten divisions—Children, Delinquents and Correction, Health, The Family, Industrial and Economic Problems, Neighborhood and Community Life, Mental Hygiene, Organization of Social Forces, Public Officials and Administration, The Immigrant—promise to be equally rich in interest and inspiration. Further information may be secured by writing the general secretary, W. H. Parker, 25 East Ninth Street, Cincinnati, Ohio.

*Religious Education Association.*—The twenty-second annual convention of the Religious Education Association will be held in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 22-25, 1925. The theme of the convention is "Religious Education and Religious Experience." An effort is being made to determine whether the newer types of religious education can produce a religious experience commensurate with that produced by the older types; and to redefine, if necessary, what is meant by "religious experience." President Donald J. Cowling of Carleton College is the president and President Mary E. Woolley of Mount Holyoke College is the vice-president of the Association.

*University of Chicago.*—Professor Floyd N. House, of Middlebury College, will give two courses in the Summer Quarter, one on the History of Social Thought and the other on the Study of Society. Associate Professor Roderick D. McKenzie, of the University of Washington, will offer courses on Human Ecology and the Family.

The Chicago Woman's Club, through its committees on boys' work, has established a research assistantship in the Department of Sociology. This is to be known as the Chicago Woman's Club Research Assistantship for the Study of Behavior Problems of Delinquent Boys. For over two years the St. Charles Committee and the Boys' Court Committee of

this organization have been interested in the study and treatment of boys the majority of whom are on parole from St. Charles School for Boys. The new plan is a development of this work with special emphasis upon research. Mr. Clifford R. Shaw, who has for the past two years been in charge of the field work of these committees, and who has been making a sociological study of behavior problems, has been appointed the research assistant.

A new professional fraternity has been formed by graduate students in the Department of Sociology. The organization aims to promote scholarship, to encourage sociological research, and to disseminate sociological findings. Membership is by election. The name of the society is Sigma Theta.

*Colby College.*—Mr. Curtis H. Morrow, who since 1920 has been associate professor and head of the department of economics and sociology, has been advanced to the professorship of economics and sociology. This is the first time in the history of the college that this department has had a full professor in charge.

*Emory University.*—Professor Comer M. Woodward, formerly of the Southern Methodist University, is now dean of men and professor of sociology in this institution.

*University of Omaha.*—A Recreation Institute will be held June 22 to July 23 in the Summer School under the auspices of the Department of Sociology. Its purpose is "to develop local leadership in the various fields of recreation, for the church, school, social, municipal and club organizations; also to awaken an active interest in wholesome recreational activities, to make the play and social life of groups more effective and interesting."

## REVIEWS

*Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology.* By L. L. BERNARD. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1924. 8vo. Pp. ix+522. Student's edition, \$3.60.

A few years ago, the instinct conception held undisputed sway in psychology, social psychology, and the social sciences. The last five years have witnessed a rapidly spreading revolt against this condition, and Professor Bernard has produced the most exhaustive critical study that has so far appeared. It is an example of patient effort and careful and critical method which will force students to reckon with it and inspire further researches as the investigation continues.

There are several problems to which Professor Bernard set himself, the first of which concerns the biological mechanism of heredity. This is obviously a highly technical subject, and the author has not hesitated to enter into the problems and methods involved, though this makes of him for the time being a biologist. Assuming the standpoint of biological evolution, in two chapters on "The Heredity and the Instincts" and "Conditional Development" it is shown that instinct as an inheritance must be thought of in very small units and with disconnected elements. The theory of heredity is obviously beyond the province of the sociologist as such, but to the reviewer, whose knowledge of biology is merely that of a layman, the argument seems unassailable. Whether anyone not a biologist is capable of going to the root of this problem is a question which we may leave open. It will probably be decided by the biologists themselves. Of particular interest is the elaborate and convincing argument that the new-born infant has been the recipient of many influences which are not hereditary.

A second problem, which occupies a hundred pages, is the most elaborate display of the current inconsistency in the use of the term which has ever been written. This is obviously destructive in intent, and certainly in outcome. In a single table is presented the record of the result of readings in more than 2,000 books by 1,700 authors, in which 15,789 cases of instinct are cited, which are classified into 6,131 types. The result, of course, is to show how inconsistent and uncritical is the use of the term, and amounts to a *reductio ad absurdum* which ought to give the coup de

grace to the belated manufacturers of homemade instincts. In the same chapters are twenty-two other tables, with elaborate classifications indicating the looseness with which terms like self-assertion, gregariousness, and sex are used as descriptive of instincts.

Pursuing relentlessly the revelation of the inconsistency and lack of clearness in the use of the word, there is a chapter on "Some False Instincts Exposed," in which play, fighting, and constructiveness, etc., are set forth with an elaborateness of citation which makes the point utterly indisputable.

The author does not deny the systems of instincts, but shows conclusively and repeatedly that most of the activities in human beings which have formerly borne this label are better understood if spoken of as habits. There is one distinction which does not appear, or at least which the reviewer in a single but careful reading has failed to note. There is a stage before the organization of habit which should perhaps receive very definite emphasis. Moreover, habits break up and new habits form, and in this transition stage it is possible to find many or perhaps most of the psychological problems. There is nothing inconsistent with the author's thesis in this statement, but on the face of it it seems that human behavior is thought of as being divisible into habits and instincts.

There is an excellent chapter on emotions, in which the theory of John Dewey is very clearly presented and defended. Emotion is not the result of instinct, but arises in conflict where instincts or habits simultaneously appear and interrupt the continuity of behavior. This is presented in explicit opposition to the formulation of McDougall, now so rapidly being discarded.

The book is very valuable and will for a long time be an authoritative monograph on the points covered, more important perhaps for its destructive contribution than for any alternative consideration, which it was not primarily the author's intention, apparently, to set forth.

The chief point of tension which the reviewer found lies in a rather fundamental and important direction. Professor Bernard is able to classify social psychologists into two groups which he calls the "instinctivists" and the "environmentalists." Now, no one can be farther from a desire to introduce metaphysical considerations into our field than this author, but such a classification not only leads uncritical followers into metaphysical absolutes, but is at times capable of being interpreted in just this way. The reviewer is certainly not an instinctivist, nor would he like to be called an environmentalist, and not because it is obvious that both inheritance and environment exist, for if one is to speak rigorously,

neither of them exists in opposition to or *apart from the other*. Both heredity and environment are valuable notions which we all use very frequently to explain and interpret phenomena of human life, but both are always employed in practice as abstractions to analyze and identify specific types of behavior which interest or puzzle us. When life marches smoothly, we make no distinction between heredity and environment. We recognize that all heredity is influenced by social impacts and that all environmental stimulations are modified by inherited bent. Life goes on in a series of concrete events, and in human experience this life is never lived in abstraction from the influence of our fellows. The environment can be said to be a temporal happening, because it is an explanation which we cannot at times avoid. But so also is heredity, in a literal sense of the word, a specific and definite interpretation of those aspects of human life which we feel cannot be understood as the result of social pressure. Heredity and environment are really negative concepts. Heredity is what cannot be accounted for by social experience. Environment explains behavior which heredity leaves unexplained. But both are abstractions—neither has any independent or separate existence. They are tools of analysis, not data, but hypotheses.

This is not to say that Professor Bernard's views are not capable of being thus formulated, but the language is the language of absolute and separate types of forces, and the individual is thought of as the result of the interplay of two forces, the heredity and the environment, with the environmental forces predominating. It seems there is great need for careful thinking and careful writing just here.

ELLSWORTH FARIS

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*Psychology of Early Childhood up to the Sixth Year of Age.* By WILLIAM STERN. Translated from the third (revised and enlarged) edition by ANNA BARWELL. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1924. Pp. 557. \$5.00.

Although this book is intended primarily for educators and teachers, it should be valuable also for social psychologists. It is an account of the child's early mental (and motor) development, with emphasis especially upon early localizations of objects and perceptions, the beginnings and perfecting of speech mechanisms, learning to see content and relationships in pictures, the development and training of memory, self-expression through fantasy and play, the growth of aesthetic attitudes and enjoy-



ment, learning to think and form judgments, the testing of intelligence, the growth of will, and the release and repression of emotions. The author draws most of his conclusions as to time stages and sequences of the development of the various mental skills from the observations of his own three children, supplemented by corroborative evidence from two or three other children, and perhaps from more general and random observations. This limited source of his data at times renders his conclusions about time series in development open to dispute, but as yet there has not been a sufficient body of data collected regarding the exact time element in localizations to enable any one to speak positively on the subject. Such data as these, even if only tentative, are of the greatest value to sociological students interested in the tracing of the development of socialized personality so well begun by Professor Cooley. This phase of sociology has been badly neglected, even by the social psychologists. Not one of the social psychologists bearing the title attempts such an analysis in any concrete way, although Allport and McDougall both treat the subject in more or less detail abstractly.

Some of the points of emphasis which may be of interest to sociologists are the conditioning influences exercised by children and especially by twins upon each other (p. 157); intelligence differences between social classes, which the author sometimes appears to think are largely hereditary (pp. 175, 195, 206, 230); character differences between the sexes (pp. 194, 196, 306, 312, 423); a rather full treatment of speech and visual mechanisms; and the analysis of judgment and emotional patterns. He seems to give too much emphasis to the instinctive and not enough to the social basis of the preparatory function of play (p. 301). He finds more intelligence than most people do in animals (pp. 63, 87). He uses the concept of instinct very vaguely, like practically all continental writers, but says there are only two instincts at birth—sucking and attraction (whatever the neural mechanism for that may be) (p. 81). He has little use for the theories of the Freudians, especially their sexual interpretation of the child mind, but he makes much use of and acknowledges the concepts of conflict and repression (p. 432). He follows Watson and others in denying that most of the fears are inherited (p. 442), and he maintains that lies are not normal to childhood (p. 544). It may trouble some readers that the English translator sometimes splits her infinitives and almost always uses the adverb “only” out of place.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

*Psychology and Politics, and Other Essays.* By W. H. R. RIVERS, M.D., D.S., LL.D., F.R.S. With a Prefatory Note by G. ELLIOT SMITH, F.R.S., and an Appreciation by C. S. MYERS, F.R.S. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923. Pp. vii+180. \$3.75.

*Medicine, Magic, and Religion.* The FitzPatrick Lectures delivered before the Royal College of Physicians of London in 1915 and 1916. By W. H. R. RIVERS, M.A., M.D., D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.C.P., F.R.S. With a Preface by G. ELLIOT SMITH, F.R.S. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1924. Pp. viii+146. \$3.75.

W. H. R. Rivers, considering that he was a student and a scholar, lived an adventurous life. He was an eminent psychologist before he wrote his *History of Melanesian Society*, which made his reputation as an anthropologist and ethnologist. In his later years he became a man of affairs and ran for Parliament as representative of the Labor party. Three of the lectures in his volume of *Psychology and Politics* were delivered in the course of a political campaign. "Surely," as Mr. G. Elliot Smith, the editor of these volumes, remarks, "the most remarkable form of appeal to parliamentary electors in the history of politics."

One thing that makes this volume interesting is that it represents the effort of a lifelong student of human nature to apply to the practical problems of political life the knowledge of human nature and of society that he had gained in the laboratory, in hospitals, and in the investigations of life among primitive peoples.

"I cannot believe," he said, "that political problems differ from those of every other aspect of social life in being incapable of solution by scientific methods."

What he proposed was to do for the forms of contemporary life what he has sought to do for primitive life, namely, interpret them in terms of a behavioristic psychology. Anthropology and ethnology have been content, until very recently, to describe social customs and institutions. What he proposed to do was to study "social behavior."

He conceived of such a study, not as psychology, nor even as social psychology, but as an independent discipline. He wished, for example, to study the political behavior of women and the differences, if there be such, between their political behavior and that of men.

"Knowledge of the facts of social and political behavior," he said, "can make a far greater contribution to our psychology than any psychological knowledge we possess at present can contribute to our understanding and treatment of social and political problems."

Three other essays in this volume, "Instinct in Relation to Society," "The Concept of the Morbid in Sociology," "An Address on Socialism and Human Nature," serve to illustrate and elaborate this thesis.

A fourth essay, "The Aims of Ethnology," emphasizes, among other things, that social changes have taken place among primitive peoples not so much by the evolution of innate racial characteristics as by processes initiated by contacts and conflicts with other peoples.

The volume *Medicine, Magic, and Religion* was written earlier than the volume on *Psychology and Politics*. It illustrates, however, the methods of investigation which the later volume has sought to rationalize.

It is actually an attempt to make out, by a comparative study, the natural history of medical science. It describes, in other words, the processes by which something approaching a scientific technique for dealing with disease has gradually disassociated itself from purely magical, religious practices and religious ritual.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*Economics of Fatigue and Unrest.* By P. SARGENT FLORENCE. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1924. Pp. vii+426. \$2.25.

*Industry, Emotion and Unrest.* By EDWARD THOMAS. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920. Pp. 255. \$1.75.

Florence states that the purpose of his book is "to traverse as thoroughly as any text-book the whole teeming ground of recent research from the point of view of economic landmarks." With this in mind, he has compiled the results of recent experiments made in England and America on the question of production and fatigue. The factory system is portrayed in order to exhibit the conditions under which the factory hand has lost interest in his job. The economic and human losses ("business" and "real costs") arising from inefficiency, fatigue, and unrest are discussed under the following headings: "The Loss by Labor Turnover," "The Loss by Absence," "The Loss by Defective Output," "The Loss by Industrial Accidents," "The Loss by Industrial Ill Health." Each of these chapters contains standardized subdivisions: the cost, the average loss, the minimum loss, and the conditions of excessive loss. Real costs are to be estimated by the pain and deprivations that fall on the human agent, such as industrial accidents, sickness, worry, ill will, and exasperation. There is thus produced industrial fatigue and unrest, which, for the purpose at hand, the author defines as "diminution in human capacity and willingness to work, associated with certain industrial conditions." The chief

value of this work lies in the fact that it brings together from a vast field data which are thus made available for comparison and interpretation.

A more direct approach to the social causes of unrest is made by Thomas in his *Industry, Emotion, and Unrest*. The theme underlying this book is that the changed nature of the social contacts in an impersonal society robs individuals of the sense of loyalty and of neighborly co-operation which was characteristic of social organization when contacts were less mediated. There is increased delay in the adjustment of grievances, a failure to enlist constructive interests, and a diminished sense of control over the forces affecting the individual's life-plan. The workman is subjected to the relentless competition which characterizes the individualistic capitalist struggle. Labor distrusts the motives and morality of this impersonal management, and all readjustments which are mere reform of business methods. Consequently a revision in the form of control or of ownership is increasingly demanded.

E. T. HILLER

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

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*An Introduction to the Study of Labor Problems.* By GORDON S. WATKINS. "Crowell's Social Science Series." New York: Thos. Y. Crowell Co., 1922. Pp. xv+664. \$3.00.

*Labor Attitudes and Labor Problems.* By WILLARD E. ATKINS and HAROLD D. LASSWELL. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1924. Pp. xi+520.

*Common Sense and Labour.* By SAMUEL CROWTHER. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1920. Pp. 284. \$2.00.

*The Personal Relation in Industry.* By JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, JR. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1923. Pp. 149. \$1.75.

Of the making of books attempting to deal more or less systematically and comprehensively with the relations of employers and employees in modern large-scale industry there seems to be no end in these days since the war. Without doubt the new experiences and experiments in trade agreements and labor management for which the war situation was the occasion have been the stimulus to a great part of the interest in the field which is manifested in this outpouring of new publications. To some extent the net result has been an accumulation of real contributions to our knowledge of the subject, but in part there has also been a duplication of material which will encumber the libraries and annoy those students who are trying to keep up with the literature of the subject.

Mr. Crowther's *Common Sense and Labour* impresses this reviewer as one of those books which belong in the latter category. If we had not been provided with so many better accounts of contemporary industrial relations, we should be more grateful for Mr. Crowther's presentation, which is readable and appears to be reasonably accurate in its report of facts. As it is, no one who is at all familiar with the subject will learn much that is new from the volume in question.

Atkins and Lasswell's *Labor Attitudes and Labor Problems* and Watkins' *Introduction to the Study of Labor Problems* are in form and purpose textbooks for college classes. Professor Watkins has given us a conventional treatment for elementary classes. As such we understand that the book is finding fairly wide use in colleges and universities. The treatment shows no particularly striking degree of insight, and the style is not inspiring. There are provided selected reading-lists at the ends of the chapters, but the references are only moderately well chosen. The book is of little utility for the student who is seeking to develop a strictly sociological point of view and technique for dealing with the problems of industrial relations.

Atkins and Lasswell have given us a volume which may be regarded as an expression of ideas and methods which have been current for several years in the Social Science Departments and the School of Commerce and Administration at the University of Chicago, where Professor Atkins was formerly a member of the Faculty, and Mr. Lasswell is now an instructor in Political Science. Although designed primarily as a textbook for students looking forward to business careers, the reviewer believes that this book will be found very stimulating by those interested in sociological research in the field. The writers have made a very successful use of several descriptive and analytical concepts which are essentially sociological, among them "attitudes," "unrest," and "status." One of the interesting features of the volume from the teacher's point of view is the plan of laying before the reader in a series of opening chapters descriptive studies of five important fields of employment in the United States: the steel industry, the coal-mining industry, agriculture, casual labor, and women's labor.

Mr. Rockefeller's conceptions of what is desirable and possible in the way of employer-employee relationships, and the experiment of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company with an elaborate plan of employee representation, for the inauguration of which he was largely responsible, are already well known. *The Personal Relation in Industry* consists, as we are told in a Publisher's Note, with one exception, of addresses deliv-

ered by Mr. Rockefeller on various occasions, and as such they have all been printed before. Taken as a whole, the book is an interesting exhibit of the point of view which an enlightened employer is willing to support.

Of the four volumes in question, the two last mentioned would be, in the judgment of the present reviewer, the most valuable additions to the personal library of a sociologist.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

*Mother and Child.* By EDWARD P. DAVIS, M.D. Third edition. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1911. Pp. 274. \$1.50.

*Familiar Talks on That Boy and Girl of Yours: Sociology from View-point of the Family.* By WILBUR F. CRAFTS. New York: Baker & Taylor Co., 1922. Pp. 432. \$1.75.

*Character Training in Childhood.* By MARY S. HAVILAND. Boston: Small, Maynard & Co., ca. 1921. Pp. 296. \$2.00.

*The Historical Child.* By OSCAR CHRISMAN. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1920. Pp. 471. \$4.00.

*Heredity and Child Culture.* By HENRY DWIGHT CHAPIN, M.D. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1922. Pp. xiii+219. \$2.50.

*The Pre-School Child, From the Standpoint of Public Hygiene and Education.* By ARNOLD GESELL, M.D. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923. Pp. vii+264. \$1.90.

*Childhood and Character: An Introduction to the Study of the Religious Life of Children.* By HUGH HARTSHORNE. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1919. Pp. vii+282. \$1.75.

*Wholesome Childhood.* By ERNEST R. GROVES and GLADYS HOAGLAND GROVES. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924. Pp. xxi+183. \$1.75.

*The Training of Children in the Christian Family.* By LUTHER ALLAN WEIGLE. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1922. Pp. ix+224. \$1.50.

*The Child: His Nature and His Needs.* Edited by M. V. O'SHEA. Contribution of The Children's Foundation. Valparaiso, Indiana, 1924. Pp. ix+516. \$1.00.

Neither *Mother and Child* nor *Familiar Talks on That Boy and Girl of Yours* offers sociological material. The first is a "doctor book" for pregnant women; the second a babel of cheap emotionalism and exhortation.

*Character Training in Childhood* does not come much nearer. Parts of it may be good common sense. But one distrusts the author who interprets science to parents in such dogmatic universals as these: "No parent need fear to hand down to his children any affliction which he himself did not inherit" (p. 6), and "A case has never been known where two feeble-minded parents had a normal child" (p. 6).

To estimate the scientific value of Dr. Christman's book it would be necessary to discover the sources of his facts. Apparently the author has gathered none of them first hand, but has relied on historical compilations of both primary and secondary nature. The result is a compendium of probably about all the facts written history can offer on the cultures and techniques of Mexico, Peru, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Persia, Judea, Greece, Rome, medieval Europe, and the early United States, as they affected child life.

The name of Dr. Chapin's book, *Heredity and Child Culture*, is a trifle misleading, since, in the words of the author, "the higher traits in human evolution and in civilization itself depend on social and not on organic inheritance." Concentration on selective breeding, prenatal care, nutrition, and clothing, as well as mental and moral culture amid the intimacies of family life, will prolong the life of the race. The critique of outworn methods and description of newer successful techniques for handling illegitimate and other dependent children offer constructive hints for a preventive program.

Secured by a physician's interest in all that pertains to physical efficiency, Dr. Gesell has traced in *The Pre-School Child* the movement for child welfare, from its inception through a number of successful experiments of today, such as the Merrill-Palmer School, the Smith-Hughes program, and the Research Station at the University of Iowa. He criticizes nursery and kindergarten movements, and pleads for "pre-parental education." Appendixes listing representative agencies, Sheppard-Towner provisions, and a questionnaire for investigation contribute to make this book useful as a handbook for teachers of courses in child welfare.

Hartshorne makes an unusually successful attempt to apply scientific principles of human interaction to the construction of a program of religious training for children. The "candidate for personality," unthinkable apart from his group, is "made over," by responding to the attitudes of a Christian family, into a person of Christian habits. But the religious bias of the author leads him to assume love and confidence as native impulses and co-operative tendencies as the only useful ones. "One achievement of the Christian religion has been to eliminate fear from the heart

of man." Suggestions for observation, incidents from child life, and bibliography enhance the usefulness of this study for teachers and parents.

The authors wrote *Wholesome Childhood* "to help parents maintain the wholesome homes that prevent the origin of those problems of childhood that, in the authors' experience, are most troublesome." Their approach to several problems, as those of finger-sucking, masturbation, obstinacy, and other habits, and those of punishment and repression, gives evidence of the careful testing of certain scientific hypotheses by observing the behavior of children in concrete situations. The reviewer cannot agree, however, that "fear must not be allowed to enter the life of an immature human being. . . . Its affects are too . . . insidious." Fear serves an inhibiting function in human life, and inhibition is necessary and often wholesome. The authors' treatment of fear, as well as their general attitude throughout the book, resembles Hartshorne's.

Professor Weigle's homily on the religious training of children in no way approaches Hartshorne's thesis. It offers nothing new, is didactic, and rises to scientific heights only in a few quotations from Dewey, James, and Thorndike.

Each of the sixteen distinguished joint authors of *The Child: His Nature and His Needs* was asked to sum up the present knowledge of children covered by his field, and to indicate the application of such known facts to the problems confronting parents, teachers, and social workers. The result is a symposium presented in clear English, exposing the kernel of each subject, stripped of technical language and undue emphasis on debatable theories. The materials are presented in three parts, describing the present status of knowledge of child nature, well-being, and education. Each part is opened by an article showing the gap between knowledge and practice, and citing certain social experiments which are bridging the gap. One is impressed with the ability of the authors, who include Goddard, White, and Baldwin, to interpret the facts in terms intelligible to the practical worker without sacrificing accuracy. Twenty pages of bibliography and eleven of biographies of authors add to the value of the volume.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

EVELYN BUCHAN

*Trade Associations.* By EMMETT HAY NAYLOR. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1921. Pp. 399. \$5.00.

*The Great Steel Strike.* By WILLIAM Z. FOSTER. New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1920. Pp. 265. \$1.75.

*The Steel Strike of 1919.* By the Interchurch World Movement. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920. Pp. 271.



*Public Opinion and the Steel Strike of 1919.* By The Interchurch World Movement. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1921. Pp. 341.

*The Morality of the Strike.* By DONALD A. McLEAN. New York: P. L. Kennedy & Sons, 1921. Pp. 189. \$1.75.

*Labor and Industry.* A series of lectures by PERCY ALDEN and OTHERS. Manchester: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920. Pp. 284. \$5.00.

*Labor as an International Problem.* A series of lectures edited by E. JOHN SOLANO. London: Macmillan & Co., 1920. Pp. 345.

*Trade Associations* is written from the author's standpoint as secretary of such an organization. Its purpose is to serve as a guide for entrepreneurs in their union for the standardization of competition and the promotion of protective activities, such as the publication of market reports, prices, and costs, and the control of legislation. It is this practical aim which underlies chapters dealing with methods of organizing central and branch associations, calling and conducting meetings, establishing cost and statistical systems, and directing other routine matters. The sociological significance of the book, though foreign to the author's purpose, is to be found in the experiences leading to the organization of trade associations, the adjustment of the members to each other under the stress of outside pressure, and the development of altered attitudes resulting from the new types of contact. As accommodation between the enterprisers develops, the social distance between laborer and capitalist increases, thus organizing both employees and employers into conflict groups.

The three books dealing with the steel strike of 1919 form a noteworthy exhibit of the rôle of conflict in our cultural order. Foster's account is instructive because of its frankness in portraying the methods used in launching a strike among workers who for three decades had been ruled by a paternalistic despotism and who were thought to be incapable of organization. The two inquiries by the Interchurch World Movement show the insistence on the part of the cultural order that the conflict processes shall be subordinated to it. Men cannot indefinitely use others as tools without being questioned by that part of the public which devotes itself to the perpetuation of the human values in society. These two books are remarkable in that they attempt to appraise and adjudicate on the basis of facts relating to specific issues. *The Morality of the Strike*, by McLean, represents, by contrast, the medieval schoolman's approach to a

problem that is too complex for the method he has at hand—the pontifical pronouncements and the logician's generalizations arrived at independently of the concrete elements in the trade disputes.

The volume on *Labor and Industry* comprises a series of twelve lectures, most of which deal with various formal aspects of the labor question. Some of these, however, are devoted to the discussion of the human element in industry. In earlier times "trouble" was confined to one isolated locality or industry; now any overt dispute extends quickly over the industrial areas of the country. This is due to the increased interdependency of industrial society and to the extension of organization of labor and of management. Unrest is deplorable only when it fails to establish better adjustments between the human wishes and the social environment.

*Labor as an International Problem* is written by ten persons, each a specialist in his own field. The authors review the history, purpose, and possible outcome of the international labor legislation sponsored by the League of Nations. The following topics are discussed: international trade unionism, labor legislation in Japan, labor reforms in Belgium, the Washington Conference of 1919, and the proceedings of the international labor organization at the Peace Conference, and at the three subsequent international labor conferences.

E. T. HILLER

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

*Fundamentals of Social Psychology.* By EMORY S. BOGARDUS. New York: Century Co., 1924. Pp. xi+475. \$3.75.

This work, which has already received considerable attention, favorable and otherwise, deals with the following topics in order: the human, affective, cognitive, habitual, social, mirrored, and mirthful natures, isolation, stimulation, communication, suggestion, imitation, fashion imitation, custom diffusion, convention diffusion, discrimination, discussion, accomodation, assimilation, socialization, social groups, crowds and mobs, assemblies and publics, occupational groups, group opinion, group loyalties, group conflicts, group morale, group control, group control agencies, group control products, originality, genius and talent, invention and discovery, mental leadership, social leadership, prestige leadership, democratic leadership, leadership and social change, leadership and world progress.

It will be evident from this formidable Rossian list that each topic must receive but sketchy and summary treatment. It will also be obvious that the work is intended for beginners, and is largely a compilation.

There is not much in the way of research or originality. The reviewer was impressed by the air of finality prevailing, by an amount of dogmatism upon problems and at points where much uncertainty remains, by the oversimplification of that which is complex and obscure. Such characteristics reveal the teacher at work initiating novices. One does not properly speak of these features as defects, for the book was intended as a classroom guide.

Much in its favor are such features as the facility of expression, making the book most readable; the listing and survey of topics of accumulating scientific importance; the polarization of the discussion about interstimulation; the skilful avoidance of the instinct controversy; the continuous interspersal of illustrative examples; the consistent emphasis upon environmental pressures and learning; the approach to the main theme by way of social institutions; and the pertinent review outline, questions, and problems. These and other features make the work of great value to teachers looking for a text in this field. The space assigned for this review will not permit any discussion of certain positions taken on debatable issues, nor detailed references in support of the criticisms here mentioned.

FREDERICK E. LUMLEY

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

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*Economic Motives: A Study in the Psychological Foundations of Economic Theory, with Some Reference to Other Social Sciences.*

By ZENAS CLARK DICKINSON. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1922. Pp. ix+304. \$2.50.

Although Dr. Dickinson modestly indicates in his subtitle that his study has only incidental reference to "other social sciences," anyone interested in perfecting his grasp on the psychological fundamentals needed in sociological research will find in *Economic Motives* a very clear and effective summary of the subject. This book presents practically nothing in the way of new concrete data on the problems of either psychology in the narrow sense or the social sciences, but, in the judgment of the present reviewer, he has advanced the frontiers of psycho-sociological research appreciably in his analysis of some of the fundamental concepts of behavioristic psychology, as, for example, in his discussion of intelligence and the learning process. An important feature of the book is the author's attempt to reconcile as far as possible the modern psychological notion of "conditioned reflex" with the association psychology of Mill and Bain. Although he regards McDougall's *Social Psychology* as giving a treatment

of instincts valuable chiefly as an inspiration to further investigation of the problem of inborn behavior tendencies, Dr. Dickinson seems to fall into the same weakness with which he charges McDougall when he ventures to formulate a rather long list of "best-authenticated major groups" of inborn tendencies in men (p. 112). On the whole, this can be recommended as a worth-while addition to the library of anyone interested in any social-science field.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

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*Sociology and Political Theory.* By HARRY ELMER BARNES. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1924. Pp. 260. \$2.50.

In this little book, Harry Elmer Barnes has marshaled, analyzed, and synthesized the indispensable contribution which sociology has made to political science. The material is divided into thirteen chapters, which range all the way from the nature, origin, elements, form, and scope of the state, to social progress, international relations, and extra-legal phases of political processes. The work is almost in the nature of a classified encyclopedia of sociological thought along political lines, although there is a thread of unity throughout. The method has resulted, perhaps inevitably, in a slight repetition between chapters, but it is remarkable what a readable condensation has been made of such a vast field. The final chapter is somewhat unique in its treatment of "Political Theory and the Social Environment of the Writer." Here as elsewhere the material is of such fascinating interest that one wishes it were more detailed. On the other hand, an extensive bibliography, as well as copious footnotes, afford opportunity for the interested reader to turn to the original sources. The book should bring to sociologists a renewed sense of the significance of the work already done by the pioneers in the field. To the relatively few general treatises surveying sociological thought, such as those of Bogardus, Bristol, Lichtenberger, and Small, we now have added a clear analysis of all that sociologists have contributed to political theory.

JEROME DAVIS

YALE UNIVERSITY

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*The Economic Waste of Sin.* By LAHMAN FORREST BOWER. New York: Abingdon Press, 1924. Pp. 272. \$1.75.

This economic sermon, preached by a distinguished retired business man, is not just a bit of alarmist yellow journalism. It is a serious statistical attempt to translate antisocial conduct into dollar units of waste. It cannot fail to supply the preacher and the captain of industry with moral

ammunition. In the very nature of the case, however, it is quite impossible to arrive at accurate statistics in any of the fields (crime, war, poverty, loss of life and energy, alcohol, prostitution, and narcotic drugs) included by the author under the omnibus term "sin." Some of these categories obviously overlap; others are only indirectly connected with any rational concept of sin; hence we need not be surprised nor take too literally the author's fixing the annual money waste of sin at the enormous total of \$13,568,588,743.00. The reviewer's passion for scientific exactitude prompts him to add 29 cents to this amount to give verisimilitude. This grand total is not the only instance of misstatement or exaggeration. For example, opponents to Truth-in-Fabrics legislation are charged with "chartered and protected honesty." "Thousands of labor leaders" are accused of growing rich through graft and extortion, and strikes and their costs are actually included in the chapter on "Crime"!

ARTHUR J. TODD

CHICAGO

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*Steel: The Diary of a Furnace Worker.* By CHARLES RUMFORD WALKER. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1922. Pp. ix+157. \$1.75.

*Horny Hands and Hampered Elbows: The Worker's Mind in Western Europe.* By WHITING WILLIAMS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922. Pp. xi+285, Illus. \$2.50.

Not the least interesting and valuable type of literature dealing with the problems of industrial relations which has appeared within the past few years is that which presents concrete descriptions of industrial situations. These two volumes are of this descriptive type. Mr. Williams' *Horny Hands and Hampered Elbows* is the third number in a series which began with his well-known *What's on the Worker's Mind*. Those who are familiar with either of the earlier volumes will need no introduction to this one, which is a record of the same type of investigation set forth in the earlier numbers. In this case, as the subtitle indicates, the field of exploration was Western Europe. Mr. Walker, in *Steel*, has given us a very similar contribution, presenting in this case his experiences as an unskilled worker in a great steel plant. The sociologist who is looking for concrete material with which to enlarge or illustrate his studies in the field of industrial relations will probably find these books very useful, especially for cases illustrating workers' attitudes and the situations to which they are responses.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

*A Study of International Government.* By JESSIE WALLACE HUGHAN, Ph.D. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1923. Pp. 420. \$2.75.

The first part of this book is a résumé of progress in international organization conducted with commendable objectivity but with occasional lapses displaying lack of thorough grounding in international law and diplomatic history. Thus the distinction between conventions and protocols on page 49 would probably surprise most international lawyers while the remark that the Declaration of London dealt "especially" with the transfer of ships registry raises a doubt whether the author was familiar with the whole of that document (p. 57). One thoroughly conversant with American diplomacy would hardly state that the United States is represented abroad only by ministers plenipotentiary (p. 103). These lapses are, however, mainly in details. For justly estimating the value and limitations of institutions, an amateur is perhaps as well qualified as a professional, and the reader will find much of interest in the author's discussion of the impact of nationalism, labor internationalism, and imperialism upon international organization and particularly the League of Nations.

In the latter part of the book, the author discusses the economic, evolutionary, and psychological bases of war, and seems more at home. "The basic problems of international government" we read, "lie in the field of social psychology" (p. 356). The solutions offered are industrial reconstruction, allowing more leisure in which instincts, now suppressed except in war time, can find a normal outlet (p. 357), ample opportunity for "conscientious objection" to custom and majority opinion in order that international government may rest on "the free consent of peoples" (p. 358); and modification of the mores by education. The author believes, however, that peace education should rest on negative rather than positive slogans. Thus she supports the "outlawry of war" rather than the "League of Nations."

"The ethics of 'Thou shalt not' is crude, yet because of its crude simplicity it can be grasped by the average man, who, according to some psychologists, is of little more than moron intelligence, and by the child, in whom the foundations of all folkways must be laid" (p. 370). It is true that extensive propagandizing of negative formula, such as no slavery, no rum, has changed formal law—but has it changed the mores? Is it not possible that the mores are influenced more by institutions and conditions of subsistence than by ideas and ethical doctrines? Certainly that was the opinion of the writer who first popularized this phraseology.

(See Sumner, *Folkways*, 1906, p. 36.) There is room, therefore, to question the author's conclusion that "it is probable that the effective League of Nations will appear as the flowering rather than the foundation of a popular will for peace." As the will to interstate peace, formally declared in the constitution, did not become an established fact among the American people until that institution had been in existence three-quarters of a century, so the reviewer doubts whether a will to international peace will grow into the mores of civilization until a League of Nations has functioned for at least that long.

Whether or not the reader agrees with all the author's conclusions, he will find much to challenge attention in this book, and also a useful bibliography at the end of each chapter.

QUINCY WRIGHT

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*The Newspaper and the Historian.* By LUCY MAYNARD SALMON.  
New York: Oxford University Press, 1923. Pp. xxviii+505.  
\$7.50.

The world-war, which has profoundly altered our views in other directions, has at the same time given us a new interest in news. It has been revealed that newspapers, and not the diplomats, make war and peace in the modern world. And the source of the influence of the press is no longer in the editorial page, but in the news column. Under these circumstances, a volume that seriously undertakes to examine the newspaper with reference to its value as a historical source has a prospective as well as a retrospective interest.

The author of this volume has rightly conceived that in order to estimate the authenticity of the newspaper, it is necessary to take account of the conditions under which the newspaper is produced. These conditions include not merely the necessary limitations of time and space under which the news is gathered and printed, but the even greater difficulties of translating to a vast and heterogeneous public precise and accurate details of events the import of which they are not prepared to comprehend.

The principal obstacles to accurate reporting are psychological rather than moral. These difficulties are rendered daily greater by the wide horizon which the newspaper attempts to survey and by the further fact that, on the whole, the reports of the day's events must be addressed to the intelligence of the least intelligent readers.

Of these difficulties, the author of the present volume is unusually well aware. The result is that she has produced, in the course of a wide and scholarly survey of an extremely voluminous literature on the press, the most candid, complete, and authoritative account of the newspaper that has yet been written.

In the whole range of discussion which the newspaper has provoked in the course of its long history there is scarcely a topic which is not reviewed, nor a writer whose observation seems worth recording who has not been consulted and referred to.

Merely as a source book and for the sake of its bibliographical references the value of this volume is very great. Without attempting to estimate its importance to students of history, for whom it was originally intended, it is safe to say that its value to students of sociology will not be less.

ROBERT E. PARK

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*Modern Religious Cults and Movements.* By GAIUS GLENN ATKINS, D.D., L.H.D. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1923. Pp. 359. \$2.50.

The author, who is minister of the First Congregational Church in Detroit and has written several other books on religious subjects, offers here a clear and unbiased though not always profound analysis and evaluation of modern religious cults. These include Christian Science, New Thought, Theosophy, Spiritism, and Bahaism. The social and psychological factors in modern civilization, as well as the lacks in the orthodox forms of Christianity, all of which have been responsible for these new movements in religion, are discussed. There is some interesting material on the life and character of Mary Baker Eddy and of the healer, Quimby, who started her upon the road of "Science and Health." The best thing in the book is the picture it presents of modern Christian liberalism, a feature of our modern civilization both as characteristic and perhaps quite as significant as the newer religious cults.

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*Young India. 1919-1922.* By MAHATMA GANDHI. New York: B. W. Huebsch Inc., 1923. Pp. 1176, plus appendix, etc., 1199. \$4.00.

This volume is a collection of short articles contributed by Mahatma Gandhi to the magazine *Young India* during the years 1919-22. They are grouped as far as possible chronologically under ten sections, which



include: *The Satyagraha Movement* (which is the Indian version of "passive resistance"), *towards Non-Co-operation*, *The Principles of Non-Co-operation*, *The Programme of Non-Co-operation*, and *The Non-Co-operation Campaign*. There is also a brief introductory sketch of the non-co-operation movement by Babu Rajendra Prasad, a biographical note, and material on the arrest and trial of Gandhi. Editing and summarizing of articles in some cases has been done by the editors.

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*My Forty Years in New York.* By REV. C. H. PARKHURST, D.D., LL.D. New York: Macmillan Co., 1923. Pp. 256. \$2.00.

The most interesting thing in this volume is the forty pages devoted to an account of the Rev. Parkhurst's assault upon the Tammany interest in New York during 1892-94. The two sermons which aroused so much excitement by their direct attack upon the corruption of the municipal administration are largely reprinted. The details of the investigation made following this by the Lexow (Senatorial) committee are however, not given. The rest of the book is devoted to an account of the early life of the Rev. Parkhurst and to "Reflections" on a variety of subjects, mainly religious.

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*Recreation.* By VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON, K.G. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co. Pp. 43. \$0.60.

This volume reprints an address delivered at the Harvard Union December 8, 1919. Recreation in the life of a cultivated Englishman is discussed in a form adapted to the Harvard undergraduate mind.

## RECENT LITERATURE

### NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

The abstracts and bibliography in this issue were prepared under the general direction of D. E. Proctor, by P. T. Diefenderfer, P. P. Denune, C. W. Hayes, E. L. Setterlund, and Mrs. E. R. Rich, of the Department of Sociology of the University of Chicago.

Each abstract is numbered at the end according to the classification printed in the January number of the *Journal*.

#### I. PERSONALITY: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE PERSON

**The Biometrical Study of Heredity.**—Mendelism is the only type of inheritance yet demonstrated in fully investigated cases; it is, however, theoretically possible that blending inheritance might exist in quantitative characters, but these also are transmitted by Mendelian factors. Mutations are rare and are the only agency by which species can be modified to any appreciable extent.—R. A. Fisher, *Eugenics Review*, XVI (October, December, 1924), 189-210. (I, 2; VIII, 2.) P. T. D.

**The Sociology of Authority.**—Authority, the central problem of mass psychology, is defined as "the untested acceptance of another's judgment." Authority is the unifying, integrating, species-conserving principle of human association, while anarchy is the dissolving, disintegrating, species-destroying one. The fundamental conflict of human history is the perennial opposition between personality and community. Where dogmatic adherents maintain the irreconcilable antithesis between authority and anarchy, communism and individualism, the sociological observer perceives a reconciliation of opposites. The need of authority in original human nature is to be demonstrated as a necessity of purpose, as an economy of the will, and as an expression of the law of least effort.—Ludwig Stein, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVIII, *The Trend of Population*, 116-20. (I, 2, 4.)

**Heredity and Genius.**—It cannot yet be said with scientific precision whether genius results from superior inheritance or from superior opportunities made possible by the better social and economic position of the family. A study of American men of genius seems to indicate the possibility of the latter.—Charles Kassell, *South Atlantic Quarterly*, XXIII (April, 1924), 112-23. (I, 2; VIII, 2.) P. P. D.

**Is There a Natural Law of Inequality?**—The contention of some recent writers that there is a natural law of inequality is based upon a misconception. Variations do exist, but variation does not prove inequality. The leading ethnologists and anthropologists of the day support this latter view.—Ira W. Howe, *Scientific Monthly*, XIX (November), 502-11. (I, 2; IV, 2.) P. P. D.

**Anthropology and Psychology: A Study in Some Points of Contact.**—The author assumes the existence of two dispositions ("types"), introversion and extroversion, and pushes an inquiry important to anthropology. He considers their biology, their racial as well as interracial distribution, their modes of inheritance, how far they are capable of being reinforced in the individual as a result of environment, whether the two dispositions commonly exert a sexual attraction or repulsion upon each other, and whether the reactions characteristic of each are expressed by a particular facies in the concrete works of art and of the crafts they produce.—C. Seligman, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, LIV (January-June, 1924) 13-46. (I, 2, 4.) C. W. H.

**A Psychology without Heredity.**—In a strictly behavioristic psychology, with its emphasis on laboratory procedure and with its insistence on physiological explanation of behavior, there is practically no room for the concept of heredity. We need not so much the assumption of heredity as an experimental technique for the study of psychophysiology and developmental psychology. Unless behaviorism makes such development, it will merely rephrase the old speculative psychological categories.—Z. Y. Kuo, *Psychological Review*, XXXI (November, 1924), 427-47. (I, 2.) E. L. S.

**Purpose and Mechanism in Psychology.**—Purposive psychology describes events in terms of purpose, allows for occurrence of phenomena under varying circumstances with different antecedent conditions, and leaves room for indeterminism. Mechanistic psychology explains phenomena as applied to a series of events with comparatively fixed antecedents with numerically definite limits. Such terms as "self," "instinct," "learning through pain and pleasure" are embodied in purposive description. There is no hard-and-fast line between purposive and mechanistic description. Because of the complexity of human nature, indeterminism must be allowed for, since all causal factors are not known. A synthesis of purposive and mechanistic description will facilitate preciseness, though absolute preciseness is impossible in psychology.—E. R. Guthrie, *Journal of Philosophy*, XXI (December 4, 1924), 673-81. (I, 2, 4.) E. L. S.

**Psychological and Sociological Types.**—In establishing types a formula is sought which expresses interaction of mental functions in the individual. These act differently in each type. To determine psychopathic types, classification is based both on psychological observation and on the social conduct of the individual. Kronfeld concludes that behind the social behavior of men the same functions and dispositions are not always operative. Environmental conditions constantly change, and reactions cannot be finally characterized even in pure psychological types. Kronfeld's connecting link between psychological and sociological types is the concept "reactivity"—a specific psychic interrelationship of functions, which conceivably leads to specific social behavior. Reactions vary with environment. It is only within the milieu of a special type that reactions are distinguished quantitatively and qualitatively.—Heinrich Klüver, *Psychological Review*, XXXI (November, 1924), 456-62. (I, 2, 4; IX, 2.) E. L. S.

**Développement psychique de l'enfant et influence de l'éducation.**—The increase or decrease in the intellect of a child in comparison with the normal child is due to certain defects of the neuro-muscular system. In the study of infant pathology, the morbid characters are usually divided into the paranoic, the perverse, and the hysteric, the causes of which can generally be traced to cardiac, respiratory, or gland disorders. All of these ailments are antisocial in character. However, these defects may be remedied to some extent by the infant's education.—Dr. Charles Grimbert, *Revue de philosophie*, XXIV (September-October, 1924), 490-507. (I, 3.) P. T. D.

**Child Guidance Clinics Planned for Problem Children.**—A child-guidance clinic is an organization that seeks to bring to the study, training, and treatment of problem children whatever medicine, psychiatry, psychology, education, and social case work can offer.—V. V. Anderson, *Nation's Health*, VI (October 15, 1924), 684-89. (I, 3; VIII, 1.) C. W. H.

**Moral and Social Development of the Six Year Old Child.**—An estimate of a child's potentials obtained from physical, psychological, mental, and pedagogical tests is an important aid in classification. Success in school depends not only upon this combined judgment but upon all that is involved in personality. Development of personality and character formation begins in the nursery. A test of thirty-six children in the first grades of four schools in Worcester, Massachusetts, was made. In general it was noticed that the children ranked highest in the schools where environment and home training were best. Complete life-histories of each child are needed for more accurate knowledge.—Ellen A. Maher, *Pedagogical Seminary*, XXXI (September, 1924), 268-75. (I, 3; IX, 2.) E. L. S.

**The World and the Blind Man.**—The blind have no power or sense not possessed by the seeing, not even an increased keenness of the remaining senses; merely a sub-

traction of sight with a somewhat better utilization and development of the four other senses to meet conditions. The psychology of the blind differs from that of the seeing only in that the blind do not see.—Charles Magee Adams, *Atlantic Monthly*, CXXXIV (November, 1924), 595-602. (I, 4; IX, 5.) E. R. R.

**The Nature of Suggestibility.**—Suggestibility is an attitude or set on the part of the individual which may be a temporary or chronic attitude, which may involve the whole organism and thus be what we call an expressive attitude, or may involve only a part of the individual's personality (dissociation); and, finally, this dissociation may develop to such an extent that one shows a double personality. Negativism is non-suggestibility. Experimental tests have thrown light upon two types of abnormal individuals: the schizophrenic and the psychoneurotic. The schizophrenic is usually suspicious, wary, and negativistic. His mental threshold goes up when daydreaming, whereas the threshold of the psychoneurotic, who is trustful, open, and suggestible, goes down while daydreaming. If the individual is neither one nor the other, there is no change under different conditions. The value of these tests is in detecting incipient tendencies toward functional neuroses, and thus they become valuable in mental prophylaxis and hygiene.—John J. B. Morgan, *Psychological Review*, XXXI (November, 1924), 463-77. (I, 4; VIII, 4.) E. L. S.

## II. THE FAMILY

**Women and the New Morality.**—With the coming of economic and political independence, women are also seeking their independence in the morality of sex. The old meaning of sex morality used to apply almost wholly to the male sex. Today we see women assuming the right to act as their impulses dictate, with much the freedom that men have enjoyed for so long. Yesterday women's true feelings and personalities were disregarded and denied. Today they are demanding their recognition on the same basis as the other sex.—Beatrice M. Hinkle, *Nation*, CXX (November 19, 1924), 541-43. (II, 1.) P. T. D.

**La promiscuité est-elle primitive?**—Promiscuity is an exceptional phenomenon among primitive peoples. It is practiced among certain congregated groups, among whom the Punaluan, of Central Australia, may be cited as the best example. In this group promiscuity is limited to small numbers of the group. The men have their women in common. It might better be called marriage of groups, since these groups are sections of families; that is, two families exchange their women of the same generation. Another case which might be considered as promiscuity in many tribes is the custom of hospitality. Among the Eskimo, wife-exchange is practiced in connection with certain customs, chief of which are those related to economic value. Finally, promiscuity exists chiefly among peoples where the separation of the sexes often occurs and is of long duration.—P. Descamps, *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, X (July, 1924), 1-22. (II, 1.) P. T. D.

**The Cultivation of Family Life.**—It is the children that make up the greater part of the family, and the children from whom the parents receive great joy and pleasure. The growing and developing of personalities is one of the family's responsibilities. To guarantee happiness in the family, everyone should be interested in the interests of all the rest. The strongest family is that in which the members of the family accept each other for what they are. The ideal family is that in which we have co-operative life.—Karl de Schweinitz, *Family*, V (December, 1924), 145-99. (II, 3.) P. T. D.

**Factors Affecting the Marital Condition of the Population.**—The relation of death, crime, insanity, and pauperism to the single, widowed, divorced, and the married. The influence on the percentage married of the age distribution, of sex ratios of men to women, of the racial and nativity elements in the population, of urban and rural communities, of manufacturing, of employment of women, of the birth-rate, and of income.—William Fielding Ogburn, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVIII, *The Trend of Population*, 47-59. (II, 3.)

**The Family Allowance System.**—In the family-allowance system we have the distribution of wages according to the family's need. France has devoted greatest attention to this system, and almost three million workers are covered by it. The allowance constitutes additions to the wage earned for every child. It is claimed that this will increase the birth-rate and decrease the infant mortality. No definite change has been noticed in the birth-rate as yet, but a decided decrease in infant mortality has taken place. The allowances are paid by the government or by the employer. This system is still in the experimental stage, and many other nations are testing it in different ways.—J. H. Richardson, *Economic Journal*, XXXIV (September, 1924), 373-86. (II, 3.)  
P. T. D.

**Educating for Parenthood.**—Education for parenthood can be carried on in two ways: through the universities, and by means of the public library system. The university has its courses in home economics, nutrition, and hygiene, etc., but to these should be added a course in training for parenthood, which should include the mental, moral, and physical education of children from earliest infancy through the high-school age, to be supplemented by graded courses and required theses. The public library, including all branches of learning, is accessible to all.—Margaretta Willis Reeve, *Journal of Social Hygiene*, X (December, 1924), 449-60. (II, 3.)  
P. T. D.

**The Fabric of Family Life.**—The fabric of family life is made up largely of things which taken by themselves are trifles. Case workers are often misled by the failure of language to express adequately the things of the spirit. Should not case workers be more concerned to form public opinion with respect to the founding of families?—Joanna Colcord, *Family*, V (November, 1924), 172-75. (II, 2.)  
C. W. H.

### III. PEOPLES AND CULTURAL GROUPS

**The Days of Our Ancestors.**—The Zuni, an ancient tribe of American Indians, can be found scattered throughout the great Southwest. Their civilization passed through the stage of collecting seeds to the stage of planting seeds. On becoming settled, abodes were dug in the ground and new devices invented for household and agricultural use. Slowly they have more and more progress until great houses were built and community life became organized. However, due to civil wars, the great houses disappeared sometime during the twelfth century. The remnants of these great house communities took up the life of the present-day Hopi and Zuni pueblos, and are making their last stand against invasive modern Americanism.—Mary Austin, *Graphic*, LIII (October, 1924), 33-38. (III, 1.)  
P. T. D.

**Psychoanalysis and Anthropology.**—The mental data investigated by the anthropologist form a part of the province of the psychoanalyst. We discover in the hidden recesses of the mind implicit beliefs or forms of thought that have been recorded either in folklore and mythology of bygone days or among savage races of the present time. There is a gradual convergence of anthropological and psychoanalytical points of view. Common to all features of the unconscious mind is some indication of their belonging to a primitive mental level. Attention is directed to two or three features of the unconscious of a general or formal nature, and two or three relating to its content.—Ernest Jones, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, LII (January-June, 1924), 47-66. (III, 2.)  
C. W. H.

**Immigration and the American Birth-Rate.**—The widespread belief that foreign immigration has been directly responsible for the decline of the native American birth-rate is not based upon fact. The birth-rate was declining before immigration became significant. Both the decline in the birth-rate and the rapid increase in immigration have been due to the rapid industrial advance and the social changes in America. Only indirectly is there any causal connection between immigration and the fall of the birth-rate; that is, in so far as immigration helped to fill up and develop the country and create conditions favorable to the decline.—E. B. Reiser, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (May-June, 1924), 274-82. (III, 4; VIII, 2.)  
P. P. D.

**The Recent Northward Migration of the Negro.**—In volume, the recent northward migration of negroes is unprecedented. It comes largely from the cotton states, from which there had previously been comparatively little migration to the North. The migrating negroes are going mostly to a few northern cities and are finding employment as laborers or semiskilled workmen in industrial plants, where to a limited extent they are making up for the falling off in the supply of foreign labor. It is a question whether the negroes can maintain their numbers in the North by natural increase, or without being recruited by immigration from the South. The movement probably accounts in part for the fact that the growth of negro population was smaller in the last decade than ever before.—Joseph A. Hill, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVIII, *The Trend of Population*, 34-46. (III, 4.)

**The Mexican Population of Omaha.**—The Mexican population of Omaha numbers about 1,000, six hundred of whom live in South Omaha. They are mostly illiterate, and are employed in the packing-houses, stockyards, railroads, and on near-by farms. They are mostly single men but include about fifty families. Their death-rate is high and their birth-rate exceedingly high.—T. Earl Sullenger, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (May-June, 1924), 289-93. (III, 4; V, 2.) P. P. D.

**The Racial Origin of Almshouse Paupers.**—A discussion of one of the points raised in the figures in an eight-page pamphlet, issued by the Bureau of the Census, *Paupers in Almshouses*, 1923. Comparison favors the negro as against the native-born white. While the proportion of foreign born in public houses per 100,000 is greater for the foreign-born than for the native-born white, yet, in the period covered, there has been a distinct diminution in the proportion of foreign-born to total white almshouse paupers. With a few trifling exceptions, all the countries from which the present law encourages immigration contributed to almshouse paupers in 1923 in excess of their representation in the population of 1920.—Raymond Pearl, *Science*, LX (October 31, 1924), 394-97. (III, 4; VIII, 1.) C. W. H.

**The Negro Migrations.**—(A debate.) It is better that the negroes be distributed throughout the nation, and that every section be responsible for the final solution of the race problem. Fortson believes that they will be more efficient in industry than in agriculture; that they have handicapped the South, whereas in the North they will replace the immigrant favorably in every way, even biologically. Pickens believes that it is doubtful if the negroes will die out as a result of such distribution, but they may become amalgamated.—Blanton Fortson and William Pickens, *The Forum*, LXXII (November, 1924), 592-607. (III, 4; V, 3.) C. W. H.

**The Ozark Bluff-Dwellers.**—This is an account of an expedition into the dry rock shelters of the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas, which happened to find a district where the conditions were especially favorable, and a large and varied collection of basketry, wood, fiber, skin, stone, bone, etc. was found.—M. R. Harrington, *American Anthropologist*, XXVI (January-March, 1924), 1-21. (II, 6.) E. R. R.

**Canoes in the Gilbert Islands.**—Here is a detailed description of a fishing-craft, accompanied by drawings and a plate. The canoe described was built of native material and with simple tools. Variant types are then described and illustrated. Following are discussions of management, seasons and weather signs, dangers of the sea, canoe-names, racing, notes on astronomy, and names for parts of a canoe.—Arthur Gimble, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, LIV (January-June, 1924), 101-39. (III, 6.) C. W. H.

#### IV. CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION GROUPS

**The Nationalists of South Africa.**—The Nationalists claim that their only demand is that the needs of South Africa shall be considered first, and that they do not want to be involved in imperial problems which are not fully understood by the people.—H. M. Meyler, *Fortnightly Review*, DCXCIII (September, 1924), 368-77. (IV, 2.) E. R. R.

**The Races of Ireland.**—It may be confidently affirmed that the Irish people are an amalgam of many strains, of which the chief are represented by Celtic-speaking folk (the Celts are a mixed race, largely Nordic), Danish Nordics, Anglo-Norman, the Scots (probably Nordic), and Mediterranean, including perhaps the Picts.—James A. Lindsay, *Nineteenth Century and After*, XCVI (September, 1924), 400-411. (IV, 2.)

C. W. H.

**What Is It that Nationalist India Wants?**—Responsible government was placed before those who were demanding it. Why did they not take it? The paramount factor in the present political crisis in India is the pride of race of the intellectual Hindu, a thing born of rapidly increased consciousness of past greatness. Vehement denunciations of the domination of the West darken the light of reason with the dust of fierce racial animosities. Is the democratic constitution of the West in harmony with the genius of the Indian peoples?—Ronaldshay, *Nineteenth Century and After*, XCVI (July, 1924), 21-34. (IV, 2.)

C. W. H.

**The Negro in South Carolina During the Reconstruction (Concluded).**—The negro was willing to work at fair wages, and his efficiency progressively increased. He did not disturb the social order. The constitution framed in 1868 was a creditable instrument, but did not represent the master class, which had withdrawn from political activity. The policy of administration came to be dictated chiefly by a corrupt group of native whites and northern adventurers, supported by a number of negro members. The part played by the negro in political frauds was greatly exaggerated for political purposes. Under Chamberlain the backbone of the ring was broken. The opposition thereafter was a group determined to eliminate the negro from politics. This was in large measure accomplished. In 1895 a new constitution by indirect means prevented the majority of negroes from voting, and all negroes from holding office.—A. A. Taylor, *Journal of Negro History*, IX (October, 1924), 381-569. (IV, 2.)

C. W. H.

**Agrarian Political Movements with Special Reference to the Non-partisan League.**—Agrarian movements have been influential in the political history of the United States and have radiated results into surrounding society. The origins of such movements are closely related to geographical and pioneer conditions, both of which sets of conditions may be regarded as causal. The Non-partisan League arose on such a background, but was also the outcome of historic unsatisfied demands of North Dakota farmers and the appearance of Mr. Townley.

The League's influence may be measured variously. Politically it has been less extensive than either the Alliance or the People's party movement. As a direct and formal political movement the League appears to be on the descent. However, its indirect political influence is very considerable. It has stimulated the growth of "progressivism" and the "third-party" movement. It has left its impress on the laws of North Dakota in numerous important legislative measures. Nevertheless most of its legislative ideas were borrowed from other states and might have been realized in due time without the appearance of the League.—John M. Gillette, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXXVIII, *The Trend of Population*, 194-98. (IV, 3; V, 1.)

**Politics and Poverty in Cincinnati.**—A survey found domination by a political party; this domination exercised not by elective officers, but by the party organization; a lack of confidence on the part of influential citizens in that party; and distressing poverty brought on by foolish legislation and unwise administration. The survey suggested that the political phase could be corrected in part by the adoption of non-partisan elections, and a modification of the charter so as to permit independent representation in the council.—Upson D. Lent, *National Municipal Review*, XIII (October, 1924), 545-56 (IV, 3.)

C. W. H.

## V. COMMUNITIES AND TERRITORIAL GROUPS

**Some Sociological Implications of the Farm Bureau Movement.**—The social theory involved in this paper assumes that all variables in the total social complex possess possibilities of dependency, or bluntly, that there are no independent variables. The sociological implications of any form of human organization are then the possible,

probable, and actual interactions of variables. The Farm Bureau can prosecute its specialized program successfully only so long as it recognizes that its individual members behave as total personalities. The interest which the specialized program represents will be endangered whenever it is presumed that this interest excludes other valid interests.—E. C. Lindeman, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVIII, *Trend of Population*, 183-89. (V, 1; VII, 1.)

**The Sociological Implications of the Co-operative Marketing Movement.**—The co-operative marketing movement arose from a desire to improve rural conditions. The farmer is profoundly dissatisfied with the modern price-making system. Then, too, he recognizes that the strong position of big business is largely due to unification. The slow but steady increase in tenancy is giving greater relative importance to a group much less individualistic than the farm-owner and more susceptible to the co-operative movement.—B. F. Brown, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVIII, *Trend of Population*, 190-93. (V, 1; VI, 1.)

**Inner London, Some Possibilities.**—In spite of the apparent chaotic confusion that London presents, the city has elements of symmetry and harmony in its town plan. A little attention paid to the character of individual districts will throw light upon the allied problems (1) where a new thing may be placed to advantage, and (2) where an old thing now demonstrably out of place may be removed. It is proposed to remove the Covent Garden Market and near-by unsightly railways and wharves and to build a wide bridge at Charing Cross.—H. A. Spiers, *Sociological Review*, XVI (July, 1924), 216-34. (V, 2.) P. P. D.

**Some Obstacles to Community Organization.**—In a community of twenty-five hundred persons in a rich oil section of a western state, repeated efforts have failed to develop any lasting community spirit around either the school, church, or community house. Obstacles include (1) rapid labor turnover, (2) separation of employees of many companies, (3) seven-day week and changing shift, (4) accessibility to near-by town of thirty thousand people.—Charles N. Queen and Stuart A. Queen, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (May-June, 1924), 283-88. (V, 3.) P. P. D.

## VI. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

**Recreation or Re-creation.**—An account of a boy who was not amenable to the ordinary recreational provisions. An analysis was made and treatment prescribed by the Institute. Recreation plans for such cases as this require something more than playground and equipment, and that includes a "mental hygiene point of view."—Claudia Wanamaker, *Playground*, XVIII (November, 1924), 461-63, 483, 484. (VI, 4; VIII, 1.) C. W. H.

**Play and Juvenile Delinquency.**—It is in the community that our moral codes first get explicit and formal definition. The fundamental source of delinquency in the United States is the disorganization of the traditions and customary basis of life introduced by the invention of modern machinery and particularly by the multiplication of the means of production. This disorganization is seen in the mobility and promiscuous association of the population of a large city like Chicago, where immense amusement areas develop.—Robert E. Park, *Playground*, XVIII (May, 1924), 95-96. (VI, 4; VIII, 1.) C. W. H.

**The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations: An Attempt to Define the Project in Sociological Terms.**—The conditions that gave rise to the Industrial Court of Kansas were unusual, and the law providing for the Court was the result of an emergency. *The legal aspects* of the question involved the extension of the police power when health, life, and the deprivation of civil rights were concerned. Also the legal right to strike, to quit work, and the legal right of the individual to labor were involved. The power of the law compelled corporations to continue production in essential industries. *The sociological phase* is the responsibility of voluntary minority groups to great society. Shall powerful conflicting groups deprive citizens of their rights or shall they be limited in their pro-



ductive operations? Shall society establish the place of productive enterprise? *The welfare aspect* of the court protects all laborers in their rights, in health, and in the administration of laws regarding wages, compensation, accidents, housing, and in fact the social life in general. The practice of the court demonstrates that it is possible by adjudication of differences to secure labor and capital in their rights, protect the public, and retain the respect of labor for law and government. *The court as a social phenomenon* brings to the foreground a number of questions which are worthy of thorough investigation. Among these are: (1) Is it possible to establish a federal court settling industrial and labor disputes judicially without an amendment to the Constitution of the United States? (2) An investigation into the decisions of the Supreme Court that seek to regulate industry under an extended application of the Fourteenth Amendment. (3) An inquiry into the welfare of labor organizations and their attitude regarding democracy, and involving the political well-being of the nation. (4) An investigation of the social psychology of the business man who sees no labor problem or admits no compromise.—F. W. Blackmar, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVIII, *The Trend of Population*, 73-84. (VI, 5; VII, 1.)

**Repression of Civil Liberties in the United States.**—This discussion summarizes recent developments in relation to free speech in the field of law—federal, state, and municipal, also in the law concerning picketing, strikes, and the right to organize. It assembles the evidence concerning administrative interference with civil liberties—from the Department of Justice down through state official to municipal authorities. It then reviews the attitude of the public mind as shown by mob violence, anti-radical propaganda, attacks upon the American Civil Liberties Union, and the relation of the legal profession to our constitutional guaranties of freedom. In conclusion it asks whether repression is likely to increase or abate.—Harry F. Ward, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVIII, *Trend of Population*, 127-46. (VI, 5.)

**Recent Death Orgies.**—Capital punishment fails to deter criminals. Those who suffer death go to the gallows as heroes. The effect upon the crowds that gather to witness the executions is morally bad. Those who would be benefited by such a scene can be deterred from crime by other means. To carry on the executions secretly within the prison walls would be admission of failure of the age-long argument for capital punishment.—Charles Kassel, *South Atlantic Quarterly*, XXII (October, 1924), 295-309. (VI, 5; VIII, 1.) P. P. D.

**A State Certificate of Marriage.**—The effect of a certificate of health would be the means of postponing the marriage until health was restored, in the case of those who were so affected by illness as to render the birth of healthy children impossible. The affections discussed are syphilis, gonorrhoea, tubercle, genuine poverty, mental deficiency.—R. A. Gibbons and others, *Eugenics Review*, XVI (July, 1924), 117-28. (VI, 5; VIII, 2.) C. W. H.

**The Experiment of a Christian Daily.**—As an experiment a daily newspaper was edited for one week upon a strict basis of Christian ethics. The choice of subjects and the admission of advertisements were guided by the editor's idea of what Jesus would do. The demand for the paper was large and much interest was manifested, but the money necessary to carry on such a work has never been forthcoming.—Charles M. Sheldon, *Atlantic Monthly*, 134 (November, 1924), 624-33. (VI, 7.) E. R. R.

## VII. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL PROCESS

**The Economic Life of India.**—Seventy-two and five-tenths per cent of the population of India are engaged in agriculture and have an economic caste system of five classes. This environment is not an incentive for individual effort, and thus progress is difficult. In spite of everything, industry and manufacturing are slowly creeping in, and large-scale production and modern towns will be the final result.—P. P. Pillai, *Sociological Review*, XVI (October, 1924), 322-35. (VI, 1.) P. T. D.

**L'orientation professionnelle de notre jeunesse.**—Stress is laid upon the choosing of a profession and insistence on entrance to it through apprenticeship. This apprenticeship greatly increases the economic, intellectual, moral, and social value of professional training. Before going into his life-profession, we have the young man with a certain enthusiasm characteristic of his age. Orientation through the profession secures the selection of the young scholar by means of his merit. The number of offices of the profession are limited, and by selection we can get "the right man in the right place."—Julien Fontegne, *Le musée social*, XXXI (October, 1924), 281-304. (VII, 1.)

P. T. D.

**L'orientation professionnelle.**—Orientation in a profession will be secured by the intellectual and physical fitness of the apprentice. The disequilibrium of today is due to the reorganization of labor which was made necessary by the war. As men went to war, women and children took their places in the office and in the factory. After the war, new positions had to be found for the men. The parent and the school have a great deal of influence over the youth in showing the advantages of a profession. Public offices of the state are also offered as an encouragement for orientation. Experiments were made on the youth of Bordeaux. The young man is sent to a school and prepared for apprenticeship, is shown the advantages and disadvantages of the different professions, and is then allowed to pick his life-work. After he serves his apprenticeship, he takes an examination and enters the profession.—André Pavie, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XXXII (September-October, 1924), 57-17. (VII, 1.)

P. T. D.

**Towards Breaking "the Vicious Circle of Mass Production."**—The American Homecraft Association and the Polytechnic Institute of India are illustrations of interest in freeing workmen from unemployment and wage slavery. The Indian experiment is not only interested in giving each man an equipment whereby he can do creative and profitable work in co-operation with fellow-workers, but also in showing him how to feed his family on an acre of land. Industry is slowly realizing its mistake in leaving the land.—J. W. Scott, *Hibbert Journal*, XXII (October, 1924), 54-63. (VII, 1.)

E. L. S.

**The Politics of Wheat.**—The wheat farmers have been trying to cure their economic ills by legislative action of both the Republican and Democratic parties. This has failed to help them, and they blame it to the incompetence or perfidy of the major parties, and now turn to La Follette, in whom they reaffirm their faith in panaceas.—Henry Adams Bellows, *Forum*, LXXII (October, 1924), 497-504. (VII, 3; IV, 3.)

E. R. R.

**The Problem of Self-Government in Mexico.**—For over a hundred years the government of Mexico has failed to meet the demands of a free or a successful government. This condition has been and still is due to the illiteracy and ignorance of the people, the presence of racial and social distinctions, the lack of means of communication and transportation within the country, and the absence of any traditions of or aptitude for self-government. No polity can get out of a nation more than there is in the nation.—Robert Glass Cleland, *Atlantic Monthly*, CXXXII (November, 1924), 701-11. (VII, 3.)

E. R. R.

**The Group Mind.**—It has been supposed that the group mind exists independently of the individual minds within the group and is in a real sense superior to them. This personification of the group mind is evident in various theories of the state. But there seems to be no justification for this interpretation of the matter, certainly not if the definition of the group mind which we have adopted be accepted. It is true, indeed, that social customs and beliefs and institutions are in a sense independent of individual minds; they do not exist in isolated individual minds. But neither do they exist aloft by themselves, without any connection or contact with individual minds. On the contrary, they appear to be the expression of the interpenetration of the different minds that compose the group.—G. Watts Cunningham, *Problems of Philosophy: An Introductory Survey*, 1924, 314-15. (I, 4; VII, 4.)

T. C. W.

**La théorie des mouvements des peuples et la guerre civile en Russie.**—Population follows the lines of least resistance and congregates in districts where natural boundaries are found. Lines of immigration usually tend to follow a westward direction. In the case of the Russians, the first movement was different. It was southeast from Siberia into Manchuria. This movement, however, was stopped by the Japanese, and changed its direction by re-migrating into European Russia and bordering states. The Russian famines of 1917-19 and 1921-22 caused great movements in Russian migration, and it was only through taxation and reorganization of the economic situation that an equilibrium was brought about. It was not until 1921 that the movement was slowly turned back and the towns and cities of Central Russia began to regain their pre-war population. With this return to equilibrium of population, the industrial production and economic situation are slowly moving back to normal.—Alexandrie Koulicher, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XXXII (September-October, 1924), 492-507. (VII, 4; IV, 2.)  
P. T. D.

**Stimulation Ranges and Reaction Areas.**—All behavior is the product of five generic factors, viz., a sustenance field, an ancestry of commingled dominant and recessive traits, a certain range of stimulations, an area of reactions, and a history of primary conditioning and successive reconditionings of reflexes and their combinations. Stimulation ranges vary greatly and are determined by physical facts. Reaction areas depend upon the intensity and amount of stimulation. Reaction is more uniform in a homogeneous than a heterogeneous population. Through countless reconditionings, the reaction of population to stimulations of indefinite reach are fashioned into human society. Reconditionings begin with facts and distinction of kind. Similarity of stimulation induced speech, which further reconditioned individual behavior, facilitated the transmission of human experience, and stimulated the process of classification which resulted in the consciousness of kind. This made men social as well as gregarious. The final reconditioning was the integration of habits—the acquisition of folkways and culture patterns which brought about our so-called civilization.—F. H. Giddings, *Psychological Review*, XXXI (November, 1924), 449-55. (VII, 4; V, 4.)  
E. L. S.

#### VIII. SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

**Is the Family of Five Typical?**—As judged by advocates of the living-wage doctrine, it is; but according to statistics, it is not. The burden of dependents is not uniform upon all wage-earners, but differs widely. Some have no dependents, others have a wife, and still others a wife and from one to fourteen children. Only a small percentage (10 per cent in England and 12 per cent in the United States) of adult male workers actually have the standard family of five to maintain. Most of them have even fewer dependents than a wife and three children. To pay all workers a wage sufficient to maintain a family of five would be adequate for only a small percentage of the workers.—Paul H. Douglas, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (September, 1924), 314-28. (VIII, 1; II, 3.)  
P. T. D.

**Family Allowances.**—A new principle of basing wages upon the cost of living for a man or woman and housekeeper with an allowance for each child is proposed. This plan is being used extensively on the European continent. Its effect upon birth-rate, the quality of children, efficiency of the worker, and national prosperity is still unknown.—Mrs. H. A. L. Fisher, *Quarterly Review*, CCXLII (July, 1924), 73-87. (VIII, 1; II, 3.)  
P. P. D.

**American White Criminal Intelligence.**—The idea that criminals are feeble-minded is based upon unscientific tradition and false hypotheses. A careful study of the intelligence (based upon the Alpha test) of native white convicts in a number of state penitentiaries shows that they are distinctly superior. The study reveals some interesting variations of intelligence among different types of crime and in different parts of the country.—Carl Murchison, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XV (August, 1924), 239-316. (VIII, 1; IX, 2.)  
P. P. D.

**How They Make Good.**—Normal adjustment of the delinquent is attained when he can live in the community without injuring it. It is convenient to name four stages in the process of "making good": insight, transference, development of personality (growth of skill, clear ideas of new behavior-goals, and the wish for social esteem), and development of new relationships.—Miriam Van Waters, *Survey Graphic*, VI (October, 1924), 39-42. (VIII, 1.) C. W. H.

**What Is Prison For?**—The public is beginning to realize that the present system of prisons produces criminals instead of reducing their number. Rather than spend money for more prisons and more policemen, we should spend it for constructive measures. The improvement of economic conditions by which a man can be fairly certain of a livelihood would be a large factor in stabilizing the character of men and keeping them from crimes against property.—E. S. Hitchcock, *Atlantic Monthly*, CXXXIV (November, 1924), 612-15. (VIII, 1.) E. R. R.

**Racial Pessimism.**—In the last two decades skepticism has been growing as to the validity and permanence of Western civilization. (1) *Is civilization bankrupt?* Pessimists base their belief on biological and psychological grounds. There is an apparent deterioration of the race under the pressure of a cultural equipment which grows ever more complex and artificial while psychic equipment remains simple. High specialization of industrial life has increased the rift. (2) *The peril of the white race.* The whites, and particularly the Nordics, appear to be the special victims of this strain. The ethnic interpretation of history has recently had many advocates. This doctrine underestimates the cultural factor in social evolution. It is true that the non-whites are developing an aggressive color consciousness and that the whites are relatively declining in numbers, but the future of civilization does not depend on racial solidarity alone. (3) *Pluralistic loyalty.* Racial and national types of social organization retain something of tribalistic particularism. Culture interests have not yet attained their proper place as a basis of organization and control. They make for harmony and are the best agencies of peace in national and class relations. Multiple groupings involve multiple loyalties. The social sciences should give more attention to developing loyalty, which must be the basis of a new social synthesis.—U. G. Weatherly, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVIII, *The Trend of Population*, 1-17. (VIII, 2; I, 2.)

**Eugenics as Viewed by a Sociologist.**—Because of the publicity gained for the facts showing the differential birth-rate, and for the movement for birth control, and for the results of intelligence testing, eugenics is attracting much attention. The movement needs to be scrutinized carefully if it is to be kept from doing harm. At present it seems to rest (aside from its scientific basis in genetics) on three assumptions: (1) that human nature is entirely hereditary; (2) that we have satisfactory means of selecting the superior stock; (3) that modern population growth is artificial and dysgenic as compared with that of earlier times, which was both natural and eugenic. All of these assumptions need to be proved before we can safely act upon them. There are many reasons for thinking that they are largely false. Sociologists as a class would deny the first, so it is passed over. A few reasons why the second and third cannot be fully accepted are given. But, supposing that we can pick out the intellectually superior, the question of whether they are also the people of superior social value is asked and some reasons adduced which seem to the author to make a negative answer necessary. Finally, some of the more certain elements in a rational eugenics program are mentioned.—Warren S. Thompson, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVIII, *The Trend of Population*, 60-72. (VIII, 2.)

**Marriage.**—There is room for much to be done in introducing reforms affecting marriage rights; however, action should be with caution. The marriage of certified insane and mentally defective persons should be prohibited. Certificates should be exchanged between the man and woman entering marriage, certifying their physical and mental fitness for such a step. Laws that would benefit the many at the cost of a few should be encouraged, and those that have dysgenic effects on the nation should be cast aside.—Major Leonard Darwin, *Eugenics Review*, XVI (October, 1924), 177-82. (VIII, 2; II, 3.) P. T. D.

**Population and Progress.**—The white race is the most numerous people on the earth, totaling 57 per cent of the 1,750,000,000 inhabitants. It is this race that is increasing most rapidly today and, in order to keep up the standard of living, must progress economically as well. Among them we find the great strides in industry taking place. Population can be taken care of only through progress in which we have increased wealth and the means of increasing the food supply. Theorists claim that this increase in population will cause the downfall of civilization, in that the lower outstrip the better class of people in the size of the families. It is noticeable, however, that the better class has a lower death-rate, and the true results are yet to be seen.—George R. Davies, *Scientific Monthly*, XIX (December, 1924), 598-610. (VIII, 2; IV, 2.) P. T. D.

**Occupational Differential Fecundity.**—There is a marked differential fecundity between occupational groups in the United States, with the professional groups showing the lowest and the unskilled labor group, the highest. This leads to a distinguishable decline in the average mental ability of the children of the nation.—Hornell Hart, *Scientific Monthly*, XIX (November, 1924), 527-32. (VIII, 2.) P. P. D.

**The Moral Aspect of Social Hygiene.**—Social hygiene means the entire range of social activities which can be brought to bear to improve national and personal health. In efforts against venereal diseases, there is needed extension of our present educational propaganda and of all existing facilities for the diagnosis and treatment of disease. The elimination of venereal diseases can be obtained only by moral means. Training of the individual must begin in earliest childhood and continue throughout childhood and youth.—Arthur Newsholme, *Journal of Social Hygiene*, X (December, 1924), 513-32. (VIII, 3.) P. T. D.

**The Juvenile Board of Health.**—In co-operation with the County Health Unit is the Juvenile Board of Health, whose membership is elected by the pupils from their own number. They promote health habits and correct conditions in the home and in the school, such as ventilation, temperature, lighting, and sanitation.—Ralph Beachley, *Nation's Health*, VI (October 15, 1924), 676-78, 744. (VIII, 3.) C. W. H.

**Mental Hygiene in the Universities.**—Mental hygiene is still an undefinable term. Its main purpose is to get the individual to fit into surroundings by adjusting and arranging all of his life-problems. There is unlimited room for the development of mental hygiene in the schools and universities. It would take up the problems of human behavior and conduct and bring the professors into much closer contact with the students.—Stewart Paton, *Scientific Monthly*, XIX (December, 1924), 625-31. (VIII, 4.) P. T. D.

**Crime as a Medical Problem.**—Scientific interpretation of conduct symptoms in terms of underlying causes is the first step toward treatment of the asocial individual according to his needs with the hope of curing his criminal tendencies.—A. L. Jacoby, *Health*, VI (August 15, 1924), 534-36. (VIII, 4.) C. W. H.

## IX. METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

**Methods of Study of Internal Migration and Distribution of Population in the United States.**—This paper presents three sets of simple geographs which objectify certain facts of internal migration: first, movements of the American frontier; second, movements of population from state to state; third, movements of adolescents from a particular rural community over a period of 100 years. Such geographs as the first two sets are readily made from United States Census data. It is urged that even cultural studies on the mingling of populations and race elements be accompanied by such visualizing methods.—C. J. Galpin, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVIII, *The Trend of Population*, 98-101. (IX, 1; III, 4.)

**The Relation of the United States to International Statistics.**—History of international statistics begins with the London International Exhibition of 1851, at which Quetelet suggested an International Statistical Congress. It was held at Brussels (1853) under his presidency and was followed by eight others and by a Permanent

Commission to further international co-operative work in statistics. The effort to strengthen the latter and give it a fixed home in Paris was wrecked in 1878 on German opposition, and both series of meetings came to an end. Somewhat the same international purpose was served thereafter by the International Congress of Hygiene and Demography, which held its latest and perhaps last session at Washington in 1912. At the Jubilee meeting of the Royal Statistical Society a new organization was started, modeled somewhat on the earlier Permanent Commission and with a limited professional membership. It met biennially, 1895-1913, and again in 1923. It plans to meet at Rome in 1925.

Kennedy, superintendent of the American Census of 1850, attended the London Exhibition of 1851 and visited several other European capitals with instructions to work for greater uniformity of international statistics, but did not materially affect the course of events. At the St. Petersburg session (1872) the Statistical Congress was invited by the United States Centennial Commission to hold its next meeting at Washington, and a year later, too late for acceptance, this informal invitation was ratified by Congress. A similar unofficial invitation was extended to the Statistical Institute by the American Economic Association and the American Statistical Association, and led to an ill-attended meeting at Chicago in 1893. The meeting at Washington in 1912 of the International Congress of Hygiene and Demography was arranged in close conformity with international precedents and is the only case of American participation in these international gatherings of which that can be said.—Walter F. Willcox, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXV—1, *The Trend of Population*, 17-31. (IX, 1.)

**Fallacies in the Use of Statistics.**—In many of our studies today we draw conclusions from work done on a selected group instead of on groups taken at random. It is almost impossible to judge whether conclusions drawn from the actions of this selected group can be applied to the group as a whole. Figures can be furnished to prove almost any point when we feel the weight of charge and think something ought to be done. It is possible to build up an argument on statistics that have no reliable foundation whatever. However, this procedure eventually results in the collapse of the argument.—Nell Scott, *Family*, V (December, 1924), 200-203. (IX, 1.) P. T. D.

**Cost of Living Statistics of the U.S. Bureau of Labor and the National Industrial Conference Board.**—This is a comparison of the two statistical studies made in relation to the cost of living in the United States by the United States Bureau of Labor and the National Industrial Conference. In percentage little discrepancy is noticed. The discrepancy that is noticed is not due to the weightings used, but to a difference in basic prices.—Elma Carr, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (December, 1924), 484-507. (IX, 1.) P. T. D.

**Progress in Methods of Inquiry and Research in the Social and Economic Sciences.**—The methods of research used in the social sciences—economics, political science, and sociology—are examined. The methods and difficulties of scientific induction in this field are considered. The specific ways in which these difficulties have been or may be overcome are by the use of three methods of social research, the historical, statistical, and case methods. Each of these forms of social research is related to scientific method.—F. Stuart Chapin, *Scientific Monthly*, XIX (October, 1924), 390-99. (IX, 1, 4.) E. R. R.

**Magic, Mentality, and City Life.**—Magic, and the "magical mode of thought," is regarded by Lévy-Bruhl as an index of primitive mentality. But the magical mode of thought, as Thorndyke's *History of Magic* shows, is not confined to primitive man. Much of our political thinking is in terms that Lévy-Bruhl would describe as pre-logical and primitive.

The West Indies, an ideal sociological laboratory, is peculiarly adapted to the study of the conditions under which the transition from pre-logical to scientific thought takes place.

The question raised by Lévy-Bruhl's investigation and Thorndyke's history is this: Is mentality, as Lévy-Bruhl uses the term, a function of the individual, the race, or the social group?

Is it possible to grade the intelligence of a community, as we now seek to grade the intelligence of individuals, by defining the limits of those regions of experience in which the leading minds (the *intelligentia*) have learned to think in realistic and rational terms?—R. E. Park, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVIII, *The Trend of Population*, 102-15. (IX, 2.)

**International Biological Registration.**—This registration would take place through the "Identity Book," which renders it possible in the course of a few minutes to determine with absolute certainty whether a person is what he asserts himself to be, no matter in what part of the world he may happen to be. It serves the purpose of a complete life-history and protects the individual in every way. It will, without violent measures, serve to educate the people up to a higher conception of the duties of citizenship and to a feeling of social solidarity.—Jon Alired Mjõen and Jon Bø, *Eugenics Review*, XVI (October, 1924), 183-88. (IX, 2; VIII, 2.) P. T. D.

**The Measure of Social Attitudes.**—The scientific study of social attitudes involves the use of objective methods of investigation, interpretation, and evaluation. Two general methods are: (1) the study of behavior and experience, and (2) the direct determination of attitudes by securing opinions, getting answers to questions on certain topics, and other objective methods.—W. Clark Willis, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (July-August, 1924), 345-54. (IX, 2; I, 4.) P. P. D.

**An Experiment in Supervision.**—In the Boston Family Welfare Society, the practice was found effective of selecting about 10 per cent of the active cases, in which a plan of treatment should be definitely outlined on the records and checked up from time to time. Examples are given.—Elizabeth L. Holbrook, *Family*, V (October, 1924), 146-51. (IX, 2.) C. W. H.

**The Psychology of Superior Children.**—There is no psychology of superior children. Superiority has yet to be analyzed into its psychological constituents. There is no infallible index of superiority in general, because of variations in the rate at which the superior child develops and because of the fact that no trait thus far studied is inevitably present in superiority. Such a universal trait may be a superior mental organization, but "mental tests" are too largely measures of maturation rate and, being based on "average" performance, ignore completely that ingeniousness and originality which is an essential ingredient in superiority. Methods of determining superiority in school have progressed from the subjective to the objective and from achievement toward innate capacity. Discrepancies between capacity and achievement in school point to the need of further study of the superior to discover what hinders or facilitates the realization of their possibilities.—Albertine A. Richards-Nash, *Pedagogical Seminary*, XXXI (September, 1924), 209-46. (IX, 2.) E. L. S.

**An Attempt to Articulate Processes.**—A view is given of some of the processes which nine case workers of some experience use in case treatment through the interview. This is a result of the workers' attempt to analyze them.—Mary S. Brisely, *Family*, V (October, 1924), 157-61. (IX, 3.) C. W. H.

**Opening the Way.**—In the type of interview that takes place usually at the point of crisis in treatment, it should not be the case worker's intention to go much beyond the point of removing conflicts. She should allow time for reactions. Illustrations are given.—Anna Vlachos, *Family*, V (October, 1924), 153-57. (IX, 4.) C. W. H.

**The Use of the Transfer within the Limits of the Office Interview.**—The emotional going-over of the client to the case worker breaks down old fears and inhibitions, and provides a safe medium in which the growth of new thought, feelings, and habits becomes possible.—Jessie Taft, *Family*, V (October, 1924), 143-46. (IX, 4.) C. W. H.

**The Contributions of Case Studies to Sociology.**—The study of man himself must eventually play a great part in the development of sociology. This article gives examples of the weakness of contributions where such vital material is not taken into account and specifications for a better method—the scientific biographical method.

Case studies for knowledge of social groups have a great value, but there is danger in taking partial case studies for general interpretations. The case-study method leaves, however, much other material for sociological investigation. The author gives here a summary of the contributions that case studies can make to sociology, particularly in aiding it to become a science of control.—William Healey, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVIII, *Trend of Population*, 147-82. (IX, 4, 5.)

**Personal Experiences and Social Research.**—Personal experiences are the keys to all knowledge, opinions, ideas, beliefs, attitudes, convictions, and interpretations. Differences in the interpretation of a situation rest upon differences in experiences. Hence, for social research, there is a value in getting the significant experiences of the persons connected with any social problem. One must seek out the persons with significant experience, get their stories, and check them up by interviews with other persons. When secured and interpreted, these accounts shed more light upon social problems than can be found by any other method.—Emory S. Bogardus, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (May-June, 1924), 294-303. (IX, 4.) P. P. D.

#### X. GENERAL SOCIOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

**What Is a Social Problem?**—A social problem means any social situation which attracts the attention of a considerable number of competent observers within a society, and demands a remedy by social action. It is not merely an objective situation. The number and character of social problems vary from place to place and from time to time. They may be classified according to source as (1) those due to unfavorable physical environment, (2) those arising from defects in the population, (3) those arising from faulty social organization, and (4) those arising from divergent ideals or class divisions within a society.—C. M. Case, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (May-June, 1924), 268-73. (X, 3.) P. P. D.

**The Growth of International Societies.**—The modern organized political international society of today is built on the conceptions that there are great international interests common to all peoples; that these international interests are superior to the individual or sectional interests of each state; that there are common standards of right and justice; that it is the duty of all to act logically together and to uphold the public interest and the public morality.—P. J. N. Baker, *Economica*, XII (November, 1924), 262-71. (X, 4; VII, 3.) P. T. D.

**The Ethics of John Dewey.**—This system of ethics is scientific and pragmatic and yet expresses idealism in self-realization and human fellowship. Dewey has brought William James, the pragmatist, and Josiah Royce, the idealist, together. Dewey approaches the subject from the side of biology, psychology, and sociology, interpreting the accumulated results of research in the field of these sciences in terms of ethics. The recent tendencies in psychology are applied to the problem of conduct. All supernatural sanctions are discarded and morality is grounded squarely on evolution, human nature, and social environment.—J. V. Nash, *Open Court*, XXXVIII (September, 1924), 527-38. (X, 4.) E. L. S.

**The Outlook for Civilization.**—The new outlook for civilization is made possible by modern psychology. Life is not in the grip of preordained fate, but of habits. An important factor in breaking down old habits has been the improvement of the means of transportation and communication. So far as human nature is concerned, there is nothing to prevent our educating ourselves deliberately and in a scientific manner to an attitude that makes the welfare of the human race its goal. During the past ten years a number of books have appeared by leading thinkers in the fields of psychology, sociology, politics, and history that advocate this new thought. For the first time in history, there is a movement that tends to bring civilization under the guidance of intelligence and in accordance with science.—Hermann Hilmer, *Pedagogical Seminary*, XXXI (September, 1924), 247-67. (X, 4; I, 4.) E. L. S.



**Aims, Contents and Methods of a General Course in Educational Sociology.**—The aim of a general course in educational sociology is to make clear to every prospective teacher that it is the function of education not only to change the individual for the better as an individual, but to change the *socius*. This demands an acquaintance with the various phases of social behavior involved in modern educational procedure. It is not enough to apply the laws of learning in assisting the individual as such, but to devise ways and means whereby every person in school becomes a thoroughly socialized citizen. The nature and direction of social forces, criteria for social progress, desirable group life and social relationships, are essentials to be included in the aims of this course. A questionnaire submitted to members of the National Society for the Study of Educational Sociology revealed a number of topics for such a course. The two most preferred were: the nature and purpose of educational sociology, and the relation and evaluation of objectives. The replies to the questionnaire indicated that the method of such a course will vary widely owing to the great variety of conditioning factors.—Clyde B. Moore, *Education*, XLV (November, 1924), 158-70. (X, 6.) E. L. S.

**Teaching of Scientific Thinking to Social Science Students.**—It is more important for teachers of sociology to help their students learn to think than to give them an encyclopedia of facts. A plan for this purpose used in connection with a beginning class in sociology includes consideration of prejudice, testimony, sources of information, propaganda, and the principles of logic.—E. L. Clarke, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (July-August, 1924), 355-58. (X, 6.) P. P. D.

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## SCUM FROM THE MELTING-POT

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### ABSTRACT

Out of more than a decade's use of California as a sociological laboratory, experimenting with the possibilities of an act padlocking brothels as the best means of eliminating them, has come the profound conviction that Continental standards regarding womankind generally differ considerably from those America has inherited from Britain. Violators of such laws are largely Mediterraneans. A strengthening of deportation laws regarding white slavery, narcotics, and alcoholics is not open to the same objection as suspending the sentence of the hobo and passing him on to the next community. A systematic deportation not only eugenically cleanses America of a vicious element but the moral effect upon their native countries makes deportation of offenders, in an international sense, doubly worth while. A new system in handling the immigration problem is recommended, that is, a rigid test in American standards by a United States Commission before the prospective immigrant leaves his native land.

An American girl once wrote a letter to Alex Skopolitis, a Greek. The writer of this article, on one of his investigation trips in the Sacramento Valley, came upon this letter. As a result, Skopolitis was deported. In this letter, the American girl was imploring Skopolitis not to desert her for a new girl he was breaking in. She recounted in the letter what she had sacrificed for him, gently reminding him that she had it within her power to put him behind

<sup>1</sup> The writer is a former state senator, president of the California State Law Enforcement League, author of the Grant Redlight Abatement Act of California, under which were classed Sacramento dance halls existing since pioneer days, also some two hundred brothels constituting the notorious Barbary Coast of San Francisco, also segregated districts in many other California cities.

prison bars. The letter contained two trunk checks for baggage from Reno, Nevada, to Oroville, California. Skopolitis' alien registration card was also inclosed.

#### DEPORTATION OF SKOPOLITIS

Armed with this evidence—for the letter with its inclosures made a complete case—we secured a telegraphic warrant from the Immigration Office in Washington, ordering the summary deportation of Skopolitis. After serving a prison term for his crimes, Skopolitis was given a return trip to Greece at the expense of the United States government.

Now, the remarkable part of this hideous story is, not that Skopolitis was deported, but that he was ever permitted to land on American soil. The trail of sorrow, disease, and death that he left behind would not have been, had Skopolitis been compelled, before leaving his native land, to explain his idea of the moral code before a United States Immigration Commission sitting in Greece. The trail of broken American homes and blind and deformed babes in foundlings' asylums that necessarily followed in the wake of his traffic in American girls could easily have been avoided, had Skopolitis been compelled to pass an examination in American standards of citizenship before setting sail from Greece.

But for years countless thousands of Skopolitises have been pouring onto American soil. Held down by generations of oppression, they have looked forward for years to the time when they might come to the Land of Freedom. But no sooner do they sail past the Statue of Liberty than they mistake liberty for license—and embark on their lives of crime.

True, we have Congress to thank for the new immigration law. This law limits radically the pro rata of immigrants from the various countries. The percentage rates for different nationalities are splendid, indeed.

But the law does not go far enough. The writer, about a year ago, told the Sacramento Church Federation that this immigration problem never will be solved until it is handled at the source. Anything short of that will permit the entry of more Skopolitises. Not



in as great numbers, perhaps, but one such trafficker can leave a trail of crime from which a generation will not recover.

#### THE MELTING-POT

America has long been known as the "melting-pot." In fact, America's greatness came from the mixture of the best European blood. The immigrants of that day came expecting hardships that built up mind and body, and with it—liberty. Since that day, the prosperity made possible by our forefathers has lured the parasites of Europe—the scum that could so well have been eliminated from the melting-pot. When the pot begins to boil, it does not take the scum long to rise to the surface. The more unassimilable the elements, the greater the amount of scum. Much of it can be skimmed off, but only after it has tainted the entire mixture. It is the *scum from the melting-pot* which we should eliminate at all costs.

#### EUROPEAN STANDARDS

Of course, it is needless to point out that these statements are in no sense an indictment of all foreigners, or of all the nationals of any particular country. Some nations maintain a very high percentage in emigrants they send. There is scarcely a country which, by a selective system, cannot contribute something of value to our national life. Without such additions in pioneer days the greatness of America would never have been attained.

The immigrants today who honestly take on American standards should be received with open arms. But it is the law-breaking foreigners whom we are talking about now. Schooled in low standards of morality, they seek to impose their European customs upon their new-found Land of Liberty. Yet an American would not last twenty-four hours in most of these countries should he violate their laws and customs.

If ever another civil war should occur in this country, foreigners would no doubt form the backbone of the forces seeking to overthrow the government. Foreigners are predominant in all the big movements of lawlessness—and these movements aim at anarchy. Deportation, and selection of immigrants at the source, will make such a catastrophe impossible.

## KING OF THE SACRAMENTO UNDERWORLD

Joe Fuski, before he set sail on his return trip to Italy, was "King of the Sacramento Tenderloin." Though he could neither read nor write, he controlled the important *bloc* of tenderloin votes. Ambitious officials, with eyes more on the next election than on the next generation, were compelled to bow the knee before this foreign king. But Fuski became engulfed in the maelstrom we caused by investigation of the Sacramento underworld, and was sentenced to San Quentin prison on a white-slave charge. Prior to this—his first vision of justice—he had become so arrogant that he trailed the writer around with his automobile for days. Even the trial did not worry Fuski much, until his plot to bribe the jury was exposed. It seems that the city dog-catcher, one of Fuski's most trusted lieutenants, took a grateful interest in the trial. A bold scheme to bribe the jury was uncovered and this dog-catcher was jailed for his part in the plot.

Fuski was finally landed in the penitentiary. We then obtained a government order for his deportation. This was accomplished, however, only after considerable difficulty over a cleverly devised birth certificate which Fuski had camouflaged in New York to cover up the fact of his birthplace in Italy. So when he walked out of the prison gates at the expiration of his sentence, he fell into the arms of the United States immigration authorities. He again sailed past the Statue of Liberty—this time toward his native land.

Yet, the entire political history of the capital city of California would have been changed had the coming of Joe Fuski to this country been controlled by a United States Immigration Commission sitting in Italy. Fuski had a whole string of white-slave dens in Sacramento which we padlocked under the Redlight Abatement Law.

Young girls have told the writer they started on their lives of shame in Joe Fuski's houses. Yet years of degradation and crime, decades of heart thrusts at the life of the nation, had to roll by before Fuski's business was broken up and Fuski himself sent out of the country.

## FAKE MARRIAGES

One of the toughest characters we have had to deal with was Mary Selowski, of Napa, an immigrant from Russia. Mary Selow-

ski ran the Stone Bridge house near St. Helena. Scores of girls went down to their doom in the house kept by this foreign woman. So contemptuous of the law was she that we had to lock her up several times for violating the redlight injunction against her house—a comparatively rare procedure in actual abatement practice. But we were unable to deport Mary Selowski. By a strange freak in the law she was able to acquire citizenship through marriage. Once having gained citizenship by marrying a United States citizen, she was beyond the law of deportation. She evidently knew it and speeded up her traffic in crime accordingly.

Fraudulent marriages were often resorted to in the days of the segregated district to defeat the immigration authorities. In the old "Barbary Coast" district in San Francisco, hundreds of women were harbored who could not speak a word of English. These were principally women imported from France.

After the closing of the segregated district in San Francisco in 1917, one of these French women who had fled to the open redlight district at Reno, Nevada, told the writer in her new crib in Reno, how she had put over such a fraudulent marriage. She said that soon after she had arrived in San Francisco she learned that the immigration authorities were on her trail. Accordingly, she got hold of a hobo, paid him fifty dollars to marry her, and had never seen him again since that day. Thus, this French prostitute, by the simple device of marrying an American hobo, was able to thwart the entire United States government. Could a situation be more ridiculous?

#### BLOOD MONEY

A wealthy jeweler with a foreign name recently accosted the writer on the streets of San Francisco. He was bewailing the closing of the redlight district. "It is a shame," he said. "I wish the district would open again. I have never made the money since the district was closed that I made when it was open." He advocated a system for placing in redlight houses every girl who might qualify according to a physical test he suggested. His own son, being of age and American born, but too young in the generation of that family to discard this European custom, stood by and agreed with his father. The writer later learned that this jeweler had lost some-

thing like \$200,000 by the closing of the segregated district. He had been selling jewelry to the inmates of these cribs on instalments of so much a week. When the business suddenly broke up, his customers left, taking his gold and jewels with them.

Thus the blood money obtained through the aid of a seared conscience is ever present to block the efforts of those who would safeguard American homes.

#### TRAPPED INTO VICE

Clara Narins is a Russian girl from Odessa. Today, under another name, she occupies a crib in a vice den in Nevada.

Nevada is now the only state in the Union that tolerates redlight districts without even a semblance of repression. Practically every place in Nevada, large enough to be called a town, supports a segregated district. Chinese are even now financially interested in several of these cribhouses.

But back to the case of Clara Narins. She was trapped into white slavery by another foreigner through a marriage ruse. She was trained into the life and put to work in a redlight house. She once turned over to the writer express money-order receipts representing hundreds of dollars of her pitiful earnings paid to this white slaver. He was indicted on a federal white-slave charge but could not be deported because he had taken out citizenship papers.

Emil Baggi once conducted a redlight house in Richmond, California, where he harbored American girls. We secured iron-clad evidence against Baggi, and he, seeking the lines of least resistance, pleaded guilty and sought to expiate his crimes with a fine. But Baggi's clever move was his downfall. With the court records showing a conviction of a crime involving vice, we had no trouble in having Baggi returned to Italy whence he came.

The stories could go on indefinitely telling how the government has returned to their native land these undesirable aliens. An even more aggressive policy would deport them by the shiploads.

#### FRAUDULENT CITIZENSHIP

And yet with the relief thus obtained, the fact remains that the damage to this generation has been done at the source. Countless

thousands of these criminal aliens have made haste to gain citizenship, either through marriage—fraudulent or legitimate—or through our loose naturalization laws. With citizenship thus acquired, the government is helpless in acting against these criminals from a deportation standpoint.

Of course, if a fraud in securing citizenship could be shown, citizenship could be revoked. But such cases would be rare, except when the government awakes to the opportunity a naturalized bootlegger would offer. When a bootlegger slips by our loosely guarded naturalization system, and swears allegiance to the Eighteenth Amendment and the rest of the United States Constitution—while his hands are dripping with illicit booze—and then goes from the courtroom to his still to manufacture and sell the poison that degenerates the American race—there is a clear case of fraudulent naturalization.

But the good effects of such a move cannot be had until Congress clearly includes bootlegging as one of the grounds of deportation. Of course this will come, but only after the foreigners have played football with our American laws a while longer.

#### AN UNWELCOME GUEST

Alexander Psychoyios is another criminal alien with an unpronounceable name. He is known in the San Francisco underworld as "The Shiek." A year or so ago we caught him in San Francisco breaking in a young girl for the purpose of paying tribute money to him at the coming state fair at Sacramento. The State Law Enforcement League rescued this girl from the place where Alexander Psychoyios had her, secured an affidavit from her detailing the story, and then presented her with her evidence before the United States immigration authorities at San Francisco.

Incidentally, Psychoyios, seeking to establish his criminality more firmly on American soil, found himself a-foul of the United States naturalization laws through fraudulent attempt to gain United States citizenship. For this crime he is now serving a sentence in the Federal Penitentiary at Fort Leavenworth. Under date of September 12, 1924, the United States Immigration Department at

San Francisco wrote the State Law Enforcement League in part as follows:

When you first brought this case to my attention on April 5, 1923, you forwarded therewith affidavit executed by one ———, to the effect that she had been exploited by the said ALEXANDER PSYHOYIOS. A statement was thereafter taken from this woman at this office with regard to the matter.

In connection with deportation proceedings which our Kansas City Office now desires to institute against this man, it is most essential that ——— testify further in the matter.

The additional evidence as requested has been submitted, and when Alexander Psychoyios serves out his penitentiary sentence he will very likely find awaiting him a return ticket to Greece. But think of the sorrow that could have been spared had Psychoyios been prevented in the first instance from setting foot on American soil! He must now be housed and fed for a period of years, then transported to his native land, all at the expense of the government.

#### FOREIGN NAMES

An explanation of foreign opposition to our laws is often shown when an initiative or referendum petition is filed with a county clerk or secretary of state affecting laws to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment. Such a petition was recently filed in San Benito County, California, being a referendum petition designed to repeal a Prohibition Enforcement Ordinance. This petition abounded in foreign names.<sup>2</sup> Of course, all of these foreign names were presumably those of citizens, either by naturalization or perhaps by birth in a foreign family. And their signing this petition was perfectly regular and legal. But it does show the foreign sentiment that has made difficult the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

#### SMUGGLING OF IMMIGRANTS

We hear a great deal of the smuggling in of aliens over the Canadian and Mexican borders. The great volume of traffic to vice centers across the Mexican border invites illegal entries in great

<sup>2</sup> The list contains 176 names, of which 102 evidently belong to persons of Eastern European birth or lineage, and half the remainder have names that indicate Northern European origin.

numbers. But serious as this may be, it is purely an administrative problem that can be handled. Nor does difficulty in enforcing that law raise a valid argument for the repeal of the immigration laws any more than does difficulty in enforcing the Volstead Act give any just reason for repeal of the dry laws. Nor would modification of the immigration law lessen any the immigration problem.

But there is one place where the bars are down in the immigration law, and therein is a grave danger. Aliens desiring to evade the United States law can ship as sailors from foreign ports. On arriving in an American harbor they may go ashore without restriction. Once ashore, all they have to do is to forget to return to the ship and they are safely in America.

A bonding plan for shipping firms would help stop this leak. A registration for all aliens, providing a registration-card system, would simplify the apprehension of aliens who smuggle themselves into America.

#### TWO WEAPONS

In California we have two effective weapons in our warfare against vice: (1) abatement of property, through the Redlight Abatement Act, and (2) deportation.

Now, as a weapon for liquor-law enforcement we have, through the Volstead Act, abatement of property, by means of which a bootlegging establishment may be padlocked for one year, as is done in the case of vice resorts. And what we need is the other weapon—deportation of alien bootleggers.

The only reason why abatement under the Volstead Act has not made further progress is because it is used too sparingly. But it will be used, and in wholesale fashion. And when it is, and when we get a law providing for deportation of alien bootleggers, and begin to enforce that law in an aggressive way, our bootlegging problems will be well on the way to solution. Such is the case now in the commercialized vice problem, wherever these two weapons are aggressively used.

When Congress gets ready to pass a law providing for the handling of this immigration problem at the source—that is, providing a rigid test in American standards in the foreign country whence the immigrant would come—then the immigration problem will

cease to be a problem, and America will get the benefit of the best brawn and brain for which the melting-pot was first intended.

Following is the list of names signed to a referendum petition to repeal a Prohibition Enforcement Ordinance and now on file in the office of the county clerk of San Benito County, California:

John Calleri	Mrs. Lilliar Goff	Lucy Hosang
Mrs. Henrietta J. Eviglia	E. E. Goff	George Loer
Frank Eviglia	Ori Silacci	Jno. J. Hogan
John Eviglia	Reni Silacci	W. M. Daly
Tony Garcia	Giovanni Pallerino	P. E. Daly
A. J. Shaw	J. H. Dooling	Katheryn Daly
A. B. Shaw	R. I. Marcus	Chester Franchini
John Corotto	Grover C. Marcus	Laurence Ottoboni
J. B. Corotto	D. Marcus	Margaret Ottoboni
Jos. A. Corotto	P. Nielsen	Herman Baccala
Tony Corotto	Wm. McGill	Angostina Baccala
Fulton Picetti	Walter E. McDonald	Antone Figoni
Emil Corotto	Mrs. J. F. Sousa	Mary Figoni
Mrs. Mary Picetti	Henry J. Zanoni	Louis Barbee
Mrs. Rose Angoustures	R. Zanoni	Francois Barbee
Anna Angoustures	Robert Zanoni	Madeline Sutton
Clara Angoustures	Rube Lopez	Floyd Sutton
Joe Angoustures	Jennie A. Lopez	Archie Walker
Antone Angoustures	Miss Marie D. Lopez	Louis Barbee Jr.
M. B. Miller	J. F. Sousa	Mrs. L. Barbee
Francois Angoustures	B. Aquistapace	Frank Echeverria
Theresa Angoustures	Eugene Martin	Antone Manitto
R. P. Stephenson	Mike Parra	Jennie Manitto
Natal Vanetti	Jas. P. McCloskey	Elena Pivetti
Mrs. Natal Vanetti	Thos. J. Wright	R. B. Gansberger
Benj. F. Maggini	Augusto Pivetti	F. Winter
H. C. Smith	Orwen Gomes	Angelo Benassi
J. P. Mehlwood	Chas. B. Berri	Mary E. Benassi
F. J. Smith	Rose Berri	Albert E. Contival
Chas. N. Beressini	Edward P. Grant	F. G. Peterson
Steve Kaelin	C. Franchini	Marie Contival
W. A. Spencer	Carlo Beressini	Chas. McCune
R. Vosti	Mrs. Mary Martin	Alice McCune
James McNamara	Gilbert Besimo	Henrietta F. Chrwall
W. J. Sanford	Alessio Vosti	Walter E. Dewers
L. W. Garrett	Teresa Besimo	Alfred A. Alexander
	Peter Hosang	John Guilhamet



Pierre Guilhamet	Mrs. Mary Muller	A. J. Guilhamet
William Vesely	R. T. Reinosa	M. Bundeson
Nell Vesely	Frank Amsier	Martin Johnson
W. L. Cottmire	Geo. Hall Jr.	Maria C. Rezendes
H. K. Cottmire	Martin Messer	J. C. Rezendes
Frank E. Lewis	Anna Messer	K. P. Ware
Hazel Triplett	N. S. Messer	H. J. Byles
A. E. Boyd	Albert P. Sullivan	Ynez Gutierrez
Ada I. Boyd	Sarah C. Matthews	Tom Moreno
H. L. Gillespie	Geo. Kehl	George Cagney
Hazel Gillespie	Ed. Waldemar	M. P. Kelly
W. H. Lewis Jr.	Henry Waldemar	Joseph F. Lompa
J. M. Thorp	Roy Miller	John Lange
Mat L. Vargas	Archie B. Sharpe	Joe Massera
Howard Hardwick	Joseph Perry	John C. Miranda
A. D. Shaw	Annie Sharpe	Nick Miranda
R. Perkins	Mrs. Mary Perry	Chris Sanchez
Martha Corotto	Jacquin Pereira	Chas. Corotto
Lucy Silacci	A. J. Ramsey	Mrs. Katie Corotto
Emma Buher	Joseph Dutra Andrade	Clemente Calleri
F. Buher	Miss Mary A. Andrade	Mrs. Mary R. Boyd
John Muller	Joseph E. Guilhamet	Joseph William Gomes

## WHAT IS INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION?

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### ABSTRACT

New institutions develop alongside old ones. Both the old and the new have cultures of their own. Maladjustment results. Such is apparently the case with modern industry and traditional education.

The conscious purposes of the proponents of industrial education are probably of local origin. Promoters of industrial education are professedly meeting the needs of the schools or of industry or of both. Some pupils "need a weaker mental menu" than others; industrial education serves as "roughage" for diluting a too concentrated mental diet. Pupils tend to leave school at too early an age; industrial education is a means of prolonging the school life of the major portion of the school population. Workers lead a monotonous life; industrial education is proposed as a means of giving eyes to laborers and of making each job a window through which the worker may look out upon the world with which his work relates him with intelligent appreciation. Finally industrial education is proposed as a means of supplying employers with better trained and more adaptable hands. Whether it fulfils all, or any, or none of these purposes need not be considered here.

But back of this movement is a condition that is stimulating men to effort along these lines. It is malco-ordination of two sources of our culture.

Where "industrial education" is accepted as a fixed and ready-made remedy for this lack of adjustment the cure is probably little or no better than the older stereotyped way that developed in response to needs long since antiquated. But when industrial education is a method of seeking the way that works well in each concrete situation the case is different. And lack of uniformity in schools and courses resulting from honest search for such a value may well be welcomed.

Our culture is a sort of a wheel within a wheel arrangement. One "round of life" is conditioned by the way we get our living. It is the result of our attitude toward the processes of machine production and the organization that is dependent upon these. Another "round of life" is conditioned by our dependence upon the application of the right formulae to the specific exigencies of life as they arise. These rounds of life may be "in mesh" or "out of mesh." There is nothing to insure a smooth working adjustment of the one to the other. Industry is the leading factor in the first mentioned feature of our culture; and education, especially popular education, performs the chief rôle in imparting the formulae by which the masses meet the situations of life as they arise.

It may be in place to say that no effort is made here to deal with

all the features of our culture; that a selection of the two features mentioned above has been made because of their relation to the subject-matter under consideration.

Industry and education are correlated. They are both variables. A change in one makes necessary a change in the other. Popular education is a variable apparently dependent upon industry.

The change that industry has undergone during the last hundred years is so marked that everyone is conscious of it. And higher education in the form of specialization has kept abreast of these changes; it has been compelled to do so. But the system of popular education has lagged behind. And the result is an inherent maladjustment between that part of our culture which has its source in industry and that having its support in the system of popular education.

Efforts are being made to bring the system of education into more sympathetic relation with industry. Probably the name that stands for more of these efforts than any other is industrial education. But what is industrial education?

Dr. John Dewey writing some years ago in reply to a criticism of his use of the term "interest" said:

Of course the term interest, taken without explanation or discussion, is ambiguous. If it had a meaning which was fully elaborated and universally recognized, no scientific interest would attach to further discussion. All terms which at a given time are centers of discussion have a like ambiguity.<sup>1</sup>

The terminology of industrial education is in the state mentioned by Dr. Dewey. It is a "center" of discussion and a source of ambiguity. To such an extent is this true that any effort to fix its terms in a final form seems futile, since that would amount to an effort to silence discussion.

The term "industrial education" is used in two senses—a comprehensive and a restricted sense. In a large way, industrial education may be made to include any and all instruction designed for industrial workers. It may include the professional education of engineering schools. But in common usage the term has been limited to the vocational education of manual workers in the trades and industries.

<sup>1</sup> Dewey, *Interest in Relation to Training of the Will*. *Third Yearbook of the National Herbart Society, Supplement*.

The Indiana Statute of 1913 defines industrial education as "that form of vocational education which fits for the trades, crafts, and wage earning pursuits including the occupations of girls and women carried on in stores, workshops and other establishments."<sup>1</sup>

The Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, sometimes called the Vocational Education Act, provides, among other things, for trade and industrial education. The kind of instruction that this Act is designed to aid with federal funds is expressly stated to be of less than college grade.

These legal documents define the term as it is used in this paper. The discussion which follows has to do with some of the forms of training that are given to persons of less than college rank for the purpose of helping them to become socially and industrially efficient.

Up to the point of definition all writers on the subject are agreed. But from here the discussion branches into four fairly distinct directions. A brief review of the leading ideas as to what industrial education is, or should be, will help to make clear what the concept embraces.

One group maintains that industrial education is or should be preparation for a proper use of leisure. Mr. Pound, who may be taken as the representative of this class, holds that the establishing of right relationship with the world of ideas and ideals is the end of all true and worth-while education. Thrift or self-restraint constitutes an important element of instruction. But Mr. Pound does not regard these negative virtues as sufficient.

The youth, according to Mr. Pound, needs fuel for his motor-ego. Something upon which it can travel into new realms of thought. He regards that fuel best for this purpose which is compounded of interest in the present, understanding of the past and sympathy with the future. History, literature, science, art, music—all these give to life meaning, and to leisure inspiration; he holds that a man though a fool can use his leisure aright if he is equipped with a reasonable concern in all that man has done, is doing, or is about to do upon this planet. The first duty of education, in his opinion, is to sow the seed of such an interest.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Acts 1913, Indiana, 68th Session, p. 37, chap. xxiv.

<sup>2</sup> Arthur Pound, *The Iron Man in Industry*, pp. 207-10.

Mr. Pound further says:

Every man whether he works at turret lathe or comptometer, needs a hobby to busy himself with, in this age of growing leisure. We hear less of vocational training than we did—for good reason, since its utility is passing. Presently we shall hear more of avocational training, which shall give every youth destined for the mill or office a hobby for the center of his garden of leisure.<sup>1</sup>

Just the opposite ideal is that presented by another group who maintain that practical or vocational education is the need of the hour. This ideal finds its most complete expression in the Smith-Hughes Act. The specific aim of this Act is to make efficient wage earners. This may be done, in the opinion of the supporters of this view, by preparing persons for new occupations or by increasing the skill and knowledge of those who have already entered a chosen vocation. The Act makes provision for those who are yet in attendance upon school in the form of day trade schools, and for those who have entered employment by evening and part-time schools or classes. Emphasis is here placed on the fact that the Act is not intended for general academic education, as it is assumed that the States are already making ample provisions for the education of their youth along general lines.

Some advocate a kind of industrial education that is really a blend of the "practical" and the "cultural." The case for this class is quite well presented by Dr. Douglas in his recent book, *American Apprenticeship and Industrial Education*. The essence of his program is as follows:

The modern workman does not need all-round skill. Processes of machine production have made the worker less specialized, but the work more specialized. The worker, therefore, has no need of general trade training; what he needs is preparation for transition from one industry to another. This is facilitated by a general knowledge of machine methods and management, by general instruction in the care of machinery, by ability to regulate its speed and a knowledge of mathematics and mechanics. These would enable the

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 213.

<sup>2</sup> Paul H. Douglas, *American Apprenticeship and Industrial Education*, pp. 122-25, 128.

machine tender to shift from one industry to another with less effort and a shortening of the intermediate period of unemployment.

The workman must be taught more than one set of operations to protect him from mental monotony and from physical malformation and fatigue. Instruction in safety methods, accident prevention, and health protection is necessary. Training in good citizenship is needed to fit him to co-operate with others. Acquaintance with the history of manual labor, of tools and of machinery and a consciousness of the significance of his specific work would make the factory hand more interested in his task.

A fourth view is being formulated. It is nowhere found clearly expressed. But it is essentially as follows.

Industrial education is a method of experimentation for the purpose of finding out what adjustment can be made to bring the culture of the public school into harmony with the culture of machine industry and its accompanying organization. Although no one frankly avows this as his kind of industrial education perhaps, yet it is clearly traceable in the work of some of the schools in this field. In fact, the superintendent of the Boston schools stated in his report in 1913, that a prevocational school had been established on Meeting House Hill for the purpose of determining the need of such a school.

Helen Sumner Woodbury makes the statement in her study of the working children of Boston that the work of the Boston continuation-school at the time of the study "was frankly experimental and its first and foremost policy was flexibility."

There is also in a recent report on apprentice education the statement that "no one has determined what particular mental food or training the part-time pupils need."<sup>2</sup>

These are only straws that show in what direction the wind of sentiment in this field is beginning to blow. It might seem to be a confession of ignorance on the part of learned men for them to say:

We do not know what industrial education is, but we are trying to learn what to make it. Our effort is to so adjust the training given by the school to

<sup>1</sup> Helen Sumner Woodbury, *The Children of Boston*, U.S. Dept. of Labor. Bull. No. 89, p. 145.

<sup>2</sup> *Apprentice Education*, Bulletin No. 57, June, 1923, p. 56.

the world in which our pupils are to live and work that they shall be fitted to meet its changing conditions with ease, efficiency, and pleasure. We take our cue, in the first place, from an understanding of the energies, capacities and impulses of our pupils; secondly, from an understanding of the world in which our pupils are to live, serve and be served; and in the third place, from the possibilities afforded by the present state of the industrial, social, and educational arts and sciences.

They say this, however, by their deeds.

Not only do we find a variety of opinions as to what industrial education is, but we also find a variety of forms in which these ideas are being embodied. The term "industrial school" embraces several types of schools. There is a rough correspondence between these types and the opinions and ideas as to what the concept contains.

The type of schools to which the name was first applied is that supposed to be best suited to the needs of the mentally, morally, socially, or even economically inferior. This type corresponds most nearly to the idea of the advocates of a combination of the "practical" and the "cultural."

Another type provides instruction in several trades. This type corresponds to the ideal held by the advocates of "practical" training.

Some continuation schools meet the ideal of the advocates of cultural training to supplement the technical education that industry provides. (Probably the best example of schools of the vocational type that give cultural training adapted to the pursuits of those attending the schools is the People's Schools of Denmark. These are agricultural schools in which no agriculture is taught.)

"Industrial school" is also applied to a class of schools that are attempting to represent several types of industrial activities in order to give their pupils a more complete understanding of industry and to prepare them to make intelligent choices of both educational opportunities and life occupations. Some administrators and teachers consider the school shops and local enterprises as field laboratories where pupils may investigate important methods, products, conditions, and requirements in the various divisions of industry. These schools provide studies that bring the boys into

\* A. H. Edgerton, *Industrial-arts and Prevocational Education in Junior High Schools*, 1922, p. 4.

contact with materials, tools, machines and processes of manipulation; also with information concerning the work and the worker in each activity represented. Thus an opportunity is afforded for varying the program of the school to meet the needs of the pupil according to the changing conditions of industry.

The "ambiguity" of the content of the term industrial education is also found when an effort is made to classify and describe the schools that are actually engaged in the work of relating school training to industry and its needs.

The limits of this paper will not permit a description and classification of all the various forms and types of schools that are engaged in the field of industrial education. So a selection has been made of those that are most popular and are in a position to serve the needs of the largest numbers.

The prevocational school is an industrial all-day school which embraces as wide a range of different types of occupations as possible. It so arranges its work that pupils can obtain acquaintance with the various occupations and that teachers may observe their pupils, predilections and abilities. The aim is not to secure a high degree of manual dexterity in any one occupation, but to ascertain the particular type of work for which the pupil is adapted and to bring his or her skill to the point where a successful apprenticeship may be begun.<sup>1</sup>

This makes the work of the prevocational school that of selecting a vocation and of bringing pupils to the beginning of a successful apprenticeship in some definite pursuit.

This is a description of one type of the so-called prevocational school. As will be seen when the intermediate industrial school is described, this description applies equally well to the work of that school.

Another type of prevocational school may be characterized as follows: Prevocational work is intended to be "cultural" and "inspirational" in the same sense as that of the regular course of study for the children to whom it is given, but it is believed to be more valuable as a preparation for the occupational experience of

<sup>1</sup> *Report of the Investigation Committee of Inquiry New York City, I, 787.*



those children, most of whom enter "vocations" at an early age.<sup>1</sup>

In this sense prevocational work is a modification of the usual work of the seventh and eighth grades for the purpose of making the work more "purposeful and vital" for three types of children: (1) "concrete-minded," also called "hard-minded," children who are more easily stimulated by doing than by reading; (2) pupils who have been seriously retarded because they have never been awakened; and (3) those who are hopelessly retarded for one reason or another.

These three types are said to vary in their marked characteristics, but to be alike in that they are predisposed to leave school at an early age.

The prevocational school according to the latter view, is an adaptation of the school to the needs of pupils who do not succeed in the existing traditional system. The intention is in this way to prolong the school life of these children and to fit them somewhat better to meet the conditions of occupational life.

Schools which do or attempt to do prevocational work vary as to aim, method, and name. Hence it is impossible to adopt a single prevocational school as a type. Even in the same city prevocational schools vary widely.

In Chicago there is uniformity in the use of the term "prevocational"; also in the method and requirement for admission to these schools. Here prevocational work is designed for retarded and backward pupils.

Such uniformity in the use of the term is not characteristic of Boston schools. Boston has six prevocational schools; these differ from one another as to the kind of pupils admitted and the nature of the work done.

The school at Meeting House Hill, for example, admits over-age and motor-type boys from any district in the city. However, many of the Boston prevocational schools provide instruction for pupils who have well defined vocational aims but whose work does not

<sup>1</sup> F. M. Leavitt, "Adaptation of Regular School Subjects to the Needs of Prevocational Boys," *Elementary School Journal*, XV, 185-89.

offer preparation for the vocations they have selected. These children do not have to be backward at all to gain admission to such schools.

The prevocational school modifies the traditional course in three ways: (1) The daily program is divided into two divisions; part of the time is for classroom or book work, and part for the industrial work. (2) The second change is in the organization. The boys and girls are usually in separate classes in both academic and industrial work. (3) The school-room work of each group of boys and girls usually centers upon the handwork of each and its meaning in the social and industrial life of the community.

The Boston prevocational schools divide the time between the various subjects and types of instruction as follows: one-fourth of the time is given to civics, hygiene, cultural studies, and recreation; one-fourth to information related to shopwork; and one-half to shopwork.

The intermediate industrial school aims to provide pupils with some knowledge of a reasonably wide range of typical industrial activities by giving first-hand information and experience in important processes of manufacturing, transportation, and commerce as a foundation for their life work. It aims to meet the demands of the "self-finding" period by developing appreciative insight into a sufficient number and variety of representative experiences to try out, discover, and develop ability for understanding and doing, as well as managing and supervising industrial work.

In a majority of the 303 most progressive schools reported in a survey made by Mr. Edgerton, the recognized purpose of the work and study in these courses is not primarily to produce skilled workers for definite vocations but to develop "industrial intelligence" and "thinking power in connection with life situations." Each activity includes contact with typical materials, tools and machines, and is organized with the intention of giving broader appreciation of economic production and demanding more respect for the various workers and their work; preparing for more intelligent judgment and use of industrial products and services; helping to develop insight and to promote more efficient production; offering opportunity for testing the interests and aptitudes of pupils, both in

positive and negative ways, in order that worthy needs and capacities may be developed through specific training.<sup>1</sup>

This school embraces a wide range in the content of its industrial courses. This may be due to the fact that these schools adapt or aim to adapt their work to the nature of the communities in which they are located. In rural communities, for example, the work is shaped by the interests of the pupils on the farms. The activities are of the farm-workshop variety and consist of carpentry, concrete construction, harness repair, forging, bench-metal work, gas engine operation, machine assembly and repair, farm woodwork and the like.

Though for the most part this type of school provides a large number of tryout courses, as stated above, and postpones the choice of a vocation as long as possible, yet some schools belonging to this division permit their pupils to elect vocational or trade school courses at the end of the seventh year. And the most progressive of these schools are said to tend to contribute toward the greater vocational efficiency of the pupils during the ninth grade.

In New York City, where the Ettinger plan is used, provision is made for a combination of nine-week units in designated schools where boys get experience in machine work, sheet-metal work, printing, woodworking, electrical wiring, plumbing, drafting, garment design, sign painting, and bookbinding. The plan, however, permits a boy of unusual ability to receive special training without completing the cycle.

The Thirteenth Street Junior High School at Los Angeles has its tryout courses so arranged that the work of the seventh and eighth grades may be worked out into vocational classes for the higher grades during the ninth year.

Manual experiences which form the basis for giving information related to the industrial materials, processes and methods involved often result in useful and semi-commercial products and services. Much of the semi-commercial product of the pupils' work is connected with the needs of the school system for repair and maintenance construction work. Edgerton's study seems to indicate that there are valid objections to the method of finding industrial experi-

<sup>1</sup> Edgerton, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

ences alone in repair work for the school, as it limits these experiences to the manual aspects of the work and prevents the instruction from including a larger understanding in the processes and conditions in the industries represented. There is a tendency, however, to increase the number of concrete experiences by adding projects not connected with those that may result in reducing the annual budget for school repair and construction work.

The Ben Blewett Junior High School in St. Louis has its industrial activities organized into two divisions: The first division consists of the seventh grade which has compulsory shop courses; the second division embraces the work of the eighth and ninth grades which are elective. After taking the compulsory course in the elementary shop a boy may then choose between the technical arts, science, commercial art, and classical courses.

Most of the pupils in this school come from families living in apartment houses. They are deprived of the privileges of tinkering and experimenting in shops of their own. So this school provides them "this one big chance of their school career for guided experimenting."

The industrial department of the Washington Junior High School, Rochester, New York, so arranges its courses that the boys spend one term in a certain shop and then change to a different shop for the next term. At graduation from this school they have a "definite knowledge of at least five different kinds of industrial work." "This course is preparatory for the regular high school work and a 'cross-over' may be made to other courses at any stage without loss of time."

The co-operative school is a plan for co-ordinating the school and industry. It is the system used in the instruction of apprentices and other employees under a co-operative agreement between the school and employing establishments or between the school and the union or between all three. The establishments or unions permit or require the apprentices to attend the school. Instead of bringing the shop into the school building as do some other industrial schools the co-operative school sends its pupils out to an actual commercialized shop for a part of their instruction.

There is no uniform plan of organizing the work of the co-operative school. Some schools require their pupils to spend the first year in school and then permit them to alternate each week between school and shop during the remaining three years. Others have the pupils in school the first two years and alternate each week during the last two years. In others the plan of alternating is two weeks in school and two in shop.

The plan followed in many of the mill half-time schools is to have one group work in the morning and attend school in the afternoon; the other attends school in the morning and works in the afternoon.

In some schools the length of the school years is that of the ordinary school. In others it is twelve months.

Perhaps still more serious is the problem of what to teach. No one has come to anything like a satisfactory conclusion, apparently, on this matter. A survey of the course content of these schools shows "no very great breadth or variety of subject-matter or clear definition of purpose other than that of the detail of the job."

So the story goes. It might be continued as there are other forms of industrial schools that have not been mentioned here. But enough has been said perhaps to indicate the nature of the substance which the term industrial education symbolizes.

The "ambiguity" of the term industrial education and the varied character of the work that is being done or attempted by industrial schools are evidence that an effort is being made to adapt some school training to the nature and needs of modern industrial conditions and processes. The effort to bring specialization in some form and degree within the reach of the masses multiplies the diversification of schools and courses. The uniformity of the traditional three "R's" of popular education is badly "spoiled." The work of the industrial schools appears to be hodgepodge.

What basis does this give for supposing that the maladjustment between certain features of our culture is being eliminated? Perhaps none so far as immediate realization is concerned. But may not this disturbance of some of our mores be taken as evidence that

<sup>1</sup> *Apprentice Education, Bulletin No. 37, p. 48.*

our society is in the way that leads to a needed reconstruction in education; and perhaps in industry, too? For if it should be discovered that industry and its accompanying organization play an important rôle in forming our culture, industry may have to be transformed into a variegated institution of instruction as well as being an agency of production and distribution.

At any rate, the present disturbance in our educational mechanism is a sign of a growing consciousness that the exigencies of life as they arise cannot all be met by an application of the same formula. The immediate disorganized character of industrial education, however, is probably proof that the right formulae for meeting these situations have not been found.

STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION  
IV. THE PROBLEMS OF GROUP-CONSENSUS; FOUNDING THE  
MISSOURI SYNOD

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ABSTRACT

Fleeing from the wrath to come entails much social fear; that fear is accentuated by new environment, unfamiliar experience, and conflict. In such situations the categories of religion are worked overtime for safe criteria of inclusion and exclusion. Such criteria open lines of cleavage between different historical articulations of religion and different types of rational media. It is here shown how an immigrant group in the crisis of transition objectified its fellowship in its creed. Relating itself to its creed as its fellowship law, it found in the stewardship thereof a principle of identity and continuity. It was the work of its leader to give the group a type of leadership, internal structure, etc., organically related to the group trust and thus functionally adequate to insure the consensus; he also cut it off from Europe as well as from America and thus secured the consensus against challenge from without.

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With the opening of the nineteenth century the retreat of religion before "rationalism" had come to a standstill. Religion faced about, prepared to meet its pursuer, but in a new strategic front. In Germany, Christians were divorcing Protestantism from the Renaissance and from humanism, and in America, pietism from rationalism. What was left they called the "conservative reformation," and the end of the conflict between a mystery religion and rationalism is not in sight.<sup>1</sup>

In America, as we have seen, Germans before the middle of the eighteenth century had rationalized their consciousness of selfhood, their feeling of difference, and called it "Lutherdom." By the middle of the nineteenth century, they identified their Lutherdom with the Augsburg Confession and their symbolic books and called it *Der*

<sup>1</sup> Joh. B. Kissling, *Der deutsche Protestantismus* (1917). 2 vols. See especially I, 179, 184, 189, 190-91, 197, 236. Parallels to American problems of general synod, pp. 230-31; also pp. 267 ff., 271, 275, 282-320 ff. Reinh. Seeberg, *Die Kirche Deutschlands* (1904), pp. 43 ff., 65 ff., 70 ff. *Der Glaube der Erweckungszeit trieb zur Union und der Glaube derselben Zeit widersprach der Union.* Krauth, *The Conservative Reformation*; Jacobs, *History of the Lutheran Church*; A. R. Wentz, *Lutheran Church* (1923), pp. 123-260. See the earlier articles of this series, *Amer. Jour. Soc.*, XXX, 3, 4, 5.

*wahre Glaube* ("the true faith"). The faith of their American brethren, on the other hand, where it was a rational function, limited by, contingent on, natural reason, was to them in its essence not religion but rationalism, for their own faith was not so limited. The true *sola fides* was part of the great mystery of salvation—it was true religion. Where Americans "got religion," where it left them emotionally agitated, where it spelled an awakening, where it was not rational, it was *Schwaermerei*. One did not get religion, one had it. Only where a Christian stood on the true foundation of the true church, *Das Wort*, believed and obeyed because "it is writ"—then and there alone did he partake of the assurance of grace. To be saved, then, one did not have to be a German, nor an American to be damned; but where the truth, which was revealed and absolute, was barred to natural reason and natural feeling alike, the social process at large must logically be dominated by the social dialectics of a historic creed.

In America as in Germany the social situation was complicated even between the Lutherans by the fact that Luther himself had left his central concept of the *Reine Lehre* far from ambiguous: with no distinction between the gospel and the *doctrina evangelii*, the word of God and holy writ. It was twice complicated by the problems of a church in a democratic era, where the general priesthood would mean a general conflict over the positive liabilities of "what is writ." The situation was complicated between Lutherans and all other Protestants because Luther had maintained the institutional character of the church, while the logic of creed as well as the social process had elsewhere favored the sectarian principle with its voluntarism and pragmatism.<sup>1</sup> Thus Lutherans would search frantically for the true church and yet treat with extreme suspicion every German and every American constructive endeavor in that direction for fear of *Rottiererei* and of *Glaubensmengerei* and all that this implied to an essentially catholic faith. For Luther had preserved some Catholic elements in some of his sacraments, enough to make it impossible for orthodox Lutherans to break the bread with "the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ad. Harnack, *Reden und Aufsätze*, I, 141-11, also pp. 207, 218; also Harnack, *Erforschtes und Erlebtes* (1923), pp. 125-29; also again, Troeltsch, *Ges. Schriften*, II, 74-80, 755, 858 ff., 916-68.



others" and thus integrate into a larger corpus and become with others of one mind; more than enough, also, for other equally orthodox Protestants to scent an estranging odor of "popery" in this quarter. So vehement, on the other hand, had Luther's curses been against Catholic "good works," so exemplary his valor, so elaborate his theology in that direction, in the sixteenth century, that there was of both enough and to spare to damn even the Calvinistic effective faith in the twentieth. Rather than lose the benefit of doubt of the *sola fides*, the Lutherans would play safe: keep away from all joint "good works" on general principles, and lay Luther's terrific ban against *Werkheiligkeit* on the social Christianity of "the others." The terminology of the sixteenth century had lost none of its emotional connotations; whether the missiles of this ancient ordnance were aimed at the party for whom they were originally intended is not the point. Even where they hit nobody at all, they become sociologically relevant in the new situation, for so great, it must be remembered, was the original emotional charge behind them that the recoil alone would cumulatively produce what concerns us here—the sense of distance. The social pedagogy of the sixteenth century was bound to confound the logic of the twentieth in exact proportion to the degree to which the social process was rationalized in terms of a historic religion and its dialectics.

For the intersocial process at large beyond the city of God, the dialectics of that religion are as important as they are within the pale of the city of God. For, with a sixteenth-century creed, there came back in all their social potency the Lutheran theories of a created universe, of original sin and all that. The Lutheran, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> has a law of nature entirely his own. That the Lutheran theology has never accepted the post-Copernican system is perhaps not so important as that its a priori synthesis precludes the acceptance of any law of nature accessible to empirical reason alone. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God . . . neither can he know them, for they are spiritually discerned." A scientific hypothesis based on evidence accessible to empirical reason, natural reason, will be damned with the presumption that it is of the flesh; coming under the religious category of the ancient sin of

<sup>1</sup> See *Amer. Jour. Soc.*, XXX, 3.

*superbia*, it will be relegated to the limbo of man's presumptions. Passive acceptance of the principle of resistless cause, childlike faith in a created, an institutionalized, static universe, will partake of the unshakeable righteousness of absolutes and bask in the sunshine of grace. Nevertheless, "He that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged of no man." Thus, the Lutheran law of nature and the Law of Nature—whatever it is—are bound to conflict not so much over *what* to believe as for the difference in the nature of the beliefs entailed. The relative transcendental valuation of the two types of rationality involved entails here a conflict pattern. Because he has the belief, the logic of which is mystery, the Lutheran will be immune against beliefs, the logic of which pertains to natural reason. Having "the one thing which is needed," he has the better of knowledge.

Not the contents of the social mind, then, but its structure will be the ultimate cause of sectionalism. That structure is determined by a mystery religion in the last analysis, because that religion has placed all its transcendental rewards in the direction of a faith which passes all understanding and its damnations on a reason which is natural and hence of the essence of sin.<sup>1</sup>

From here, as the present writer has aimed to show and will further demonstrate, the social progress is fundamentally charged with its polarities. It is charged on the emotional side with the fear reaction against the pride of natural reason, against *Superbia*, the ancient Greek fear of the *Hybris*. It is charged with the fear of the taboos against mixing the things clean and unclean, against yoking ox and ass together, against "What comes from the flesh"—against Belial. The social process will be dominated by religion in proportion as religion has rationalized that fear, elaborated a rational technique for separating the sheep from the goats, the children of light from the children of darkness, the "we" from the "others."

<sup>1</sup> Rationalism: Best exposition of the anti-modernism of this group, see *Synodalbericht Westliche Synode* (1897); also *Allgemeine Delegatenconferenz* (1893), p. 30: *Wir verurteilen die hoehere Kritik vom Standpunkt der Vernunft als eine Narrheit und vom Standpunkt des Christentums als eine Gotteslasterung*; also *Lehre und Wehre*, IX; XII, 297. See also for its latest exposition: Th. Graebner, *Evolution, an Investigation, and a Criticism* (1922), pp. 101, 112, 123; 143, 5, 8, 156; also Michigan, 1909, 1924. Cf. Illinois, 1901. *Atlantische Syn.* (1909).

On that technique: the rational side of our problem, nothing need at present be said except that the mind which will dominate the intersocial process between the two rational systems is logically a function of the earlier one of the two. A certain complementary-mindedness will prevail between the one and the other social minds. Believing in the things that pass all understanding, the Lutheran will believe nothing about the things that do not. Moreover, he will have a highly sensitized threshold of the consciousness of difference; in proportion as he flees from the wrath to come, he will stay away from the "others" who have "a different mind than you."<sup>1</sup> The harp of David is not indicated as the social medium in the interstitial process, sweet reasonableness actually taboo where the presumption of damnation is on the side of that other mind. Thus it stands to reason that religion may retard rather than hasten the process of integration. It must retard the social kinetics, and be a poor conductor of social energies, because it will develop a most effective technique of insulation in proportion as it rationalizes the "be ye separate." It has been shown that the identification of Calvinism, of American Protestantism itself with rationalism, was the decisive factor in the sectionalism within this American city of God. It might have been shown that with this identification, language nationalism assumes a new meaning for American Lutheranism as well as for the German Christians. It was the conflict over the Augsburg Confession which taught even American Lutherans that adoption of the English language means, after all, not "the old

<sup>1</sup> Rationalism: Best exposition of the creed—a priori of the social rationalism of this group, see *Syn. Ber. Westl.*, 1897. *Warum sollen wir uns . . . dem modernen Fortschritt in der Kirche ernstlich widersetzen?* Eight reasons, p. 12: "Religious truth, unlike natural truth is not matter of natural reason (*Natuerlicher Erkenntnis*) but matter of revelation; holy writ is complete, neither needs nor tolerates natural amplification; divine injunction against deviation and against fellowship or partnership (*jeglicher Kirchengemeinschaft*) with innovators; natural reason even in its regenerate form is entirely inadequate medium for development (*Fortbildung*) of doctrine (*Glaubenslehren*). Doctrine of Holy Writ of such a nature that every attempt at development leads to its dissolution. Community which deviates from its organic character as instrument of soul-salvation surrenders its character as a Christian community. Society, substituting human means for divine means of soul-salvation, defeats its purpose. Because finally, the congregation by invalidating divine law-norm (*Ausserkraftsetzung der geottlichen Rechtsnormen*) repudiates its allegiance to its captain and Lord-Christ."

For theological valuation of "Progress," *ibid.*, pp. 13-20: *Nicht zu den Resultaten*

church getting a new language but a new language mastering the church." It will be shown that the a priori of creed entails a challenge to the majority principle of consensus, and thus for the nineteenth century a conflict of revolutionary portent. It entails the problems of conditional allegiance in every respect. The Lutheran Christian is neither a German nor an American; his first allegiance is to the city of God, and it is precisely this allegiance which offers a key to the understanding of the nature of sectionalism and to the problem of assimilation. The Germans in America ceased to be Germans in proportion as Germans in Europe became converted to rationalism or owed allegiance to the state. Their consciousness of difference in the presence of the forty-eighters, moreover, was none the less pronounced for the fact that the latter were ardent German nationalists even in America.<sup>1</sup> With their nationalism they would have nothing to do; their language they preserved because they would be Christians, not Germans. Nothing, however, could indicate better the importance of the social process of religion for nationalism than the fact that while the German nationalism in America of the Germans as Germans is a thing of the past, the parochial school, mind, and language, the cultural sectionalism of the Lutherans is not. No second generation was born to the forty-eighters, their rationalism is forgotten, but fundamentalism has been fruitful as the Lutherans have multiplied. The metaphysical principles of *Gemeinschaft* must seem of the greatest importance for group integration and group survival. The mind, then, the conditional allegiance of which will

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*der modernen Theologie bekennen wir uns sondern zur Concordia von 1580—sage 1580*, pp. 19, 32, 33, 35: "All modern progress is swindle." *Wo ist auf dem Gebiet der modernen Wissenschaft einer der ueber den Aristoteles um ein Betrachtlisches hinausgekommen waere (- 32)?*

Theological valuation of "Natural reason." Dynamic power of inertia: *Gott hat die Welt erschaffen und der Mensch kann und soll nichts neues schaffen*. Difference of natural and theological reason, *ibid.*, pp. 32-36, 41-46: "They [the theological modernists] do as the Heathen Kant did—they criticize Holy Writ by the standard of reason instead of criticizing reason by the standard of Holy Writ" (p. 55).

Telism of a religious *Gemeinschaft* limited by its a priori: Every "Christian endeavor" in disobedience of its organic law is *ultra vires*: *ibid.*, pp. 71-80. Criticism of the Christianity of the "others," pp. 71-80: "All due to the fact that they have forgotten what Christianity really is." Analogy of organic group law of the *Gemeinde* and of state and nation; disobedience to group trust is revocation, pp. 92, 94, 96.

<sup>1</sup> See Heinrich H. Maurer, *Amer. Jour. Soc.* (Feb., 1917).

be the subject of these studies, if it is "from Missouri," is not necessarily German. The first onslaught against the empirical rational societal technique of a prospective National American Lutheran church came from Tennessee; it came from the West and not from Europe. They were westerners and American born who first insisted on all the Lutheran symbols in their mystic meaning. They also insisted on the "virgin birth." Neither was the reaction to their type of faith as registered by the friends of the General Synod necessarily an American one. Shober, the Moravian, thought "that these people must be crazy." But Henkel, the westerner, champion of the new creed sectionalism was most assuredly not *verrueckt*.<sup>1</sup> Nor is Mr. Bryan a German. The conflict has much to do with nationalism, but its ultimate cause nationalism is not. It is the technique of an earlier rational type in dealing with a later one. It is the rational technique of the peasant farmer (if we may tentatively generalize from our observations in connection with the Pennsylvania German) in dealing with one which is essentially urban. However that may be, it is certainly not a question of more or less faith but of different kinds of faith. It is not a question of more or less Christianity, but between different historical articulations of Christianity—between different types of religion. In the last analysis the responses of these particular Christians to a social situation are conditioned by the responses of the earliest Christians to the situation in the Roman Empire. The mind-pattern for a pluralistic universe is the polarity of mystic faith and empirical reason, of faith and law, of the here and the hereafter, the city of God and the city of man. Different God-concepts entail different salvation concepts, different salvation concepts entail different church concepts, and "all sociological consequences follow from the church type." The beloved community domesticates a social type, functionally related to its own principles of fitness and selection. But the mental circumcision of a creed-bound social type entails specific conditions for the intersocial process as well as a specific technique of inclusion and exclusion. With its own social estate, a church socializes its own conditions of allegiance. We are here in the presence of a sectionalism which springs from the subsoil of historical experience, of a hyphen which is far

<sup>1</sup> Bente, *American Lutheranism*, I, 148-237.

older and far more stubborn than nineteenth-century nationalism. The hyphen of some German-Americans at least is the hyphen of St. Paul and the early Christians in the Roman Empire.

To review once more the situation at large into which fundamentalism enters, we may summarize our facts as follows. In the eighteenth century in America, the German had found in a mild confessionism the means of rationalizing his sense of selfhood, of of difference, and of kind. Even that mild confessionism and its relatively rational social technique broke down in the course of the westward movement and the increasing dissociation between German communities of heterogeneous origin, location, and degree of assimilation. It broke down as a binder between Germans, German-Americans, and plain Americans. It broke down finally because some rationalists had come to distrust their supernatural faith and most believers their natural reason. At a time when America itself was a house divided largely for this disintegration of an older societal technique, owing to an increasing cultural differentiation, both parties to the irrepressible conflict thus conceived imported from Europe a metaphysical principle to rescue or blast the consensus. Both parties invoked some categorical imperative and sought the sanction of some "higher law." Both parties are again at war. It is the higher law of a specific fundamentalism which shall be analyzed here because it was naturalized in the Middle West—the strategic area of the conflict today.

The movement which gave rise to the emigration in 1838 from Saxony of the Lutherans who were to form the mother-congregation of the "Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio and other states" is in a sense the consummation of the Reformation. It was also a revolt against the technique of control of a paternalistic sacerdotalism. As has been observed about all German religious movements, this one began with pietism and ended in orthodoxy. The close relation between that pietism and that orthodoxy within the city of God, to the democratic movement outside, is not gainsaid by the reluctance of these Lutherans against being in any way associated with rationalism, against being called democrats. The relation of the social rationalism of their religion to the democratic movement will become apparent once we study their group life under the cate-

gory of sociology rather than religion. What they accomplished was to constitute the primary neighborhood group as a law-fellowship, a peace- and *Rechtsgenossenschaft*—a group trust-at-law. The liabilities of their group law—Holy Writ, the Augsburg Confession, and the Lutheran symbols—they enforced through the consensual and procedural technique of apostolic Christianity. Their social technique conserves the individualism, the group socialism of a Germanic law-trust, and of the apostolic peace-fellowship of love. Whatever the merits of their particular group law for the social process at large, this is their essential contribution to democracy, namely, that they used the technique of the apostolic community to socialize the idea of *fundamental law*. From the point of view of civil polity, the chief interest in the conditioning of the *socius* through the religious process lies here. That fundamental law for them partakes of the finality of absolutes: It is revealed truth. If it admits of different interpretations, it is not their fault.

Disciplined, punished, dragooned by a state-church, for insisting on the natural depravity of man, they denied that state-church the right to demand that they preach a cheerful Christianity, a Christianity which did not disdain the joys of life. The shallow ethical rationalism of an officious ecclesiastical bureaucracy was intolerable to the new calling-conscience, the new stewardship of souls; it was altogether too offensively manipulative to a professional middle class which had come of age. The peasant, on the other hand, only needed to apply to religion his customary conservatism (the only rational principle which had made his status safe) to see everywhere an ominous abridgment of right. That the rationalist state-church should consider him properly baptized without the confessional renunciation, the sacramental exorcism of the devil, was an intolerable grievance to one who as a peasant had been sensitized against novations and against sacrilege as a Christian.<sup>1</sup>

Great were the possibilities of pectoral theology in such a situ-

<sup>1</sup> Hochstetter, Koesterling, Vehse, have written the history of the group. The present material is taken from the sources of the group, especially the synodical reports and the letters and lives of the founders. For the best bibliographical introduction to the sources of the group see E. Eckhardt, *Homiletisches Reallexicon* (Battle Creek, Neb., 1917). For the conditions leading to emigration see *Synodalbericht Iowa Dist.* (1901), which gives the best short account of the decisive elements in the case.

ation, with Christian consciences thus perturbed and Christian liberties thus denied. Leadership naturally fell to the ordained spellbinder whose personal magnetism overcame the natural reluctance to sever secular roots, and whose *charisma* and prestige allayed the fears of leaving the institutional fold.<sup>1</sup> As an emigration society these Saxons had drawn up an agreement; as a Christian flock they huddled closer together on the ocean; and in the vacuum of sheer space, they signed their covenant, as a congregation. Gripped by fear for body and soul, they would make doubly certain that their undertaking had not jeopardized their state of grace, nor cast them out of the church. They pledged their riches and their freedom of action for the assurance that in the person of their leader the *ecclesia repræsentativa* was with them. Of that church, as their leader conceived it, the vestments, alba, mitre, crozier, and great seal were ready at St. Louis, but the Apostolic Lutheran Episcopal Church of Stefansburg was not to be.<sup>2</sup> Soon after arrival at St. Louis, the community was torn by strife, the religious mind had become distressed with fear lest the whole movement had come from the flesh. With the certainty that, as far as their leader was concerned, it had so come, these Christians felt themselves without a religious bond. There was much new evidence of the depravity of the natural man, and the group seemed doomed. It undoubtedly was doomed unless it rationalized anew its relation to the supernatural church and derived therefrom a new authoritative principle adequate to the new situation—a new technique of consent.

In this situation the laymen, some of whom were lawyers, gave vent to their fears for their investments as well as their souls. A lay theology of disillusionment found the whole enterprise contrary to their Christian calling, its ordained leader unfaithful, his theology wrong, his church-concept an abomination, smacking of popery. The character of the fellowship was thus prejudiced. They might have been a self-willed *Rotte*, a misled *Hause*, a strayed flock. Some went back penitently whence they had come; some pastors laid

<sup>1</sup> See *ibid.*, for the genesis of the idea of emigration; first idea of Missouri, etc., pp. 20-21. Over seven hundred souls reported for emigration. They founded a communal treasury with 123, 987 *Thalers* paid in, in *barem Gold* (*ibid.*, p. 21).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 20-23.



back into the hands of their communities their ministerial office. They might now write to Germany for a ministry whose *charisma* was vouched for by proper ordination from the hateful rationalistic state-church which they had left; they might also disband and each go his way, cast off his old selfhood with his old *Gemeinschaft*. But even then the supernatural element thereof would haunt him; might he not also lose his Christian soul?<sup>1</sup>

The fear complex of that supernatural element, the sense of safety which lay in continuity and identity with a larger group, might also be safeguarded by a new leader. Such a one was not far nor slow in claiming their allegiance. In 1839, the Rev. Mr. Grabau, twice imprisoned in Prussia as a dissenter, had emigrated to Buffalo with his flock and set up in America what he called *Die aus Preussen eingewanderte Kirche*. That church was the woman that had fled from the serpent into the desert. Having thus assured himself of the prestige of continuity, so highly prized as we have seen in *spiritualibus* and so useful as a presumption of authority and proprietary right, he had soon occasion to send word to St. Louis to the effect that his was the one authentic Lutheran church. He also warned them that they had no business to give comfort, shelter, and status to his ecclesiastical serfs who had run away from a spiritual trouncing. Those writs of right, or *Breve's*, albeit in the mimicry of pastoral letters, came too late in St. Louis. So did at last his authentic Lutheran curses and his ancient ban.<sup>2</sup>

For, within two years of their arrival, under the stress of the conflict over their own unfaithful leader, and in the agony over the spiritual implications of his unfrocking for themselves and the group, the Saxons in Perry County and St. Louis had done a remarkable piece of work. With their unfaithful leader they had made short work. They rowed him across the Mississippi and thus cast him out as one with whom they had no *Gemeinschaft*. Thus forced by

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 28-29. *Synodal Berichte*, pp. 1-10. Walther, *Briefe*, 2 vols., 1915, *passim*, for the agonies caused the group by its early experience and their influence on the consensus. This was the most decisive event in the history of the group.

<sup>2</sup> Second only in importance to the Stefan episode of the formative period of the group was the controversy with Grabau: see *Iowa Dist. Syn. Bericht* (1901), pp. 36-51; *Allgemeine Synodalberichte*, pp. 1-10, for the sources of the controversy, pp. 94 ff. For Grabau's theology see *Informatorium*; also Kraushaar, *Verfassungsformen*.

the case-logic of events to rationalize anew what was left of their fellowship, they also boldly unfrocked the *ecclesia repraesentativa* and thus put more than the waters of the Mississippi between themselves and the church of an institutional lordship, and a *Herrschaft*. In the wilderness, they reclaimed for their group the character of a *Genossenschaft*. They related it to the supernatural element in their *Gemeinschaft* as to a group-trust-at-law. How this was accomplished pertains to history and to theology and its law of religious fellowships. Only the sociological implications of the process can here be touched. With Troeltsch we must see in the a priori of a creed the constitutive principle of a commonalty; with Bagehot a powerful kinetic agent in free discussion and debate. Such a discussion and debate became here an "integrator of the elements of social consciousness." But even discussion and debate are determined by historical patterns and by a social situation issues are presented, joined upon, and decided.

The following elements in the situation are relevant here. Bereft of leadership, with the problem of an authoritative principle of consent before them, these Lutherans fell back on their famous behavior pattern of a "disputation." In this disputation, the dangers of a "new Babylonian tower" were avoided because the ministry and the lay element joined issue on their respective relations to their church, their fellowship, and its common law. The mutterings of educated laymen had found voice in a pamphlet with the theses of which the ministry must take issue. They asserted the inalienable right of the community to the powers of the keys as well as the power over the *adiaphora*, including the corporate structure of the group; the supremacy of the commonalty over the ministry as its organ, under the law of their faith. They enumerate the faults of the *ecclesia repraesentativa* as revealed by the false leadership of the unfrocked Stefan. They maintain that emigration in general is contrary to the calling concept and that this emigration in particular was a work of devilish deceit and trickery and not a work of God.<sup>1</sup>

In the disputation which took place in April, 1841, at Altenburg, Missouri, the Rev. C. F. W. Walther, one of the original immigrants of the group, defended the essentially Catholic character of the

<sup>1</sup> For the theses of the laymen: *Synodalbericht Iowa Dist.* (1901), pp. 24-26.

group as of the church universal, while he admitted that the powers of that church were vested in the commonalty. In his "Theses" distinction is made between the invisible church, the spiritual *corpus Christi*, and its visible body. A group is of the visible body whether right or heretically wrong. A religious group may thus be a genuine church, though not the right church: to be reformed and set right, though not to be dissolved. As the right church it will be adjudged according to its common, rightful, public confession, avowed by its members in their fellowship. In either case it partakes rightfully of the powers of the church, sets up a valid administration and stewardship of the spiritual estate thereof, animates its ministerial organs, administers the sacraments effectively, and uses the keys powerfully to loosen and to bind on earth and in heaven.<sup>1</sup>

With the question of their status no longer prejudiced by their errors, there could be no longer a question of repudiation and dissolution. The problem was now one of reorganization and reformation. Of this reformation, the Rev. C. F. W. Walther became the Martin Luther. He laid the foundation of his church as a fellowship upon some of the original propositions of the laymen. He lent the prestige of his biblical and historical theology to a return to

<sup>1</sup> For Walther's theses at the disputation at Altenburg, see *ibid.*, pp. 29-32. Walther's corporation law and its epoch-making theological documentation is laid down in his writings especially: C. F. W. Walther, *Kirche und Amt* (1852, 1865, 1874, 1893, 1911); and *Die Rechte Gestalt einer vom Staat unabhängigen Ev. Luth. Ortsgemeinde* (1862, 1890). For the application of that law in the practice of soul-saving, the social empiricism, and the consensual technique of Walther; the rôle of the German equation in the disputation, and also the influence of the American environment, see Walther, *Briefe*, I, pp. 10-15, 115, 117, 118, and *passim*; also Guenther, *Lebensbild Walthers*; also Sihler, *Lehre und Wehre*, Vols. III and IV (1857-58): *vonden Spaltungen in den hiesigen Lutherischen Gemeinden*, pp. 71 ff., 131 ff., 139; how to organize congregations and insure the consensus under prevailing difficulties *nicht mit Hülfe von Beredsamkeit und auf eine Partei gestuetzt, auf Amtsgewalt poehend; nicht fertige Verfassung, aufzwingen sondern von Fall zu Fall mit der Gemeinde entscheiden und so eine Verfassung organisch aus der Gemeinde allmaehlich herauswachsen lassen . . . die Gemeinde zur Mitarbeit an der Selbstregierung erziehen*. The real process of Americanization as a consensual process can here be beautifully observed. It can also be observed how the process began with the education of the pastor himself from case to case, from "snæg" to "snag." For an amusing case of a pastor who refused to learn his lesson, see *Allgemeine Synodalberichte*, I-X, p. 16. On the process of degeneration without such a "cure of souls" in the primary group, see Wyneken, *Die Not der Lutheraner* (1842); also *Der Kirchenfreund* (1856), p. 101.

the group technique of the first two centuries with communities loosely federated but held together by the bond of creed unity. He thus removed creed and doctrine from the realm of group controversy and at the same time secured the full benefit of group-conserving inhibitions and taboos inherent in an a priori synthesis. The great historical prestige of such an a priori would now unite where a rational search for the all-saving charism had formerly divided. The rational ordering of the formal and constitutional intra- and intersocial arrangements of the group, on the other hand, was now a matter of *adiaphora*—a nonessential. A matter of conviction, it must endanger the consensus; a matter of convenience, it need not. On the contrary, the telism of an a priori synthesis must now get the full benefit of empirical social reason; the new rational technique of *Gesellschaft* must now give up its advantages to a *Gemeinschaft*; it could only help, it could not seriously injure the group in its consensus.<sup>1</sup>

These principles, the Rev. Mr. Walther now proceeded to elaborate in a series of theological treatises which became fundamental in the history of the church in America, and which have been called in one instance decisive and final in the history of the Lutheran church. This is his treatise on the *Kirche und Amt*, wherein he rationalizes the stewardship of the power of the keys as a trust and *Amt* of the whole group. He therein relates the group, the ministry, and in the last analysis the individual Christian himself organically to the group interest; everywhere he secures adequate function under the group socialism of a specific historical Christianity.<sup>2</sup> A

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, also Walther, *Briefe*, I, 6-15, 115-19 also *Synodalberichte*, I-X (1848), pp. 33-34; also *Rechte Gestalt*, paragraphs 25-26, 29-30. *Lutheraner*, June (1878).

<sup>2</sup> Walther, *Kirche und Amt* (1911). For the social situation and the conflict giving rise to this important book (probably the most important German contribution to American Christianity at this time) see *Synodalberichte*, I-X, pp. 267, 246-48, 283, 323, 373. As the "*Rechte Gestalt*" is the fruit of the Stefan conflict, so the *Kirche und Amt* is the fruit of the Grabau controversy. It was ordered by, submitted to, and approved of the Synod in 1851, and is the foundation of the corporation law of this federation of churches. See pp. viii, ix, for its principles of selection. For its confessional basis, *Augsburg Conf.*, paragraphs 7, 8. *Power of the Congregation*, paragraphs 4-5; how to "tell it to the community" paragraphs 12-20. For his distinction between *Stand und Amt*, pp. 221, 222. Sovereignty of whole community, p. 3-8. Nature of federal superorganization, pp. 86, 344, 349, 356; for another polemic in the *Amtsstreit*, see W. Loehe, *Kirche und Amt* (1851), also Kissling, pp. 290-300. The *Amtsstreit* is one of the forms in which

study of the sources of Walther's fellowship technique cannot here be intended. It would repay the sociologist with an insight into the *nexus* between antecedents and consequences. It would show how the valuation of history as normative is determined by a religious *a priori*. The trust in the dynamic power of inertia appears here as a *postulatum* of a theology which operates with the *a priori* of a created and static universe. The choice of this historical precedent as normative, the rejection of that one as not binding or false is another matter. It is apparently dictated by the logic of the social situation in relation to which the choice has to be made. That logic, however, is eminently subjective logic; it becomes articulate through the rational medium of a specific science or technique of experience and is thus charged with the valuation of the polarities thereof. Thus a given social situation, as well as every element therein, is defined by that science and its telism—the one before it arises, the other before it enters. Both are "known by their works"—their past performances in history as valued by the salvation *pragma* of a historical religion which poses as the judge. Thus the *a priori* synthesis of the rational medium of social choices makes those choices a foregone conclusion in their limitation at least. Historical analogies stay away or present themselves as a *secta* of a given interest to help it "make its law." In that interest continuity is given, "history repeats itself," and inertia becomes dynamic as the court sees the light.<sup>1</sup>

If "the German historian is more of a factor in the calculation of Germans than any other scholar of proportional merit,"<sup>2</sup> Wal-

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the democratic movement translates itself into terms of theology; in other words, the logic of the social process working as *social pedagogy* can here be seen in its modification by a specific technique and rational medium.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid. passim*. Also *Synodalberichte*, I-X. Another important factor in the shaping of the corporation law of the group was the presence of an urban congregation (St. Louis).

<sup>2</sup> Small, *Origins of Sociology*, pp. 49, 257. The writer hardly needs to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor Small. This whole series in scope and method is due more to Professor Small than to any other single factor. The great value of the foregoing work suggests a similar line of studies on the influence of historical conflicts upon the meaning of Protestantism, etc. The controversy between the historical school and the old and new rationalism is a case in point—an entirely new definition of Protestantism results therefrom; also a new orientation to its neighbors. Even so the influence of democracy on religion might be studied in the terms of the *Amtsstreit*.

ther's treatment of historical precedents is a decisive factor in the calculation of Germans in the Middle West. Through him, history worked overtime for a group searching frantically for the authoritative objective principle of its super-personality which it had lost. But here, as elsewhere, history is not just "history." The choice of historical precedents was determined, not by the mind of a historically minded theologian alone, but by the social situation of the church in America which bade the historian do its chores. Two elements were here decisive: the absence, for once, of that old nuisance, the state, and the possibilities of the new environment. The freedom of the Christian man needed defining, the antics of the natural man needed curbing. To the Lutheran, the world is traditionally full of devils, and a new set of devils had to be identified by their works: their finger-prints in history, as it were. The absence of the state and a blissful isolation made it possible at last to skip a number of pages in history. Walther did not find it necessary to consult either history or theology of the last two centuries. With the seventeenth century his casebook of history closes, and thus he performed for his group, and to American sectionalism, the decisive service of cutting it off from Germany, from Europe, from time and space, from pietism, from rationalism, from the old theology, and from the new: from the *Geistesgeschichte* of the last two centuries with all its troubles. Today, to one of the best informed minds of the group, "there has been little that is new since Aristotle."<sup>1</sup> In rationalizing its relation to what was left of the world and the devil, the group, with Walther, limited itself to the precedents of the first two, the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. In those centuries they are at home, these middle westerners; by rehearsing the experience of those ages they learn; by tracing the pattern of the experience of those centuries they live; by applying those patterns to new situations they make history; and thus it is that while some history does not, some of it does repeat itself. Such is the influence of Mr. Walther on the historical perspective of the group: that it interprets the process of life in America in terms of the life of the early Christians in the Roman Empire and of the early Lutherans in the Holy Roman Empire of Charles V and of the seventeenth century. Without an

<sup>1</sup> *Westliche Synode* (1897), p. 32; also Graebner, *Evolution* (1922).

appreciation of this fact, the mind of this group and the mind of the Middle West, as far as they are concerned, are not intelligible and therefore apt to be misjudged.

The fellowship law of Walther is a masterpiece of theological social rationalism. It is excelled only by his mastery of the apostolic technique of persuasion, guidance, and correction. In proportion as he socialized that technique as the social medium of the group, he educated the Germans; he made them amenable to the interests of group life. He yielded to the lay element where it was necessary and thus made the religious group respond to the inherent interests of underlying primary groups, such as the family, the neighborhood, the linguistic group. He did so within the meaning of "what is writ," and thus rationalized those interests, domesticated those groups, forced them to be part of one another upon the terms of an earlier technique of accommodation. To such terms he gave the sanction of his seventeenth century dogmatics. He bent the *mores* of the German or Norwegian peasant, forever clannish, tribal, the cousin who had become a neighbor, forever righteous or a wiseacre with "the book," or a fault-finder or a tell-tale with his neighbor, to the Christian principle of charity. He showed infinite patience with the German natural man and his niggardliness before the contribution box, until that German peasant had grown into a Christian who was charitable or a farmer who could afford it.<sup>1</sup> Even in the technique of correction and guidance among the ministry he mellowed the German or Lutheran tradition of *Rechthaberei* and of flare-up so that there is even in that quarter a remarkable resourcefulness of means in suggestion and persuasion, control and discipline of self, a keen social conscience in the presence of the flush, or the bluff, or the insincerity which "come from the flesh." Forever aware of the imponderables of the social situation in America, to which he gives frank recognition in his policy, the German theologian merges into the American statesman. His contributions to America—the fellowship law of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Missouri and the traditions of his leadership—reveal the possibilities of German Protestantism as a

<sup>1</sup> What is perhaps considerably more—he educated them to consider themselves principals of a public interest—trustees of a group interest, and thus did more to educate them into American citizens than anything else. See *Synodalberichte Allgemeine*, I-X, pp. 322-23.

*socius* in America. They also reveal its limitations. For where the law of his faith had spoken, where he recognized issues of principle, where the cognitive technique of his faith, his creed, his *Lehre* taught him to distinguish between the "we" and the "others," there he was the most consistently rational non-co-operator. Compromise and its social equivalent, partnership and *Gesellschaft*, he surrounded with all the religious taboos of the second and of the sixteenth century; and it must be said that his rational technique for the "be ye separate" without was quite as resourceful as that for the "be ye united" within. Thus, this greatest leader of a "beloved community" of German Christians in America graced a German Christian fellowship with all the blessings of the Old and the New Testament. But he also damned every American fellowship with all the curses of that same Old and New Testament, in order to enforce his principle of "No Union without Unity": no partnership in action without fellowship in principle.<sup>1</sup> Whether the synthesis of the logic of a religious creed, and the procedure of a tribal law have here been more effective in teaching the religious man to be united, or in encouraging the natural man to be separate, is only a matter of academic interest. Less academic is the study how a specific creed-fundamentalism conditions here a *socius*. Sociologically speaking, creed-fundamentalism becomes the homologue of tribal-mindedness; the *socius* within becomes a burry, ground-gripping, non-co-operating, and irreducibly tribal-minded *ego* and individualist without.

A study of the logic of the social process which produces that *ego* and that *socius* will now be in order. It is the more relevant for the fact that it is entirely "made in America."

[To be continued]

<sup>1</sup> This will be shown in particular in the following articles. See Walther, *Rechte Gestalt*, paragraphs 28-30; also *Allg. Syn.*, 1-10, pp. 270 ff.; *Synodal Conference* (1898). Also *Seventh Gen'l Del.* (1893). See also Walther, *Illinois Dist.* (1877); also Benthe, *Was steht der Vereinigung im Wege* (1917); also *California-Oregon Dist.* (1892); *South Dakota* (1919), *Atlantischer Distr.* (1919); *South Dakota* (1922); and a final blast at Modernism, *North Dakota and Montana* (1922): *Die Gefahren die unserer Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche in dieser letzten Zeit von seiten der Welt drohen*. For the literature of the churches affiliated with the Missouri Synod in the *Synodalconference*, that of the Wisconsin Synod has been used with greatest profit; see especially: *Theologische Quartalsschrift* (1-20). XIX., pp. 182 ff.; IX., 156 ff. XXIII., 254 ff.; XX., 1-18, 88-112.



# SOCIOLOGY AND PLATO'S "*REPUBLIC*"

## PART II

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### ABSTRACT

Resumé of Part I. Plato formulated radical questions about society, but his method of answering them was in effect not a model but a warning. The chief significance of Plato for sociology is as an illustration of what sociology is not. This fact is shown by the course of debate or monologue in each of Books iv-x. Sociology is trying to be science, not philosophy; or if it is ultimately to merge into a realistic philosophy, it will not be a philosophy of the dialectical type. The social philosophers, from earliest to latest, are worth study by the sociologists in the degree in which they are interpreted in the light of this distinction.

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Plato and the sociologists are alike in this respect: each asked the question, What is the nature of human society, and what is wise conduct in it?

Plato tried to answer the question by setting in order the casual accumulations of ideas in his own mind.

The sociologists came to consciousness in a condition of aggressive discontent with that way of trying to get answers to the question. They had been surfeited with futile reasonings about society after the general Platonic plan. They determined to start a program of searching into the objective facts of human society, whatever these facts might do to previously formed opinions. Now, as I have said, our minds cannot work at all except by giving credit to previous mental operations in connection with inquiry into things external to the mind. The difference between dialectic and science is radically a difference of ratio and of primacy between the opinion factor and the discovery factor in the mental equation. Dialectic says, "*Think* in order to know." Science says, "*Learn* in order to know."

As compared with other men of his period, Plato had learned very much about the world as it had disclosed itself up to that time. Compared with *all* men, both before and since his time, Plato was a babe

in the wood. His accumulation of knowledge was a beggarly basis for deductions about the influences evolving human situations.

Following Professor Shorey's hint, my guess is that if the Socratic method of cross-examination had been turned upon Plato himself, he would have acknowledged something like this:

I have discovered that much in human society depends upon leaders.

I have discovered that there are good and bad leaders.

Good leaders make for the prosperity of the led.

Bad leaders make for the misfortune of the led.

I have discovered many reasons why leaders become bad, and I infer that it is necessary to put in place of these reasons influences that will tend to make them good.

The most potent influence that I know of is education, and the sort of education that makes most for the qualities that we want in leaders is the sort of education that we should try to introduce.

I am not sure just what the best education would be, but there are certain things to be said in favor of the following kinds of instruction.

Now all these are platitudes. They appeal so directly, however, to fairly sophisticated common sense that it is hard work to maintain discussion against them. This fact was symbolized in the feeble opposition of the two brothers to Socrates.

But suppose someone ventures the question, If all these commonplaces are as true as they look, what is there about human society which, all the intervening two thousand years and more, has prevented the adoption of Plato's program and the production of ideal leaders? Thereupon the whole question of the essential nature of human society is thrown wide open, and we realize that Plato has *asked* the question more than he has answered it. I am using *The Republic* as the first of a long series of exhibits, down through the philosophies of history, which show that the dialectical method of trying to answer the question has been tried over and over again during the intervening centuries, with the chief total result that the prospect grows dimmer and dimmer of ever getting an answer by that method. These futile efforts to explain society are instructive in the degree in which we are aware that they were all first and foremost exhibitions of the foreordained futility of the dialectical method as a means of discovering objective reality. The more we concern our-

selves with conclusions reached by that method, whether by Plato or by the latest soap-box orator, the more we confuse ourselves and obstruct the passage of human intelligence from faith in opinion over to reliance upon research. The path of the ages is strewn thick with the débris of dialectical attempts to command knowledge. A certain acquaintance with these attempts is necessary for the general sophistication of social scientists. Whether the absolute quantity of acquaintance with those attempts bulks much or little, the result will be a mental miscarriage unless it takes shape as consciousness of the emptiness of the dialectic method and the relative promise of the method of positive science.

Before attempting to characterize Book iv, it will be well to recall Professor Shorey's pointer (above, p. 517) that Plato was not, and knew he was not conducting an inquiry into practicability. He was dramatizing certain of his own opinions. More specifically, he was staging a pageant of moral values correlated so as to exhibit his estimate of their relativities.

Now it is not my business to deal with these judgments with reference to their antecedents. That is, I am not now interested in the question, How did it come about that Plato held such and such opinions? That is a perfectly legitimate question in its time and place. I am not denying that there are times and places in which attempts to answer that question might be profitable. This is not the time and place. We are dealing with the relation of Plato to sociology. Our proposition is that the chief significance of Plato for sociology is as a brilliant example of what sociology is not.<sup>1</sup> Sociology is an attempt to be the precise opposite of that which was most conspicuous in Plato's method. As I have said before, the only things in common between Plato and the sociologists are, first, desire to understand human society, second, desire to improve human society. Compared by means of the technique to be relied upon in finding out

<sup>1</sup> The etiology of opinions and of modes of thinking is of course important subject-matter for sociological investigation. The question, Of what historical and environmental factors is a given body of thought a function? must necessarily grow in importance in the degree in which positive research is able to make its way into the areas that have been occupied by philosophers of history. The present discussion does not deal with relations of the sociologist to *The Republic* from that point of view.

about society, Plato is as different from the sociologists as a musical composer is from a newspaper reporter.<sup>1</sup> Plato was rationalizing. That is, he was organizing his stock of theological, psychological, aesthetic, and moral ideas into a coherent system. Using the more dignified word, he was philosophizing. Far be it from me, as I have protested before, to deny that there is a function for philosophizing in the conduct of life. Without philosophy, in its gradations from the most naïve reflection to the most comprehensive and logical systematizations, we could not attain to a plane above idiocy. Philosophizing is to the general conduct of life as the annual stock-taking to a business. Philosophy in its matured form may be likened to a system of accounting, which is the completest development of the rudimentary device of keeping a day-book. But, as I have said, dialectical philosophy is essentially an appeal to the already known. Science is perpetual adventure into the unknown. That which differentiates sociology from philosophy in general, and from the philosophy of history in particular, is that the leaders in creating the later discipline decided to cut loose from the methods of dialectics, and to stake their existence upon the methods of scientific research.

Passing then to Book iv of *The Republic*, we find Plato expounding in an elementary form what we now speak of as the *functional* view of society, in contrast with basic assumptions that life is to be conducted as an affair of detached individuals, each estimating values by the measure of their worth in terms of his own happiness. Socrates leads the discussion in such a way that it outlines, stroke by stroke, a picture of the state as a co-operating whole, and not allowed to increase in size beyond the number "consistent with unity" (iv. 423. B). Quite in the spirit of our modern protective tariff protagonists, Socrates says (*loc. cit.*): "Let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but one and self-sufficing."

As a condition of realizing a city-state of this sort, "each individual should be put to the use for which nature intended him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own business, and

<sup>1</sup> The contrast is not used with any implication that other things than different functions are involved.

be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many" (iv. 423. D).

According to Socrates, this ideal is to be realized by attending to "the one great thing," viz., "education and nurture." If this fundamental matter is attended to, citizens will easily see their way through such trifling matters of detail as "marriage, the possession of women, and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common" (iv. 423. A). In the same spirit, Socrates repeats, a moment later, on the supposition that citizens are properly educated there will be no need to impose laws covering the "ordinary dealings between man and man"; "What regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough for themselves" (iv. 425. D)..

It should be noted that throughout the argument the religious note is clear and persistent. With inattention to certain details, a reader might get the impression that the theology of John Milton was uttering itself. Whatever the cogency of the logical argument, Socrates repeatedly reminds his hearers that everything depends at last upon the favor of the gods.

The reasoning converges upon a more precise description of *justice* than had previously been reached. In brief it is as follows:

Socrates summarizes (iv. 427. E): "I mean to begin with the assumption that our state, if rightly ordered, is perfect."<sup>1</sup> "Being perfect, it is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just." (*loc. cit.*) A state embodying the four cardinal virtues, *wisdom, courage, temperance, justice*, is the virtuous state.

For our purposes it would be a waste of time to examine the question whether Socrates had reasoned in a circle during this part of the argument. His auditors were carried with him, and we need not be finical about details in the technique, since we are pointing out the inconclusiveness of the entire method—the greater which includes the less.

Nor need we stop for inquiry whether Socrates found a clear distinction between the concepts "temperance" and "justice." This again is a detail important to his disciples, not to us. The main

<sup>1</sup> What is a little matter like verisimilitude among dialecticians!

strategy of the argument is its persuasiveness as bearing upon the question of justice of, for, by individuals. Abbreviated, the further argument is this: Justice is a sort of reduced miniature of the perfect state. It is "doing one's own business, and not being a busybody" (iv. 433. A); it is "the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him" (iv. 433. E). The carpenter does not do the business of the cobbler, nor the cobbler that of the trader, nor the trader that of the warrior, nor the warrior that of legislators and "guardians" (iv. 434. A).

In a word, "the just man, then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be just like the state" (iv. 435. B).

Whatever be the worth of this conclusion, our main point is that, in the exercise of bringing his hearers to adoption of the conclusion, Socrates appears as performing a skilful process of persuasion, not a piece of research ending in discovery. As in every other case of deductive reasoning, the conclusion was safely packed away in the premises before the argument began. Whether it is anywhere else or not, the conclusion is in cold storage in the premises. The task is to persuade the listeners to the argument that it is there, and to enlist them in extracting it from that depository and adopting it as their own. In other words, it is an operation upon the mental processes of the unconvinced, to induce them to adopt intellectual values which they had not previously recognized. It is an affair of subjective valuation, not a search into realities that are outside the mind. For example, after everything in the Platonic philosophy has been discussed for centuries, Nietzsche may come along and pooh-pooh the whole system. He may allege that the world is not for the just man, nor for the just state; it is for the superman and the superstate. In other words, he may allege a scale of values that is virtually identical with that in Thrasymachus' mind, in Book i; and so long as our own thinking is the final standard, we are at liberty to go with Plato or with Nietzsche. Nothing is decisive.

The book comes to a close by way of a detour through equally inconclusive mental philosophy (iv. 435. D ff.), which even Jowett, the editor, calls "a tiresome digression" (Introduction, p. 75).

In discussion of Book iv I quoted, without comment, a remark which appeared to have been received by the company as too com-

monplace for argument, viz.: "If our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, as well as other matters which I omit, such, for example, as marriage, the possession of women, and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common" (iv. 424. A). The remark did not seem as axiomatic to the company as their assent indicated, and their recall of it presents the central theme of Book v.

That is, in the character of Socrates, Plato is brought up against the enigma of the relations of the sexes, of the relations of parents as such, and of parents, as citizens, to children; and of the relations of the state to each and all of these.

At intervals for more than two thousand years, the ideas that Plato outlines in Book v have furnished subject-matter for ponderous theological and philosophical argumentation. Since certain people began to call themselves sociologists, many of them have supposed that they cannot lay a proper foundation for their science unless they go back to Plato, and particularly to his suggestions about the relations of the sexes. In denial of all this, I simply vary the expression of my whole purpose in giving so much time to *The Republic*. My main thesis is this: *For any supposed direct bearing upon sociology, considered as a method and technique of research, The Republic has no significance whatsoever.* The sociologist is no more bound to square his ideas of procedure with the argument of *The Republic* than he is to reach an understanding with the Ptolemaic conception of the universe. Plato's systematology was utterly foreign to our systematology. He was trying to do what we are trying *not* to do. For the sociologist, Plato's thinking has the same status that any other human phenomenon has, viz., something which may be studied in our ways. It is not something which can furnish a model for our ways of study. My constant refrain is: *The Republic* is no more sociology than an apple-tree is botany or an elephant zoölogy.

It betrays an atrophied sense of humor for a sociologist to suppose that he must try to adjust Plato's ideas of the relations of the sexes to modern standards, not to say modern standards to Plato's ideas. Those ideas were incidents in the development of a civiliza-

tion different from ours. If we are studying the comparative evolution of societies, Athenian civilization in particular and Hellenic civilization in general are of course of inestimable importance as concrete cases. What any philosopher, in the course of the evolution of any civilization, thought about the past, present, or future of that civilization is of interest to us simply for what his mode of thinking is worth as a mode of thinking, not because of any authority attributable to his opinions, unless those opinions rest upon bases which we now regard as sufficient.

As to Plato's vision of a Utopia of sex relations, as sociologists we have no more occasion to concern ourselves with it than with the Walhalla of Nordic mythology or the happy hunting-grounds of North American Indians. Whether Plato's sex scheme is a patch that fits into his social garment, is his affair, not ours. At all events, he was talking from and to a man's civilization. To a Greek of Plato's time, as to Hebrew worthies from Abraham to David, women, whether wives, concubines, slaves, or professional prostitutes, were chiefly items of sheer biological convenience. Morals, in our sense, played a very minor rôle in any consideration of them. We could no more expect Plato than King Solomon to write a treatise on the social relations of women that would conform to modern views, whether popular or scientific. The proposals of Plato, then, in this fifth book have no more claim to consideration as having a bearing on sociological problems than the institutions of child widowhood and the *suttee* in India, or the institution of celibacy in the Romish church. Each is a phenomenon of certain social groups. Neither is a term in social science.

Not then as matters of sociology, but as curiosities of culture history, several items in this Book v are worthy of mention. For instance, first, Plato spoke, in the person of Socrates, not in the tone of his own time, but very much in the spirit of the latest half-century, about the latent equality of women with men, and the economy of giving them equal educational opportunities. This from the point of view that they were by nature equipped with as authentic capacity as men for "guardianship" in the sense explained in the second book (v. 451. C ff.).

In the second place, Plato had a very modern attitude toward



what he would probably have been delighted to call "eugenics" (v. 459. A ff.).

In the third place, Plato appeals *in form* to the pragmatic test of what is good or bad for the state, i.e., whether a device will work or not (v. 462. A ff.). For example, he proposes to test social devices by their relative usefulness in gaining the purposes of the state, e.g., in preventing "discord and distraction." This is a naïve gesture in the direction of experimental science. The context plainly shows, however, that Plato's actual process is not a scientific testing, i.e., any sort of *experiment* to show whether the desired effect can be produced in practice; but his process is still quick reference back to the stock of ideas in his mind, to discover whether the proposal and those ideas are compatible. This is the precise opposite of a positive or scientific method.

In the fourth place, Plato reaches far ahead of his time in picturing the *fraternal* relation as the basic economy of a state (v. 463. B). "Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when anyone is well or ill, the universal word will be 'with *me* it is well' or 'it is ill'" (v. 463. E); i.e., as it was expressed four centuries later, "rejoice with them that do rejoice and weep with them that weep."

In the fifth place, Plato discloses ideas about war which in some respects are more humane than the best of our modern codes, and far better than the practices of all the nations at times in the German war (v. 469. B ff.).

In the sixth place, Plato distinctly formulates his knowledge that the whole scheme which he has unfolded is literally visionary in more than one sense. He says (v. 473. D):

*Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils—no, nor the human race; as I believe—and then only will this our state have a possibility of life and behold the light of day.*

This passage alone is enough to show that in Plato's mind *The Republic* was not a political or social platform, but a dramatization of the author's scale of moral values. In his day, pragmatism had

not been formulated as a technique of evaluating moral conceptions. Plato was not at all abashed by the consideration that his moral values were not available for immediate use. To him moral values had an absolute, intrinsic worth, whether they could be realized in the concrete or not. *The Republic* was a device for exhibiting some of them in the stage setting of a vaguely imagined state. When he says in substance, "Of course these things cannot come in reality till kings are philosophers and philosophers kings," it would seem as though even the sententious owls who have been treating the discussion as if it were a constituent convention, with plenary power to put its findings into force as a basic law, would discover that they had completely misunderstood Plato's purpose. Thousands of pages have been printed on the physics and politics and psychology and ethics of Plato's views about community of property and of women, for example.<sup>1</sup> The literal fact is that we certainly cannot tell from *The Republic* what Plato, as a practical citizen, would have recommended as a working system of property and sex relations. He was picturing, on the one hand, certain unfortunate workings of existing property and sex relations, and he was picturing, on the other hand, human beings in certain imaginary relations in which those unfortunate incidents were not supposed to be present. Therefore he is interpreted as having made the serious proposal that philosophers should be made kings, and that having become kings they should function as philosophers, in order to realize these ideal relations!<sup>2</sup> What Plato was really driving at was that men would have to become much wiser than they were, before goods of higher orders than their current conditions could be attained. Again I say that the most evident phenomenon in the treatment of *The Republic* throughout the centuries has been absence of a sense of humor.

Seventh, and finally, Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates a notable analysis which presently takes the form of antithesis between *knowledge* and *opinion* (v. 476. D ff.). It is a pathetic outreaching after the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity. It ends, however, with a subjective standard. It is implied, rather than affirmed, that knowledge is seeing "the absolute and eternal and

<sup>1</sup> See Jowett, *The Republic*, II, 112 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Jowett *op. cit.*, II, 133.

immutable" (v. 479. E). It is also implied, rather than stated, that having the thought, or rather using the word for the category "absolute" or "eternal" or "immutable," is seeing the same. This advertisement of illusion sufficiently distinguishes the contrast between Plato's criteria of knowledge and our modern conception of objectivity.

Remember that I am deliberately *not* trying to treat *The Republic* as it might most properly and probably be treated by philosopher, psychologist, culture historian, literary historian, moralist, or literary critic; I am trying to show that it is *not sociology*, and that it is an injustice and a misfortune for students to be introduced to *The Republic* as though it were sociology.

Whatever its failure of attainment, sociology in the United States has made a brave struggle to become something different from dialectical social philosophy. It is trying to be science, in distinction from philosophy, or at least as the price it pays for expectancy of becoming sometime in one of its aspects a part of a positive philosophy which is evolving in antithesis with dialectical philosophy. A long line of thinkers, from Plato to—let us say—Benjamin Kidd or Oswald Spengler, have been more or less confounded, even by some sociological teachers, with sociologists. I am urging that sociologists ought to be acquainted with this long line of social philosophers, for the sake of discovering that they brought the very thought of social theory into such disrepute that a species of scholar had to be differentiated in sharp antagonism with the most characteristic of their works, and with that part of their method which had vitiated and emasculated previous attempts to become social science (history and economics in particular). These more positive social sciences, say after 1800, had nevertheless failed fully to emancipate themselves from dialectical influences, and a still more complete break with dialectic was attempted by the sociologists. Having stated this thesis repeatedly, and illustrated it at considerable length in connection with the first five books of *The Republic*, I shall try to say more briefly what needs to be said about the other five books.

Book vi. of *The Republic*, then, is more involved and elusive than either of the previous divisions of the argument. Fortunately for our

purpose to be brief, it is also the most remotely related to sociology. It is a multiplied variation of the antiphonal themes: the perfect "guardian" must be a philosopher (vi. 53. B), and only the perfect philosopher is fit to be a "guardian" (vi. 484. B). Development of these propositions merges into discussion of the problem, What is *the good*? (vi 505. D; cf. 506, B, 508. E). The conclusion is so attenuated that it seems to have been too subtle even for Plato's further purposes. Jowett says:

It is remarkable that although Plato speaks of the idea of good as the first principle of truth and being, it is nowhere mentioned in his writings except in this passage. Nor did it retain any hold upon his disciples in a later generation; it was probably unintelligible to them. Nor does the mention of it in Aristotle appear to have any reference to this or any other passage in his extant writings.<sup>2</sup>

I confess I should be skeptical whether a man was endowed with the makings of a good sociologist if he could read *The Republic* without finding himself in a fight with himself to resist its fascinations. It has exhaustless lure for anyone with imagination, or with intellectual curiosity. There are many situations in which readings from *The Republic* would be salutary exercises in mental gymnastics and in moral stimulation. My constant contention, however, is that, for the sociologist as such, in the development of his own proper procedure, neither *The Republic* nor any of its successors in relying upon a dialectical method has anything but a negative and precautionary value. For anyone engaged in trying to get positive knowledge, it is a snare and a delusion. I mean by that not necessarily in the judgments at which it arrives, but in the processes of arriving at the judgments. They are abhorrent to the methodology of science, and they tend to disqualify the mind for scientific criticism.

Book vii reaches the most transcendental level in the scheme of *The Republic*. Its central theme is the nature of *true enlightenment*, and the means of attaining it. The discussion ranges from elementary pedagogy—the value of arithmetic, then geometry, then astronomy, etc., in education—to pure speculation about dialectic, which is "the science of absolute truth."

The exposition starts with what Socrates refers to as an "allegory," and it may be noticed in passing that one of the particulars

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, II, 25.

in which *The Republic* is alien to our present conception of sociology is that its technique makes almost precisely the same use of analogy which was among the futilities of sociology in its beginnings. Analogical reasoning, with the illusions which are direct consequences of it, may be said to constitute one of the main threads of the discussion. In this case the figure employed is that of men who had been chained from childhood in an immovable position in an underground den. "Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance." They can see only vaguely the shadows that it casts. Then some of them are liberated and compelled to walk into the light until they return to the cave and try to make their new outlook plausible to their lifelong associates.

This is Plato's way of picturing the relation of a conceivable few who become philosophers, or gain complete enlightenment, when they mingle with ordinary men. In Socrates' own words (vii. 517. B):

The entire allegory you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world, according to my poor belief, which at your desire, I have expressed—whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the *idea of good* appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

The rest of Book viii is virtually an amplification of this passage. When stated in forms of application, which, as we have seen, Plato knew to be only conceptual, not practicable, the implications are in the direction of Socrates' further explanation (vii. 519. C, D):

The business of us who are the founders of the state will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all—they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough, we must not allow them to do as they do now. . . . I mean that they (now) *remain* in the upper world; but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labors and honors, whether they are worth having or not.

Again I reword my entire case for Sociology vs. *The Republic*.

Nothing human is beyond the range of the sociologist's legitimate interest. The kind of discourse which fills *The Republic* is not an exception to the principle. The sociologist's legitimate interests, however, fall into two classes, viz., first, those which are immediately connected with the technical processes for which he is responsible as a specialist; second, those which he shares with all enlightened men in their need of organizing knowledge of all sorts into rational conduct of life. In the former connection, the sociologist has only the remotest and most attenuated interest in *The Republic*. Association of the two in any closer sense is as preposterous as it would be to inject readings from Browning into the calculations of a statistical commission. As personalities, statisticians, like other men, may enlarge their horizon by reading the poets. As technicians, they must relentlessly exclude poetry from their procedure. Precisely the same is true of the sociologists and the whole literature of dialectic.

Once more placing the aims of the Platonic and of the sociological method side by side should help to exhibit the truth of my contention. Sociology has become a collection of techniques adapted to the purpose of discovering, interpreting, and eventually, we hope, in some degree, controlling the different causal factors that operate in human group relations. Dialectic, Plato's ultimate reliance for derivation of knowledge, is described a little later by Socrates in these words (vii. 532. A):

This is the progress which I (you) call dialectic: When a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the visible.

Is it not plain that the relation of sociology to such procedure is identical with that of statistics to poetry?

Now that sociology has arrived at a rather secure consciousness of its own vocation, it will be wholesome penance for the sociologists to reflect upon the further dictum of Socrates (vii. 534. E): "Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, and is set over them; no other science can be placed higher—the nature of knowledge can no farther go."

Within the memory of men now living—possibly since the birth

of the youngest child—virtually the same proposition has been asserted, the word dialectic giving place to the term sociology! It is not for nothing that I plead for clarification of fundamental historical and methodological ideas at the outset of sociological study.

Whether students of psychology and pedagogy have more to learn professionally than the sociologists have from this seventh book of *The Republic*, or from any other part of it, is not for the sociologist to decide. For our purposes all its rationalizing amounts simply to a setting up of mental images which have conceivable value only as their contrast with reality may serve to stimulate effort toward producing men more like the picture. As adventurers in gaining knowledge, we may conclude with Glaucon (vi. 540. C), "You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made *statues* of our governors faultless in beauty." As an artistic presentation of types of civic excellence contemplated as ideals, *The Republic* has almost the same relative standing in literature which Raphael's "Transfiguration" has among paintings. This does not affect my argument. I am not questioning the eminence of *The Republic* as a work of art. I am simply pointing out that it is not a work of science, more particularly not of social science, most particularly not of sociology.

Book viii of *The Republic* might easily be mistaken for an excursion into political science. On the surface it is what modern professors have often announced as a course in "comparative constitutions." In reality it uses a very inadequate equipment of scenery to stage a further pageant of civic virtues and vices, to make the former look attractive and desirable, the latter repulsive and contemptible. Socrates summarily classifies the Hellenic states as (1) aristocracy, (2) oligarchy, (3) democracy, (4) tyranny (viii. 544. C). Assuming that these types are as clear and unequivocal as their names, he proceeds to dispose of them by scheduling the imperfections which are associated in his mind with the name of the type. In other words, the name is treated as though it stood for a complete inventory of qualities, quite fixed in their character and proportions. We may see the fallacy in a conceivable modern parallel. Suppose we give to the British government the name "imperialism," to the American government the name "republic," to the French government the name "democracy," and to the Russian government the name "sovietism."

Then suppose we proceed to give a rating to these four governments, not on the basis of adequate investigation into the ways in which they actually function, but by striking a balance-sheet between the evil and the good which tradition has charged or credited to the type. By this method Great Britain, as a typical imperialism, might be loaded down with every alleged imperialistic sin from Sennacherib to Wilhelm II, with no offsets for any actual merits; while America might get the benefit of all the goodness which Plato lodges in the conceptual pattern "republic," with no discount for its failures in practice. It is not to be supposed that Plato would apply his scheme of classification with quite that degree of naïveté in a concrete case, but this is the ground-pattern of premise and conclusion which his method presents. That pattern of procedure lends itself to the main purpose which we have found in *The Republic*, viz., persuasion that certain models of conduct are admirable, others despicable. The procedure is utterly out of place in any sort of social science which seriously pursues the aim of objectivity. With that perception we find ourselves absolved from all apparent obligation to treat Book viii as having a claim to the attention of sociologists.

A mystical mathematical symbolism applied to the birth-rate has a place in the argument of Book viii (546. B ff.), as well as a recurrence of the figure of the metals. The former especially presents a puzzle for the literary interpreter, but each is negligible for the sociologist.

In Book ix Socrates appears less than ever in the character of a positive scientist, and becomes more of a preacher. He is reaching the climax of his persuasion that certain types of civic character are odious and their opposites exemplary. For this purpose, after a short excursus into moral philosophy and psychology, to determine "the nature and number of the appetites," he exploits the abstraction "the tyrannical man." The sterility of the method illustrated in Book viii is still more impressive here. It is not observation of cases and generalization of facts. It is deduction from concepts, or it is raising familiar details to the rank of universals. The same method is followed when attention shifts to arrangement of a scale of pains and pleasures (ix. 580. B ff.), and the greater and less reality of different orders of pleasure (ix. 583. B ff.). The dialectic arrives at a synthe-



sis which projects its zenith of sentiment and its nadir of knowledge in the "calculation" that the king lives "729 times more pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by the same interval" (ix. 587. C). The indications in the context are that the auditors were correspondingly impressed, and it would be a pity to break the spell. On the outside, without interrupting the solemnities, we may irreverently whisper to ourselves the refrain by which we keep ourselves reminded of realities: This dramatization of good and bad is adroit persuasion, but it is not science.

At the end of the book Plato has expressly admonished readers that he has not been dealing with things as they ever can be in this world, but with conceptions which point toward fulfilment only in a higher life. At the end of a crescendo which expresses the moral achievements of the truly wise man (ix. 591. B ff.), and in answer to Glaucon's safe qualification, "You mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only, for I do not believe that there is such a one anywhere on earth?" Socrates concludes: "In heaven, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he who desires may behold, and beholding may take up his abode there. But whether such a one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter; for he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other."

From the spiritual outlook reached in Book ix, the opening of the tenth and last book once more introduces an anticlimax. It drops to the lower level of a denunciation of poetry. Plato, to be sure, alleges moral grounds for his desire to banish poetry from the state, but his contentions are so debatable in themselves that injection of them into a more comprehensive ethical argument impresses the reader as frivolous. It is a curious trifle that Plato's indictment of poetry pivots upon the primary count that poetry is *imitation*, and imitation is "ruinous to the understanding" (x. 595. B), and thereupon immoral. Persons whose minds work that way might pounce upon that word "imitation" and triumphantly declare that it destroys my whole case for the dissociation of *The Republic* and sociology, because here is a premonition of Tarde's theory of imitation!

Not so much judgment as temperament will determine whether

the reader will feel that the discourse has returned to its highest level when Socrates introduces his beliefs about the immortality of the soul (x. 608. C). Whatever may be the intrinsic worth of the ensuing argument, it is inconceivable that any competent person would contend that it is sociology, or has any connection with sociology, except in the sense that everything is connected with everything.

Nor can the impression of anticlimax be much relieved by Socrates' recourse to a mythological tale to support his beliefs about immortality (x. 614. B). Incidentally, the defenders of poetry have quite as strong a case against Plato as he has against the poets, when he uses mythological material for his own purposes.

Nearly hidden in the story, however, and in the morals that Socrates draws from it, are two sentences which, it seems to me, might well have been inscribed upon the title-page of *The Republic*. Better than any others that I can select, they epitomize the animus and the argument of the whole work, and distinguish it from sociology in the strict sense, viz. (x. 618. B, C):

*And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one leave every other kind of knowledge, and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find someone who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity.*

The difference between Plato and the sociologists does not consist in the contrast between presence and absence of desire for all the knowledge within reach of men, and for the best life that mortals can achieve.

The contrast is in the fact that Plato believed *dialectic* to be the pass-key to that knowledge, whereas everyone who understands the rudiments of the scientific method has discovered that dialectic is not, never was, and never can be a pass-key to that knowledge.

We may picture the scheme of knowledge as it appeared to Plato in this crude way: Knowledge is a complete picture. It has been chopped up into fragments and scattered through men's minds. If men would use the supreme patience that would be necessary to assemble all those bits of knowledge and fit them perfectly to one

another, which is the work of dialectic, they would at last find the one place appointed to each fragment, and fit each fragment into its foreordained place, as in an infinite Chinese puzzle.

To science, on the contrary, objective reality is an unknown number of detachable leaves each of which contains information important in itself, but the leaves so far in sight cannot present their full meaning till they are read in connection with perhaps an infinite number of leaves, some of which have not yet come to light. So far, we have been able to spell out what may prove, for all we know, to be only a few of the easiest words and sentences of the leaves that we have discovered. The processes of deciphering these leaves are not processes of turning our minds inward upon themselves. They are processes of focusing our minds upon the physical things and the human behaviors outside our minds, that is, upon the characters in which the leaves are written, and progressively storing our minds with transcripts of this reality. With each addition to this record, the partialness of this store becomes more evident.

On the other hand, as I said early in these notes, the scientific method at every step has a use for a dialectic of its own, which, like accounting in a business, is not a creator of reality, but a way of reporting discovery.

I have nothing but applause for Plato in his work of teaching men how to use the knowledge which they had. I have no patience with begoggled leaders of the blind who see no difference between Plato's pedagogy and special pleading, on the one hand, and scientific methodology on the other. Indeed, it is a safe reading of all the leaves of reality which men have thus far deciphered to conclude that Plato was right, not in the details of his mental picture, but in his judgment of the most durable human attitude, when he spoke through Socrates these closing words of the symposium (x. 621. C):

And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved, and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness, and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way, and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games, who

go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing.

By some uncanny law of contrast, which may be in alliance with some deeper law of likeness, I am reminded of that laboriously satirical and cynical book which Erasmus wrote in 1509, *The Praise of Folly*. There can be no doubt that in a general way this path-breaker for the later humanism was actuated by the same purpose with Plato, viz., to convince men of the foolishness of folly. With this association in mind, I can think of no more revealing substitute for the title, *The Republic*, than the legend *The Praise of Wisdom*. The suggestion is the more appropriate when we remember that, in the Socratic and the Platonic philosophies, wisdom and virtue were so closely related as to be practically identical.

Ever since the phrase "social science" came into use, people who called it social science to dope their minds into dreams of how nice it would be if two and two made six; or what a pleasant time might be had by all if there were no human nature in human nature; or what delightful things might happen if everybody always saw everything through the dreamers' eyes, and weighed everything in the dreamers' scales,—not only many people of this type, but others much wiser have derived no end of aid and comfort from incontinent misinterpretation of *The Republic*. With details changed, the same malfeasance has been comfortable in treatment of a long line of dialecticians, not ending with the philosophers of history.

This survey has been for the sake of lifting up one voice against a stupidity and an abuse which have embarrassed the efforts of all the social sciences to become effectively objective. In a word, there are various angles from which *The Republic* is both interesting and instructive. Considered as sociology it is neither.

The gist of the whole matter is this: Sociologists as such should study moral philosophers, philosophers of history, and all others whose method is chiefly dialectical, not as models, but as problems.

## HAVE SUBHUMAN ANIMALS CULTURE?

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### ABSTRACT

Although the continuity of animal life from the lowest up through *homo sapiens* is almost universally accepted among scientists, there is still a widespread tendency to make a sharp distinction between man and lower animals in capacity for culture. Culture consists in behavior patterns transmitted by imitation or tuition. Domesticated animals acquire culture complexes from human beings. Animals acquire behavior complexes by the imitation of one another. Instances of instruction of the young by animal parents are authoritatively reported. Songs invented by certain birds and then acquired by other birds through association are conclusive evidence of the rudiments of culture, in the strictest sense of the word. In culture, as well as in other respects, there is no sharp break between man and the lower animals.

Both affirmative and negative answers to the question which forms the title of this article have been given prominence recently. Case states the negative opinion emphatically:

The social sciences begin where biological sciences end, and that is at the level where *culture* appears. Culture itself is, in the generally accepted definition by the veteran anthropologist, E. B. Tylor, "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." It is a phenomenon exclusively human and social. That is to say, culture is not the possession, so far as yet shown, of animals, and on the other hand, no *human group* was ever found lacking a culture of relatively high complexity. In this respect a tremendous gulf separates man and the lower forms of life, the anthropoid apes and social insects not excepted.<sup>1</sup>

Similarly Kroeber<sup>2</sup> asserts that the distinction between animal and man which counts is not that of the physical and mental, which is one of relative degree, but that of the superorganic and social which is one of kind. On this basis he concludes that in civilization man has something that no animal has.

<sup>1</sup> Clarence Marsh Case, *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, p. xxix. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1924.

<sup>2</sup> A. L. Kroeber, "The Superorganic," *American Anthropologist*, N.S. 19 (1917), pp. 163-213.

While H. G. Wells is hardly a specialist in anthropology, his disagreement with the foregoing opinions is so pronounced as to be worth quoting:

But ordinary mammals have added to pure instinct *tradition*, a tradition of experience imparted by the imitated example of the mother, and in the case of such mentally developed animals, as dogs, cats, or apes, by a sort of mute precept also. For example, the mother cat chastises her young for misbehavior. So do apes and baboons.<sup>1</sup>

Recent psychology is prone to eliminate the gap between human and subhuman behavior by interpreting the former in terms of the latter. Thus Thorndike says: "These simple, semi-mechanical phenomena . . . which animal learning discloses, are the fundamentals of human learning also . . . are the main and perhaps the only facts needed to explain it."<sup>2</sup>

As comparative sciences have increasingly shown similarities between *genus homo* and other animals—in skeletal structure, in embryological development, in the central nervous system and even in fundamental psychological characteristics—there has been an increasing tendency to regard the differences between man and his subhuman kindred as being of degree rather than of kind. In the animal sequence from lowest to highest, as in other phenomena, variations have come to be thought of by many as approximating a continuous series rather than as comprising "tremendous gulfs." The question may well be raised, therefore, whether the possession of culture by man negates this conception of continuity.

The culture of animals, if they have any, is of course not on a level with that of human beings. It is much inferior in universality, in complexity, and in rapidity of accumulation. Yet if any subhuman animals have culture in even a rudimentary way, it is clear that such sweeping denials as those quoted above are misleading and confusing. Kroeber,<sup>3</sup> in disclaiming anything superorganic in animal speech, discreetly says: "If this summary is not absolutely exact, it departs from the truth only infinitesimally." It is that "infinitesimal" part that we wish to investigate.

<sup>1</sup> H. G. Wells, *Outline of History*, p. 175. New York: Macmillan, 1921.

<sup>2</sup> Edward L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, pp. 136-37. New York: Teacher's College, Columbia University, 1915.

<sup>3</sup> A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, p. 107. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1923.

A definition of culture is, of course, an essential prerequisite to this discussion. Tylor's definition, quoted above by Case, prejudices the issue by assuming that all culture is human. Wissler suggests a more satisfactory definition when he says that culture "is not innate but acquired by the individual by imitative or educative processes."<sup>1</sup> Culture includes all behavior patterns socially acquired and socially transmitted. Behavior patterns in general might be classified into three groups: (1) instinctive, (2) sub-socially habitual, and (3) cultural. The instinctive group includes those behavior patterns which, without the aid of trial and error, imitation or tuition, develop full-fledged if a suitable environment is provided. The sub-socially habitual group includes action patterns which, while depending upon innate capacities, are conditioned in their form by the varying nature of the physical environment and by learning through trial and error. For example, an animal might form the habit of going to a salt-lick in a certain locality, or of spending the night in a certain cave, or might by practice acquire skill in the capture of prey. As differentiated from instinct and sub-social habit, culture includes all behavior patterns acquired through social contacts, i.e., by imitation or tuition.

Parenthetically it should be pointed out that it is not pertinent to this discussion to determine whether imitation is or is not instinctive. Imitation is a recognized channel through which human culture has developed; even though the means of transmission may be instinctive, the thing transmitted by imitation is culture.

Under the proposed definitions two borderland types of behavior must be recognized, and two subdivisions of cultural behavior itself. The first borderland type consists in behavior conditioned by modifications which other animals have made in the physical environment. For instance, paths made through a forest by one animal tend to be used by other animals. The path may be thought of as a rudimentary artifact, and as conditioning a social-behavior pattern, even though neither imitation nor tuition enter in. The second borderland type consists in socially conditioned behavior where temporary imitation is involved, but where it cannot be said that a

<sup>1</sup> Clark Wissler, "The Relation of Culture to Environment from the Standpoint of Invention," *Popular Science Monthly*, LXXXIII (1913), 164.

permanent behavior pattern is transmitted. The flying of wild geese in formation, and herd phenomena in general typify this sort of social but non-cultural behavior.

Culture itself, under the definition adopted above, includes first, the permanent habits acquired by the individual through imitation or tuition, regardless of whether or not they represent an accumulated tradition, and second, behavior patterns which accumulate, i.e., which are transmitted to an individual from another who has himself acquired them through imitation or tuition.

The definition does not stipulate that the behavior pattern need have originated in the species which acquires it. The domestication of animals consists in transmitting to them certain culture complexes. The fire-engine horse, in his response to the ringing of the alarm, in his habitual adjustments to the harness and to the rest of the apparatus, in his participation in the excitement of the fire run—in his whole adaptation to the situation—displays his adoption of a culture complex. When, moreover, a new horse in being broken in is placed between two old horses, the animals themselves are participating in the transmission of the culture.

The trained monkey, who acquires human behavior patterns, is a striking example in this field. The parrot acquires culture elements from human beings when he imitates their speech.

But subhuman animals acquire culture not only from human beings but also from each other. Liebe<sup>1</sup> describes lessons in flying given by male and female falcons. First the parents fly dexterously about in front of their little ones, who sit perched on a bough. Then the old birds push the young off the bough and the pupils are forced into flying. If the incident is truly given, without distortion due to prejudice of the observer, and if one agrees with Liebe's interpretation, this episode involves clearly the transmission of culture.

Groos<sup>2</sup> says that "birds can no more fly of themselves than babies can walk." He supports this statement by the experimental observations of Stiebelang and Müller. Twenty-four days elapsed before the canaries could fly, eat, and bathe alone. In the meantime the birds were urged on by their parents, who held food before them

<sup>1</sup> Karl Groos, *The Play of Animals*, p. 105. London: Chapman and Hall, 1898.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 103-7.



and uttered encouraging calls. More arresting is the knowledge that the chick in company with its parent takes only from five to eight hours to learn to walk; if separated from the hen it takes from eight to sixteen hours. Though it is instinctive for a duck to swim, yet a duck hatched and reared by a hen needs a longer time to become used to water, presumably because the hen does no swimming for the duckling to imitate.

Watson<sup>1</sup> relates several valuable incidents. A female monkey had an opportunity to learn some specific thing without tuition and failed. The male learned by his own efforts, and then performed in front of the female. She at once repeated the act as he had done it. "There is some slight evidence that one of them learned something from the tuition of the other." That slight evidence is important in its bearing on the animal's faculty to transmit culture. "Cole states that raccoons can be made to learn an act by tuition after having failed to learn it without tuition." From the fact that a cat refused to turn a button which would release her, until another cat turned it several times in front of her, "Berry states that the Manx cat is very much influenced by the behavior of its associates." As quoted by Watson,<sup>2</sup> "Lashley finds that when an Amazon parrot which does not talk is confined with a bird which does, the untrained animal begins to repeat at first very indistinctly the words of the trained parrot."

Craig<sup>3</sup> asserts that among pigeons the parent birds unconsciously educate their young in some very important matters. Furthermore, "if two inexperienced birds are allowed to mate they are slow in coming to the point of mating;" but if an inexperienced bird is paired with an experienced one the latter takes the lead and the former learns quickly.

R. L. Garner<sup>4</sup> lived for a time in the Fernan Vuz Country for the purpose of studying the behavior of chimpanzees. In order to win their confidence, he forbade anyone to molest any of the denizens

<sup>1</sup> J. B. Watson, *Behavior An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, pp. 287 ff. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1914.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 295.

<sup>3</sup> Walter Craig, "Voices of Pigeons as a Means of Social Control," *American Journal of Sociology*, XIV (1908-9), 86-100.

<sup>4</sup> R. L. Garner, "Contemporary Ancestors of Ours," *The Independent*, CI (1920), 60.

of the jungle, except beasts of prey, while they were on his cane patch. The animals frequently came in parties to the patch. One day a servant disobeyed Mr. Garner's orders, and chased away a few chimpanzees. For the fourteen remaining months of Mr. Garner's stay in the jungle, not a single chimpanzee appeared near the house again. Since only a few of the numerous chimpanzees who had formerly visited the place had experienced the harsh treatment, it seems clear, according to Garner's interpretation, that the new behavior pattern of avoidance had been transmitted from one group of animals to the others.

Although the instances thus far cited demonstrate the *acquisition* rather than the *accumulation* of culture by animals, they suggest the possibility of the latter. No modern psychologist would deny that animals learn new habits by the trial-and-error method. If it be admitted that animals imitate the behavior of their fellows it becomes not only possible but probable that the acquired patterns of one animal should become transmitted habits among his fellows and thus constitute culture in the fullest sense.

Evidence strongly suggestive of this hypothesis is given by Conradi<sup>\*</sup> on the basis of his experiments with English sparrows. He says that imitation is an important factor in the song of each species of bird; he even raises the question of whether a bird's song may not be wholly a matter of imitation. He illustrates this by quoting Mr. W. E. D. Scott: "Two birds isolated from their own kind and from all birds, but with a strong inherited tendency to sing, originated a novel method of song, and four birds, isolated from wild representatives of their own kind and associated with these two who had invented the new song, learned it from them and never sang in any other way." Here clearly is a basic invention initiating a tradition definitely parallel with human culture complexes.

In Conradi's experiments two young sparrows in nine months imitated some of the song of the canary, and adopted the canary's call note; when put back with sparrows the two rapidly took up sparrow notes again; but with renewed instruction, when once more with the canaries, they regained all the canary notes they had lost.

<sup>\*</sup> Edward Conradi, "Song and Call Notes of English Sparrows When Reared by Canaries," *American Journal of Psychology*, XVI (1905), 190-98.

Who knows whether young beavers, if reared in isolation from older generations, would instinctively have the skill to build beaver dams? Who knows, indeed, whether a considerable part of the behavior of all higher mammals may not consist of accumulated traditions? In the absence of long and careful experiments it is very rash to make sweeping denials. Certainly such evidence as is available suggests the possibility that the field of animal sociology would afford rich materials if it were to be explored with any thoroughness.

While it is unquestionable that animals have no culture comparable in complexity, richness, or intellectual attainment with the culture of man, still in view of the above instances in which animals have acquired by imitation or tuition not merely human culture through domestication, but also types of behavior from each other, and have even shown some evidence of socially accumulative behavior complexes, it cannot be denied that they possess at least the rudiments of culture. With respect to culture, as well as with respect to physiological structure and to innate psychological faculties, there is no sharp break between man and the lower animals.

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#### AN APOLOGY

The paper entitled *Boundary Lines of Social Phenomena*, by Professor John M. Gillette, in the March, 1925, number of the *American Journal of Sociology*, was printed from an earlier draft, not from the revised version which the author submitted as a substitute. The paper as it appears fails to do justice to the author's latest thought. The responsibility for the error is wholly my own, and I offer my sincere regrets and apology not only to Professor Gillette but to the readers of this *Journal*.

ALBION W. SMALL

## PRE-LITERATE PEOPLES: PROPOSING A NEW TERM

ELLSWORTH FARIS  
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Conservatism in terminology is always desirable. An indiscriminate coinage of new words is not to be undertaken lightly, for this involves a waste of time and effort, impairing the continuity of scientific writing. Science has been called funded knowledge, and if each one gives free rein to his desire to use new words, it is difficult to add to the edifice of our predecessors, or to insure that those who follow us will profit by what we have done. In the matter of a term for designating those peoples who are the subject-matter for ethnological research, there is, however, an apparent need for a better term than those now current.

For some time the writer has been using in lectures and class discussions the term "pre-literate" to designate the peoples of the *sociétés inférieures*, as Lèvy-Bruhl calls them. This article is written to suggest the term to scholars at work in the fields of ethnology, sociology, and psychology as a more objective word than any of those now current. The term is obviously suggested by Lèvy-Bruhl's word "pre-logical," and it seems even more defensible than that very questionable word. The need for a new terminology is apparent upon a very cursory consideration of the writings in this field. Goldenweiser has recently broken away from any attempt to make a distinction and entitles his book *Early Civilizations*, treating as civilized the Eskimos, Australians, Central Africans, and Iroquois. This use of the word "civilization" has been criticized as an unwarrantable extension, robbing the word "civilized" of any content, for indeed if all peoples were civilized, we shall need a new word to indicate the great difference in culture that separates us of the modern tradition from the societies found in Melanesia, Central Africa, and Greenland.

The history of terminology in this field is long, but need not be recounted in detail. It would include, among others, the words "pagan," "heathen," "barbarian," "savage," "primitive," "lower

“races,” “nature peoples,” and several others. The etymology of these words reveals them to have been objective in origin, though they have acquired a content which ethnocentrism has turned into depreciation. We know that the pagan was originally merely a villager; that the heathen was at first merely a plainsman, and that the savage was originally only a forest-dweller. These words have, however, all acquired a meaning which has led to their gradual abandonment as scientific terms. How recent this development is, will appear from recalling the title of one of Dewey’s epoch-making papers which he called the “Interpretation of the Savage Mind.”

The most widely used word now is “primitive,” by which men from Herbert Spencer to Boaz, including some of our most valuable literature, designate those peoples and cultures which I propose to speak of as “pre-literate.” The most recent book in this field, that of Lèvy-Bruhl, which appeared in English in 1923, is called *Primitive Mentality*.

The objections to the term “primitive” are several. It is ambiguous. There was a primitive man, and concerning him much has been written. The myths all describe him, and Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and many more have set down in detail the picture of him which they conceived. The primitive man of Hobbes was the hypothetical, primordial being who was presupposed in a political theory. Rousseau described another one, quite opposite in character, but imaginary. Herbert Spencer in accordance with the preconception, which we no longer entertain, identified contemporaneous peoples of pre-literate cultures with primitive man, and since Spencer the word has been widely used to denote the Bantus, the Polynesians, the Negritos, and all those peoples outside the cultural influences of Europe and Asia.

It needs no argument to show that primitive man so designated is not really primitive. Their culture is very old, their languages are complex and highly developed, and their inheritance goes back very far. They are often referred to now as “so-called primitive peoples.”

“Pre-literate” seems a far better word. It is neutral, connoting no reflection of inferiority, and is, therefore, objective and descriptive. Moreover, it may well be that the introduction of a written symbolic language is the chief differentiation between the culture of city-dwellers and those who belong to the “lower societies.”

But whether this be true or not, it is evident that none of the peoples we include in the term "savage" or "primitive" possess a developed, written language. This is not because they cannot learn to read and write. Missionaries and teachers have proved that letters are not impossible to them. They have simply not had the opportunity to learn. They are not literate, nor illiterate. They are pre-literate.

Pre-literate man is, then, one in whose culture there is no written literature. And it is obvious that such a person is in a very different situation, culturally, from an *illiterate* person, by whom we mean a man who cannot read what other members of his society have written and can read.

It would be interesting to attempt to set forth the changes in a culture which the introduction of writing brings about. For writing means record, and the records of a vanished generation make possible a continuity of culture otherwise impossible. Literate people have a history; pre-literate peoples have only oral tradition. And the difference is analogous to the possession by a person of memory. To lose one's memory is to lose one's personality. And something analogous takes place when the records of the past give us an attitude toward our ancestors otherwise impossible. Moreover, written instruments transcend not only time but space, and make possible the integration of societies into larger units, thus adding a new dimension to life. It is no accident that civilization is derived from the word "city," for pre-literates do not really have cities. At the most they have large villages.

Literature begins with Egypt, and in spite of many differences between the civilizations of China, India, Greece, Rome, Babylon, and medieval Europe, one is constantly being impressed with the fact that all of these civilizations have many points in common which differentiate them clearly from that large outer group whom we speak of as pre-literate.

Modern man may be differentiated by several cultural elements, but science in the sense of controlling nature is perhaps the most outstanding one. For this we go back very far to get the germs, but the full expression is a matter of only a few generations. Mathematics, objective science, and humanism differentiate us from the ancients. A written language differentiates both us and the ancients from those who have not yet learned to write—the pre-literates.

## NEWS AND NOTES

Notes of interest to the readers of the *Journal* should be in the hands of the editor of "News and Notes" not later than the tenth of the month preceding publication.

*Social science research fellowships.*—The Social Science Research Council at its annual meeting in Chicago on April 4 announced the appointment of the following fifteen scholars as research fellows of the Council for the year 1923-26, selected from a total of 108 applicants:

Luther Lee Bernarč, Ph.D., professor of sociology, University of Minnesota. *Problem:* A study of the development of the social sciences in Argentina with special reference to the economic, political, and other cultural circumstances under which they were developed. *Place of Study:* Argentina.

Charles Warren Everett, M.A., instructor in department of English and comparative literature, Columbia University. *Problem:* Life of Jeremy Bentham and the editing of his unpublished manuscripts. *Place of study:* London.

Harold F. Gosnell, Ph.D., Instructor in Political Science, University of Chicago. *Problem:* Factors determining the extent of popular participation in elections in typical European states. *Place of study:* Washington, D.C., England, France, Germany, Belgium.

Marcus Lee Hansen, Ph.D., assistant professor of history, Smith College. *Problem:* A basic study of the origins of the foreign elements in the settlement of the upper Mississippi Valley. *Place of study:* Washington, Dublin, London, Geneva, Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen.

Joseph Pratt Harris, Ph.D., instructor in political science, University of Wisconsin. *Problem:* Workings of election registration systems in the United States. *Place of study:* Headquarters at Chicago, field work throughout the country.

William Jaffee, Docteur en Droit, tutor in French and economics, College of the City of New York. *Problem:* The industrial revolution in France. *Place of study:* France.

Edgar W. Knight, Ph.D., professor of Education, University of North Carolina. *Problem:* A study of the folk high schools in Scandinavian countries, especially Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. *Place of study:* Europe.

Simon S. Kuznets, M.A. (candidate for Ph.D., June, 1925, Colum-

bia), fellow in economics, Columbia University. *Problem*: Secular trends in economic theory, their interrelations and their bearing upon cyclical fluctuations. *Place of study*: New York City.

Rose S. Malmud, M.A., graduate student, Columbia University. *Problem*: The psychology of literary ability. *Place of study*: Columbia University, New York.

Thomas P. Martin, Ph.D., associate professor of American history, University of Texas. *Problem*: A study of Anglo-American relations as influenced by economic, political, and social forces playing within and between the two peoples. *Place of study*: England.

Hutzel Metzger, M.S. (candidate for Ph.D., June, 1925, University of Minnesota), part-time research assistant, University of Minnesota. *Problem*: An analysis of the price of certain farm products, with a view to deriving information that will promote the better adjustment of agricultural production. *Place of study*: Minnesota.

Ernest R. Mowrer, Ph.D., assistant professor of sociology, Ohio Wesleyan University. *Problem*: Family disorganization as a socially inherited behavior pattern. *Place of study*: Chicago.

Mrs. Mildred Dennett Mudgett, Ph.D., assistant professor of sociology, University of Minnesota. *Problem*: Legislation affecting the pre-school child in certain European countries. *Place of study*: England, France, Italy, and Scandinavian countries.

Sterling Denhard Spero, Ph.D., fellow, New School for Social Research. *Problem*: The position of the negro in industry. *Place of study*: Headquarters at New York. Field investigations.

Dorothy Swaine Thomas, Ph.D., research assistant, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. *Problem*: The economic factor in crime. *Place of study*: New York State.

The fellows will travel and study in the following countries: Argentina, England, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.

These are the first awards of the Social Science Research Council. Plans have been made to offer research fellowships annually for the following four years.

The following are the officers of the Council: president, Dr. Charles E. Merriam, University of Chicago; vice-president, Dr. John R. Commons, University of Wisconsin; Secretary, Dr. Horace Secrist, Northwestern University; treasurer, Dean E. E. Day, University of Michigan. The Council consists of twenty-one delegates elected three from each of the following national scientific societies: The American Economic



Association, The American Political Science Association, The American Statistical Association, The American Sociological Society, The American Anthropological Association, The American Historical Association, and The American Psychological Association.

The Committee on Research Fellowships of the Council consists of Dr. Wesley C. Mitchell, chairman, professor of economics, Columbia University; Dr. Charles E. Merriam, professor of political science, University of Chicago; and Dr. F. Stuart Chapin, secretary, professor of sociology, University of Minnesota.

*The Survey of Race Relations.*—The Findings Conference of the Survey of Race Relations, a Canadian-American study of the Oriental on the Pacific Coast under the auspices of the Institute of Social and Religious Research, was held at Stanford University, March 21-26, 1925.

The findings, mainly the composite expression of the research staff present at that time, have been based also upon the simultaneous advice of a selected group of outside persons. The research staff was represented by Dr. Robert E. Park and Miss Winifred Raushenbush (University of Chicago), Dr. Louis Bloch (California State Bureau of Labor Statistics), Professor S. J. Holmes (University of California), Professor R. D. McKenzie (University of Washington), Professor P. A. Parsons (Portland School of Social Work), Professor Kenneth Saunders (Pacific School of Religion), and Professor Eliot G. Mears (Stanford University). Other assisting persons connected with the Survey in attendance were Mr. J. Merle Davis (administrative director of the Survey until December, 1924); Professor E. O. Sisson (Reed College), of the Executive Committee; Professor R. C. Root (College of the Pacific); Mr. George Gleason, of the Los Angeles Y.M.C.A. (Secretary of the Survey's former Los Angeles office), and Mr. Galen M. Fisher (Institute of Social and Religious Research, New York). Other helpful persons who were present to criticize the draft of the tentative findings were President N. F. Coleman (Reed College), Dean W. F. Bade (Pacific School of Religion), Professor W. G. Beach (Stanford University), Professor George S. Sumner (Pomona College), Professor C. E. Rugh (University of California), Mr. C. N. Reynolds (University of Oregon Medical School), Mr. H. M. Sinclair (University of British Columbia), Miss Ethel Richardson (Assistant Superintendent of Schools, Los Angeles), Professor W. W. McLaren (Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Massachusetts), and Mr. Bruno Lasker (The Inquiry, New York).

At the opening meeting on March 25, the tentative findings were read, section by section, by Professor Mears, chairman of the Committee on Co-ordinated Research, with interspersed discussion in charge of Professor

Park, director of research. There were in attendance about one hundred and fifty persons, including several college presidents and leaders in social, religious, educational, and business activities on the Pacific Coast.

One of the unique achievements of the Survey is the fact that professors in the various colleges on the coast, all the way from British Columbia to southern California, have been enlisted so extensively in carrying on various aspects of the investigation. These teachers have been delighted to discover, in the field of race relations, an incomparable laboratory which serves both as a training ground for their advanced students and as a field of public service.

It is the firm conviction of the Committee and of the investigators that only a beginning has been made; but if, as is hoped, the foundations have been well and truly laid and the Survey is continued as it ought to be for an indefinite period, there is every reason to expect it to yield both scientific and practical results of far-reaching significance.

The pamphlet containing the tentative findings of the Survey may be obtained from the Survey of Race Relations, Headquarters at Stanford University, California.

*The National Council for Social Studies*—The fifth annual meeting of the National Council for Social Studies was held in Cincinnati, Ohio, February 21-22, 1925, during the annual convention of the Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association. Professor Charles A. Ellwood was the delegate of the American Sociological Society to the meeting. The meeting was a very important one and was addressed by a number of speakers, including Professor Tryon, of the University of Chicago; Superintendent Wood, of California; and Professor Hutson, of the University of Pittsburgh. At the business meeting the following statement of standards for the teaching of social studies in high schools was unanimously adopted:

1. The social studies, including history, economics, sociology, and government, if offered, shall be organized in one department, unless the school is so large that separate departments are required for one or more of these studies.
2. The minimum preparation in subject matter of any teacher of history, economics, sociology, or government shall be 30 per cent of the total requirements for the Bachelor's degree in the four subjects of history, economics, sociology, and government; of which at least 15 per cent of the total requirements shall be in the selected major study, and the other 15 per cent in the other three, with a minimum of 5 per cent in history.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Translated into credit hours, this standard means that if 120 hours are required for the Bachelor's degree, a minimum of 36 credit hours in the social studies shall be required; of these, 18 hours must be in the selected major, and 18 hours in the other three social studies, with a minimum of 6 credit hours in history.

3. The minimum preparation in education of any teacher of history, economics, sociology, or government shall be 10 per cent of the total requirements for the Bachelor's degree in educational subjects; and these subjects shall include general and special high-school method, and practice teaching.<sup>1</sup>

In addition to adopting the above resolution, a number of important committees were authorized and appointed:

1. A committee to collect and organize information with regard to surveys and other similar facts bearing on the status and tendencies of the social studies in cities, states, and foreign countries.
2. A committee on state legislation and city ordinances dealing with the social studies.
3. A committee of formulation of standards.
4. A committee on membership and affiliation with sectional, state, and local organizations of teachers of social studies.

Arrangements were entered into with the *Historical Outlook* making, that periodical the organ of the National Council and providing that members of the National Council may receive the *Outlook* and membership for a total of \$2.25 yearly.

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: *President*, H. C. Hill, University of Chicago. *Vice-President*, HESSIE L. PIERCE, University of Iowa. *Secretary-Treasurer*, EDGAR DAWSON, Hunter College, New York City. *Corresponding secretary*, MARY V. CARNEY, Central High School, St. Paul, Minnesota.

*London Sociology Club*.—Recently there has been organized in London a Sociology Club composed of about fifty members, chiefly sociologists and historians, including in their number L. T. Hobhouse and Graham Wallas. The secretary is Dr. Morris Ginsberg, of the London School of Economics, where the monthly meetings of the Club are held. This new organization is to be distinguished from the long-established London Sociological Society, although many members of the Club are also members of the Society.

*Institut International de Sociologie*.—M. René Worms, secretary of the International Institute of Sociology, announces in the *Revue Internationale de Sociologie* the election as associates of Roscoe Pound, Harvard University; Jane Addams, president of the International League of Women for Peace and Democracy; and Pitirim Sorokin, formerly of the University of Petrograd and now professor of sociology in the University of Minnesota.

<sup>1</sup> Translated into credit hours, this standard means that if 120 hours are required for the Bachelor's degree, 12 hours of education shall be required.

*American Sociological Society.*—The Society has recently lost by death two of its distinguished members, Eobert A. Woods and Norman Bridge. Mr. Woods was one of the early members of the Society. While in many articles and in several books he has made an attractive presentation of the social philosophy of the settlement movement, his most valuable contribution to sociology is probably his two studies *The City Wilderness* and *Americans in Process*. Dr. Bridge was best known for his contribution to medical research and for his writings; his membership in the Society for many years is an indication of his breadth of interest.

*Russell Sage Foundation.*—The publication of a volume on *Child Marriages* by Mary E. Richmond and Fred S. Hall is announced.

*University of Chicago.*—Professor Jesse F. Steiner, of the University of North Carolina, is teaching courses on "Community Organization and Immigration" in the Graduate School of Social Service Administration during the spring quarter. He will offer courses also in the summer quarter.

*University of Denver.*—Permission has been granted to the Ministry of Education, Cairo, Egypt, to make an Arabic translation of *Society and Its Problems; an Introduction to the Principles of Sociology*, by G. S. Dow.

*New York University.*—The Macmillan Company announce the publication of a revised edition of *Immigration* by Professor Henry P. Fairchild.

*University of Missouri.*—D. Appleton and Company announce the publication in July of a new elementary text in sociological theory by Professor Charles A. Ellwood, of the University of Missouri, entitled *The Psychology of Human Society: An Introduction to Sociological Theory*. This is an entirely new book, designed to supersede Professor Ellwood's previous texts, and will be a final statement of his sociological point of view. The contents of the book and to some extent its point of view are indicated by the following titles of its chapters: "The Study of Group Life," "Group Life and Organic Evolution," "Group Life and Mental Evolution," "Primary Group Life—The Forms of Association," "The Unity of the Group and Group Action," "The Continuity of the Group and Its Culture," "Changes within the Group: Normal," "Changes within the Group: Abnormal," "Instinct and Group Life," "Intelligence and Group Life," "Imitation and Group Life," "Feeling and Group Life," "Social Order," "Social Progress," "The Nature of Human Society," "Humanity as the Ultimate Group."

*University of North Carolina.*—Professor Ernst T. Krueger, Vanderbilt University, will offer courses in sociology in the summer school.

## REVIEWS

*Social Psychology*. By FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924. Pp. xiv+454. \$2.50.

The wide circle of readers of the admirable *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, of which Dr. Allport is one of the editors, will welcome this volume in which he attempts to set forth a system of psychology from the standpoint of the now popular school of behaviorism. Behaviorism is not, however, presented as a method of research, which is the cardinal insistence of Dr. J. B. Watson, who coined the word, but rather and merely as "another way of conceiving the facts."

Behaviorism is essentially an effort to study human life objectively. It began in America in the study of animal behavior, on which it has leaned heavily ever since. The method has been applied by Watson to the study of infants, with some interesting and valuable results. The time will undoubtedly come when the method will be rigorously followed in studying personality, but a careful re-reading of this volume forces the statement that Dr. Allport has here done no such thing. The reader is prepared for this lack of consistency in the Preface by the note of admiration for the Freudian psychology, which, as every reader of Watson knows, is the *bête noir* of every behaviorist. Behaviorism has in general three lines of approach: physiology, chiefly neurology; study of animals; and the study of infants. It leaves out of account any discussion of consciousness, meaning, or imagination, and indeed began as a reaction to the method of introspection.

Dr. Allport here follows the original pattern in presenting the usual inadequate chapter on neurology, illustrated with pictures of hypothetical nerve paths; introduces the subject of social behavior with numerous accounts of animal life, and bases all his system upon what he assumes to be the essential elements of infantile behavior. But one can hardly conceive such behaviorists as Watson and Lashley reading without irritation the discussion of reflexes, which central concept is used throughout the book in a manner which is wholly uncritical and absolutely divorced from any experimental attack whatever.

Much space is devoted to the contention that social psychology is a study of the individual and not the group. This concept of social psychology has of course been familiar to American readers for thirty years

in the writings of Dewey, Thomas, and others. But it is one thing to investigate the persons in a society and quite another thing to assume that the institutions of society are all to be explained as a result of the reflexes of babies. This fundamental assumption is apparently exactly identical with that of McDougall, with whom Professor Allport imagines he has wide divergences. The two positions are not quite alike, but the differences are minor. McDougall explains warfare as due to the instinct of pugnacity, while Allport "explains" the threat of hostility "implied in large protective armaments" and "the espousal by the German people of the kaiser's policy" as due to the "prepotent" infantile reflex of struggling (p. 59). If we are to have cultural institutions derived from the behavior of infants in arms, then surely the word "instinct" is to be preferred to such a clumsy term as "prepotent reflexes."

Neither the Russians, who invented the concept "conditioned reflex," nor the behaviorists, who adopted it with the same meaning, took the precaution to have it copyrighted. Therefore anyone may use it in any sense he pleases. Dr. Allport specifically states that he does not mean by "reflex" a real reflex. His reflexes are "multiple responses," and the singular is used "only for convenience." The result is not convenience, but confusion. For reflex is a very definite notion in the writings of the Russians, and it is a valuable and useful concept in medical diagnosis. Medical dictionaries list nearly a hundred diagnostic reflexes, and there are many others not useful in diagnosis. The "conditioned reflex" refers, of course, to a modification arising from simultaneous presentation of stimuli. Yet Allport refers to the whipping of a boy for stealing as an obvious example of a conditioned reflex. But it is not obvious; for it is subsequent to the activity. Moreover, it is demonstrable that whipping as a cure of stealing has obvious practical limitations.

But the conditioned reflex is still more seriously deformed in the treatment of the text. For it is modified on the efferent side by learning, so that not only is the stimulus changed by conditioning, but the behavior is utterly different, so that all that is left of the reflex is the name. Pavlov's dog secreted saliva at sight of food. By conditioning he came to secrete saliva in response to a musical note. If the dog had learned to howl when the musical note was sounded, Pavlov would not have called this a conditioned reflex, but there is nothing in Allport's treatment that would prevent such a formulation.

Part I of the text is devoted to the individual in his social aspects, and should of course have been analytical. On page 99 the author states that such has been his purpose: "Our method in the preceding chapters has

been mainly analytical." The reviewer's criticism is that the method has been the reverse of analytical. It has been exaggeratedly synthetic. Personality is assumed to be the result of the operation of reflexes, six of which are called "prepotent," and these are listed and given extended treatment. They are: starting and withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, which three are the basis of fear and anger, and all result in movement from the stimulus; and three others, hunger reactions, sensitive-zone reactions, and sex reactions, which result in approach to the stimulus. If these were the result of any method of analysis, the matter would be different. The only hint to the method occurs when the list is introduced on page 50 with the phrase, "We may recognize six important classes." So long as the fundamental human reactions depend upon the literary "recognition" of textbook writers, social psychology may be accurately defined as the opinions of professors.

"Behavior" is curiously defined. If the definition were not repeated on page 147, the reader would be inclined to regard it as a slip of the pen. It is called "responding to a stimulus by an activity that is normally useful to the individual." Later on, lynching is discussed and condemned, the serious evils of American democracy are described, billboards are spoken of as disfiguring the landscape, and the evils of small towns receive attention, so that the value of the definition remains in question.

To a sociologist, the most interesting chapter is the concluding one, which is frankly not psychological, but an excursion into social science. There is perhaps no other fifty-page chapter in existence where so many of the social problems are defined, discussed, and settled. We are told what is the matter with the rural mind, why country children are sexually precocious, and small towns given to scandal-mongering. He tells us how to run the public schools, discusses economics, and shows that upon men of business must rest the responsibility of saving us. He is skeptical whether leadership is a good thing or bad, since leaders usually secure their power through suggestion (p. 421). He has the solution for the Negro problem, and offers valuable suggestions to Congress, among them the taking of the vote when each congressman is alone in his office.

In spite of the serious and fundamental difficulties already mentioned, the book is interesting and is obviously the result of care and industry. The really valuable part, and this applies to many other books than the present, is the account of the experiments which the author himself made and reports. These concern several interesting aspects of social behavior: the experiments in reading facial expression, the result of the presence of others upon solving of problems both of thought and of a routine nature.

These experiments are interesting, valuable, and a real contribution to our knowledge. They have nothing whatever to do with "prepotent" reflexes and are not helped by being associated with them.

Social psychology can be conceived as the study of individuals or persons, but the fatal fallacy of Allport is to assume that the animal or the infant has within him the elements which develop into culture and institutions. That the author is vaguely aware of this difficulty is apparent from his trouble over the concept of submission. Submission is not in the baby, and yet slavery exists. If he were more careful or better informed, he would also know that whole societies have existed for generations without fighting or warfare. The struggling of an infant when held too tightly has no more to do with warfare than it has to do with smoking cigarettes. Punishment, slavery, religion, art, and countless cultural elements must be thought of as arising out of the interaction of persons, and can no more be found in the infant than the properties of water could be discovered by considering the separate nature of oxygen and hydrogen.

Social psychology must be analytical. We must start with persons. Personality is the subjective aspect of culture, and by comparing personalities of varying ages, divergent cultures, and contrasting traditions, it may be possible ultimately to work out what the essential elements are.

The book has been for the reviewer, who read it carefully twice, an interesting and stimulating experience. It reveals an interesting and engaging personality. Someone has remarked that a false theory does no harm and may even do good, stimulating others to make a better theory. It is a false or erroneously reported observation which is a crime against science, and this crime Dr. Allport has not committed. He has not reported many observations, but those that are set down are presented in a faultless manner.

ELLSWORTH FARIS

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*Towards International Justice.* Being a collection of essays and papers on international organization and the League of Nations. By F. N. KEEN, LL.B., with an introduction by Professor Gilbert Murray, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1924. Pp. 249. \$2.50.

*War: Its Nature, Cause and Cure.* By G. LOWES DICKINSON. New York: Macmillan Co., 1923. Pp. v+155. \$1.50.



*Losses of Life Caused by War.* By SAMUEL DUMAS and K. O. VEDEL-PETERSON. Edited by HARALD WESTERGAARD. Publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923. Pp. 191. \$2.00.

During the world-war and since there has been an enormous amount of writing and even more thinking on the problem of international organization. The collection of ten articles on the problem by Mr. Keen are not particularly remarkable in either content or manner of presentation, but the collection has a certain interest as showing the evolution of the conception of a League of Nations in one mind. Mr. Keen, as a lawyer and student of the history of legal and political institutions, was well equipped to study the question, and it seems probable that his opinion at different periods from 1915 to 1923 are fairly typical of those of numerous other competent students of the subject at the same time.

In February, 1915, Mr. Keen was thinking in terms of a League to Enforce Peace. He feared the idea of a league unsanctioned by physical force was "not practical but delusive" (p. 35). In December, 1917, however, he is impressed with the thought that within the state the discharging of obligations and the yielding of obedience to governing authority are not secured by force at all or even by the threat of force, but by such influences as the power of habit or fashion and respect for public opinion [p. 71].

In 1921 he notes with apparent satisfaction that though many people envisages the League of Nations as

the germ of an institution which will set out definitely to secure permanent and universal peace by means of coercive force based upon compulsory laws universal in operation . . . clearly the League as now constituted is not such an institution, and is rather conspicuously deficient in effective coercive force [p. 187].

On the other hand, its best feature is the creation of a permanent secretariat for "the continuous collection, systematic study and impartial review of all the facts affecting international affairs and relations" (p. 194).

Although believing that the League covenant needs amendment, the author considers it a good beginning and approves particularly of its flexibility (p. 180). Its weakness arising from lack of universality he several times deplors and thinks League members are more likely to be overtimid than overzealous in persuading Germany, Russia, and the United States to come in (pp. 194, 244).

The author's observations on the League deal with the text of the covenant rather than with the actual operation of its organs, although he clearly recognizes the importance of public familiarity with the latter (p. 242). To the present-day student of the League, however, the interest of these essays lies mainly in the information they give of the gradual orientation of the League idea in the minds of thinking people.

In passing to Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson's recent book, the atmosphere changes from that of law and procedure, perhaps a bit dry, to passion and vivid illustration. Mr. Dickinson is a literary artist and writes to arouse and persuade as well as to instruct. He believes that "if mankind does not end war, war will end mankind" (p. 11), and is even willing to be "provocative" in order "to force the attention of busy indifferent men upon the tremendous issue that faces us" (p. 155).

Mr. Dickinson's remedy is a change in policy—without that no League of Nations can function (p. 112). "All states in all their wars have always had a double object: on the one hand to keep what they have got, on the other to take more. This and this only, is the cause of all wars other than civil wars" (pp. 50, 110). Consequently, the cure of war lies in the abandonment of policies of aggression.

The author deals with many aspects of his subject, the effect of science, historians, the press on war, the relation of human nature to war, the consequences of war, but in no chapter is he more interesting than in that dealing with the causes of the world-war. His account of pre-war diplomacy does not differ greatly from that given by Professors Gooch, Fay, and other careful historians, although one gets the impression that he is over hard on statesmen, not of one side or the other but of all. They pull the strings while the people are helpless dolls (p. 79). After all, are not statesmen frequently reluctantly forced to dangerous steps by parliaments, or by the people who have been aroused by information or misinformation for which statesmen are not responsible. Mr. Dickinson sees more free will in history than most modern historians.

The difference in attitude between Mr. Keen and Mr. Dickinson is well illustrated by their relative estimates of the territorial clauses of the treaty and of the League. "I have not myself the means of judging," writes Mr. Keen, "and do not presume to express any opinion as to whether all the new state boundaries laid down in the peace treaty are or are not the most suitable," but the important thing is that if they are in some cases bad the League may correct them, and he urges an amendment to the covenant to make this process easier (pp. 122-23). For Mr. Dickinson, however, hot over the secret treaties, the League is "the

smallest part of the peace: a mere appendage, leaving untouched all the predatory schemes of the victorious states" (p. 92). Fervor and judgment are doubtless both necessary if the cause of peace is to progress.

So also is information as accurate as possible. The two monographs published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace attempt to give this on one important phase of the war problem. The authors have brought together what statistical data exists on war losses since the middle of the eighteenth century. Perhaps the leading impression left with the reader is the extreme unreliability of such data. Military statistics on losses must be used and because of the interest to deceive, concentration of interest on the number of effectives rather than the character of casualties and insufficient time in the rapid movement of campaigns they justify Napoleon's phrase "false as a bulletin" (p. 22). Data from different sources on the same battle often vary over 100 per cent so at best the results of these studies are rough approximations. Even in the world-war in which more statistical data are available than in any previous war estimates of total losses of all belligerents vary from 7,000,000 to over 11,000,000 (pp. 137, 144). One of the most interesting results of the historical survey is the evidence it gives of the progress of medical science. Losses from disease have declined greatly in proportion to losses from wounds. There also seems to be some evidence that improvement of weapons which tends to keep armies farther apart strengthens the defense more than the offense and makes the proportion of losses to men engaged less (pp. 90-91).

Mr. Dumas, who treats of losses up to the world-war, and Mr. Vedel-Petersen, who deals with world-war losses (both military and civilian), have performed their tasks in an objective spirit, and their statistics, always accompanied by comments as to the reliability of the data, give a mine of information, useful to students of the psychological, sociological, economic, and political consequences of war.

QUINCY WRIGHT

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*Our Neighbors.* By ANNIE MARION MACLEAN. Macmillan Co., 1922. Pp. 288. \$1.75.

Miss MacLean has made another splendid contribution to the literature of personality study. Students of social pathology and laymen and women will find this collection of human documents unusually appealing and valuable. The genuine literary quality intrigues interest. Her own profound personal experience, appreciated by those who have known

her as teacher and friend, bears fruit in her keen insight and sympathetic touch. Her long and intimate contact with the varieties of human beings that she describes insures the reliability of her facts. Finally, Miss MacLean has a rare gift in depicting personalities in interaction with their environments. She avoids, on the one hand, the patronizing attitude of the person who feels superior and writes "sob stuff"; and, on the other hand, the ranting of the radical-class partisan. Her sense of humor relieves an otherwise tragic picture.

After introducing the extent of the problem of population contacts, she takes up the immigration question. Then those who seem caught in a hopeless treadmill in securing the merest necessities of life claim consideration. With the charm of a Bret Harte, she introduces the casual laborer. We find ourselves identifying our own vagrant impulses in these picturesque semi-responsibles. The day workers seem a drab and irritating lot to some of us, but when Miss MacLean develops the print from the negative, which is all we have hitherto seen, we see the figure picturesque against the background of a large-scale industry with definite and, in some respects, rather easily remedied maladjustments. One of the most appealing stories of patriotic service is told of one of the women who work by the day.

Perhaps no aspect of poverty is ever more blindly criticized than the matter of reckless spending. Miss MacLean, like Professor Patten, sees the matter of spending among the poor in much the same light as she might among the middle class or rich—in terms of personal satisfaction. Unemployment becomes a human terror. The "color line" fades as a vague bogey and becomes a vital issue to men and women searching for a decent home environment in which to bring up their children. We realize that there are two sides to the color line when we listen to the preacher:

Brudders an' sisters, hell fire will sure lick yo up ef yo doan put yo minds on things infernal. Yo is wedded to de flesh while de spirit waits. Yo is no better dan white folks. Yo is giben ober to vanities. De white wimmin stan' all day an' put kinks in dere hair wid hot irons, an' fix it till it bush out big. De culled wimmin stan' all day an' wid straightenin' irons take out de kinks God put in dere hair, an' make it lie down slick. An' de white an' black paint de faces de Almighty gib 'em, when He meant dey should use soap and water. Oh, wicked an' adulterous generation, what yo doin' adulteratin' yo'selves lak dat?

The maintaining of a home, under any circumstances, is an engrossing task. With handicaps and dangers on all sides it becomes an act of faith or folly as we choose to interpret it.

Discontent is not all born of agitation: "The ignorant poor are groping for the light. They know vaguely that there is hope somewhere. If this were not true, democracy would be imperiled."

It is a well-nigh overpowering temptation to quote from Miss MacLean's child friends:

If the love of childhood is in your heart, you will be enthralled by dirty little waifs of the slums as well as by clean children on well-kept avenues. And you will, of course, try to abolish slums, and wipe out conditions that make waifs. If not, the goblins will get you!

That many fall by the wayside is not surprising, but that many more struggle on in spite of almost overwhelming odds constitutes the challenge to constructive thought in abolishing and preventing such tragic struggles.

Figures are bloodless. They give no notion of a neighbor's woe. Poverty is not synonymous with sin and crime; but vice and crime breed where human hopes are at their lowest ebb, and this is most frequently among those who have lost ground in the economic struggle. It is obvious that no society that permits grave inequalities to fester into vice is going to be a permanently safe abiding place for all the people.

S. W. ELIOT

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*A New Province for Law and Order.* By HENRY BOURNE HIGGINS.  
New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1922. Pp. vii+181. \$2.00.

As president of the Australian Court of Conciliation and Arbitration from 1907 to 1920, the author of this small volume has done more than any other one person to develop a common law in the field of industrial relations. This is the new province for law and order with which he deals. Chapters i-iii are reprints of articles in the *Harvard Law Review* of November, 1915, January, 1919, and December, 1920. In these three articles the then head of the Commonwealth Court set out in a masterly manner the principle which he thought should obtain in industry and which he had applied in his awards in concrete cases, reviewed the development of the system of control which had been set up under compulsory arbitration, and incidentally defended the system against some of the attacks made upon it and the official attempts to introduce new devices which would undermine it. Chapter iv, "Subsequent Decisions, brings the story down to 1922. Chapter v, "The future of Industrial Tribunals," sets out Justice Higgins' matured views as he looked back upon his experience after he had resigned as president of the court because of the enactment of a law authorizing the government to establish special tribunals in such cases as it might see fit and whose decisions could not be

modified by a court award. He is convinced of the soundness of the system of compulsory arbitration and maintains that it can bring and has brought to the workers, the employers, and the public great gains—gains not otherwise to be realized. The machinery should be strengthened and revised by making possible the creation of shop committees in addition to the boards of reference heretofore used, and by placing the control of matters concerning industrial relations entirely under the commonwealth government. Only by this centralization of authority can confusion be avoided and a proper standardization of wages and working conditions be realized among the several states. In this chapter he also deals briefly with a number of other matters, such as unemployment. The book carries two appendixes: the one, "The Industrial Peace Act of 1920," the other, his statement made in court concerning the government attitude toward his court and the setting up of special tribunals on announcing his resignation in 1920.

Whether they agree with Justice Higgins' views on compulsory arbitration or on the issues between him and the government, students of labor problems and economic theorists will find these views valuable. The book brings them down to date and assembles them conveniently within one cover.

H. A. MILLIS

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*The Administration and Politics of Tokyo: A Survey and Opinions.*

By CHARLES A. BEARD. New York: Macmillan Co., 1923.

Pp. vii+187. \$2.50.

The outstanding impression derived from a reading of this comprehensive survey is the relative backwardness of Tokyo in the science and art of municipal administration.

As a Tokyo journalist recently remarked, no one has yet explained why thousands of Tokyo citizens will sit enraptured for three hours at a lecture by Dr. Einstein, and then be wholly content to wade home through mud, ankle-deep in unpaved streets, with open drains on each side.

The contrast is heightened by the method of presentation which usually commences with a statement of principles or attainable standards and continues with a description of conditions which are in many cases astounding.

The main fields of municipal government which are thus analyzed include the relation of the city government to the urban area, the powers

and limitations of the city government, the management of municipal finances, the purchase of goods, personnel administration, and municipal utilities. From the point of view of the sociologist, however, the most interesting chapter is that on the spirit and practice of self-government in Tokyo. Here Dr. Beard inquires into the mainsprings of municipal action, the organization of the electorate, the character of public officials, the formulation of public programs and related questions.

Among the significant facts presented are the striking increase in general interest in municipal affairs as measured by the decrease in non-voting, the similarity of type of councilmen elected respectively by the higher and lower taxpayers, the distribution of councilmen among the professions, predominantly the lawyers, business men, and merchants, and the social composition of the Tokyo population.

The most striking element in the social composition of the city is the thousands of petty shopkeepers and handicraftsmen. . . . Indeed Tokyo is mainly a collection of villages with a metropolitan centre."

Dr. Beard raises many controversial questions but always with the greatest tact and discretion. To Americans the volume gives some cause for satisfaction at the progress achieved in American cities; to Japanese it sets a standard of achievement which may well challenge the constructive efforts of Japanese statesmen and municipal experts for many years to come.

L. D. WHITE

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*Robert Owen: A Biography.* By FRANK PODMORE. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1924. Two volumes in one. Pp. 688.

Whatever attracted the biographer to his subject, whether a common interest in psychical research, spiritualism, or radical social theory, he has produced the most complete, authoritative, and illuminating study of Owen in the English language. And the time was ripe for such a biography, for all of its four predecessors were woefully out of date and inadequate. Recently a large collection of Owen's letters which had been lost for more than a generation came to light. This made possible the clearing up of many points in Owen's meteoric career. The biography itself is the story of one of earth's homeliest, most loving, most kindly intentioned, most self-opinionated, proud, arrogant, self-complacent, unteachable, heretical, and visionary men. In a sense, Owen was a Bourbon, for in public life, as his biographer observes, he never learned anything and never

forgot anything. He was an unbusiness-like business man, a man of means without financial sense, a pioneer in modern industrial methods yet not a typical captain of industry. He was rather a prophet of the Rousseau school, for like Rousseau, he conceived the world in his own benevolent image and likeness. But Podmore's study is more than a biography. It constitutes a sort of handbook to the Industrial Revolution, and in no small degree might be reckoned as an introduction to the study of welfare work, personnel management, efficient production, and incentive-building. Still more than that, it constitutes one of the most significant chapters in the history of educational theory and reform, for Owen was primarily an educational reformer, even though manifesting all the defects of a self-educated thinker. In applied social work, he will be remembered chiefly by his support of the Factory Acts and for his factory-village improvements. The sociologist will be grateful for this book as a very readable account of the development of Owen's fundamental social theory, namely, "Any general character, from the best to the worst, from the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any community, even to the world at large, by the application of proper means; which means are to a great extent at the command and under the control of those who have influence in the affairs of men." The experiment at New Harmony, described in great detail and with copious illustrations, is the climax to the whole Owen life-story, and, from the standpoint of a laboratory check-up on Owen's theories, is a sufficient justification, if there were no other, for this new biography. The illustrations, liberal bibliography, and index add enormously to the interest and usability of this notable work.

CHICAGO

ARTHUR J. TODD

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*Farm Credits in the United States and Canada.* By JAMES B. MORMAN. New York: Macmillan Co., 1924. Pp. xv+406. \$3.50.

The author, who is economist of the Federal Farm Loan Board, has written previously, *The Principles of Rural Credits, Business Co-operative Organizations, in Agriculture*, etc., etc., so he is at home in this field. In the present book he gives the first authoritative statement, from intimate knowledge, of the workings of the rural credit laws of the last ten years. It analyzes and summarizes the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 and the Agricultural Credits Act of 1923, giving chapters in parallel legislation in Canada, comparing the operation of the laws in the two countries.



The author evaluates the different features of the acts (showing the practical results, supporting his statements by facts and statistics) upon the farmers, bankers, rural communities and the nation. There is a Bibliography of state and national government reports.

On page viii of the Preface is, "In the light of social progress, there can be no object in rural credit legislation unless it tends to improve the home life of individual farmers." In the last chapter are other evidences that the author realizes that the business of farming and production are not the whole of life on the farm, that these ought to be incidental; means to the end of improving the social life, citizenship, and national life.

The question answered by the book is, What has been the success of the farm credit system? Both sides of the answer are given support by much statistical material and other data. There are numerous references to facts gathered by the government bureaus, especially the department of agriculture, but the exact pages and titles are omitted. One wishes he might verify some of the material. Many obscurities in the operation of acts are made clear.

This scrutinizing study may prove disheartening to some of the friends of recent credit legislation. These quotations will show that the laws are not an unqualified success from a social point of view.

There has been too much legislation already. Better by far would it have been for the farmer had he been unable to get into debt which now threatens to drain his income to the last dollar [p. 386]. . . . More than two million farmers are paying the penalty of too much credit too freely granted with both private and public funds [p. 387]. . . . While no greater crime has ever been committed against agriculture than the rapid increase of too easy credit facilities, the industry as a whole is far from being in a deplorable condition [p. 387].

A vastly more important task for legislators than providing ways and means of getting farmers into debt is to make it possible for them to get out of debt [p. 391]. . . . The plain fact is that pleas for rural credit systems during the past ten years have been made more in the interest of bankers and politicians than in behalf of farmers [p. 392]. . . . O, ye legislators! Your task is to leave the rural credits legislation alone and correct the abuses of your own past legislative extravagance and folly [p. 393].

The book fills a decided need, and all interests in the farm situations are deeply indebted to Mr. Morman for his careful presentation of this important problem.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*The First Time in History: Two Years of Russia's New Life.* By ANNA LOUISE STRONG. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1924. Pp. 249. \$2.00.

This newest picture of Russia is marked by what Leon Trotzky in his Introduction to it calls "the point of view of action" as contrasted with the aesthetic or contemplative. It has all the qualities of good short-story technique. While exhibiting the reporter's sharp eyes and cut-and-dash method, it nevertheless reveals considerable sober economic insight. For the first time, the reviewer frankly confesses, he gets a dynamic view of Russia—Russia as a going concern and not an arena of placards and theories and conflicting philosophies of life; Russia in picturesque human detail, full of inner stresses and conflicts in administration, bitter mutual criticisms, acrid humor, clever politics. It has the ring of truth, in tendency if not in specific detail. At least, truthful or not, the actors and their sayings and doings live and are not mechanized abstractions of Good and Evil. The gist of the book and its flavor may be put in the author's own words:

There is a lot of "mess" in Russia. Ordinary discomforts in life, the rotten inefficiency of the heating system in winter, offices tangled in red tape, crudities of every kind. There are plenty of things to shock—profiteers and gambling dens and bootleg whiskey and every rotten thing there is anywhere in the world. But it is the only place in the world where I get a feeling of hope and a plan. With hundreds of thousands of people living for that plan and dying for it and going hungry for it, and wasting themselves in inefficient work for it, and finally bringing a little order out of chaos for it. . . . It is a typically Russian combination: a gorgeous and an utterly backward people, and a handful of young enthusiasts who intend that the thing shall be done.

Even in spite of such frank admissions it would appear that the author had underestimated the odds against which the Soviet régime is matched. A recent observer considers the menace of Anti-Semitism even greater than does Miss Strong, who notes its disturbing presence and charges it to the new-rich profiteers and speculators, most of whom are Jews. Industry still gasps for capital. Education is makeshifting even if John Deweyized. But the church seems to have adjusted herself to the new order, and the national debt has been gaily forgotten. Hence one brand of prophesying may be about as good as another. If Miss Strong's prophecies prove as sound as her pictures are interesting she will deserve wide reading.

ARTHUR J. TODD

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

*Representative Government in Industry.* By JAMES MEYERS. New York: George H. Doran & Co., 1924. Pp. 249. \$2.00.

*Labor Disputes and the President of the United States.* By EDWARD BERMAN, PH.D. New York: Columbia University Press. "Studies in History, Economics and Public Law." Volume CXI, Number 2; Whole Number 249, 1924. Pp. 284. \$3.00.

It is well known to all those who have carried on systematic study or reading in the field of "labor problems" that the now very extensive literature of the field includes articles and volumes written by authors of many different points of view. In the face of this protean material, the sociologist who is interested in the subject may well find it convenient for his own purposes to classify together, in his files and in his memory, volumes of ostensibly very divergent character. In the opinion of the reviewer, this might be done with the two most recent works which have been sent him.

James Meyers, author of *Representative Government in Industry*, has had his knowledge of the field of industrial relations developed by his experience of several years as "executive secretary of the Board of Operatives, Dutchess Bleachery, Incorporated." This is to say, adopting for the moment the average employer's point of view, that Mr. Meyers is labor manager, or head of the personnel division, of a medium-sized industrial plant which is and has been for some years carrying on an experiment with a comparatively radical plan of "employee representation." He is by no means narrow, however, in his point of view, and his book might very well be classified under the heading of what Glenn Frank has labelled, in his recent volume of that title, "the politics of industry." What Mr. Meyers sees quite clearly, and sets forth in extremely readable fashion, is that we have in modern industry a problem of group control, and that the problem of control is not entirely solved in any group until all the social forces in the group are co-ordinated with reference to some one group objective and program. Employee representation is one of the concrete methods which have been tried for promoting this end. Mr. Meyers' book is popular in style. He presents a quantity of concrete material, but frequently, in fact mainly, not in such form that it can be verified—a fault which is perhaps inevitable in the present stage of evolution of the study of industrial relations, due to the reticence of participants in various situations to reveal details which might weaken their strategic positions. He is somewhat prodigal with general opinions about the broader aspects of the field with which he is concerned, and it

may be taken for granted that these opinions will be very differently received by different readers, according to the bias which each one has.

Dr. Berman's *Labor Disputes and the President of the United States*, as the title and classification of the volume in the *Columbia University Studies* might suggest, is a typical academic study of a carefully limited topic. It is an excellent example of this class of studies, well written and thoroughly documented. Like Mr. Meyers' smaller volume, it might be classified by the sociologist under the category, "the politics of industry," but in this case, as the title clearly indicates, it is more specifically the governmental aspect of the problem of industrial control which is in question. For the sociologist, both of these volumes, but the latter one particularly, should be valuable mainly as sources of raw material. Both are worth while also as sources from which one may amplify his appreciative contact with the general subject of industrial relations.

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

FLOYD N. HOUSE

*Town Planning and Town Development.* By S. D. ADSHEAD. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Pp. xvi+204. \$5.00.

This is the first of a series of books on town planning by the professor of town planning in London University. It is a textbook based on experience in teaching the subject. The matter is gained from the preparation of actual planning schemes.

Of special significance in the book is the broad view taken of planning. It has always seemed to the reviewer that in England town planning was largely housing and in the United States largely zoning or traffic control. Although a large share of the book is given to the English Housing Acts and Planning Acts, yet Professor Adshead shows by his first chapter that his own thinking is not confused by the usual aberrations. He places housing and planning in their proper place in community development.

American city planners and sociologists can be saved from current aberrations by reading chapter I, entitled, "The Sociological Basis of Town Planning." To indicate the broad basis upon which the book is written, note these quotations: "Town planning and regional planning is very dependent upon the older and more abstract science of sociology" (p. 1); also, "Architecture, engineering, law, and sociology are arts and sciences which it is necessary to know something about in order to deal satisfactorily with the complex problem of Town Planning, but the

application of these is, after all, dependent upon conditions arrived at by study of the science of sociology" (p. 2).

So significant is this first chapter that it might well have been read at a joint meeting of the American Sociological Society and the National Conference on City Planning, to the profit of the members of both organizations.

Aside from the first chapter the book deals with English housing legislation and town-planning acts and the way the acts have been carried out. The book is carefully prepared, giving the salient points on these important and usually confused subjects. It is timely for the United States because we must soon seriously face the problem of housing legislation, and such books will greatly aid us in profiting by the experience of England.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*The American Labor Year Book, 1923-24.* Edited by SOLON DE LEON. New York: the Rand School of Social Science, 1924. Pp. 548. \$3.00.

This volume, like its four predecessors, is a book that is of inestimable value, packed full as it is of information bearing upon the labor movement, both in this country and abroad. In addition to containing an international labor directory which lists all trade unions, labor political parties, workers' educational institutions, co-operative and labor papers and magazines, it reviews with exceeding compactness and thoroughness the industrial and social conditions of 1923-24; distribution of incomes, concentration of industry, census of wage-earners, wages, cost of living figures, hours of work, unemployment, child labor, immigration, convict labor, housing and living conditions, and a vast array of similar topics. In it are summarized the major trade disputes of the period, all legislation affecting labor, all court decisions, and the activities of labor in politics. The present status of workers' education, labor banking, and co-operative movements are treated. A chapter on civil liberties contains a record and summary of the important free-speech cases and court decisions. The international labor movement is adequately discussed, as well as trade unionism and trade-union political activity in all foreign countries.

The volume is highly documented and shows every effort at careful compilation. The arrangement of material is excellent, and a sixteen-page Index adds to the ease of use. This book, perhaps better than any

other single publication, will serve to give an understanding of the present state of the labor movement, with its gains and losses. There is no other comparable summary of the activities of labor during the past two years. The book is quite indispensable to the reference shelf of the sociologist.

MALCOLM M. WILLEY

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

*Du Tsarisme au Communisme. La Revolution Russe ses Causes—ses Effets.* By GREGOIRE ALEXINSKY. Paris: Armand Colin, 1923. Pp. 288. 8 francs.

The Russian debate still goes stirringly on. Not the least sturdy contribution is this excellent, compact, and clearly written essay by a well-known publicist, member of the Duma, *émigré*, uncompromising anti-Bolshevist. He marshals the old familiar characters in review—Rasputin, the Empress, Korinlov, Kerensky, the Soviet leaders, and the Tsche-Ka. The fundamental causes of the revolution are traced to the land problem, the weakness of the middle classes, the rotten bureaucracy of the *ancien régime*, the lack of any considerable self-sufficing industry, a working class not strong in itself but able to profit by the weakness of its bourgeois enemies. What are its results? Foremost, the end of the great landed estates; next, the change from big to small industry and commerce. Both of these changes spell conservatism—political and economic. What does this augur for the soviet régime and the future of Russia? "The Russia of tomorrow will be a country truly democratic and free, whose chief economic and social principles will be private initiative and free competition in every domain. . . . Russia tomorrow will be the country of all most radically hostile to "stateism." But Russia will not become anarchistic. "To the contrary, after her recent experiences, after the 'autocracy without autocrat' of Nicholas II, the mild anarchy of the provisional bourgeois government of Lvov Milioukov, the criminal weakness of Kerensky's socialism, and the hell of the soviets, she will tend to settle on a strong national state with firm authority and will obey it not by fear but by conscience." The implications are obvious. Monarchy there might be of the English type, but autocracy nevermore, whether of Czar or Bolshevik. The revolution destroyed the one and showed up the other. The judgment of a well-informed *émigré*, one-sided perhaps, but candid, and with the ring of authority.

ARTHUR J. TODD

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

*Workmen's Compensation.* By E. H. DOWNEY, PH.D. New York: Macmillan Co., 1924. Pp. xxv+223. \$2.00.

With splendid preparation in his earlier studies and with long experience with the Wisconsin Industrial Commission and as compensation actuary of the Insurance Department of Pennsylvania, Dr. Downey was without question the person best qualified to write a book on workmen's compensation in the United States. From every point of view—style, the mastery and handling of detail, critical analysis, soundness of view, guidance to further reading—this is an excellent piece of work. It is an exceedingly good book and fills a long-felt need for a treatise which would set out a complicated matter clearly and succinctly in a way any intelligent reader will enjoy, and which would at the same time withstand critical examination by the expert.

In successive chapters the author deals with the social cost of industrial injuries; the scope of workmen's compensation; the scale of compensation benefits; the administration of workmen's compensation; compensation insurance; the prevention of industrial injuries; and the American compensation system.

Those interested in labor legislation, in social work, or in the formulation and administration of compensation systems will find this a very useful and authoritative book. It will also serve well the needs of classes studying labor problems.

H. A. MILLIS

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*The Political Party as a Social Process.* By VIVA BELLE BOOTHE. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1923. Pp. 130.

In this monograph the social process is conceived of as the formal result of the customary political activities of a people as they are developed by a series of reactions and adaptations to environmental conditions. This is rather an unusual view to take of the social process. A political party is certainly one of the functional forms in the social process, but it seems to be straining the point to say that the party is a process itself. The results of social adaptations are commonly called institutions or organizations.

Dr. Boothe outlines an ambitious program in her introduction for the study of political institutions and processes in the United States. While the program is only partially fulfilled in the pages that follow, the attempt is a distinct contribution to political science and sociology. A mass of statistical material has been skilfully organized to show the rela-

tion between party alignments and economic and social changes in the United States during the period from 1865 to about 1900. Especially convincing is the demonstration of the influence of the location of the transcontinental railroads on party lines in the frontier states. The thesis that minor parties in the United States have grown out of social and economic maladjustments is also fairly well established by the same methods. The contention that third parties have been the means by which political parties in the United States have been made to conform to changing economic and social environment is harder to prove by the statistical method. Dr. Boothe might have used the congressional elections and party votes in Congress as well as the presidential votes to back up this part of her argument. In addition, the vote against the party in power during a period of economic stress might have been used as an index of the amount of political discontent. The description of the Liberal-Republican movement and the sketchy account of agricultural discontent in 1922 are the weakest points of Dr. Boothe's analysis. In spite of its limitations and partial character, the monograph marks a distinct advance toward the building up of an interpretation of the American party system in terms of social and economic forces.

HAROLD F. GOSNELL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*Manpower in Industry.* By EDWARD S. COWDRICK. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1924. Pp. 388. \$3.25.

Mr. Cowdrick's *Manpower in Industry* adds one more to the growing list of books designed for personnel managers and for college students who desire to prepare for that occupation. The volume is a reasonably good example of its class, and will be useful to the reader whose interest is primarily sociological in about the same measure as would any one of a half-dozen other recent books of similar character. The first chapters of this book are below the standard set by the remainder of the volume, and give the reader an unfavorable impression not borne out by a careful examination of the whole book, in which the important topics now attracting the attention of labor managers and industrial personnel workers are quite adequately set forth. There are brief selected bibliographies at the ends of chapters, but the book is weakened for the purposes of the reader whose interest is in research by the absence of any citations of authorities for the statements made.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE



*A Bibliography of Eugenics.* By SAMUEL J. HOLMES. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1924. Pp. 414. \$5.00.

This extensive and valuable bibliography classifies literature on eugenics under the following heads: Heredity and Evolution; Eugenics and Works of a General Character; Genealogy; The Problem of Degeneracy; Alleged Increase of Insanity; Notorious Families; Heredity of Human Traits; Heredity of Human Defect; Alcohol in Relation to Heredity, Lead Poisoning, Blastophthoria; Racial Influence of Venereal Disease; Hereditary Factor in Crime, Delinquency, Prostitution, Pauperism and Vagrancy; Inheritance of Mental Ability; Alleged Relation of Genius to Insanity and Other Abnormalities; Race; Birth-rate; Neo-Malthusianism; Natural Selection in Man; Selective Effect of Infant Mortality; Sexual Selection in Man; Selective Influence of War; Urban Selection and the Influence of Industrial Development on Racial Heredity; Racial Influence of Religion; Immigration and Emigration in Relation to Racial Changes; Consanguinity; Race Intermixture and Inter-marriage of Racial Stocks; Determination of Sex; Sex Ratio; Influence of Age of Parents on Offspring; Influence of Order of Birth on Offspring; Negative Eugenics, Sterilization, Segregation.

H. B. S.

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*Free Speech Bibliography, Including Every Discovered Attitude toward the Problem Covering Every Method of Transmitting Ideas and of Abridging Their Promulgation upon Every Subject-Matter.* By THEODORE SCHROEDER. New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1922. Pp. 247. \$4.00.

This is a catalogue of rare books and obscure pamphlets. In the pages of this bibliography we may read the long story of our emancipation from the political and moral censorship of the church, the courts, and Mrs. Grundy. Of all these the last to yield is Mrs. Grundy.

The aim of the author has been to record everything, the trivial with the consequential. This has some advantages; it has made this volume not merely a bibliography but at the same time a source book for sociologists, particularly with reference to the changing sex mores.

In general, references are listed under the motives that are supposed to have inspired them: economic, religious, war, sex, etc. Under each general classification there are other minor classifications. For example, under the general title "Sex" is the subtitle "Reformers." Under "Re-

formers," one meets the names, taking them at random, of Julian Hawthorne, Maurice Maeterlinck, Bernarr McFadden, and Carrie Nation. Altogether, there are something like 2,400 names referred to in the index.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*What Is Man?* By J. ARTHUR THOMSON. New York: Putnams, 1924. Pp. lx+331. \$2.00.

Lester F. Ward was a natural scientist of wide repute when at length his biological researches led him into the realm of human association, in which field he became equally pre-eminent. Similarly, the distinguished professor of natural history of the University of Aberdeen, to whose work in biology the educational world has long been indebted, has in the volume at hand joined forces with the sociologists. As a biologist who does not regard biological facts as supreme he has written an introduction to "an all-round study of Man as Organism and Social Person." With emphasis throughout upon the biosocial nature of mankind, the volume considers successively the relation of man to the lower animals, the probational period of primitive life, the evolution of the nervous system as an instrument of the mind, and the way in which behavior and conduct and societary forms are biologically influenced. The value of the volume lies not so much in any newness of data as in its lucid, uncomplicated yet unquestionably authoritative manner of presentation—a style which is already widely known through the author's popular *Outline of Science*. Modern sociology cannot hope to understand its materials without the findings of biology, and yet all too frequently the sociological student must obtain that knowledge at second hand. Although written largely for the untechnical reader, *What Is Man* is for the serious scholar as well as a scientifically accurate summing up of the biological factors of civilization.

EARLE EDWARD EUBANK

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

*International Social Progress.* By G. A. JOHNSON. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924. Pp. 262.

The objective of this book is to examine the part which the International Labor Organization established by Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles "is called upon to play in the adventure of constructive internationalism to which the modern world is consciously or unconsciously

committed." "Constructive internationalism," that is to say, social progress. Social progress, to the author, consists in "the extension to ever increasing numbers of people of facilities for the pursuit of objects not necessary for mere survival." That is, it depends on producing, or the will to produce, surplus. Since such distributable surplus, the material condition of all social progress, is available only in the industrial order, and since the industrial order is essentially international, whatever is done internationally to improve the industrial order contributes to social progress. Q.E.D. Such is the author's argument, backed up by minute details of the several labor conferences at Washington, Genoa, and Geneva together with results in national legislation and the work of the various international commissions appointed by the I.L.O. The analysis of the work of these commissions is particularly worth while and timely, notably the resolutions on immigration and the health work of the Joint Maritime Commission. The prospect for the I.L.O.'s rapidly growing library becoming a world-center for research is alluring to all students of social science. Every American, however, must feel a sense of shame and embarrassment as he reads this record of substantial achievement and fails to find the United States anywhere in the list of its ratifiers or supporters.

ARTHUR J. TODD

CHICAGO

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*Population and the Social Problem.* By. J. SWINBURNE, F.R.S. New York: Macmillan Co., 1924. Pp. 380. \$5.00.

After an extended discussion apparently designed to establish the commonplace that human fertility is greater than is necessary to maintain a stationary population, the author assumes that man exercises or tends to exercise his reproductive powers to somewhere near the limit. In consequence there is always a pressure of population; numbers are limited by positive checks and increase to the maximum that the checks allow. This population pressure is the social problem, the fundamental cause of human and social ills. The book contains much superficial discussion of material relevant and irrelevant to the general position that human ills may be eliminated by a steeply progressive tax on children that only the wealthy may afford them, by the elimination of all charity and most public education, and by a laissez faire economic order. The book shows no fundamental insight into the problem of population and makes no contribution to an understanding of social problems.

E. B. REUTER

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

*The Super-City: A Planned Physical Equipment for City Life.* By ROBERT RUSS KERN. Washington: Vail-Ballou Press, 1924. Pp. 349. \$2.00.

This book portrays a comfortable, clean, healthy, and beautiful city on the physical side. Definite suggestions are made for improvement of transportation, city-planning, housing, industry, ventilation, protection, zoning, aesthetic; recreations, etc., etc.

The Super-City is presented in bold outlines; on some points details are given. It is a dream of the social scientist, not of the city-planner, contractor, or builder. Convenience, comfort, happiness, and time-saving are the words frequently used.

Scores of problems of interest to the student of urban sociology are either treated or mentioned. Scarcely any important items are overlooked. Professor Kern knows a great deal about the modern city, and he weaves this knowledge into his Super-City.

There is little scientific information, no statistical tables, and no mention of research. This book is a pleasing dream, but it is sensible, suggestive, informing, and based on knowledge. It is for the popular reader, but the academician will enjoy it.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*Child Welfare in the District of Columbia.* By HASTINGS H. HART.

New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1924. Pp. x+150. \$2.00.

This survey was started in 1918, shortly after the request of the Monday Evening Club of Washington, through its committee on dependent and neglected children, to the Department of Child-Helping of the Russell Sage Foundation to make an intensive study of child-welfare work in the District of Columbia. The invitation was accepted partly because of the service which might be rendered in the immediate situation, and partly because of the influence which such a study in the national capital might have on child-welfare work throughout the country. The survey has revealed the need of getting together of different independent child-welfare agencies in the District of Columbia to act unitedly for the welfare of the neglected children.

These two volumes represent two of the best and latest social surveys in two of the most typical and interesting urban centers in this country.

TSI C. WANG

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*The Principles of Comparative Sociology.* By NICHOLAS PETRESCU, Ph.D. London: Watts & Co., 1924. Pp. xi+191.

National differentiations make society unstable; and hence, the socialization of nations is essential—this is Dr. Petrescu's major theme. He develops two categories of motives, the physical and the moral, one corresponding to "conditions" and the other to "conceptions"; one material, the other psychological. It is not clear why these themes should be called "comparative sociology" any more than many other comparative social studies now being conducted. The style is social-philosophical.

The author's emphasis on a study of "differences" is well placed, as is his development of the idea of "an identity at the basis of all social manifestations." An interesting discussion is given of the relative meaning of customs, and of the necessity of translating whatever appears as "differences" into terms of their own natural history, of their own social conditions, and in terms "of the social process by which they are produced."

EMORY S. BOGARDUS

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

*The Public Health Service: Its History, Activities, and Organization.*

By LAWRENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1923. Pp. xiii+298. \$2.00.

This volume of the "Service Monograph Series," published under the auspices of the Institute for Government Research, describes one of the most highly organized technical staffs of the federal service. In conformity with other volumes in the series the book gives in order an account of the historical development of the service, its activities, its organization, and its personnel. Appendixes contain a list of its publications, a collection of the laws pertaining to its work, financial statements, and a comprehensive bibliography. Among the subjects of special interest which are referred to at some length are the co-operative activities with state and local health authorities and the research functions. Co-operation as a means of social accomplishment and leadership finds many a good illustration in these pages. Reading between the lines one becomes aware also of the growing success of the board in setting standards and in securing uniformity in public sanitation. The historical introduction gives a striking picture of the expansion of a federal service, and its many ramifications both in other branches of the federal service and in state and local health departments.

LEONARD D. WHITE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*An Introduction to the Psychological Problems of Industry.* By FRANK WATTS. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921. Pp. 240. \$5.00.  
*Fundamentals of Vocational Psychology.* By CHARLES H. GRIFFITS. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924. Pp. xiii+372. \$2.50.

Mr. Griffiths' book is designed for a textbook for college courses in vocational psychology, to be given by departments of psychology. So far as the reviewer is qualified to judge, it appears to be an excellent book for the purpose. Being extremely technical in character, it may present difficulties for the sociologist who is not well versed in the particular field. As an exhibit of what psychologists now believe themselves able to accomplish in the way of vocational selection and guidance, it should be interesting to any student of industrial relations.

Mr. Watts, who is lecturer in psychology in the University of Manchester, England, has written a much more readable book, the style being less technical, as is suitable for a book of broader scope. Although much of the content will be a repetition for American readers, his account of "industrial unrest," in a fifty-page chapter of that title, should prove helpful to anyone who is interested either in that particular topic or in the general concept of "unrest" as a sociological problem.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

*The Hospital Situation in Greater New York: Report of a Survey of Hospitals in New York City by the Public Health Committee of the New York Academy of Medicine.* Prepared by E. H. LEWINSKICORWIN. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1924. Pp. xix+356.

The survey revealed the need in the city of an agency which would continually gather and interpret facts about hospitals and which would serve these institutions as well as the public with information concerning community needs and hospital procedures and problems. At the suggestion of the Public Health Committee of the New York Academy of Medicine, such an agency was established by the United Hospital Fund of New York City, known as the Hospital Information Bureau. The Committee was urged to publish the report by many who felt that there is need of a source book of this kind.

TSEI C. WANG

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*Mexico. An Interpretation.* By CARLETON BEALS. New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923. Pp. 280. \$2.50.

This volume seeks to present to the ordinary reader a picture of Mexico today, and this it does well. It is in popular form, without bibliography or footnote references. The style is vigorous and the author's conclusions not always cautious, but the book is not sensational. The author drew upon several years of active experience in Mexico and upon the knowledge of intelligent and specially informed Mexican friends.

The description of the Mexican people is presented against a historical background, but Mr. Beals is particularly interested in the events of recent years and the development of the national consciousness. There is much interesting material on the agrarian reforms. The chapter on "The Rise of the Mexican Proletariat" contains a discussion of the organization of labor and of labor's relation to politics, and has something to say on the Fascist movement in Mexico. There is a suggestive short chapter on the new middle class. The chapter on "The Condition of the Lower Classes" contains valuable data on the budget and standard of living of the peon. The last part of the book describes recent relations of the United States government with Mexico as a continuous course of inconsistent mistakes inspired by the "Oil Interests."

Particularly by reason of the account and interpretation of the events of the last dozen years—of what Mr. Beals calls "The Revindicating Revolution"—this book will be wanted by everyone particularly interested in Mexico.

ROBERT REDFIELD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*Folk Festivals and the Foreign Community.* By DOROTHY GLADYS SPICER. The Woman's Press, 600 Lexington Ave. New York. Pp. 152 with bibliography. \$1.50.

*Folk Festivals and the Foreign Community* is a practical handbook, the fruit of actual experience in organizing community festivals among the foreign-born of our American cities. The folk festivals, of which four detailed examples are given in the latter half of the book, consist in the informal organization, largely by the participants themselves, of the traditional and seasonal rites and customs actually practiced in the fatherland and sometimes carried over to the new world by the different foreign populations. This is in contrast with the more elaborate and

formal and less democratic pageant. The folk festival is a "means to an end and not an end in itself. It is the method of making possible a more intimate knowledge of foreign people, of bringing together races of diverse customs and beliefs in a united community interest, and of approaching that great store of Old World culture and beauty which remains closed to all but those endowed with sympathy and understanding." An interesting point emphasized by the author, and one on which she had a good deal of information, is the large number of ancient traditional rites still preserved and actually practiced every year by the foreign-born in this country.

MARGARET PARK REDFIELD

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*Principles of Advertising.* By DANIEL STARCH, Ph.D. Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University. Chicago, New York: A. W. Shaw Co., 1923. Pp. 998. \$5.00.

This book seeks to apply scientific methods to what Dr. Starch understands as the five fundamental problems of advertising: (1) To whom may the product be sold? (2) By what appeals may it be sold? (3) How may the appeals be presented most effectively? (4) By what mediums may the appeals be presented so as to reach the class of people to whom the product is to be sold? (5) What is a reasonable expenditure for promoting the sale of the product by the means of printed sales efforts?

But while the book seeks to meet the practical problems of the advertiser it contains a great quantity of material, experimental and statistical, which may be of interest to the sociologist. It contains the results of psychological laboratory tests and of field investigations by questionnaires. Particularly it collects and compares a large body of statistics dealing with past and present circulations of magazines and newspapers.

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*The World in Revolt. A Psychological Study of Our Times.* By Dr. GUSTAVE LE BON. Translated by Bernard Miall. New York: Macmillan Co., 1921. Pp. 256. \$4.00.

The world-war, its causes, and immediate and probable results, are discussed in psychological terms from the point of view of a patriotic though not completely biased Frenchman. Dr. Le Bon stresses particularly the perils of "state intervention" as expressed in socialistic or syndicalistic theories and the need for individual initiative, internal



discipline, and unity of aim in national development. These qualities are to be attained by education, which is to be a "training of character" rather than of the intellect alone, the possibility for which is illustrated by Prussia in her unification of the minds of Germany.

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*Nature and Human Nature: Essays Metaphysical and Historical.*

By HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1923. Pp. xi+529. \$3.00.

The beautiful composition and presswork done on this volume would be worthy of a masterpiece. Despite its attractive title, the sociological reader will find little to enlighten his intellect, although he may refresh his spirit with some of the esthetic eulogies of philosophy, truth, beauty, personality, music and poetry, art and democracy contained in its pages. There are also essays on "Religion and Race Progress," "The Socratic Bergson," "Plato's Conception of the Cosmos," and "Hebraism as a Mode of Philosophy," all more or less in the same vein. Truly these are essays which, when properly delivered in the classroom, should thrill to ecstasy the hearts of the undergraduates aflame with a passion for goodness and beauty—on the sidelines.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

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*Character and the Unconscious: A Critical Exposition of the Psychology of Freud and Jung.* By J. H. VAN DER HOOP. Translated by ELIZABETH TREVELYAN. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923. Pp. viii+223. \$3.50.

This book is a survey of the psychology of Freud and Jung and as such touches only the high points of psychoanalysis. The author discusses the origins of psychoanalysis, the unconscious in the normal mind, the relation between the conscious and the unconscious, the development of the emotions, and Jung's psychological types. He holds that the analytic and synthetic points of view are not irreconcilable. He maintains that we may look to psychoanalysis for an understanding of many problems of the "mind" but that the amateur must beware.

SAMUEL C. KINCHELOE

Y.M.C.A. COLLEGE  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

*China in the Family of Nations.* By HENRY T. HODGKIN, M.A.,  
M.B. New York: Doran, 1923. Pp. 267. \$2.00.

The purpose of this book is well stated by the author as follows: "Our task in these pages will be to look at one little piece of this story where different currents begin to mix and meet, where the interchange of thought and customs is producing a new synthesis." The author treats the problems historically—the nature of the Chinese civilization, how it came into contact with other cultures, how changes took place, and how a new civilization is developed—from the Chinese as well as from the Western points of view.

TSI C. WANG

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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*Human Effort and Human Wants: An Interpretation of Economic Activity in Relation to Human Life.* By LOGAN G. MCPHERSON.  
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923. Pp. xii+318. \$2.50.

This book is distinguished from the average one-volume treatise or textbook in "Principles of Economics" only by the particularly strenuous efforts which the author makes to convince the reader that present politico-economic institutions are approximately the best possible, and by the rather peculiar literary style, which resembles that of a literary essay of sentimental tone, rather than a scientific treatise. The student of sociology who has had access to any good textbook in economics will find little that is new in this volume.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

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*Women and Leisure: A Study of Social Waste.* By LORAIN PRUETTE,  
PH.D. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1924. Pp. 213. \$3.00.

By an examination of the census of women in gainful occupations, Dr. Pruette has discovered that a large proportion of women have too much leisure. This constitutes social waste. There has been no study made, however, of such groups as hotel and apartment-hotel dwellers, for example. The viewpoint here is economic, tinged with feminism, though certain material has been collected on the desires and daydreams of the adolescent girl. In spite of her reading of sociological literature. Dr. Pruette has a concept of culture which is limited to the activities of novelists and of women's clubs.

MARGARET PARK REDFIELD

CHICAGO

*Cures. The Story of the Cures that Fail.* By JAMES J. WALSH, M.D., PH.D., Sc.D. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1923. Pp. 284. \$2.00.

This volume might better perhaps be called "the story of the cures that have succeeded—for the time being." Dr. Walsh gives here a popular account of "cures," ranging from those effected by patent medicines, healers, magnetism, hypnotism, mesmerism, and Dr. Perkin's metallic tractors to the modern cure-alls of Couéism, "conscious control," and psychoanalysis. The author draws some material from medieval times but does not attempt to link up his subject with primitive magic nor to go deeply into the psychological bases for such cures.

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*The Community Playhouse.* By C. J. DE GOVEIA. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1923. Pp. 165. \$2.00.

This small volume is a practical manual for "the beginner in Community Playhouse art." Just what constitutes a community or community playhouse art is, however, not clearly defined, though it is stated that "as yet, in the United States, there is no perfect example of the Community Playhouse in the strictest sense of the term." The term as applied here includes little, not necessarily "Art," theaters, whose supporting audiences number approximately four hundred and which "have influence on the community." There is some bibliography.

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*The New World of Labor.* By SHERWOOD EDDY. New York: George H. Doran Co., 1923. Pp. 216. \$1.50.

Sherwood Eddy, who has had over twenty-five years' experience in Y.M.C.A. work in the Orient and Russia, made in 1922-23 a trip around the world in order to make a general survey of the labor situation. This volume contains chapters on labor conditions in China, Japan, and India, where the industrial revolution is just in process; Russia, where new experiments are being tried out and the "worker has more power and less wages than in other industrial countries"; sketches of "the evolution of labor in the west"; the British and American labor movements; and a brief account of the labor situation in continental Europe, particularly in the Ruhr. Mr. Eddy expresses Christian sympathy with the workers, but he has also collected a mass of statistical and other material.

*Housing Progress in Western Europe.* By EDITH ELMER WOOD, M.A., PH.D. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923. Pp. 210. \$3.00.

This volume contains a concise report on what has been done by private initiative, municipal control, and national legislation in England, Belgium, France, Italy, and Holland, for better housing for the working-man. The Appendix contains material on the Spanish Housing Laws of 1911 and 1921. National preferences in the matter of housing are interesting as typical of national differences. For example, the fact that the English—though England is pre-eminently a country of renters—so much prefer the small separate “garden cottage” type of housing that they are erecting them even in the cities, while the Italians refuse to live in anything but large apartment buildings even when there is ample space to spread out.

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*Strenuous Americans.* By R. F. DIBBLE. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1923. Pp. 370. \$3.00.

*Strenuous Americans* includes the biographies of such varied though contemporary characters as Jesse James, Admiral Dewey, Brigham Young, Frances Willard, James J. Hill, P. T. Barnum, and Mark Hanna. All represent some aspect of American ideals. Jesse James as a myth rather than a man, the “American Robin Hood,” is well conceived. In the case of the other biographies, a wealth of material has not been interpreted in its sociological significance so far as it might have been. Brief bibliographies are appended to each biography.

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*In the Days of My Youth.* By JAMES BALDWIN. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1914, 1923. Pp. 493. \$2.50.

This volume, which was first published anonymously in 1914, is an intimate personal account of a childhood spent in a Quaker backwoods settlement of Indiana. It is the story, too, of a boy's sensitive, imaginative temperament in conflict with the rigid mores of the “New Settlement.” Love of books and exaggeration seemed to point directly to possession by the “Old Feller” in the eyes of the anxious mother and interested neighbors. Refuge in an “invisible playmate” is one of the typical results of such a situation.

*Recollections of a Rolling Stone.* By BASIL TOZER. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923. Pp. 288. \$6.00.

This autobiography is of little account from a sociological standpoint. The author, a well-to-do, educated Englishman of the sportsman type, gives here a frank narrative of not very unusual experiences in various parts of the world and finally in the world-war.

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*The Control of the Social Mind. Psychology of Economic and Political Relations.* By ARLAND D. WEEKS. "Conduct of the Mind Series," edited by JOSEPH JASTROW. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1923. Pp. 260. \$2.25.

Professor Weeks, who is dean of the school of education of the North Dakota Agricultural College, elucidates herein the principles of social psychology for popular consumption. The author is typically American in his belief in progress and the omnipotence of education. "Professor Weeks's major purpose is centered upon the civic consciousness and the civic conscience which must be shaped from the materials of human nature."

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*Privateering and Piracy in the Colonial Period.* By J. FRANKLIN JAMESON. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923. Pp. xxvi+619. \$5.00.

This is a carefully selected and edited book of source materials on privateering and piracy.

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*Crystallizing Public Opinion.* By EDWARD L. BERNAYS. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1923. Pp. viii + 218. \$2.50.

This is an attempt of a practical publicist to interpret problems of publicity in terms of Trotter's theory of the herd instinct.

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*Race Prejudice.* By JEAN FINOT. Translated by FLORENCE WADE-EVANS. New York: Dutton, 1924. Pp. viii + 320. \$3.00.

An English translation of the well-known standard French work on race prejudice.

## RECENT LITERATURE

### NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

The abstracts and bibliography in this issue were prepared under the general direction of D. E. Proctor, by C. W. Hayes, E. L. Setterlund, Mrs. G. J. Rich, Flora Levy, R. Redfield, and P. T. Diefenderfer, of the Department of Sociology, of the University of Chicago.

Each abstract is numbered at the end according to the classification given in the January number of this *Journal*.

#### I. PERSONALITY: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE PERSON

**An Experimental Study of Fear.**—The conscious pattern of emotion is akin to the pattern of perception—core of sensation and context of sensations and images. As an integral part there is always an affective element. The emotive pattern carries the meanings both of a movement and of the result of that movement. The wide differences found among the various classifications of emotions are due to their being based upon the action-meanings, which the emotive consciousness carries, rather than upon the mental components or patterns of the emotions.—V. Conklin and F. L. Dimmick, *American Journal of Psychology*, XXXVI (January, 1925), 96-101. (I, 2.)

E. R. R.

**A Study of Estimates of Intelligence from Photographs.**—An experiment is reported in which a large number of judges estimated intelligence from photographs. Their judgments agreed so little with the measured intelligence of the subjects that they could have been made as well with their eyes closed. The few cases of marked agreement were shown to be the result of chance when these same judges failed to arrange correctly a second set of photographs in order of intelligence. The more intelligent judges did no better than the less intelligent ones.—Donald A. Laird and Herman Remmers, *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, VII (December, 1924), 429-46. (I, 2.)

E. R. R.

**A Survey of the Intelligence and Environment of School Children.**—Children whose parents are engaged in so-called brain and skilled work rate higher than those whose parents are of other occupations. The English-speaking people are engaged more in "brain and skilled" work and less in unskilled labor than the non-English-speaking class. They also rank higher on a rating of the child's environment. Intelligence, nationality, and environment appear to be closely related.—T. Fukuda, *American Journal of Psychology*, XXXVI (January, 1925), 124-39. (I, 3.)

E. R. R.

**Brains and the Immigrant.**—As the intelligence tests were given in schools, it became apparent that the children of immigrants of Polish and Italian origin, and of Negroes, did not do as well as children of other stocks, and it was soon concluded, first, that these tests determine native intelligence, and second, that those racial groups from north of Europe may be considered as having the greatest intelligence. The same form of reasoning applied to the army intelligence tests. Those given in the United States worked out according to the number of years' residence in this country. It showed increasing intelligence with longer residence and showed the big difficulty in the way of the immigrant as language. Invidious comparison, between races as between individuals, is always odious. If the psychological tests were constructed with an eye to allowing for past differential experiences, and attempts were made to incorporate in them forms which might not be too foreign to the persons taking them, there would without doubt be a greater leveling up.—Melville Herskovits, *The Nation*, CXX (February 11, 1925), 139-41. (I, 2; III, 4.)

P. T. D.

**Note on Building Likes and Dislikes in Children.**—In a child aged two, a dislike of oranges and of a snapper (as plaything) was formed by dropping orange juice into his mouth with occasional alternations of vinegar, these latter being accompanied by the sound of the snapper. In a child of four the vinegar had so little effect that it was not possible to produce a strong dislike for its accompaniment.—Fred A. Moss, *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, VII (December, 1924), 475-78. (I, 3.) E. R. R.

**The Great Teacher.**—Society is to the modern individual what nature was to the ancient man. But in the last analysis it is not the concept of society in general, but man in and as a member of a particular community that must be reckoned with. Out of his experience in his own society (community) the individual develops, grows, learns. It is out of social interaction that both the development of the individual and the group is achieved.—Henry Vanderbyll, *The Open Court*, XXXIX (January, 1925), 43-64. (I, 4.) E. L. S.

**Historic Determinism and the Individual.**—The modern development of science has led to a deterministic interpretation of history. While history can never again be written as a record of the acts, desires, and caprices of a few leading men and their effects, it may well be asked whether the sudden opening of vast new domains of knowledge has not tended to depress unduly the share taken in the historic process by thinking, willing man.—James Truslow Adams, *Atlantic Monthly*, CXXXIV (October, 1924), 510-19. (I, 4.) E. R. R.

**Analytical Psychology and Individuality.**—In so far as consciousness is confronted with the symbol, the individuality is so far imperfect. It is in the living of the life implied in the symbol that individuation becomes actual. Individuation is conceived to lie in the progressive harmonization of the outer with the inner. The mode through which individuation takes place is therefore to be subsumed under the general conception of the image or symbol which is dissolved, or, if the image be of a human form which is depersonalized, as the life implied by it is more and more completely lived.—J. M. Thorburn, *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV (January, 1925), 125-39. (I, 4.) E. L. S.

**Dream Symbolism and the Mystic Vision.**—The author asserts that the two facts which emerge out of the study of dream symbolism are: (1) that the materials out of which the picture is constructed are derived from the reader's own experience and (2) in each case there has been a serious preoccupation with some particular problem which presumably has been "re-excited by some event shortly before the dream." Dream expression is the effect and not the cause of the preoccupation.—B. H. Streeter, *Hibbert Journal*, XXIII (January, 1925), 332-44. (I, 4; IX, 5.) E. L. S.

**A Genetic Scheme for the Classification of Personalities.**—Personalities cannot be satisfactorily classified in a one-dimensional scheme because of the many different factors in personality. The author proposes a scheme of four psychological dimensions supplemented by several temperamental or somatological groups. Introversion-extroversion, conceived in terms of attention conditions, constitute one dimension. The second dimension is the scale of intelligence. The third dimension is called the *noetic*, or the form of thought which dominates the life of the individual. The fourth dimension is probably the moral. The four dimensions must be supplemented by the recognition of several diathetic differences or types of a (probably) non-dimensional nature as: the balanced, the cyclothymic (and its subdivisions), and the epileptic which are doubtless largely conditioned by the functioning of the endocrine system.—Edmund S. Conklin, *The Pedagogical Seminary*, XXXI (December, 1924), 316-32. (I, 4.) E. L. S.

**The Concept of Social Distance.**—The concept of "Social Distance" is an attempt to reduce to measurable terms the grades and degrees of personal and social understanding and intimacy. Self-consciousness, class-consciousness, and race-consciousness represent states of mind that arise when we become conscious of the distance that separates us. Both class- and race-consciousness affect our personal relations. All persons could get along together if each would stay in his place. Democracy abhors social dis-

inctions, but it maintains them. Prejudice is a disposition to maintain social distances—an instance of group-consciousness, as reserve seems to be of self-consciousness.—Robert E. Park, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (July-August, 1924), 339-44. (I, 4).  
P. P. D.

## II. THE FAMILY

**Homeless Husbands.**—A discussion of the marriage and family customs of the Menangkabaus on the west coast of Sumatra. The system is matriarchal (women's rights, but not women's rule). The eldest brother of the "Head Woman" of a household acts as the father of the children of the household and represents it in the governing body of the tribe.—Mabel Cook Cole, *Asia*, XXIV (August, 1924), 595-99. (II, 3; III, 6.)  
P. P. D.

**If a Chinese Leaves His Village.**—Modern industrialism has been held in check by the Chinese family system, the clan unity preventing a man from leaving his village to work in the factory town. Industry is now breaking up that family organization. Women are entering industry in large numbers. This fact is bringing about radical social changes, especial as regards the marriage relation.—Vera Kelsy, *Asia*, XXIV (June, 1924), 463-67. (II, 2.)  
P. P. D.

**Progressive Parents—Their Tragedy.**—Parents frequently rear to maturity individuals who can bring them neither spiritual comfort nor the companionship on which they had counted. Progressive parents reason with their children instead of ordering them about, let them run where they like and play with whom they like. In adolescence the child contradicts them and often shows contempt toward them. In the maturity of the children we see a still farther setting back of the parents. Progressive parents, though knowing they shall lose their children, lose them to something which may be bigger and better than the things they like and understand, but to something that is still foreign.—Margery Swett, *The New Republic*, XL (November 19, 1924), 296-97. (II, 3.)  
P. T. D.

**What Ails American Youth?**—Mr. George Coe in a book entitled; *What Ails Our Youth* gives numerous faults of the young people of today, but it is not so much the youth who are ailing as the society into which they are born. It is no wonder that American youth are purposeless, unstable, and vainly and trivially occupied, when they know they are educated on the assumption that education is a discipline imposed upon them by others for the realization of conventional ends. The youth of today are prevented from obtaining real freedom by limitations of opportunity, by defective education, by economic pressure, and by governmental action.—Herbert Croly, *The New Republic*, XLI (February 11, 1925), 301-3. (II, 3.)  
P. T. D.

**What's Wrong with the Home?**—Today, in adding to the periphery of our homes we have somehow missed or lost the core. All the old home words and attitudes and deep organic satisfactions have fled and in their place is cynicism. The trouble is, our anemic home life has lost its own spirit of adventure and creation—and in return we have given the children the automobile and the radio. They have failed to respond to the fresh definitions of science with reference to the needs of childhood, and they have lost interest in life, in and for itself. What we need is the parental attitude that respects the personality of children and seeks to deepen and enrich their social relationships.—Miriam VanWaters, *The New Republic*, XLI (February 4, 1925), 277-80. (II, 3.)  
P. T. D.

**Where Shall Children Be Brought Up?**—All things being equal we can agree that, where the home and the family are providing for the child (even to a limited degree) those opportunities for physical and mental growth that mean the full and free development of the individual, the child is better off with his own family and in his own home. Where we have subnormal parents, neglected or uncontrollable children, placement is in some cases the best form of action. Placement in institutions is often preferred to placement in foster homes.—Laura Merrill, *The Family*, V (January, 1925), 224-27. (II, 3; IX, 4.)  
P. T. D.



**Marriage and Divorce.**—The United States can now boast of a plurality of the world's annual divorces for today it outstrips all other races. In 1922 the proportion of marriage to divorce in the United States was 7.6 to 1. At present the United States government has no control whatever over marriage and divorce. The power to legislate rests wholly in the individual states. Thus with almost as many different sets of laws as there are states we have the people going to the various states for the liberty which they seek. The sole cure for our demoralizing license is absolute uniformity in our marriage and divorce laws from the Atlantic to the Pacific.—Robert Grant, *Yale Review*, XIV (January–March, 1925), 223–38. (II, 3.) P. T. D.

### III. PEOPLES AND CULTURAL GROUPS

**Remarques sur l'art Préhistorique et l'art Nègre.**—A presentation of five figures found in Pleistocene deposits, showing the rude characterization of man by negroid tribes dwelling in the southern part of Europe. The faces are covered by the masks of animals and therefore the real facial traits are not shown.—M. Didan, *Revue Anthropologie*, XXXIV (September–December, 1924), 369–73. (III, 1.) P. T. D.

**La Culture de Blé et la Préhistorie.**—During the Neolithic age agriculture displaced the nomadic life of the previous Paleolithic period. It is in this period the inhabitants begin to use cereals which are supposed to have had their origin in Mesopotamia. In this period of cereal culture the age of chalk and calcareous utensils and implements is succeeded by the age of bronze.—J. B. Legros, *Journal des Économistes*, LXXIX (January, 1925), 56–59. (III, 1.) P. T. D.

**The Great Migration.**—A result of the treaty between Turkey and Greece was the exchange of peasants. Greek peasants in the Turkish Empire were sent to Greece and vice versa. Regardless of property they were required to go and only took with them what they could carry. Deaths and hardships followed; their lines of migration and the landing places were centers of the lowest forms of destitution.—Ellen Chater, *The Survey*, LIII (January 1, 1925), 402–4. (III, 4.) P. T. D.

**The Americanization of 1-A-10.**—A Freshman class in English, extremely low in intelligence tests, and meeting the tenth period every day contains members of fifteen nationalities between the ages of twelve and sixteen. The article presents the themes written by these foreign immigrants after being in America a few weeks. The trend of their thought is shown by the contrast between the dreams they had of America, and the fulfilment of life as it actually is.—Nichols Adelaide, *The Survey*, LIII (February 1, 1925), 511–12. (III, 4; I, 4.) P. T. D.

**Grass—The Struggle of the Persian Race for Existence.**—This article is the first of a series in which the author tells the story of the dramatic struggle of the Bakhtiari tribesmen of Persia in search of grass for their flocks. In this article the reader is introduced to the rulers of Persia, especially the Premier, Rahim Khan, some of the social life and political problems of modern Persia.—Meriam C. Cooper, *Asia*, XXIV (December, 1924), 941–47. (III, 6.) P. P. D.

**Cavemen of the Tunisian Desert.**—A vivid description of the "Climbing Troglodytes" of the Orghanna Plateau in Southern Tunisia. The author describes the life of the people, homes, occupations, marriage customs, position of women, religion, communal organization, etc.—Horace D. Ashton, *Asia*, XXIV (December, 1924), 981–87. (III, 6.) P. P. D.

**The Heritage of Fiji.**—Fiji is a land where royalty is still held in high regard and where custom reigns supreme. Much of the primitive culture has disappeared, but there is still enough to be worthy of study, and which, under competent leadership, would develop into a real indigenous civilization.—Stephen Howes, *Asia*, XXIV (September, 1924), 706–10. (III, 6.) P. P. D.

**Living Conditions among the Samoans.**—Samoans are agriculturists. Their labor is intermittent; their income small; their needs easily satisfied. Bread, fruit, *taro*, and

fish are the staple articles of diet. Houses are plain; furniture is simple; clothing is scanty.—William M. Green, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, IX (September–October, 1924), 34–39. (III, 6.) P. P. D.

**Social Traits of Samoans.**—Samoans are noted for their hospitality. Games and feasts are their great occasions. Marriage is the rule; families of from four to six children are most common. Women are inferior to men in social rank, but have much freedom and are well treated. The homes have little furniture. The children enjoy many games and are experts in swimming and dancing. The motion picture show is popular. Community of property discourages thrift.—William Green, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, IX (November–December, 1924), 129–35. (III, 6.) P. P. D.

#### IV. CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION GROUPS

**What Is a Race?**—The concept of race is not at all clear. When we speak of innate characteristics of races we mean by the term "race" a group of people descended from a common ancestry and for this reason alike in anatomical form. A whole racial group can never be described by a few descriptive terms, because there will always be many individuals of deviating types. It may be possible to characterize family lines, but the assumption of general racial characteristics, anatomical, physiological, or mental, excepting those that belong to the race as a whole, is arbitrarily made.—Franz Boas, *The Nation*, CXX (January 28, 1925), 89–91. (IV, 2.) P. T. D.

**The Mexican Casual Problem in the South-West.**—This article includes a discussion of the rapid increase of the Mexican immigrants into the United States since 1907, especially in the south-western states; the occupations into which they enter; a comparison of their native intellectual capacities with those of other laborers; the social problems created by their presence.—Edwin F. Bamford, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (July–August, 1924), 363–71. (IV, 2; III, 4) P. P. D.

**Some Backgrounds of Indian Nationalism.**—The writer traces the geographical and historical causes for the present India and maintains that Indian nationalism will live but must undergo severe testing. He furthermore suggests that the only form of nationalism that will unify all the races, languages, and religion of India will be some form of constitutional democracy. No one group can permanently rule or exploit the other groups in the Indian body politic.—O. M. Buck, *The Methodist Review*, CVIII (January–February, 1925), 57–73. (IV, 2; III, 5.) E. L. S.

**The Nationalist Movement in Asia and the Future of Missions.**—An outstanding phenomenon that the missionary must face in Asia is nationalism. The dawning consciousness of the worth of its own culture is one of the main springs of Asiatic nationalism. The military pressure of Western powers enhances nationalism. The principles of Christianity, taught by the missionaries, heightens the sense of human worth and increases the feeling of nationalism. The missionary movement must not be drawn into conflict with the national aspirations of the peoples of Asia, and the rising church in Asia must be given complete liberty and a chance to control its own affairs as soon as possible.—H. E. Wash, *The Methodist Review*, CVIII (January–February, 1925), 108–15. (IV, 2; III, 5) E. L. S.

**The Jew and the Club—A Study of Social Prejudice.**—In Europe the cafe life takes the place of American clubs, and persons of congenial tastes will congregate there for their social activities. The raising of the religious question at the recent Democratic convention shows that while we lay great stress on political equality the real basis of our life is social equality, and the Jews have been unjustly discriminated against.—By X. *Atlantic Monthly*, CXXXIV (October, 1924), 450–56. (IV, 2, 4.) E. R. R.

**Biological and Social Consequences of Race Crossing.**—One of the worst features of race crossing is that it disturbs social inheritance, from which much that is best in human existence results. Most inherited characteristics are blending and this is true of mental as well as of physical traits. There is no race problem biologically in the United

States. The problem of racial mixture is the social attitude toward race crossing with the negro and, on the Pacific Coast, with the Chinese and Japanese, and the social environment in which race crossing occurs and in which the hybrids are forced to live, an environment such that their social opportunities and attainments are decidedly limited.—W. E. Castle, *Journal of Heredity*, XV (September, 1924), 363-69. (IV, 2; III, 5; VIII, 2.) E. R. R.

**Democracy and Its Opposite.**—Nature has *unequalized* the members of society. Democracy includes all tendencies to exalt the weak without impairing the collective strength of the group. Its opposite, "Oligarchism," includes all tendencies to give to the ablest the most responsible functions and richest rewards, without excessive subjugation of the less able. Every social group is the theater of these conflicting forces, Oligarchism and Democracy. All groups have some Democracies and some Oligarchisms. The degree of each varies from time to time.—David Snedden, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, IX (November-December, 1924), 91-97. (IV, 3.) P. P. D.

## V. COMMUNITIES AND TERRITORIAL GROUPS

**Religion and Rural Culture.**—The qualities of rural life which are really destructive must arise in the proportion to the degree in which rural people discover unified ways of life. If the refining influence of religion and culture is to play a creative part in rural life, serious attention must be given to the quality of rural leaders. Rural leadership in the United States is on the whole incompatible with a thoroughgoing process of cultural development. Preaching, teaching and worshiping as the means, with conversion as the end, represent both the method and the purpose of ordinary church function. So far as the rural church is concerned, the most important function is preaching. However, if religion is going to reach its height in relation to rural culture, more adjustments are needed both in method and content.—E. C. Linderman, *The Survey*, LIII (December 15, 1924), 511-12. (V, 1.) P. T. D.

**Population Movements in Chicago.**—Cities grow like trees, dying at the heart and building anew around the periphery. The great loop district, once the dwelling-place of Chicago's leading citizens, has changed to a place of business. By day it throbs with life, by night it is deserted except by belated workers, travelers, and those who cater to them. The ring around the loop: the lower North side, the near West side, and the near North side have become rooming-house centers with disorganized life and vice.—Thomas W. Allison, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (May, 1924), 529-33. (V, 2; III, 4.) P. P. D.

**Debrecen and the Hortobagy Pusta.**—Debrecen is one of the oldest Hungarian cities and today is one of the first-rate cities in Hungarian national cultivation and economics. It is also noted for its schools and universities. The Hortobagy pusta, a geographical unit resembling a steppe, lies within the domains of Debrecen and its inhabitants still retain the original traits of their primeval ancestors. However, the rapid assaults of culture are slowly beginning to make a change.—Louis Zoltai, *The Sociological Review*, XVI (October, 1924), 336-43. (V, 2.) P. T. D.

**Community Forces: A Study of the Non-Partisan Municipal Elections in Seattle.**—*The neighborhood and the public:* The neighborhood in its various forms of expression is an important factor in community development. It expresses itself through local improvement and civic clubs, local commercial clubs, and neighborhood papers. It has been an important factor in municipal elections, usually supporting the local candidate (before the war), but now is beginning to support the man of its class. The public as a whole is conservative—more given to disapprove than approve. The voting public is divided into three groups: first, the downtown mobile disinterested group; second, the labor group located around the industries who support labor movements; and third, the upper economic group who are markedly conservative.—R. D. McKenzie, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (May, 1924), 560-68. (V, 2, 3; VII, 3.) P. P. D.

**Quality versus Quantity: The Goal of Community Organization.**—The literature of community organization shows what is common to American social theory, namely, a heavy burden of quantitative concepts. The effort of community organization is to socialize, but quantity of contacts alone do not socialize—England and Germany became estranged while their contacts were increasing rapidly in number. Life in a modern apartment house does not socialize. The measure of community organization should be, "What happened," and not, "How many came."—E. C. Lindeman, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (May, 1924), 518-19. (V, 3.) P. P. D.

**A Critique of the Community Movement.**—The community organization movement has spread rapidly in recent years. In many communities the plans have failed, due to (1) Lack of adequate diagnosis—too much reliance upon the needs of the community and the evils to be met, and no concern about the natural history of the community; too little recognition of the individuality of communities; (2) Community organization too narrowly conceived; (3) Overemphasis upon administrative devices.—Jesse F. Steiner, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, IX (November-December, 1924), 108-14. (V, 3.) P. P. D.

**The Wilderness of Judea and the Nomadic Ideal: A Study of the Social and Religious Effects of Geographic Environment.**—The wilderness of Judea deeply affects the temper of the Hebrews and the tone of their literature offered an asylum for non-assimilable elements of society; allowed the constant infiltration of Arabic origin and thus reinforced the "nomadic ideal" within the body politic; tempted the people of the villages who were properly farmers back again into semi-nomadic life that tended to preserve the nomadic spirit of simplicity and independence. This combined with semi-pastoral character of the Judean highlands, discouraged Baalism, but vitalized the monotheism and stern ethics of the prophets of Yahweh.—C. C. McCown, *Journal of Geography*, XXIII (December, 1924), 333-49. (V, 4; VII, 2.) E. L. S.

**Geographic Principles in the Study of Cities.**—The main factor in the location and prosperity of most cities is a combination of natural conditions, supplemented by man's activities which has led to the formulation of a principle, viz., that cities tend to develop wherever there is a "break in transportation." Every seaport marks a break in transportation of the first order. Some geographic principles found in study of seaports are: seaports tend to develop where there is a good natural harbor near a productive region; where harbor is near transportation lines that lead into interior of continent. Lake ports tend to develop where cost of transportation is lessened by carrying on waterways large bulky goods, or where there is a break between lake and rail or canal transportation, or at a place where a stream enters a lake. Cities tend to develop along rivers where the land is high enough to be above flood damage, but where access to river front and uplands beyond the river valley is easy; or near the junction of two navigable streams where transfer of goods is necessary; or near where river navigation is interrupted by falls; or at points where rivers are easily crossed by ford, ferry, or bridge. Among geographical principles applied to cities located on railroads we note that the first railroads were constructed from city to city along previously used routes of travel; that railroads promote the growth of established cities through cheaper and more rapid transportation; railroads led to establishment of numerous new towns and that none of the important cities of North America and only small proportion of villages are without railroads. D. C. Ridgley, *Journal of Geography*, XXIV (February, 1925), 66-78. (V, 4, 1.) E. L. S.

**The Changing Role of the Kentucky Mountains and the Passing of the Kentucky Mountaineer.**—Although the Kentucky Mountains were settled at an early date they constitute the largest and only undeveloped area in Kentucky. For nearly one hundred years the mountaineers have been immured in their mountains. Amid their mountain surroundings they have multiplied in numbers, wringing a bare existence from the soil. Cut off from the outside world this group of people have perpetuated customs and expressions of the eighteenth century. With the development of the coal resources of this region there is an invasion of twentieth-century industrialism which has resulted in the influx of both the negro and the "foreigner."—D. H. Davis, *The Journal of Geography*, XXIV, (February, 1925), 41-52. (V, 4; III, 4.) E. L. S.

VI. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

**Logical Method and Law.**—Logic is really a theory about empirical phenomena, primarily connected with intelligent guidance of making decisions. It is subject to growth and improvement like any other empirical discipline. The issue involved in a logical method is not a purely speculative one, but implies consequences vastly important in practice. The sanctification of ready-made antecedent principles as methods of thinking is the chief obstacle to the development of the kind of thinking which is the indispensable requisite of steady, secure, and intelligent social reform in general, and of social advance by means of law (legal decision) in particular. Infiltration into law of a more experimental and flexible logic is a social as well as an intellectual need.—John Dewey, *Philosophical Review*, XXXIII (November, 1924), 560-72. (VI, 5; X, 3.) E. L. S.

**Women Police.**—Women officers are recognized as particularly valuable in the prevention of crime. As to the functions of the women police officers no definite formulation has as yet been accepted. This kind of work demands a woman not under twenty-five years of age who has a trained, sympathetic understanding of social problems, adaptability, pleasing personality, and who gains easily the confidence of others. She should be a graduate from high school and should have had at least one year of paid professional case work. Finally the police woman has a definite responsibility in a general public service program.—Chloe Owings, *Journal of Social Hygiene*, XI (January, 1925), 38-45. (VI, 5, 6.) P. T. D.

**Social Work and Industry.**—There are two diametrically opposed opinions regarding relations of industry to social work: (1) industry must make use of social work; (2) "business is business." However, there is no fundamental alienation between social work and business. In industry there is need for social work in cases of employee relief, accident, employment, discipline, financing employee loans, etc. Social workers entering industry should understand: (1) revolutions in industry are slow; (2) human nature is not restricted to one class; (3) business is not strictly scientific; (4) industrial relations work is not strictly scientific. Industrial welfare work must not be paternalistic.—Arthur J. Todd, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII (July-August, 1924), 325-28. (VI, 6; IV, 1.) P. P. D.

VII. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL PROCESS

**The Social Status of Occupations.**—A list of forty-five occupations was chosen at random and submitted to 450 students from six different institutions for their estimation of the social status of these occupations. There are clear-cut differences in estimates of the social status of the various occupations. These must be pointed out and social attitudes so altered that every necessary occupation receive positive social recognition.—George S. Couts, *The School Review*, XXXIII (January, 1925), 16-27. (VII, 1; IX, 2.) E. L. S.

**Man's Share in Civilization.**—The value of science, art, and religion is largely individual rather than social. Men need to be educated to the fact that science is the cleanser of thought, art is the cleanser of emotion, and religion is the effort of man to bring himself into unity with the universe.—Ramsay Traquair, *Atlantic Monthly*, CXXXIV (October, 1924), 502-8. (VII, 2.) E. R. R.

**Modernism as a World-Wide Movement.**—Modernism in the world-religions is a response to disturbances of the old ways. The ideas of science in the realm of thinking and the products of science in practical life have forced into consciousness problems which the programs of modernism attempt to solve. Each group must cope with "fundamentals" which are as varied as the religions. Are the religions of the world passing into a new phase? A. E. Haydon, *Journal of Religion*, V (January, 1925), 1-13. (VII, 2, 4.) E. L. S.

**Mutations of Progress.**—Mutations in plants and animals have their analogies in the life-movement of human society. Illustrations are: the teachings of Christ, the Renaissance, the religious revolution, the political revolution, and the industrial revolu-

tion. Such events are iconoclastic and smash old traditions, habits, customs and laws.—Frank W. Blackmar, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, IX (November–December, 1924), 83–90. (VII, 4.) P. P. D.

**New Folkways.**—Folkways are the slow accumulation of the ages of group experience, both accidental and intentional, under the varying circumstances of life. Every change in the environment of a group calls for some compensating change in the structure of its folkways. War, travel, books, and periodicals, all means of communication, science and inventions, all these beat directly, and often, with terrific impact upon the structure of the old folkways. In politics, religion, and intellectual life we have great changes in the folkways. Education and the schools help to bring the new folkways in; but probably forces, such as industry, which are much more fundamental than academic efforts of any variety must be depended upon to bring in the new folkways.—Joseph K. Hart, *The Survey*, LIII (January 15, 1925), 341–42. (VII, 4.) P. T. D.

**Is the Practice of Fellowship a Narcotic Indulgence?**—Group emotion tends to inhibit the action of conscious will, to release primitive impulses, and to discourage intellectual activity. Unity of fellowship tends to an artificial suppression of personal excellence to the average level of traditional thought, conventional feeling, and primitive impulse. No fellowship as a whole ever makes a discovery or a moral advance. The practice of fellowship is only justified in so far as it contributes to a better adulthood and involves no sacrifice of the higher person to the lowly passions of a mob.—Cavendish Moxon, *The Open Court*, XXXIX (January, 1925), 21–27. (VII, 4; I, 4.) E. L. S.

**Fundamentalism in the Presbyterian Church.**—The rise of the Fundamentalist movement in the Presbyterian church begins with the agitation aroused in the nineties by the charges of heresy brought against Professors Briggs, H. P. Smith, and McGiffert. The movement advanced from a concern for the infallibility of the Scriptures to the insistence on certain doctrines declared fundamental in Christianity. The action of the presbyteries and the General Assembly in the Fosdick case are cited, and an interpretation of the significance of the controversy is given.—R. H. Nichols, *Journal of Religion*, V (January, 1925), 14–36. (VII, 4; IV, 4.) E. L. S.

**Some Thoughts on Our Social Machinery.**—Life today has more necessities than life has ever had in the past and these necessities in turn have innumerable accessories. Elaboration is continually going on, and as the social structure elaborates we have found new adjusting and protective agencies and organizations necessary. The two grave social dangers in this situation of over-organization are the tendency to form the habit of meeting difficult situations by creating new machinery to deal with problems rather than to adapt old machinery and also the tendency of each class and group in the community to elaborate its own traditions without relation to other traditions and thought streams. Disharmony exists among the traditions of social agencies in the community and is aggravated by each new organization that is formed. It is in the family agency that the future seems to lie.—F. Stuart Chapin, *The Survey*, LIII (December 15, 1924), 322–23. (VI, 6; VII, 4.) P. T. D.

#### VIII. SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

**Some Objections to the Family Wage System Considered.**—If the family wage system were put into effect it would cause too great an increase in population, particularly among the least desirable class. There is no need for such a system since wages are already sufficient for the needs of the workers. It would lessen the energy with which men worked and hence would decrease output. It would be impossible to administer. These and nine other objections are considered.—Paul H. Douglas, *The Journal of Political Economy*, XXXII (December, 1924), 690–706. (VII, 1; II, 3.) P. T. D.

**English Statistics of Pauperism during the War.**—A statistical study of English pauperism showing: the course of pauperism before the war, the disappearance of the pauper during the war, decline in the number of the homeless poor, vagrants and casual

paupers, decline in old age pauperism, other tables of less importance, and finally, some reasons for the decline in pauperism.—Edith Abbott, *The Journal of Political Economy*, XXXIII (February, 1925), 1-32. (VIII, 1.) P. T. D.

**Public Opinion as a Cause of Crime.**—Modern society passes many laws; has respect for few. Legislatures have lost prestige. They are popularly thought of as corrupt, bossridden, inefficient. The attitude toward the police is one of cynicism and suspicion; courts are ridiculed or held in contempt. With such attitudes there can be little respect for law as such. There is a prevalent belief in the possibility of "fixing things." Lynchings, Klan raids, and similar practices illustrate public distrust for law.—E. H. Sutherland, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, IX (September-October, 1924), 51-56. (VIII, 1; VII, 3.) P. P. D.

**Illegitimacy among Negroes.**—The large per cent of negro women engaged in gainful occupations, chief of which are domestic and personal service and agriculture, is to some extent responsible for some of the sex delinquency and illegitimacy among the negro women. It is an established fact that the majority of unmarried mothers are derived from the more ignorant and illiterate groups. Going back into the history of the negro we have the change in the status of marriage, from very little or no regulation on the plantations before the Civil War to marriage with some sort of legal ceremony after the war. Thus illegitimacy is increased; due to the fact that some of the lower classes of negroes have not yet become accustomed to the legal regulations. The number of illegitimate births per thousand births is far greater among the negro than among the native white mothers and the foreign-born white mothers, but is not very much greater than the illegitimate birth-rate among mothers of foreign countries.—Reed, *Journal of Social Hygiene*, XI (February, 1925), 73-92. (VIII, 1; II, 3.) P. T. D.

**Family Endowment in Its Bearing on the Question of the Population.**—Among the artisan and middle classes family allowances, provided that the amounts were fairly or nearly adequate to the cost of maintenance, would result in many (but by no means all) of them having slightly larger families than they at present permit themselves to have. Nothing would induce them to return to the really large families that were so common a generation ago. In general it would decrease the birth rate among the slum dwellers, diminish the particularly dysgenic stimulus to parenthood achieved in drink habits, and give more time to women for child bearing, when they are thus not entirely dependent upon their husbands or their own resources. Finally, the family allowance will probably tend to lower the birth rate among those who now have the largest families, because it is the raising of the standard of living and of the dignity and status of the mother that has a tendency toward this end.—Eleanor R. Rathbone, *Eugenics Review*, XVI (January, 1925), 270-75. (VIII, 2; II, 3.) P. T. D.

**Family Allowances.**—Family allowances would produce many immediate advantages. They would relatively increase the fertility of the more efficient types, but it is questionable whether they would decrease the fertility of the poorer classes. They would certainly improve the death rate among the poorest classes, as has been shown in the case of France. Family allowances seem likely to produce definite racial benefits; because the more efficient strata would thus have their fertility increased more than would the less efficient types.—Major Leonard Darwin, *Eugenics Review*, XVI (January, 1925), 276-78. (VIII, 2; II, 3.) P. T. D.

**The Geographical Aspect of Eugenics.**—At the present rate of increase in the population of the world no region will have room for colonists in about two more centuries. Today the British Empire is sending all its surplus population to its outlying dominions. They have resolved to people their own lands with British stock and to maintain the present proportion of their numbers in the world. This is the only way in which their conception of righteousness shall receive its normal development in their lands. In order to do this a family with at least four children is necessary. Vaughan G. Cornish, *Eugenics Review*, XVI (January, 1925), 267-69. (VIII, 2; V, 4.) P. T. D.

**Biological Limits in the Development of Society.**—The differences between the "biological" school, which conceives of social differences as being due to inherited causes, and the "cultural" school, which regards them as being significant of acquired and socially perpetuated characters, is at basis a disagreement over the location of what may be described as biological limits upon society. The lower biological limit is that degree of mental development below which society as we know it could not exist. The upper limit is the greatest social advance which may be reached without biological change in the human beings who compose society. If the margin between these limits is narrow, social differences must be biological; if it is wide, social differences may be largely cultural.—Stuart A. Rice, *Journal of Heredity*, XV (April, 1924), 183-85. (X, 5; VIII, 2; I, 2.) E. R. R.

**The Pratt Family: A Record of Human Inbreeding for Eight Generations.**—The record of a prominent St. Louis family shows a normal and healthy descendant who, instead of the 254 different ancestors to which an individual is entitled in the number of generations studied, actually was descended from only 142 different people. The newer experimental work has shown that inbreeding is not injurious merely by reason of the consanguinity involved and instead of being condemned it should be commended.—Frank Blair Hanson, *Journal of Heredity*, XV (May, 1924), 207-10. (VIII, 2; III, 3.) E. R. R.

**A New Zealand Study in Natalty.**—This article is an attempt to present the more important uniformities which can be brought out by an analysis of the statistics of birth. Tables are compiled on fecundity, children born alive per hundred women according to age and previous issue, sexes of children born, illegitimacy and prejudiced births, multiple births, and stillbirths. Edward P. Neale, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XIX (December, 1924), 454-67. (VIII, 2; IX, 1.) P. T. D.

**Social Hygiene: A Review and Forecast.**—The problem of social hygiene is the adjustment of the human race to the conditions of an industrial civilization. Monogamy is the most common form of marriage but due to lack of sex restraint venereal diseases have spread into every community. A campaign against venereal disease in the most advanced countries is developing more and more into a social hygiene movement the object of which is to increase the social value of the family as a biological, monogamous group.—Sybil Neville Rolfe, *Journal of Social Hygiene*, XI (January, 1925), 1-37. (VIII, 3; III, 3.) P. T. D.

**What is Mental Hygiene?**—Mental hygiene is a science, an art, and a movement devoted (1) to the promotion of the best endowment with, and development, preservation and use of, the mind, i.e., the mental capacities, tendencies and activities which are involved in efficient human living; (2) to the prevention of the impairment of these capacities; (3) to their restoration if impaired; (4) to development of compensatory capacities if restoration is possible; and (5) to securing the most favorable conditions for the handicapped during the period of incapacity.—E. Stanley Abbot, *American Journal of Psychiatry*, IV (October, 1924), 261-84. (VIII, 4.) E. L. S.

**Maladjustment among College Students.**—The scholastic, social, and personal problems of college students are based on natural and understandable causes. These problems are present on every campus but are not receiving adequate attention. A beginning of handling them has been made by the psychological clinic. An individual method of dealing with these problems is a necessity because of the extremely personal nature of most of them. It is probable that mental hygiene classes would serve as a preventive measure and might care for some of the less serious problems. Little work is done in most universities although the problem is recognized.—Zoe E. Leatherman and Edgar A. Doll, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, VIII (December, 1924), 390-409. (VIII, 4.) E. L. S.



## IX. METHODS OF INVESTIGATIONS

**The Pluralistic Field and the Sample.**—For statistical purposes any plural number of things, qualities, circumstances, happenings, or other items is a pluralistic field. To count and scrutinize all items in any societal field is very costly; sampling is substituted. A sample is any item or count which *adequately and without misleading* may be taken as a substitute for an entire pluralistic field. In homogeneous fields, the sample should be taken at random. Heterogeneous fields should be broken up into homogeneous components and random samples taken from each component, each sample being proportionate to the relative quantitative value of the homogeneous field from which it was taken.—Franklin H. Giddings, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (May, 1924), 481-83. (IX, 1.)

P. P. D.

**Moral Valuation about Men and Women.**—This article describes in detail a statistical method of studying ethics. It is an attempt to get at moral standards of university men and women. The study aims to describe double standards of morals but the writer feels the need, as a result of this investigation, of a genetic study of double standards of morals from the anthropological, psychological, and sociological point of view. From such a comprehensive study there should be formulated a reflective criticism of these moral attitudes.—A. P. Brogan, *The International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV (January, 1925), 105-24. (IX, 2; X, 4.)

E. L. S.

**Why They Failed to Answer: A Follow-Up of the Questionnaire on the Sex Life of Unmarried College Women.**—Sociological studies based on the results of questionnaires sent to considerable numbers of people are frequently criticized because of the small proportion of replies received to the number sent out. This has occurred in connection with the studies of the sex life of normal women carried on by the Bureau of Social Hygiene. This article is a statistical tabulated study of the results.—Katherine B. Davis, *Journal of Social Hygiene*, XI (February, 1925), 92-102. (IX, 2.)

P. T. D.

**Should Young People Study Themselves?**—The knowledge of most of us today is gained in the third person neuter. This is not because we are interested less in ourselves than in others, but rather it is the social result of tender minded teachers or zealots. What does the alleged education of today contribute toward an understanding of one's self? Discipline committees, social ostracism, parental advice—are oftentimes positively harmful, rather than simply neutral. Knowledge has been depersonalized. Theoretically, as a proposition in pure psychology, young people should be able to study themselves to the advantage, both of themselves and to society.—Donald Land, *The Survey*, LIII (January 1, 1925), 405-7. (IX, 4.)

P. T. D.

**Should Social Workers Tell?**—Social work can not be successfully done unless complete confidence exists between the worker and the client. This cannot be obtained if the social worker enters the home almost as a policeman in disguise. In order to secure protection from inspection of records by law, the professional status of the social worker should be established on the same basis as the criminal lawyer and physician and thus we would have the legal privileges that follow from such professional status. The social worker must remain a case worker and individualize in these as in many other situations. He may and he may not feel the necessity of breaking the principle of a privileged communication and act as a voluntary officer of the law.—I. W. Rubinow, *The Survey*, LIII (December 15, 1924), 345-47. (IX, 4, VI, 6.)

P. T. D.

**Experience and Race Relations: Opinion, Attitudes and Experience as Types of Human Behavior.**—In the study of race relations we are concerned with experiences and personal reactions of individuals and races. Experience is concrete, personal, and unique. It is not fact, but personal reaction to an interpretation of an event. History is interested in the event, sociology is interested in the attitude called forth by the event. Experiences are the sources from which to gain a knowledge of the attitudes of strange

peoples. Myth and legend may be as important as events. Opinions are not attitudes but rationalizations of attitudes.—Robert E. Park, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, IX (September–October, 1924), 18–24. IX, 4; 2; (IV, I, 4.) P. P. D.

#### X. GENERAL SOCIOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

**What Is Sociology?**—Sociology deals with the group and the individual's relations to it; study of the instinctive urges; social values which tend to take institutional form and establish patterns of conduct. Social contacts are important and the attitudes developed from them. Social attitudes become the social forces. Principal social processes are conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. Their product is a socialized person. The group exercises control over its members. The field of sociology includes social origins, social psychology, social theory, social technology; and social research.—Emory S. Bogardus, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, IX (September–October, 1924), 57–62. (X, 1.) P. P. D.

**Some Present Tendencies of Psychology.**—Psychology must face, in common with physiology, the problem that both in life and in mind there is something which differentiates them from the activities of lifeless substances. There is a "purposefulness" imposed upon the organism, which becomes in the higher forms of life a "purposiveness," a self-conscious realization of the existence of purpose. The explanation of life and mind as mechanism has led the way to scientific progress. But it is not the whole story. Purpose and the consciousness of purpose are necessary to a complete understanding of mental life.—C. S. Myers, *American Journal of Psychology*, XXXVI (January, 1925), 53–65. (X, 3.) E. R. R.

**Personality as a Category.**—The author maintains that Charles Renouvier was not interested in tracing the evolution of social laws and practices, for he seeks the explanation of these, not in history but in human personality—a point of view from which his philosophy of history was constructed. It is within the conflicts of the individual that he discovers the basis for the present state of society, which he views as one of discord and war. Clifford L. Barrett, *Journal of Philosophy*, XXII (January 29, 1925), 75–80. (X, 3; I, 4.) E. L. S.

**The Rational Character of the Democratic Principle.**—The principle of democratic government claims its validity on the ground of reason. The freedom and equality of democracy are rooted in the independence and universality of reason. In democracy the law of identity expresses the fundamental standard of human relations. This law has to be narrowed in its application to human affairs resulting in classifying identities that are considered self-identified. Democracy here seeks to apply reason to the world-existence by treating entities as pure identities subject to determination of magnitude.—Marie C. Swabey, *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV (January, 1925), 140–49. (X, 3.) E. L. S.

**Psychology, Education, and Sociology.**—If democracy is to be realized by getting the best out of each it must be done by a scientific process of selection and elimination creating an intellectual élite. Intellectual levels are the basis of true democratic education. This will solve many of our industrial, educational, and social problems since the weakling is receiving more attention than he is worth in all these areas of life.—William D. Tait, *School and Society*, XXI (January 10, 1925), 33–37. (X, 4; VIII, 1.) E. L. S.

**Group Plan of Organizing Classes in Social Science.**—Experiments have been made in organizing classes in sociology and economics into groups of from four to eight students each for the study of special problems. The purposes are: first, to individualize the members of large classes; second, to develop team-work among students; third, to stimulate initiative; fourth, to stress methods of studying social problems rather than mere textbooks and lectures. The plan has proved highly gratifying.—Stewart A. Queen, *Journal of Social Forces*, II (May, 1924), 513–15. (X, 6.) P. P. D.

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